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Abstract of Thesis
The discipline of International Relations finds itself challenged by theorists 
who argue that processes of globalisation undermine the sovereignty of the 
territorial state, thereby eroding the basis for an autonomous science of ‘the 
international’. This challenge assumes that traditional forms of state-centric IR 
theory were adequate until very recently, but need to be discarded now that a 
global society has replaced the territorial organisation of social life. This thesis 
argues that the assumption of a ‘golden age’ of state sovereignty is misleading as 
a description of modem international relations. Even before the current period of 
globalisation, states did not fully ‘contain’ society. The purpose of this thesis is 
to contribute to a theory of modem intemational relations that takes account of 
modemity’s global aspects.
The first part of the thesis analyses various critiques of state-centrism and 
shows that their historicisation of the modem intemational system is problematic 
because of an ahistorical conceptualisation of the relationship between politics 
and economics. The second part consists of a reconstmction of the historical 
materialist theory of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, which shows 
that the territorialisation of states and the modem separation of politics and 
economic did not coincide either temporally or stmcturally. This leads to a 
reinterpretation of the ‘Westphalian system’ that stresses its pre-modem nature 
and shows how the competitive dynamic of this system contributed to the 
universalisation of capitalism at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
The third part inquires into the consequences of the emergence of capitalism 
within the context of a pre-existing system of territorial states. It shows how the 
entrenchment of the national state in the late nineteenth century mediates the 
contradictions of global capitalism. It suggests that the territoriality of modem 
political space has become ‘intemalised’ by capitalism, though the relationship 
between national state and world market remains riven by contradictions. This 
requires a change of perspective in the globalisation debate: rather than to ask 
whether national sovereignty is undermined by globalisation, IR should inquire 
into the limits to global economic integration given the persistence of national 
sovereignty as the -  currently - only effective way of regulating the economy and 
reproducing capital.
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INTRODUCTION: FROM THE 
INTERNATIONAL TO THE GLOBAL?
The Globalisation Thesis
The current wave of theories of globalisation suggests that the last 25 years 
may have witnessed the beginning of a new global age, in which society, for the 
first time in history, becomes a transnational phenomenon. A global economy has 
emerged which all but disregards national boundaries, in which ‘space becomes 
annihilated by time’; some, indeed, have posited the end of geography. Others 
point to the deepening cultural and normative integration of global interactions. 
And even those who have pointed out the idealistic content of many of these 
theories of global culture, and who have questioned the benign character of 
global social movements, themselves stress the globalisation of class relations.
As the world seems to be moving from the ‘ interdependence’ of national 
societies and economies towards a truly global form of existence, the state is 
increasingly downgraded as the form of organisation through which effective 
political authority is wielded. If the territorial organisation of exclusive 
territoriality was one of the fundamental pillars of the ‘modern’ intemational 
system which emerged in the post-feudal period, we now seem to be moving 
towards a ‘postmodern’ order in which the clear lines dividing the national from 
the intemational no longer seem to cut so sharply. If sovereignty is understood as 
a claim regarding the organisation of political authority, which posits that states 
are the main organisational forms of political power, then globalisation seems to 
imply the end of the world system based on sovereignty.'
There are two basic forms of this argument. The first is based on the negative 
claim that global economic and social transactions have undermined the capacity 
of the state to govem or even just regulate ‘their’ national economies and 
societies. This may be called the thesis of the ‘incontinent state’. The movements
Camilleri and Falk 1992, 2-6.
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of goods, services, ideas and communications between states authorised by 
members of civil society are just too fluid for states to be able to control them. 
States thus become increasingly incompetent in the face of global transactions; 
their ability to fulfil basic state functions is thrown in question. Effective 
authority leaks away from the state; political power is consequently absorbed by 
other organisations, from formal and informal apparatuses of governmental 
coordination outside of state boundaries, to the organisations of civil society with 
which states are increasingly forced to cooperate, collaborate, and negotiate.
Most importantly, however, there seems to have been a transfer of power from 
the state to the market. Aspects of social life that had formerly been regulated by 
the state, are now seen to be increasingly governed by the market. The dis- 
empowerment of the state corresponds to the empowerment of the market. Some 
scholars see this process as signalling a blurring of the lines between public and 
private, as well as between politics and economics, as private actors take on 
public functions and responsibilities. This argument is expressed, in a 
paradigmatic form, by Susan Strange:
Where states were once the masters o f markets, now it is the markets which, on many crucial 
issues, are the masters over the governments of states. And the declining authority of states is 
reflected in a growing diffusion o f authority to other institutions and associations, and to 
local and regional bodies.^
For Strange, the territorial boundaries of the state become increasingly 
dissociated from the transnational or global organisation of social and economic 
life; as a consequence, the state is less and less able to fulfil the basic functions 
(those defined by Adam Smith) for which, according to Strange, it was created.^
The second argument goes further than these formulations in that it posits not 
just an undermining of the national state, but the emergence of a system of 
intemational authority, which has some degree of cohesiveness. There is not 
simply a fragmentation or even dispersal of political authority, but a re­
integration of effective regulation and governance of the world economy. To 
some extent, the debate over this question is fought out on the terrain of 
traditional IR theory. Realists deny any process of global state formation, which 
alone they regard as having the capacity to change the fundamental logic of
Strange 1996, 4.
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anarchical relations between sovereign states. In the absence of such 
developments, the insecurity prevailing in a world in which supra-state 
institutions cannot guarantee national security must reproduce sovereignty as the 
organisational principle of interstate interaction.
Liberals, of course, have increasingly accepted the problématique of anarchy as 
the starting point for Intemational Relations and Intemational Political Economy 
(IR/IPE).'^ They are hence first of all concemed with showing that increasing 
interstate cooperation can indeed mitigate the consequences of anarchy. 
Institutions of global govemance, they argue, allow states to overcome the zero- 
sum logic of anarchical politics. Intemational politics is thus increasingly 
replaced by global politics, which accepts the interdependencies created by social 
and economic transactions and seeks to manage them with a view to stabilising 
the global system. But many of these theorists of global govemance are quick to 
point out that the regulatory capacities do not match the sheer scale and fluidity 
of transnational interactions; there remains something of a ‘govemance gap’.^
There are other scholars, however, who suggest that important aspects of 
global govemance have developed within global civil society; networks of the 
‘transnational managerial class’, like the Davos Conferences, and their ‘organic 
intellectuals’ organised, for instance, in the Trilateral Commission are actively 
formulating a new ‘common sense’ which serves to circumscribe the parameters 
of ‘sensible’ public policy, and to coordinate domestic economic strategies with 
the requirements of global production and accumulation. The state, as Cox 
suggests, is thus transformed into a ‘transmission belt’, which adjusts national 
society to the imperatives of the world market -  imperatives which are very 
much socially constructed (both materially and ideologically) - by these
3 Strange 1996, xii and 14.
4 Most o f the argument presented in this thesis applies to both IR and IPE, especially in its
state-centric mainstream versions. However, while IR is increasingly becoming a sub­
discipline o f IPE, there remain important ontological differences between the declining 
number o f students o f ‘the international’ who continue to insist on the autonomy of the 
inter-state system, and those who acknowledge that ‘the domestic’ and ‘the 
international’, as well as ‘the political’ and ‘the economic’, cannot be neatly separated 
and theorised in abstraction from each other. Where IR or IPE is used in this thesis 
without reference to the other, it relates to these ontological differences.
5 Cf. Züm 1995, 153-54.
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transnational elites/ In this perspective, then, the ‘internationalisation of the 
state’ does not refer to a process of global state building, but to the reorganisation 
of the relationship between state and civil society. As civil society becomes 
global, states lose their character as ‘communities of fate’ and become organs of 
this world society -  no longer as sovereign units which fragmented the world 
economy into ‘national economies’, but as subordinate elements in the system of 
govemance of this global society.^
At the heart of all these contributions to the globalisation thesis is the notion 
that state-centric modes of theorising were adequate until very recently, but have 
been rendered questionable by the contemporary reorganisation of social life. 
Even neo-Gramscian theorists of IPE, who note the inadequacy of statist and 
pluralist conceptions of the state and who insist on the analysis of ‘state/society 
complexes’ rather than states, seem to agree that society was until very recently a 
nationally bounded realm, contained by the state’s authority and capacity to 
control and regulate social, economic and cultural interactions between the 
members of their societies.
In these perspectives, then, the present age is regarded as undergoing a cmcial 
step in what seems to be an evolutionary dynamic that leads from national to 
global society, and from an intemational to a global economy. This 
reorganisation of social space, these theorists argue, must have momentous 
implications for the role and functions of states in the global political economy. 
And the social sciences, they propose, have to come to terms with a world in 
which the clear demarcation between domestic and intemational spheres is 
becoming highly blurred. This implies that the empirical foundations for a 
science of an autonomous sphere of ‘the intemational’ (with its own distinct laws 
and pattems) are vanishing.^
There is of, course, no shortage of critiques of this argument (or of some of its 
steps). The transformation of the intemational to a global economy, in particular, 
has been questioned in great detail, as has been the ‘footloose’ character of 
multinational corporations, and the uniqueness of contemporary ‘global’ finance.
6 Cox 1996a, 302; cf. van der Fiji 1998, 132; Gill 1990.
7 Cf. Shaw 1994, 19.
8 c f  Shaw 1994, 24-25; Scholte 1996, 48.
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Others have noted that trends towards cultural universalisation are countered by 
processes of particularisation and re-nationalisation. But while these empirical 
(or even just statistical) objections are of great importance and need careful 
analysis, they tend to accept the underlying assumption, i.e. that social and 
economic globalisation must necessarily undermine the sovereignty of the state.
The prior question must be, then: how appropriate is this assumption itself? 
This question cannot be answered, it has to be stressed, by recourse to that 
favourite academic strategy which finds the truth between two ‘extreme’ 
positions, somewhere in the reasonable middle. Such a strategy, rather 
predictably, has already asserted itself given the contending claims regarding 
globalisation. Thus both ‘hyper-globalists’ and ‘globalisation-sceptics’ find 
themselves called to order by the sober ‘transformationalists’; whereas the 
former posit a fully developed global economy, for instance, and the latter note 
that not much has changed at least in comparison to the pre-1914 period, these 
scholars seek to cut through the smoke of hype and denial by asserting that we 
are somewhere on the way between ‘the international’ and ‘the global’. And so, it 
follows that while the state has lost some of its importance, it remains, for the 
time being, a crucial player in the globalising (rather than global) political 
economy.’ The notion of an inherent dichotomy of state and world society or 
world market, however, remains just as crucial to this perspective as to the more 
enthusiastic globalists.
Outline of Argument
The critical examination of the dichotomy of the national (and, derivative of 
that, the m/er-national) on the one hand, and the global on the other, is at the 
heart of this thesis. Its exploration provides a powerful prism through which 
some of the most vexing issues that confront the discipline of IR/IPE in its 
attempts to come to terms with current transformations. Most crucially, it allows 
us to de-reify spatial arrangements by highlighting the historicity of spatial 
practices. The importance of historicising the spatial framework which IR (and
Held et al. 1999, 2-10.
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even much of IPE) takes for granted has recently been stressed in an important 
article by John Agnew. According to Agnew, IR has been caught in a “territorial 
trap” by its propensity to regard the territorial form of organising political space 
as a timeless feature of social life. “Theorizing is thus put beyond history” by 
conventional IR’s geographical assumptions.
The rejection of the ‘territorial trap’ is a crucial theme in the emerging 
challenge to the orthodox agenda of the ‘neo-neo-synthesis’ which focuses on the 
problématique of the conditions and limitations of cooperation under conditions 
of anarchy. Heterodox approaches to Intemational Political Economy as well as 
critical theories of Intemational Relations share the idea that intemational 
systems are inherently historical and related to broader social stmctures that are 
subject to transformation. In this perspective, it is the historical constitution and 
potential transcendence of the modem intemational system, and with it the nature 
of modemity itself, which becomes the substantive focus of IR/IPE. It is on this 
basis that innovative IR theory seeks to reconnect to social theory.
The purpose of this PhD thesis is to contribute to the emerging body of a 
critical social theory of intemational relations. But my starting point is quite 
different from that chosen by most heterodox IR theorists in one important 
respect. The latter suggest that IR has to finally emerge from the “territorial trap” 
in order to come to terms with the current move from the national/intemational to 
the global, thereby assuming that the phase of modemity which ended in the 
1970s (which some regard as the end of modemity itself) was in fact determined 
by the territorial state. By contrast, I Avill argue in chapter 1 that the modem 
world economy is premised upon social relations which are innately 
transnational. This argument is premised on Marx’s fundamental insight that 
capital is not a thing, but a social relation. Its implication is that a theory of 
intemational relations can never be a theory of the pattems of interstate relations 
alone, but has to interpret the relations between states in the context of the 
expansion and transformation of capitalism’s global society.
But Marxism suffers from serious problems itself, the problem of accounting 
for the exclusive territoriality of capitalist political space (given that capital is
10 Agnew 1994, 72; Cf. the penetrating analysis o f the same issue in Youngs 1999, 34-50.
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inherently transnational) foremost among them. In recognition of these problems, 
the latter part of the second chapter seeks to identify some requirements for a 
viable Marxist theory of the intemational relations of modemity. I emphasise the 
need for a radical historicisation of the categories through which Marxism seeks 
to constmct a theory of modemity in order to overcome its tendency to explain 
the rise of modemity in an economistic and evolutionistic fashion. I also stress 
the need to overcome the base/superstmcture model of social change and the 
ability to recognise and account for the differences between forms of capitalism 
itself. Finally, I argue that perhaps the biggest challenge for Marxism lies in 
developing a theory of the modem state as a national, or territorial, state, and to 
theorise the changes in the relationship between capitalist statehood and the 
capitalist world market.
Is it possible to (re-)constmct an historical materialist approach which can 
address these challenges, or is Marxism necessarily reductionist? The next three 
chapters explore different Marxist attempts to overcome economistic tendencies. 
Each of them builds on some understanding of ‘totality’ (rather than on the 
causality of the economic sphere), but they differ with respect to the specific way 
in which they seek to relate the ‘superstmctures’ to the ‘base’. Chapter 2 starts 
by considering the stmctural Marxism of Althusser and Poulantzas, with its 
emphasis on the ‘relative autonomy’ of the capitalist state. This approach points 
to the interaction between the levels of base and superstmcture, but in order to 
retain a central role for ‘the economy’ (if only in the last instance), it had to 
replace economic with stmctural determinism. It also suffered from its inability 
to bridge the gap between theoretical and empirical inquiry and its incapacity to 
account for change.
These concems are fundamental, by contrast, to neo-Gramscian critical theory, 
which has become the most influential form of historical materialist theorising in 
IR/IPE. I will show, in chapter 3, that this approach is still based on the 
problématique of stmctural Marxism, whose limitations it seeks to overcome 
without being able to break from its basic assumptions. In the end, the neo- 
Gramscian perspective circumvents the problems of stmctural Marxism only by 
breaking up the unity of capitalist development into a number of self-contained 
‘historical stmctures’. Moreover, while according more autonomy to the state
Introduction: From the International to the Global? 12
and reducing the economism of traditional forms of Marxism, these authors no 
longer have a theory of sovereignty or the capitalist market. They thus fail to 
engage with some of the most fundamental categories of IR, focusing on the 
variations within modem institutions rather than on the institutional structure of 
modemity itself..
The fourth chapter then presents a different solution to the twin problems of 
state power and historical legacies within an historical materialist framework. I 
will argue that E.P. Thompson’s notion of capitalism as a ‘stmctured process’ 
provides an altemative to both the stmcturalist reification of capital and the neo- 
Gramscian dissolution of capitalism into a number of discrete ‘historical 
stmctures’. In fact, Thompson’s stress on the imbrication of the political, cultural 
and legal ‘superstmctures’ of the capitalist economy points the way to a 
conceptualisation of capitalism which effectively overcomes the 
base/superstmcture model which has marred historical materialism for so long. 
This argument is developed further by drawing on the most innovative and non­
positivist forms of historical materialism: the ‘political Marxism’ of Ellen 
Meiksins Wood and Robert Brenner, and the ‘open Marxism’ of John Holloway, 
Werner Bonefeld and Simon Clarke (to name but a few). ^
A recent wave of historical materialist theorising of international relations, 
which I will critically review in the fifth chapter, draws extensively on these 
Marxist social theories. In particular, they take up the argument that capitalism 
involves the historical separation of politics and economics. But these theorists, I 
will argue, proceed too quickly from this argument to the historical form of state 
which has dominated the capitalist period, i.e. the national state. The 
interpretation of capital as a social relation which finds institutional expression in 
the institutionally differentiated spheres of ‘the political’ and ‘the economic’ 
does not explain why the capitalist political space is territorially segmented and 
governed by competing sovereignties. I will suggest that the exclusive 
territoriality of capitalist political space derives not from the inner nature of 
capital, but from the way in which capitalism came to be bom into a pre-existing 
system of territorial states.
This argument is explored historically over the following two chapters. In 
chapter 6, building on an interpretation of the transition from feudalism to
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capitalism that takes the radical distinctiveness of capitalist modemity as its 
starting point for the conceptual framing of this process, I will suggest that the 
emergence of capitalism should not be seen as the product of ‘long sweep of 
history’ which led up to this event by some inherent necessity. Indeed, I will 
argue that most of Europe did not experience a transition to capitalism in the 
early modem period. According to this view, territoriality of political authority is 
not only an outgrowth of the feudal logic of ‘political accumulation’; absolutist 
state formation also embodied a logic of process diametrically opposed to 
capitalist development as it was based on a fundamentally different property 
relationship, which, following Robert Brenner, can be understood as ‘politically 
constituted’. Politics and economics were not differentiated in absolutism. The 
logic of political accumulation had also been operating in feudal England, but it 
was short-circuited by the rise of a qualitatively distinct form of property 
relation; the English state came to express very different social relations of 
sovereignty from those embodied in the absolutist states of continental Europe, 
which relied on the empowerment of the property in things to mediate the 
appropriation of surplus. On this foundation, political domination and economic 
exploitation could assume different institutional forms.
Chapter 7 then considers the implications of this argument for our 
understanding of the absolutist intemational system, which, I will argue, should 
be regarded as fundamentally non-modem. More specifically, I will show that the 
pressures of intemational conflict did not translate into a ‘modemisation’ of the 
state and the economy; the ‘rationalisation’ it effected remained circumscribed by 
the particular rationality of absolutist property relations. It also shows how this 
rationality pervaded the dynamic of the intemational relations between these 
absolutist states. With the industrial revolution in Britain, however, the existence 
of the absolutist mling classes organised as sovereign states became threatened. 
The nineteenth century saw successive waves of ‘revolutions from above’ 
through which these state classes tried to secure their intemal and extemal 
reproduction by imposing capitalist property relations on their societies. The 
capitalist transformation of continental Europe thus took place within the 
framework of exclusive territoriality, which was reproduced despite a 
fundamental change in the nature of social space. But while capitalist politics is
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very different from absolutist politics, sovereign territoriality continued to 
structure the social relations of capitalism.
The question of what the structuration of capitalism by the territoriality of 
political authority means for capitalist development is at the heart of the third 
part of this thesis. Chapter 8 will seek to specify the consequences for 
capitalism’s ‘logic of process’ in conceptual terms. I will argue that the non­
coincidence of the spatialities of authority and accumulation presents a constant 
source of tension, as states strive to internalise the conditions under which they 
have to secure the reproduction of ‘their’ capitals. But while states are agents in 
the production and structuring of global space, their policies cannot be grasped in 
terms of some innate ‘national interest’; they arise out of the mediation of class 
struggles and crises of accumulation. This is, then, a highly dynamic process 
which gives rise to changing pattems of intemational conflict, in which state 
strategies of competition and the competitive strategies of individual capitals can 
enter into different relationships. It also generates different ‘spatial regimes’ 
through which the relationship between the national and the global is constituted 
on a temporary basis.
In chapter 9, I will provide a schematic overview of some of the socio- 
geographical regimes which have characterised the history of capitalist 
modemity. I will also attempt to explain why, over the course of capitalism’s 
development, there has been a clear tendency to nationalise the economic space 
of the world economy through the deployment of the territorial power of states. 
Thus, while exclusive political territoriality has its roots in pre-capitalist social 
relations, it has become more rather t h ^  less entrenched since the 1870s, and it 
has gone hand in hand with the increasing ‘caging’ of transnational relations. 
This tendency was expressed most clearly by the rise of the nation-state (to be 
distinguished from the more generic ‘national state’ of which it forms a particular 
instantiation). This process, I will argue, was a reaction both to the much more 
transnational organisation of the world market, centred on the British economy, 
in the preceding period, and to the transnational aspirations (and to some extent 
organisation) of the working class since the 1870s.
The result was a double segmentation of capitalism’s global society, based, 
firstly, on the promotion of the state as an altemative ‘imagined community’ to
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that of class; and secondly, on the incorporation (at least by tendency) of a part of 
the world economy into the political jurisdiction (and sometimes even the 
boundaries) of these national/imperial states. This implies a complication of the 
notion prevalent in the globalisation literature that there has recently been a 
progression from the national to the global. The ‘national economy’ was not the 
starting point of capitalist development, to be superseded now that 
communication and transport technologies have developed sufficiently to allow 
for a single global market to emerge. Nor was this national caging of capitalism’s 
global society and economy ever more than a tendency, even at the height of the 
welfare state. The latter part of chapter 9 will highlight the transnational or global 
context of ‘embedded liberalism’. I will argue that the postwar intemational 
order composed of national states and national economies was premised upon the 
increasing incorporation of further areas and social relations into capitalism’s 
global society.
The turn towards increasing global economic integration during the 1970s thus 
appears less as a transition from the intemational to the global than as a 
rearticulation of world capitalism. This does not mean that the transformation is 
irrelevant -  far from it. But the question remains how are we to conceptualise 
this transformation. In the extended conclusions, I will suggest that we should 
pose the problem of globalisation not so much in terms of the demise of national 
sovereignty (or even just autonomy) as a consequence of increasing intemational 
interdependence or a change in the nature of the world economy. Instead, the 
question which needs to be answered, in view of the reconstmcted interpretation 
of capitalist modemity presented in the preceding chapters, is whether global 
economic integration is sustainable, given the fact that territorial states, arguably, 
remain the only available (though not necessarily effective) form of regulation 
and govemance of the world economy and of capitalism’s global society.
But, and this is cmcial, if the national form of capitalist statehood should be 
reproduced in the current period of geo-economic integration, this is a contingent 
rather than a necessary aspect of capitalist development. Capitalism may exist 
politically in the form of a ‘global state’, and the concept of capital may in fact 
require the existence of global sovereignty to make possible the reproduction of 
capital at a certain level of development. This would suggest that if, contrary to
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the needs of global capitalism, no such global state formation is in fact taking
place, then the consequence may once again be a return to heightened
geopolitical competition.
This is not a prediction of necessary doom, but reflects a methodological 
commitment to a non-reductionist form of historical materialism. Indeed, if there 
is one lesson to be found in the history of capitalist development, it is that global 
economic integration does not produce global political integration in any causal 
or functional sense. States have different possibilities to react to the 
‘spatialisation strategies’ of economic actors. How they will use their
territorialised authority will depend not simply on the requirements of capitalists 
(or the imperatives of the ‘national interest’), but will be shaped in the process of 
mediating the contradictions of capital accumulation and class struggle, as well 
as the competitive pressures between states themselves. In the end, the 
spatialisation strategies of states may be as important for the socio-geographical 
patterning of capitalist modemity as those of economic actors -  if not more so.
1. THE LIMITS OF SOCIETY: STATE-
CENTRISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS OF MODERNITY
1.1. The Critique of State-Centric IR
No aspect of orthodox Intemational Relations, whether in its traditional Realist 
form or its modified liberal-institutionalist guise, has proved more provocative 
than its commitment to the analytical centrality of the state and the interstate 
system in the study of world politics. Scholars engaged in the formulation of a 
critical social theory of IR/IPE argue that state-centrism takes as unproblematic 
two assumptions that simply can no longer be accepted in the face of recent 
transformations in the nature of world politics: the clear distinction between ‘the 
internal' and ‘the external', and the separability of ‘politics' and ‘economics'. 
These analytical differentiations, they suggest, are not given by the nature of 
social life itself, but are the product of a particular historical period. When these 
historical arrangements begin to change, the usefulness of the concepts abstracted 
from such temporary realities begins to wane.’ The contention of the critics of 
conventional IR is that we are in the midst of such a period of historical 
transformation, and thus challenged to develop new conceptual tools for the 
emerging order.
The critique of orthodox IR is thus built on the notion of a recent watershed 
which separates a ‘Westphalian' order in which states were the dominant actors, 
institutionally differentiated from the economic sphere, but nevertheless 
controlling social and economic transactions across their boundaries (and thus 
had clearly demarcated national economies which they were able to regulate 
independently and effectively), from a ‘post-Westphalian' system in which all 
this no longer pertains. This understanding, however, is far too simplistic; it 
dramatises current processes of social and intemational transformation by
Cf. Cox 1996b, 89.
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understating the ‘transnational’ or ‘global’ aspects of the first, and the 
‘international’ features of the second. As Fred Halliday notes, the traditional 
“banishment” of globalisation as an historical tendency of modemity itself “has 
given way to promiscuity”, thereby obscuring the “continued adaptation of the 
global and the particular” which obtains today as it had at the beginning of the 
modem age, if not in the same form.^
In the theorisation of the relationship between the national state and the world 
market - which condenses the analytical distinctions between intemal and 
extemal, national and global, as well as politics and economics -  we can find 
surprisingly similar socio-spatial representations of modemity shared by 
orthodox IR theorists and their heterodox critics, based on the supposed 
dominance of national political and economic space. Instead of focusing on the 
issue under contention between these approaches, i.e. whether modemity (or at 
least its state-centric phase) has come to an end, I will attempt to provide some 
conceptual foundations for an altemative interpretation of contemporary 
transformations by rethinking the relationships of politics and economics, and 
between the national and the global, in modemity. In doing so, it will become 
evident that it is the concept of modemity itself which is in dire need of re­
examination.
The purpose of the present chapter is to establish some initial plausibility for 
the claim that modemity is not only global (or transnational) in some cmcial 
respects, but that it is premised upon transnational social relations and, indeed, a 
global society. Taking up the theoretical innovations developed by some Realists 
in their attempt to respond to the challenge of globalisation theory, I show how 
the sociological arguments to which they tum tend to undermine some cmcial 
Realist assumptions, especially its implicit spatial premise - that society exists 
only within the boundaries of states. I then tum to historical materialism to gain a 
better understanding of the social relations underlying the modem world 
economy. That raises the question whether this theoretical framework provides 
an adequate basis for the theorisation of the role of the state in modemity, and
Halliday 1994, 2.
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whether its value is ultimately limited by replacing state-centrism with economic 
determinism.
1.2. Realism vs. Globalism
Not surprisingly, some of the most insistent critiques of the globalisation thesis 
have been voiced by representatives of the Realist tradition in IR and IPE. There 
is no need here to invoke once again that favourite bogeyman of all the 
presumptive heirs of Realism, Kenneth Waltz; Realism has more to offer than his 
simplistic (or ‘parsimonious’) ‘science’ of the intemational system. Even though 
it remains ultimately limited by its fixation on the state. Realism continues to 
pose questions which other approaches ignore at their peril.
Many Realists have done little more than challenge the empirical account of 
the emergence of a global society and economy. They note that the current 
structure of the world economy is not too dissimilar from that which preceded 
World War I. According to Stephen Krasner, transnational flows cannot be 
regarded as new, as developed states have always relied on intemational trade 
and finance; nor is globalisation new as developments in one part of the world 
have for a long time affected developments in other parts.^
But Krasner also carries the Realist argument beyond this standard empirical 
critique, emphasising a systematic relationship between the consolidation of 
sovereignty and the increase in cross-border economic transactions. In an 
important article co-authored with Janice Thomson, the authors note that the 
historical period which first saw the emergence of interdependence (the last 200 
years), was precisely the same period in which sovereignty was consolidated and 
states finally asserted a monopoly over the means of violence within their 
territories. Interdependence, far from implying the decline of sovereignty, in fact 
presupposes its existence and consolidation. The reason is that
High levels o f exchange and market-rational outcomes (...) require stable property rights 
which, in a capitalist economic system, internalize costs and benefits. The only actors 
currently able to provide such rights are national-states. ... [I]n the modem world
Krasner 1994, 13.
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consolidated national states are the necessary if not sufficient condition for stable property 
rights that internalize costs and benefits/
International institutions, based on the hegemonic position of a particular state, 
have become increasingly important for the maintenance of intemational 
economic flows, but they remain based on the national sovereignty of the 
countries involved. At the same time, intemational transactions remain subject to 
the respective national jurisdictions of the states whose boundaries they cross. In 
the end, then, Thomson and Krasner conclude that “the commonplace notion that 
there is an inherent conflict between sovereignty and economic transactions is 
fundamentally misplaced”.^
Janice Thomson develops this theme even further, by expanding on the 
familiar realist distinction of sovereignty as state authority within a given 
territory, from effective state control. She argues that the activities over which 
states claim authority are not fixed but subject to transformation. In fact, 
Thomson suggests, this is an inherent aspect of what it means to be sovereign: 
the right to define what is to be regarded as ‘political’ and thus subject to state 
authority, and to relegate other activities to the ‘private’ realm of the economy, 
culture, civil society, etc. In this sense, sovereignty confers a ‘meta-political’ 
authority on the state, which allows it to define the social scope of its authority/ 
at the same time, states recognise the right of other states to do the same within 
their territorial boundaries. Thus, if activities which states have defined as private 
become intemationalised, it can hardly be claimed that this threatens the 
sovereignty of the state. On the basis of this argument, Thomson suggests, it may 
be more appropriate to understand current processes of intemational change not 
in terms of a decline of sovereignty, but as a process of redefinition of 
sovereignty involving “changes in the norms or mles delineating the legitimate 
forms of functional authority and means of enforcing those mles”.’
Such changes in character of sovereignty are not new: mercantilism, laissez- 
faire and embedded liberalism all expressed rather different relationships
4 Thomson and Krasner 1989, 197ff. On the weakness o f sovereignty before the
nineteenth century, see Krasner 1993.
5 Thomson and Krasner 1989, 198.
6 Thomson 1995, 222; cf. Krasner 1988, 87.
7 Thomson 1995, 225.
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between the sovereignty of the state and the realm of ‘private’ activities. 
Sovereignty, thus understood, is not static, but subject to the occasional 
reorganisation of the nexus between state and society within the modem regime 
of sovereignty. By identifying one particular form of sovereignty with the 
essence of sovereignty we are misled into thinking that such a reorganisation 
means the transcendence of sovereignty as such. Against such tendencies in the 
globalisation literature, Thomson argues that contemporary processes of 
intemational transformation should be understood in terms of a reconstmction of 
the content of sovereignty and the redrawing of the line between the public realm 
of the state and the private realm of the economy and civil society. Thomson 
furthermore argues that this transformation, like earlier such processes, has its 
source in the attempts of states to strengthen their capacities to wage war and 
maintain domestic order.
States, in this perspective, author-isQd interdependence in order to enhance 
their ability to reproduce themselves and their meta-political authority in the face 
of domestic and intemational challenges.* As a consequence, whatever far- 
reaching implications interdependence and globalisation may have, they are 
unlikely to break up the long-term complementarity of state and market, even 
while modifying their concrete relationship. For ultimately, this complementarity 
is itself an expression of modemity and, more precisely, of the modem 
intemational system of sovereign states, which constituted the world economy as 
an autonomous social stmcture. As Thomson argues:
An economic realm of choice distinct from a political realm o f coercion is not, as liberalism 
presupposes, natural and timeless but is a product o f history and practice ... The 
contemporary differentiation between the state’s realm - politics - and the economy is itself a 
product o f the modern interstate system and the meta-political authority imparted to it by the 
institution o f sovereignty.^
L3. Sovereignty and Society: the State as ^Container*?
Thomson’s conceptual elaborations impart to Realism an historical and 
sociological depth which it has often lacked in the past. In trying to come to
8 Thomson 1995, 216-217.
9 Thomson 1995: 222.
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terms with the challenge of other approaches which posit a fundamental 
transformation of the intemational system, Thomson, like Krasner, challenges the 
“ahistorical” conceptualisation of the sovereign state in these approaches. Yet in 
so doing, she also pushes against some of the rigidities of Realism itself, 
accepting that those neo-realist theories which take sovereignty as given in fact 
provide “not a universal theory of global politics, but a theory of relations among 
modem states”.’” But it is only with the assaults of globalist theories that Realism 
seems to become aware of its own historical foundations, and Thomson’s work 
remains all too rare in self-reflexively tackling the theoretical challenges 
following from this admission. And, in the end, there are good reasons to doubt 
the ability of the Realist school to provide a satisfactory understanding of the 
modem intemational system and its dynamics. If taken seriously, the very issues 
raised by Thomson in order to defend Realism undermine the Realist framework 
even as a historicised theory of modern intemational relation. Two cmcial Realist 
axioms, in particular, become highly problematic on the basis of her own 
argument.
Firstly, Thomson remains squarely within the Realist tradition with her 
insistence on the centrality of intemational imperatives not only to the actions of 
states, but also to their form of sovereignty. (Though she does note that social 
actors, too, influence the nature of the state’s sovereignty, this aspect remains 
underdeveloped.) But what Thomson fails to ask is what the implications of a 
change in the content of sovereignty are for the dynamic o f international politics. 
The ‘dynamisation’ of the concept of sovereignty is thus conceptualised 
passively; the content of what states regard as falling under the sway of public 
authority remains irrelevant for the character of interstate competition. The latter 
seems to be determined by the form of sovereignty as such, not by its content. 
Modem intemational relations are thus portrayed as static in character, even 
while sovereignty itself is conceptualised as dynamic.
This mode of argumentation is of course familiar from historical sociology, on 
which Thomson relies heavily. But historical sociologists have in their tum 
appropriated the understanding of the intemational system as a static category
10 Thomson 1995, 218.
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from unreconstructed forms of Realism or even from neo-Realism. It is precisely 
this aspect, however, which has come under increasing attack from those 
engaged in constructing a Weberian theory of IR.'' According to these theorists, 
it is not j u s t , T h o m s o n ,  modem states which “are, in part, constituted by the 
intemational system”;'  ^we have to be able, in tum, to think of the intemational 
system as constituted by states and the dominant state-society relations prevailing 
within them (or at least within the dominant states). A fully ‘stmcturationist’ 
perspective on the relationship between the state and the intemational system, 
which considers the dialectical relationship between agency and stmcture, is thus 
required.
But once this problem is posed - once we no longer take ‘war’ to be an 
independent and ahistorical variable which supposedly explains state-formation -  
the question of the societal processes which impinge on the constitution and 
reconstitution of sovereignty emerges as a focus of enquiry. For these processes, 
which Thomson herself does not deny but seems to regard as secondary, now 
have to be analysed from the perspective of their contribution of the dynamic of 
the intemational system itself.
Secondly, Thomson shares Realism’s view of the economy as a creature of the 
state; the economy is a source, ultimately, of state power and is managed and 
regulated by the state so as to serve its autonomous interests. She acknowledges 
that states are in rivalry with societal actors conceming the stmcturing of 
economy and that these private actors have interests which do not coincide with 
those of the state. This leads Thomson to claim that there is a non-coincidence 
between state and society inasmuch as the state is more than a mere 
concentration of social interests. Yet she seems to regard as unproblematic a 
fundamental (though implicit) assumption of all Realist theory, namely that state
11 Cf. Hobden 1999; Hobson 1998a and 1998b. The critique o f the realist
conceptualisation of the intemational system (and o f its appropriation by historical
sociologists, which Thomson re-imports into her sociological realism) has been taken up 
not least by a number o f neo-Weberians concemed with a more sophisticated 
theorisation o f ‘the intemational’. The problem with these approaches is, however, that 
they fail to take up Thomson’s cmcial insight regarding the historicity o f the separation 
of politics and economics, and instead fall back on a shallow pluralism o f social spheres 
which are trans-historically applicable.
12 Thomson 1995, 221.
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and society coincide in spatial, if not in social terms. Society exists within and is 
contained by the boundaries of the state.^^
But the thrust of Thomson’s own argument would seem to imply, at the very 
least, a complication of this assumption. For, those social activities that have 
been defined as non-political by the state are thereby also, in principle, uncoupled 
from the territoriality of political space. To be sure, they remain dependent on the 
regulatory mechanisms of territorial states (though not necessarily of the state 
from which they originate), and their spatial scope could, in theory, also be 
circumscribed by the boundaries of these states; but the fact remains that those 
social activities usually termed ‘economic’ have become organised across 
boundaries."^
Does this constitute a world society? Quite clearly, not every form of exchange 
across boundaries does have the power to do so. As long as we start from ‘the 
economy’ as an abstraction, this question can only be answered in the negative 
(or if we answer it in the positive, the ‘society’ and ‘economy’ will become 
universally coextensive). Instead of focusing on the supposedly general attributes 
of economic behaviour, therefore, we have to look at the particular modern form 
of organising production and exchange. Thomson introduces a moment of 
historicity in her approach when she defines the modem economy as a “realm of 
choice distinct from a political realm of coercion”.’^  But even this historical 
delimitation of the applicability of neo-classicism will not allow us to recognise 
the unique ‘societalising’ forces of the modem economy. These will become 
apparent only when we start to enquire into the historically specific 
presuppositions and dynamics of capitalism. It then becomes increasingly 
plausible to understand the world economy not simply as a system of material 
transactions based on the pre-social choices of free and equal individuals with 
given preferences, but as an inherently and eminently social realm. In this
13 On the state as ‘container’ o f society, see Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 92-94; Taylor 
1994 and 1995.
14 According to Anthony Giddens, “from its inception, the world capitalist economy was 
never just a vast commodity market. It involved, and involves, the commodification of 
labour-power in different regional settings. ... Whether they are small firms or large 
transnational corporations, most business enterprises are slotted directly or indirectly 
into economic relations stretching beyond the confines o f any particular state” ; Giddens 
1985, 278.
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respect, the capitalist world market is rather different from the one which 
preceded it:
Capitalism inherits a global world market -  a system of commodity exchange and circulation 
-  which it digests then regurgitates as the world capitalist system, a system o f production. To 
achieve this, human labour power itself is converted into a commodity, reproduced like any 
other commodity according to specifically capitalist social relations.
Capitalism now emerges as the crucial category. And capitalism is best 
understood as a system of power relations (the specification of which will be an 
important aspect of the first part of this thesis). These power relations, unlike the 
sovereign authority of territorial states, are not confined by boundaries.
Capitalism is a fundamentally transnational form of economy and society. 
Even during the age of imperialism and protectionism, or at the height of the 
welfare state in the postwar period, the nation-state arguably never contained the 
economy and society to the degree implied by the proponents of the globalisation 
thesis. As Michael Mann points out, while social relations became increasingly 
‘caged’ by the nation-state and its inter-national relations since the mid­
nineteenth century, this is only part of the story. For
the expansion of these national and inter-national networks always proceeded alongside the 
expansion o f certain ‘transnational’ power relations, especially those of industrial capitalism 
and its attendant ideologies (liberalism, socialism).’^
1.4. Modernityf Capitalism and Territoriality
What are the theoretical implications of this argument? Certainly not that 
sovereignty is of minor importance to the existence of a capitalist world market 
and society. In that respect, Thomson’s (and Krasner’s) arguments remain valid. 
What can no longer be accepted, however, is the Realist restriction of IR’s 
research object to the relations between states (even in the extended form 
suggested by Thomson, which looks at state-formation from the perspective of 
the international system). Instead, the expansion and deepening of transnational
15 Thomson 1995, 222.
16 Smith 1984,61.
17 Mann 1997, 476. Mann develops a more general argument against the spatial equation
o f society with the state (not just for the modem period, but applicable to all o f history),
in Mann 1986, ch. 1.
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social relations, and their changing relationship to the interstate system and its 
dynamics, have to become a central focus of IR.
Such a perspective would entail an important shift in the problématique which 
defines the core problems and questions with which IR as a (sub-)discipline is 
concerned. IR would no longer take its problématique to be the enquiry into the 
possibilities and limits of cooperation under anarchy, as in the joint research 
agenda of neoliberal institutionalism and neo-realism. Instead, it would be 
defined by the problem of modernity: to determine the role of the international 
system in the rise and development of modem society and to ask how this 
international system itself expresses the dynamics and contradictions of 
modernity.'^
International Relations has to reinvent itself as a theory of historical 
international systems, and thus as a theory of international change. It has to 
concern itself centrally with the social forces which created the modem state and 
the modem intemational system, as well as with the transformations within the 
institution of sovereignty and the changes in the pattems of modem intemational 
relations. But in all of this, it can never simply strive to develop a theory of 
interstate relations, but has to be a theory of the intemational relations of 
modemity: of a historical society which is inherently transnational, yet is 
politically organised in the form of states claiming sovereign authority over the 
population of territorially delimited realms.
Far from implying that Realism continues to be valid in the present as the 
world has not changed, the arguments of Thomson and Krasner suggest, to the 
contrary, that Realism is inadequate even as a theory of the past.’^  But this also 
implies that the current wave of critiques of Realism, and of the orthodox IR 
agenda more generally, is itself premised upon a historical perspective which 
accepts far too much of the conventional story. Its central claim, that sometime 
around 1970 there was a decisive break which saw the transcendence of national 
societies and the intemational economy by a global social and economic system.
18 Cf. Rosenberg 1994, 4.
19 According to Krasner, “If the fundamental problems o f intemational politics and 
intemational political economy are enduring, so are the theoretical perspectives that we 
use to understand them. Although the theoretical tools have become more sophisticated, 
there has been no theoretical breakthrough, no paradigm shift” ; Krasner 1994, 13f.
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seems to confirm that at least until the 1970s, society was more or less contained 
by the state.
Martin Shaw argues in this vein that while the notion of a multitude of discrete 
societies may have fit the realities of the 19th century, it has now lost its 
relevance: “today the concept of ‘a society’ can only be applied fully and 
consistently ... to human society on a world scale”.^ ° Andrew Linklater and John 
Macmillan similarly point out that the “wasteland between states ... is now 
pervaded with complex global economic and social linkages which suggest that 
Global Politics should replace Intemational Relations”. For this reason, they 
argue, “Intemational Relations can no longer be regarded as the analysis of the 
relations between clearly and securely bounded sovereign states responding to 
the challenges of an immutable anarchy”.^ '
But when could the intemational system ever be adequately understood in 
these terms? The notion of a golden age of sovereignty, whether in the postwar 
period or in the nineteenth century, in which states exerted full control over 
societies neatly delimited by territorial boundaries, is a myth which serves only to 
reinforce a cmde conceptual altemative between sovereignty and globalisation. It 
is hardly surprising that, on the basis of this dichotomy, critical theorists tend to 
associate sovereignty and ‘globality’ with two different phases of historical 
development, in which sovereignty appears ultimately as the hallmark of 
modemity, whereas globalisation signals a move towards a postmodem age (or at 
the very least towards a new and qualitatively distinct form of modemity).
It is not the epochal form of theorising that is problematic, as both positivists 
and post-positivists of a postmodem inclination might object; indeed, the greatest 
significance of the globalisation debate is its stimulation of theories of historical 
change and social transformation which might challenge the dominance of
20 Shaw 1994, 129. Shaw recognises that a ‘global society’ did not emerge all o f a sudden; 
but he argues that today, for “the first time since human beings inhabited this earth, it is 
possible to describe comprehensive networks of social relationships which include all 
people. We have not just some global connections - these have been developing for 
centuries - but the clear outline o f a global society”; Shaw 1994, 3. For Shaw, this global 
society is characterised not just by processes o f ‘systemic integration’, like the 
development o f global production and exchange systems, global mass media and ‘world 
politics’ rather than intemational relations; he contends that there is also a definite 
process o f global ‘normative integration’, with the appearance o f common values and a 
global political culture emphasising human rights, democracy and minority rights (129).
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ahistorical and positivistic methodologies in IR and the social sciences more 
generally. What is problematic, however, is the specific understanding of 
modemity which underlies the various contributions to the globalisation thesis. It 
implies that modemity was fundamentally dominated by and centred upon the 
territorial state, while the late or post-modem epoch is defined by the prevalence 
of global social and political relations. In as much as capitalism is regarded as an 
irreducible aspect of modemity, it is conceptualised as subordinate to the state 
and to its boundaries. The state, and the territoriality of political authority, thus 
become the defining elements of modemity.
But if, as I argued above, the modem state never contained the capitalist world 
society which emerged in the nineteenth century, the implication is that the 
reconsideration of those changes which are usually termed ‘globalisation’ require 
a reconsideration of modemity itself. Now, it is certainly correct that “[ejquating 
society with state is a basically modem view of the world”.^  ^ Anthony Smith 
notes that the founding figures of the modern social sciences, especially Marx, 
Weber and Durkheim, all implicitly built on a “methodological nationalism” 
which regarded society as a territorially bounded phenomenon.^^ The further 
development of the social sciences enshrined this assumption by promoting the 
disciplinary separation of domestic and intemational politics. In this sense, there 
was a “nationalizing of the social sciences”, which was also marked by an 
increasing subservience of social studies to the concems of particular states. '^*
But even if we accept these observations, it does not follow that modem 
society was actually a national society in the sense suggested by its representation 
in the social sciences. To be sure, such representations have their own efficacy, 
and the nationalising of the social sciences certainly contributed to the 
nationalising of society since the final quarter of the nineteenth century. Yet this 
process can itself only be understood by reference (and, more specifically, as a 
reaction) to the simultaneous transnationalisation of social relations which had
21 Linklater and Macmillan 1995, 4 (emphases added).
22 Taylor 1999, 7.
23 Smith 1979, 191.
24 Agnew 1994, 69.
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set in with the rise of a capitalist world market at the end of the eighteenth 
century.^^
Instead of taking the modem social sciences’ representation of society as 
‘national’ to be a faithful reflection of the reality of modem social relations, we 
would then have to ask whether the current understanding of modemity is itself 
an adequate one. It may be useful at this point to remind ourselves that not all the 
theories of modemity are in fact as much committed to some form of 
‘methodological nationalism’ as Smith suggests. Most importantly, Karl Marx, 
while seemingly taking the ‘national societies’ of Britain, Germany or France as 
his starting point, developed a theory of capitalism which, according to Simon 
Bromley, “had no necessary national reference and his historical depiction of its 
emergence and consolidation was explicitly global in scope”. In this sense, 
Bromley argues, Marx may even be seen as “the first significant theorist of 
globalisation”.^ ^
Considering the prescient words of the Communist Manifesto, it is indeed hard 
to charge its authors with an excessive concem with states and borders. Their 
understanding of capitalist modemity is inherently global:
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments, and thereby 
the relations o f production, and with them the whole relations of society. ...A ll that is solid 
melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober 
senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. The need of a constantly 
expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the 
globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. The 
bourgeoisie has through its exploitation o f the world-market given a cosmopolitan character 
to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin o f the Reactionists, it 
has drawn from under the feet o f industry the national ground on which it stood. ... In place 
o f the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every 
direction, universal interdependence o f nations.^^
For Marx and Engels, the world is unified by capital. But capital is not simply 
a social class which acts, or a means of circulation which penetrates; it is a social 
relation. Only because the relations between people have become stmctured, 
through complex historical processes, in such a way that individuals have to 
compete with each other in the market, is it possible for money to become self- 
expansive -  and thus to assume the historically unique form of capital.
25 Cf. Albrow 1996,45.
26 Bromley 1999, 284.
27 Marx and Engels 1998, 7-8.
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According to Marx, it is the ‘capital relation’ between the owners of the property 
in the means of production and propertyless wage-labourers which constitutes 
such a system of market dependence (on both sides of the relation!). Once 
constituted, capital can never rest, but has to penetrate new areas and more and 
more productive activities (including forms of cultural production formerly 
regarded as ‘non-economic’) in order to expand its value, and thereby to 
reproduce itself economically and socially.
The expansion of capital is never just the universalisation of exchange 
relations; it is also the expansion of capitalist social relations, generating a 
system of universal ‘interdependence mediated by things’. Commodities moving 
across boundaries not only embody particular social relations, they also socialise 
the relations between those who are thereby brought into contact. Capitalism is 
constitutive not just of a world market in which goods cross boundaries, but of a 
global(ising) civil society as well.
1,5. The Territorial State and the World Market (A First Cut)
At this point, we have to confront some old yet still depressingly pertinent 
questions about the ability of historical materialism to provide a theory of the 
intemational system.^* So far, I have shown that Marx’s understanding of capital 
allows us to excavate a system of global social relations beneath the institutional 
order of modemity. But can Marxism ever develop a theory of modemity as such, 
rather than of its economic stmcture? In particular, can Marxism account for the 
role of the state and the interstate system in modem history, or does it simply 
replace state-centrism with class-centrism or economic determinism and 
substitute a transhistorical evolutionism for the ahistorical theories still dominant 
in IR and sociology?
These questions are of central importance to the present attempt to develop a 
historical materialist theory of modem intemational relations by situating them in 
the broader perspective of the rise and development of capitalism. They become 
all the more pertinent if we remind ourselves that Marx’s vision of increasing
28 Cf. Linklater 1996, 120; Mann 1988, 140; Giddens 1985, 26.
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‘universal interdependence’ has not actually fared all that well during the 100 
years since Capital was published. Despite the assertion of some Marxists that 
there cannot be much that is new about today’s ‘globalisation’ as Marx already 
described its fundamental aspects 150 years ago, it is clear that Marx himself 
expected this process to be much more linear than it turned out, anticipating it to 
be ruptured by a communist world revolution rather than to be transformed by 
the strengthening of nation-states and their boundaries.
While it is therefore necessary to insist on the transnational nature of 
capitalism, and to challenge the prevailing sociologism which can only conceive 
of society in unitary terms, either as a bounded national society or a single global 
society, our understanding of capitalist modemity and its intemational system 
cannot be simply transnational. As Fred Halliday notes:
To stress the broader, capitalist, character o f the intemational system is not to argue that the 
social relations are in any simple sense transnational. Marx in the nineteenth century and 
much apparently contemporary sociological thinking make the same mistake in assuming 
that the state was simply being swamped by transnational processes.^^
The stmcturation of capitalism’s social relations cannot be understood in 
abstraction from the (changing) role of the state in the spatial and social 
reproduction of capital. And the capitalist state, at least so far, only exists as a 
‘national’ or ‘territorial’ state. But if this is the case, are capitalist social relations 
national or transnational? I suggest that in resolving this question we do not have 
to follow the globalisation thesis into positing successive stages in which either 
intemational or global aspects prevail; this would do justice to neither ‘stage’. 
Instead, capitalist social relations may be seen as simultaneously transnational 
and national/intem ationalThe cmcial theoretical and historical issue is then 
the dialectic of nationalisation and globalisation, which is, in different forms, 
present through modem history.^'
29 Halliday 1994, 92.
30 ‘National/intemational’: for those who regard social relations as primarily ‘national’ in
character, the ‘international’ is directly implied by this concept as an impoverished
realm o f non-society. No state was ever completely autarkic, but in as much as the 
relations between states are conceptualised as inter-national, the relations between 
state/society complexes are regarded as regulated by states. ‘The national’ and ‘the 
international’ are thus, in traditional IR theory, two sides of the same coin which both 
describe (or posit) the dominance o f territorial states in social life.
31 Compare Linklater who emphasises the “dialectic o f globalisation and fragmentation” in
modemity; Linklater 1996, 120.
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In this vein, Peter Burnham suggests that contemporary ‘globalisation’ may be 
seen as but one particular instance of the ongoing “national processing of global 
class relations”/^ Moreover, as the very possibility of capitalism is premised on 
the abstraction of political coercion from the process of production and surplus 
extraction, the national state and the world market are necessary social forms 
through which the capital relation is constituted. As Simon Bromley argues, “the 
historical spread and social reproduction of these new types of social relations ... 
accounts for both the national form and for the universal interdependence of 
global capitalism”.^  ^ But Bromley also adds that the development of global 
capitalism was uneven, stemming from both the universalisation of capital 
relations and the pressures of interstate competition, a process that Marx failed to 
theorise. Within this context, clealy, we have to situate the strengthening of state 
apparatuses since the late nineteenth century. Crucially, however, this process 
was itself part of the further globalisation of capital:
the growth o f regulatory bodies and practices has, on the whole, served to provide the 
conditions for the expanded reproduction o f capital on a global scale, thereby underwriting 
the sovereign form o f political power that is the basis o f the liberal capitalist states system.^'*
But while these arguments accurately point to the close relation between the 
sovereign state and the world market in capitalist modemity, it is far from clear 
whether they are sufficient to establish the necessity of the capitalist state being a 
national state, and thus to explain why capitalist political space is and needs to be 
fragmented territorially. What is there in the capital relation, premised as it is on 
the separation of politics and economics, that requires ‘the capitalist state’ to be 
a territorially bounded, national state? Put differently, why exactly does the 
capital relation exist not only in the form of institutionally separated political and 
economic spheres, but also through differentiated internal and external realms? 
Marxists seem to focus on the former, while taking the latter for granted, thereby 
accepting too quickly that the capitalist state has to be a national state simply 
because the capitalist state is a national state. In this sense, Marxism, too, is 
caught in the “territorial trap”.^ ^
32 Burnham 1994,
33 Bromley 1999, 287.
34 Bromley 1999, 300.
35 Cf. Agnew 1994, 69.
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1.6. The Case for * Epochal Theory*
The globalisation thesis posits an altemative between national and global 
forms of society; it suggests that we are currently moving (or have already 
moved) from one stage to another, leaving 'international relations’ behind. A 
historical materialist understanding of the nature of capitalism, I have argued, 
problematises the national/global dichotomy, as it highlights both the national 
and the transnational aspects of capitalism’s historical existence.
For a Marxist theory of IR/IPE, this raises two fundamental problems. The first 
is to develop a theory of the different regimes of capitalist space produced in the 
‘national processing of global capitalism’. To insist that capitalism was always, 
in some sense, global (just as it always was national/intemational), is not to argue 
that it was always global (and national/intemational) in the same way. The point 
is that the real socio-spatial differences in the process of capitalist development 
cannot be grasped adequately through the national-global dichotomy, but require 
a more complex and differentiated conceptualisation of the distinct ‘geo- 
economic’ regimes in which the national and the global have become articulated 
in specific historical forms. This presupposes, secondly, that we have found an 
answer to the rather more fundamental problem, which is concisely formulated 
by Halliday:
why, if there is a world economy in which class interests operate transnationally, there is a 
need for states at all. What, in other words, is the specificity and effectivity o f distinct states 
within a single economic totality?^^
Neither of these questions can be answered by narrowing our perspective to 
the explanation of ‘intemational change’. They require a broad theory of 
historical transformation within which the emergence and development of the 
intemational system and the world economy can be situated. More specifically, 
such a theory has to be able to conceptualise capitalist modemity as, on the one 
hand, a distinctive (and perhaps even unique) form of organising social relations, 
and, on the other hand, to account for the spatial and temporal changes and 
variations within the institutions and dynamics of this historical epoch. Historical
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materialism has from the outset aspired to provide such a theory of fundamental 
and conjunctural historical change. Yet its efforts have been marred not just by 
its inability to explain the existence of a capitalist intemational system, but by 
more fundamental evolutionistic and economistic tendencies, as well as its 
association with positivist models of ‘scientific’ research. Should we, therefore, 
turn to the alternatives to historical materialism, which according to their 
proponents provide the basis for non-reductionist historical sociologies of 
modemity?
Martin Albrow recently issued a call for a return to “epochal theory”, which 
recognises and theorises the mptures between historical periods, such as the 
current break between ‘modemity’ and ‘globality’. While the equation of 
modemity with the ultimate dominance of the nation-state that underlies 
Albrow’s theory of globalisation is simplistic (and thus the particular historical 
break he identifies questionable), the need for “epochal narratives” is accurately 
identified. Though this may be seen as a reinstatement of naïve models of 
historical progress and teleology, the intention is exactly the opposite.
According to Albrow, it was Marx’s original theory of epochal transformation, 
based on a particular ‘science’ of history and a prediction of imminent social 
revolution, that provoked the elaboration of non-historical (and even anti- 
historical) theories of social development. Albrow traces this theoretical 
tendency, which stressed the continuity of the past in order to make plausible the 
expectation of future continuity, back to Max Weber. Weber rejected what he 
saw as Marx’s single-factor explanation of social change, arguing that social 
processes can have many different causes and that different spheres of society 
ultimately followed autonomous logics. But undemeath the complexity of causal 
connections, Weber posited the “guiding thread” of the rationalisation of all 
spheres of social life, leading from Greek philosophy to, inter alia, modem 
capitalism and the modem state. In this perspective, “the future stretches out as a 
limitless expansion of more of the same, an intensification (Steigerung) of 
rationality”.^  ^ By the same token, the past is like the present, if not yet to the
36 Halliday 1994, 91.
37 Albrow 1996, 17. The ‘limitless modernity’ approach is brought to its logical conclusion 
in Michael Mann’s work, which sets out from the assumption that “[h]uman beings are
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same degree. Thus, modemity is less a particular epoch than a “cultural condition 
of the West”; modernity became “limitless”, without a real beginning and 
without a conceivable end/^ Albrow adds:
Effectively, then, it was social scientists, in tune with the times, sometimes following, 
sometimes independently replicating Weber, who promoted the limitless modemity notion. 
They responded to Marx by discarding his theory o f epochal change, making their science 
into a study o f the present as an unbroken continuation of the past.^^
But if Albrow emphasises historical mptures, he rejects any return to the 
Marxist conceptualisation of historical development: the “impetus for change 
may originate equally in religion as in the economy, in disease as in ideas. To 
this extent, Weber’s multiple factor account remains intact”. Moreover, Marx 
misunderstood modemity when he reduced it to capitalism: “No age can be 
reduced to a single sphere”.'^® Modemity, Albrow points out, is “more than a 
production process, or even an economic system”."*' Unfortunately, Albrow 
himself remains within the parameters of the rationalisation model he criticises 
so eloquently when he conceptualises the transition from modemity to globality 
in terms of the ongoing process of rationalisation."*^ Even more importantly, 
however, he never establishes an altemative to the rationalisation model to 
explain the rise of the sovereign, territorial state, and of the capitalist economy.
A Marxist perspective might provide such an altemative by starting from the 
observation that capitalism itself cannot not be understood as rational economic 
activity. Capitalism is not the rational pursuit of market opportunities. Capitalism 
is a system of power relations which impersonally compels people to reproduce 
themselves materially by selling commodities (including their labour power) in
restless, purposive, and rational, striving to increase their enjoyment o f the good things 
of life and capable o f choosing and pursuing appropriate means for doing so” ; Mann 
1986, 4. It is not surprising that on the basis o f his methodological rationalism and 
individualism, Mann should reject not only the idea o f a ‘postmodern rupture’ in 
connection with globalisation, but also to downplay the epochal significance of 
modemity itself; cf. Mann 1993, 11-12.
38 Albrow 1996, 18.
39 Albrow 1996, 18.
40 Albrow 1996, 20; this statement does not prevent Albrow from adding: “Moreover, if
one sphere has exercised more o f a defining quality, it has been the nation-state rather 
than the economy”; ibid.
41 Albrow 1996, 30.
42 The rupture which the transition to globality signals is defined, for Albrow, by the
exhaustion o f the state as the main promoter o f rationality, due to the universalisation of
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the market. Two implications should be highlighted here, though they will be 
developed theoretically and historically in later chapters. Firstly, capitalism 
cannot be ‘a single sphere’, for the very possibility of capitalist production and 
exploitation is a reorganisation of social power in toto. The explanation of how 
people become dependent on the market for their livelihood cannot be found in 
the economic sphere alone. For the economy to become an insulated realm in 
which the private control over economic forms of property (the ‘means of 
production’) mediates the appropriation of surplus, is only possible within a 
society of a new and very distinctive type: a capitalist society.
Secondly, the rise of capitalist society cannot be interpreted in terms of the 
increasing rationality of individuals, or the rationalisation of institutions which 
would allow individuals to achieve given economic ends efficiently. In 
explaining the rise of capitalist society, we can neither assume an autonomous 
economic sphere, nor an irreducible economic rationality. Consequently, those 
who, like Albrow, endorse Max Weber’s multi-factor approach can no longer 
take the most crucial step in achieving a genuinely ‘epochal theory’ that would 
put a premium on the radical differences between historical epochs. For by 
accepting the notion that all social life is differentiated into autonomous spheres 
of politics, economics, society, culture, etc., they fail to address the implications 
of Thomson’s crucial argument (and of an increasing number of social and 
intemational theorists, including historical sociologists like Anthony Giddens) 
that the separation of politics and economics, at least, is specific to modemity.'^^
If this argument has any pertinence, then Weberian pluralism, just like the 
Marxist base/superstmcture model, imposes the categorial framework of 
capitalist modemity onto pre-modem societies. A particular historical form of 
social organisation is thus ‘ontologised’, and historical analysis reduced to 
establishing the interaction or articulation of these stmctures. Whether such 
analyses are mono- or multi-causal, the histories they generate are essentially
statehood itself; but the end of the process o f rationalisation has not, thereby, been 
reached; Albrow 1996, 37, 55 and 64.
43 Thomson 1995, 222; cf. Giddens 1985, 67; Elias 1976, 55; Polanyi 1957, ch. 4; 
Anderson 1974, ch. 1.
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ahistorical and implicitly teleological/'^ Thus, much of Marxist analysis replaces 
the rationalisation model with the ‘dialectic’ of the forces and relations of 
production. This ‘basic law’ of historical materialism seems to posit precisely the 
independent economic logic which cannot be assumed before the rise of 
capitalism. In that sense, Marxism may be characterised by what Karl Polanyi 
has termed the “economistic fallacy”: under the impression of modem 
capitalism’s extraordinary productiveness, it has taken the unique dynamism of 
the insulated capitalist economy in modemity to be representative of all forms of 
society."*^
If Marxism is to overcome this limitation, it has to question the 
base/superstructure model of social change, to revise its understanding of 
historical change, and to put the radical historicity of capitalist modemity at the 
very centre of its theoretical and historical efforts. This may require a 
fundamental revision of the Marxist model of historical development as a 
necessary and predetermined succession of stages of development leading by 
necessity to capitalism -  a model of social change, incidentally, that Marx 
appropriated from the mechanical materialist stages theory of classical political 
economy (adding the perspective of a transition to socialism).'^^
The reconstmction of historical materialism also presupposes a critique of the 
positivist tendencies to which many Marxist approaches are prone. So far, I have 
sought to establish that Marxism does not necessarily have to be a ‘single-factor’ 
theory. This also entails an epistemological perspective which is very different 
from the causal one ascribed to Marxism by its critics. Max Weber, for instance, 
took issue with “the common materialist view of history, that the ‘economic’ is 
in some sense an ‘ultimate’ in the chain of causation”; this he regarded as “totally
44 According to Karel Kosik, the choice between mono-causal and multi-causal 
methodologies “is itself the consequence o f a particular view o f reality. This view has 
first extracted certain isolated abstractions from social reality, promoted them to 
ontological existents (factors), and then backtracked and introduced these metaphysical 
constructs into various contexts, interactions or causal dependences”; Kosik 1976, 64.
45 Cf. Block and Somers 1984, 63 ; Giddens 185, 33: Marx’s “mistake was to suppose that 
the West, prior to the origins o f capitalism, was any more dynamic, or ‘progressive’ than 
other class-divided societies have been. It is only with the arrival o f capitalism, more 
particularly industrial capitalism, that the pace o f social change becomes really 
dramatic”.
46 Comninel 1987, 146-55
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worthless as a scientific statement”/^ He also provides the inspiration to many of 
today’s ‘constructivists’, who claim that while “material interests” are of great 
importance to the explanation of social processes, only an inclusion of “ideal 
interests” could capture their full complexity/^ According to Ruggie, Weber 
sought to avoid the pitfalls of both the
subjectivism of the German Historical School and the positivism o f the Austrian Theoretical 
School (marginal utility theory) and Marxism. Although the latter two differed in many 
respects, both sought to reduce problems o f social action and social order to material 
interests, and both embraced a naturalistic monism -  that is, the belief that the natural 
sciences embody the only valid model o f science to which the social sciences should, 
therefore, aspire.'*^
Marx’s work is undeniably marked by deep ambiguities and even 
contradictions. The charges of positivism and economism can only stick because 
they can be backed up by textual evidence. Marx frequently invokes the 
‘immutable’, ‘inevitable’ and ‘iron’ laws of capitalist (rather than general social) 
development. To be sure, these laws have a completely different epistemological 
status from those elaborated by positivists, in that they are not universally valid 
but only with a particular form of society, and only as long as individuals find 
themselves in those historical relations which produce as an outcome the pattems 
which Marx describes as laws. Yet they remain uncomfortably nomothetical in 
form, seemingly asserting that the ‘facts’ of capitalist development follow 
inevitably from unchanging causes. And even if the laws of the capitalist mode 
of production are to be regarded as the laws of a specific historical epoch, there 
remains Marx’s own notorious summary of his method in the Preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique o f  Political Economy, which clearly states laws of 
historical development. Here, he asserts the transhistorical primacy of the
47 Quoted in Mommsen 1985, 239. Gramsci noted laconically: “It often happens that 
people combat historical economism in the belief that they are attacking historical 
materialism”; Gramsci 1971, 163. This point unfortunately continues to apply today. 
John M. Hobson feels compelled to insist: “if  a theory is not class-reductionist, then it’s 
not Marxist. And if it is class-reductionist, it’s flawed”; Hobson 1997, 226. But 
dogmatism is no preserve o f Marxists, and the ritual chanting o f ‘multi-causality’ no 
magic spell against its temptations.
48 Cf. Wendt 1999, 92-96.
49 Cf. Ruggie 1999, 219. It is not completely clear, whether Ruggie accepts this view of 
Marxism which he ascribes to Weber. It should be noted that, like Wendt, Ruggie’s own 
perspective, demonstrates a “continuing commitment to a unity-of-science thesis and the 
pursuit o f a theory o f intemational reality based on positivist basic assumptions”; 
George 1994, 127. Also compare Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1999a, 35-38.
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economic base over the political, legal and ideological superstructures; he 
specifies a model of law-like and necessary evolution of different ‘modes of 
production’; and he posits a mechanism of historical development driven by the 
contradictions between the ‘forces’ and ‘relations’ of production/^
There are also, of course, numerous theoretical statements in Marx’s work (as 
well as the body of his historical and journalistic analyses),^' which point in the 
opposite direction and which suggest a much more radical anti-positivism (based 
on a form of dialectical reasoning) than his critics have been able to recognise/^ 
Thus, while Marx stressed the ‘natural laws’ of capitalism, he also made it clear 
that these laws only obtained as long as individuals were not the masters of the 
social order which forced them into relationships with each other that produced 
as their outcome these laws. While we do find Marx accepting, often too quickly, 
it is true, the laws of political economy as ‘surface’ phenomena, the intention 
was a critical one: to show that these laws are only natural as long as they are 
accepted as natural.T heir naturalisation was precisely the effect of the positivist 
social sciences (and certainly not one that has decreased in importance today), 
which do not inquire into the underlying historical system of social relations, but 
construct a relationship between ‘facts’ in a purely external way, as ‘factors’ 
influencing each other. It is not surprising that these social scientists, among 
which we may count Weber, have read Marx as if he was positing the same sort
50 Marx 1978a, 4-5.
51 At least according to Antonio Gramsci, the “claim, presented as an essential postulate o f 
historical materialism, that every fluctuation o f politics and ideology can be presented 
and expounded as an immediate expression o f the structure [the ‘economic base’], must 
be contested in theory as primitive infantilism, and debated in practice with the authentic 
testimony of Marx, the author o f concrete political and historical works” ; Gramsci 1971, 
407.
52 The social historian Jürgen Kocka, who ultimately remains closer to Weber than to 
Marx, notes that “whenever [Weber] focused on Marxism, he criticized a particular 
elaboration o f Marx’s theory but essentially missed M arx’s own position, from which 
the contemporary historical materialists had transgressed” (1985, 135). The same may 
be said about many o f today’s critics o f Marxism; there is, however, less excuse for 
them today than there may have been for Weber, who did actually write in a period 
when Marxism had become heavily positivistic (under the influence, it should be noted, 
o f the same neo-Kantianism which has also profotmdly influenced Weber himself). 
Kocka concludes that there are important similarities in both approaches. Hayward 
Alker similarly argues that both Marx and Weber could be seen as “exemplary writers” 
in the tradition o f a “interpretative/constructivist social science” (1996, 15).
53 According to Giddens, a non-positivistic interpretation o f Capital can take its starting 
point from the observation that “for Marx the existence o f capitalism is predicated upon
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of laws (or correlations) that they were seeking to ‘discover’. But for Marx, 
social laws were not statements about the causal relationship between analytical 
abstractions under which specific ‘cases’ or ‘instances’ could be subsumed. 
Thus, as one Weberian historical sociologist notes perceptively:
It is true, for Marx, that history did not have an unlimited plasticity. However, the ‘eternal 
laws’ which Weber ascribed to him are not in Marx’s thought. When Weber accused the 
historical materialists o f having an ahistorical and monocausal notion o f law, he was not 
criticizing Marx, but rather those who interpreted him rigidly and non-dialectically. O f 
course, Marx didn’t always follow his own historical-dialectic approach, and above all 
M arx’s concept o f the relation of the universal and the particular in history can be 
understood only on the basis o f its origins in Hegelian logic. By the turn o f the century and 
especially in the decades following, such concepts were interpreted by a public which no 
longer shared the assumptions and insights o f Hegelian logic; even Weber may have 
succumbed to this type of misunderstanding.^"*
Similarly, while Marx is adamant that idealism cannot yield an explanation of 
historical development, it should be noted that the ‘idealism’ he criticised was 
not one which asserts that norms, values or ideas influence social processes. 
Marx’s main point of reference was the Hegelian notion of the ‘Absolute Idea’ 
coming to an increasing self-consciousness of itself through the movement of 
history, realizing itself in progressive stages of materialisation. Thus, when he 
notes that it is not consciousness which determines being, but being that 
determines consciousness, he opposes mainly the idea that the empirical world is 
the product of mind, of a consciousness which increasingly develops towards 
ever higher stages of self-consciousness and self-realisation in an autonomous 
process of philosophical progress.
This consciousness is not the consciousness of individuals; it is “an 
independently-acting historical subject in its own right”. For Marx, by contrast, 
the subjects of history are “real, living individuals” endowed with a 
consciousness through which they seek to come to terms with the conditions in 
which human beings find themselves situated and gain their livelihood.People 
gain consciousness of their world in experiencing the conditions under which
the prevalence o f reification, such that the laws o f the valorisation and accumulation of 
capital appear to have the status o f ‘iron laws’”; Giddens 1981, 234.
54 Kocka 1985, 139-40. Note that dialectics is largely absent fi'om today’s meta-theoretical 
debates in IR. Even were alternatives to positivism are recovered, as in Smith and 
Hollis’ valuable Explaining and Understanding International Relations (1991), the 
dialectical altemative finds scant attention (but see Heine and Teschke 1996).
55 Sayer 1989, 86.
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they live - their possibilities and their limits - in the effort to transform these 
conditions. For Marx, every form of human praxis involves ideas through which 
people seek to make sense of their actions and the contexts within which they 
take place. But while their ideas and their consciousness will never be 
independent from their experiences, they are “not to be understood as an effect of 
‘material existence’”, dictated by the economic ‘base’.^ ^
1.7. Conclusion
This chapter began with Realism’s response to globalisation and ended with 
Marxist epistemology. The link between both is the pressing need for theories 
which can come to terms with social and intemational transformations, as well as 
continuities. I have argued that this requires a re-engagement with the category of 
modemity, especially in as much as modemity is conceptualised as premised on 
the national caging of social relations. Highlighting the inherently transnational 
character of capital as a social relation, I have argued for a perspective which 
recognises the existence of a ‘global society’. But this capitalist global society 
cannot be understood as somehow prior and anterior to the states which stmcture 
it politically. Marxists have argued that sovereign states are the necessary 
political form of existence of global capital (just as the world market is its 
necessary economic form); they are unable to explain, however, why the 
capitalist state could not be, for instance, a global state.
To develop a historical materialist theory of capitalist intemational relations 
which would enable us to better understand the dialectics of nationalisation and 
globalisation inherent in capitalist development up to now, and its possible 
future, we have to tackle some fundamental problems with Marxism itself. In the 
face of rampant economic determinism of much liberal globalisation analysis, the 
challenge for historical materialism is today to vigorously develop the non- 
economistic, non-reductionist, and anti-positivist resources which the Marxist 
tradition provides. This task cannot be achieved by appealing to the authority of 
Marx. A viable historical materialism cannot be founded on a reinterpretation of
56 Kocka 1985, 138.
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‘what Marx really said’, not only because capitalism has changed since the mid­
nineteenth century, but because Marx’s work is itself always incomplete, often 
ambiguous and not infrequently contradictory.”
Over the next three chapters, I will examine different approaches to Marxism 
with respect to their contributions to a reconstructed historical materialism, 
which in turn provides the basis for a Marxist theory of the modem intemational 
system. Each of the approaches surveyed starts from the rejection of economic 
determinism; each is concemed with the development of a historical materialist 
account of specific historical epochs, and thus with the distinctiveness of social 
orders; and each seeks to comprehend historical epochs as social totalities. Their 
answers are, however, very different. Engaging first with the highly influential 
attempts to achieve such a reconstmction of materialism through the emphasis on 
the reciprocity between base and superstmcture (many of which, from Althusser 
and Poulantzas to Robert Cox, take their cue from Antonio Gramsci), I will 
suggest that a more promising way out of the economistic comer is that taken by 
those Marxists who emphasise the imbrication (E.P. Thompson) of the 
‘superstructures’ in the ‘base’ itself. These latter approaches seek to transcend 
the base/superstmcture model itself, rather than to render it more interactive.
57 Cf. Gouldner 1980, ch. 2.
2. THEORISTS OF THE SUPERSTRUCTURE: 
FROM GRAMSCI TO ALTHUSSER AND 
BEYOND
2.1, The Grams dan Legacy
No name is more firmly associated with the development of the non-positivist 
and non-economistic potentials of historical materialism than that of Antonio 
Gramsci. Having fallen into relative obscurity after his premature death in a 
fascist prison, his thought emerged at the centre of critical Marxist thinking in 
the 1970s. It seemed to provide the foundations for a historical materialism 
which could take account of the often decisive importance of ‘superstructuraf 
processes in historical development, especially the formation of hegemonic ideas 
and institutions in the political and social spheres, without denying the “decisive 
nucleus of economic activity” on which hegemony must be based.’
For Gramsci, the key question for a historical materialism appropriate to the 
changed circumstances of the 1920s (and especially those prevailing in Italy) 
arose directly out of his experience as leader of a revolutionary communist party: 
how to explain the overwhelming failure of revolutionary aspirations in western 
Europe, following the one victorious revolution in backward Russia. He 
highlighted the role of the ‘superstructures’, among which he counted ‘civil 
society’, in strengthening the defences of the western bourgeoisies against 
revolutionary movements. This has two important implications, both of which 
became central concems for those ‘neo-Gramscian’ theorists who, in the 1970s, 
built on Gramsci’s pioneering work. Firstly, Gramsci highlights the crucial role 
of religion, ideology, politics and other supposedly superstructural aspects of the 
capitalist mode of production in the reproduction of existing social relations. 
Secondly, the concrete form and content of these superstmctures are not simply 
given by the ‘economic stmcture’, but can vary considerably. This in turn must
Gramsci 1971, 161.
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have consequences not only for the way in which capitalism works, but also for 
the possibility of revolution in any particular historical situation.
These two lines of argument merge in what is, without question, Gramsci’s 
main contribution to historical materialism: the theory of the ‘extended state’ that 
organises social hegemony. For Gramsci, the role of the state in the reproduction 
of capitalist class relations can hardly be captured if it is regarded as 
epiphenomenal to the development of the ‘forces of production’; nor can the state 
be comprehended, in the time-honoured Marxist fashion, as simply an instrument 
of repression. If the bourgeoisie is still the dominant class, able to extract value 
and to limit the democratic and collective control of people over all the social 
conditions under which they have to maintain and lead their lives, then the 
explanation of this persistence in the face of class struggle and capitalism’s 
internal economic contradictions must be looked for in some deeper mechanism 
of social integration. This mechanism is the extension of hegemony through 
successive ‘passive revolutions’.^
This strategy is based both on ‘economic-corporative’ concessions to those 
classes which could challenge the reproduction of capitalism, and through the 
promotion of a cultural framework which generates legitimacy for this system by 
giving it the semblance of universality. The construction of hegemony, according 
to Gramsci, is not the work of the institutions of government alone, but is rooted 
in civil society. Indeed, in as much as schools, churches, parties, the media, and 
so on, are actively elaborating the common-sensical notions of what is possible 
and rational (and what is not), they should be seen as part of the state. This 
‘extended state’ thus becomes an agent of hegemony whose ability to reproduce 
capital depends both on its control over the means of coercion and its role in the 
creation of social consent.^
The implication is, of course, that revolutionary strategy cannot simply be 
directed at gaining control of the government apparatus; at least where capitalism
2 Cf. Camoy 1984, 76.
3 This formulation deliberately keeps the exact nature o f the relationships between
consent and coercion, state and civil society, as well as hegemony and dominance,
underspecified. Perry Anderson has pointed out the vagueness o f Gramsci's basic
concepts and explored the diverging political implications in great detail; Anderson 
1976.
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has deep roots in civil society, the precondition for successful revolution is a 
general revolutionary consciousness which has left behind the existing common 
sense and established a new hegemony in civil society. The battleground of 
social transformation thus turns out to be a cultural one, as “it is on the level of 
ideologies that men become conscious of conflicts in the world of the economy”. 
The economy itself is determinative of historical development only “in the last 
analysis”.'^  The historical process itself can never be a mere matter of progression 
from an initial stage to a pre-determined telos, as history does not move without 
conscious human praxis.
For Gramsci, this precludes the possibility of subsuming history under some 
‘scientific’ laws of evolution. The challenge for historical materialism was thus 
not the explication of the ‘objective situation’ in which a swift revolution could 
be successful, given the objective laws of history, but to demystify the system of 
seeming ‘necessities’ which confronted men and women as apparently objective 
facts and unchangeable processes. Ultimately, the purpose was to contribute to 
the long struggle through which subordinate classes would regain consciousness 
of their own collective subjectivity, enabling them to become agents of a radical 
social transformation.^
The anti-positivist and culturalist aspects of Gramsci’s thought have proven 
most fertile to the Marxist tradition, even though Gramsci’s influence has waned 
considerably over the last 15 years as the antinomies and limitations of his 
approach have become clearer. As Germain and Kenny note:
While Gramsci did indeed reconceive and in some ways surpass classical Marxist 
understandings o f base and superstructure, he did not provide a tight altemative model in 
their stead. Rather he moved towards a reading o f the superstructure which took far more 
seriously the different levels and domains o f social power, and which recognised culture and 
ideology as partly constitutive o f identity and hegemony.^
Gramsci, in other words, did not transcend the base/superstructure model, 
though he made it more interactive. Germain and Kenny consider Gramsci’s 
“epistemological and ontological ideas as innovative and eclectic but ultimately 
problematic”, as his subversion of the ‘binary’ understanding of the material and
4 The former quote paraphrases Marx, the latter Engels; Gramsci repeatedly comes back
to these two quotes throughout the Prison Notebooks; Gramsci 1971, 162.
5 Cf. Femia 1987, 76-80.
6 Germain and Kenny 1998, 12.
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the ideal never really transcended the dichotomy itself/ I will suggest in this 
chapter that the same is true for those Marxist approaches which have built in 
various ways on the thought of Antonio Gramsci.
A further, though related, problem is that Gramsci does not, in fact, provide a 
theory of the state form, as he focused exclusively on its concrete, historically 
defined functions, which he saw as deriving from the balance of class forces in 
any particular conjuncture. This leaves open some crucial questions about the 
relationship between the state, the economy and ‘civil society’ in a historical 
society in which surplus appropriation primarily takes a non-political form. It 
may be argued that Gramsci, by taking as his level of abstraction the concrete 
‘historical situation’ rather than the structure of capitalist society, adds important 
considerations to Marxism, but that he also takes too many aspects of both 
capitalist modemity and the Marxist conceptualisation of capital accumulation 
for granted.
The systematic conceptualisation of the structure of the capitalist mode of 
production was, however, very much at the centre of the work of Louis 
Althusser, who shared with Gramsci the rejection of all forms of economism. 
Moreover, Althusser explicitly sought to theorise the peculiarity of the capitalist 
state as having “relative autonomy”, and further developed the emphasis on the 
importance of the superstmctures for the reproduction of capitalism. In this 
connection, he also drew directly on Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and the 
extended state, which appear in his work in the form of “ideological state 
apparatuses” (schools, media, unions, etc.).* These institutions, whether the 
“repressive state apparatus” of the government or the ‘ideological state 
apparatuses’ of civil society, all contribute to the reproduction of the ‘stmctural 
whole’, and render irrelevant the question whether these state functions are 
provided by public or private institutions. The distinction between civil society 
and the state becomes redundant (though not that between politics and
7 Germain and Kenny 1998, 12; of. Anderson 1976, 26-27.
8 Having established the relevance o f the superstructural levels in the ‘sacred texts’ of
Marx and Engels, Althusser argues that it was only Gramsci who pursued these 
arguments and contributed to their theorisation through the concept o f hegemony; 
Althusser 1970, 114 and fii. 29. The Gramscian influence on Althusser and, especially,
Poulantzas, is analysed by Camoy 1984, 89-127 and Thomas 1994, ch. 5; also see
Jessop 1982, 153.
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economics, which Althusser regarded as distinct from this relationship and 
characteristic of capitalism).
Despite these direct and indirect links, Althusser was not, of course, a ‘neo- 
Gramscian’ in any straightforward sense. Indeed, Gramsci represented the 
historicist and humanistic Marxism that Althusser, above all, detested and sought 
to expunge as a corruption of ‘true’ Marxism and a mockery of the ‘real’ Marx. 
Yet it was the fusion of Althusserian and Gramscian elements which is, more 
than any other theoretical heritage, responsible for the various Marxisms and 
especially post-Marxisms which developed since the 1970s and continue to exert 
their influence today. When the reaction against the structural determinism, 
which Althusser had traded in for the traditional economic determinism, set in, it 
was to Gramsci that Marxist theorists turned. Poulantzas, especially in his later 
work, led the way by emphasising the role of “power blocs” in organising 
ideological consensus. In trying to account for the concrete development of 
capitalism in particular conjunctures, Poulantzas and soon after the theorists of 
‘regulation’, hesitantly turned their back on Althusser’s self-evolving structures, 
and began to emphasise that the ideological integration of capitalist social 
formations is a political project.
But while the re-engagement with Gramsci reinforced a new emphasis on the 
level of the ‘conjuncture’ rather than the abstract level of the ‘mode of 
production’, the parameters for the historicisation and périodisation of capitalism 
were still set by Althusser. In Poulantzas’s later work, this leads to a tension 
between functionalism and voluntarism. Much of the development of Marxism 
since the late 1970s can be understood as an attempt to resolve this tension. I will 
argue in this chapter that this tension can only be eased, within the parameters of 
this perspective, by delinking the ‘conjuncture’ or ‘social formation’ from the 
‘mode of production’. Such a delinking has indeed been the dominant tendency 
within the Regulation School, which took its cue from Althusser and Poulantzas. 
It finds its conclusion in the work of Robert W. Cox, who finally takes ‘historical 
structures’ rather than ‘modes of production’ as the basis for the périodisation of 
world history.
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2,2. A Science of Structures: From Althusser to Poulantzas
2.2.1. History without Subjects: Louis Althusser
By acknowledging the reality of the superstructures of a mode of production, 
and by relegating the economic level to a determinant of a social formation only 
“in the last instance”, Althusser was able to contribute to the revitalisation of a 
Marxism that had, in many of its forms, capitulated to the mechanistic ‘dialectic’ 
of the forces and relations of production. His approach also appeared to 
overcome the theoretical weaknesses of the other great current, Hegelian 
Marxism, especially the persistent voluntarism that was implicit in its core 
concept, the ‘expressive totality’.^  Against all forms of humanism and 
historicism, Althusser argues that Marxism is a science of structures. Structures, 
not the agency of any historical subject, have to be the focus of theoretical and 
historical analysis, as the qualities or properties of actors are always the functions 
of social structures.
The structure o f the relations o f production determines the place and functions occupied and 
adopted by the agents o f production, who are never anything more than the occupants of 
these places, in so far as they are the supports (Trager) o f these functions. The true ‘subjects’ 
(in the sense o f constitutive subjects o f the process) are therefore not these occupants or 
functionaries, are not, despite all appearances ... ‘concrete individuals’, ‘real men’ - but the 
definition and distribution o f  these places andfunctions.
Social practices can be completely reduced to their role in the reproduction of 
the three structural ‘regions’ which exist in any mode of production: the political, 
the economic, and the ideological (even though it is only in capitalism that ‘the 
political’ becomes ‘relatively autonomous’). The historical content of these 
practices is determined by the prevailing mode of production. The latter can be 
thought of as a “structure of structures” which assigns the particular functions to
9 This concept sees the superstructural forms o f society as expressing a single inner
essence. The phenomenological forms o f capitalist society, for instance, are the 
necessary forms in which the essence o f this society, usually the capital relation, finds 
expression. Martin Jay, in his fascinating reconstruction o f the ‘adventures o f the 
concept o f totality’ suggests that it was the exhaustion o f the concept o f ‘expressive
totality’ which led Marxists opposed to the orthodox formulation increasingly to search 
for alternatives to ‘Western Marxism’. Althusser’s was but one solution, others included 
the scientific Marxism o f de la Volpe and Colletti; Habermas’ post-dialectical critical 
theory may be seen as another such attempt; Jay 1984: 274-75.
10 Althusser and Balibar 1970, 180.
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the structural regions through which the mode of production as a whole is 
reproduced. Practice, in other words, cannot but reproduce the whole.
The whole is the mode of production, but for Althusser, a mode of production 
cannot be conceptualised completely in terms of the economic structural region. 
It will always include ideological and political levels which are functionally 
necessary for the reproduction of the relations of production. In this functionalist 
sense, the economy determines the social totality “in the last instance”, not least 
by specifying a “structure in dominance”, while at the same time allowing for the 
“relative autonomy” of the superstructural levels.” This reproduction of 
capitalism through the structuring of practices related to different moments of the 
totality is necessary because economic appropriation has to be maintained 
politically and justified ideologically. An economic region in which the direct 
producers cannot appropriate all created wealth themselves cannot reproduce 
itself without political and ideological practices which the base generated in 
order to maintain the whole.” The determination between the economic base and 
the economic, political and ideological levels is thus one of structural causation 
rather than one of instrumental disposal of the state by economic classes.”
Simon Clarke notes that the functionalist principle operating in Althusser’s 
Marxism makes the Althusserian ‘decentred’ notion of totality rather 
‘expressive’.” However, this is only half the picture. So far we have been 
concerned with the level of theory, applied to the mode o f  production rather than
11 Althusser 1970, 111-12.
12 cf. James 1990, 149. James adds: “The dominant instance o f a society is then that aspect
o f it which sustains the existing economic system by controlling and justifying its 
allocation of income and resources. And granted that particular modes o f production
will be more effectively legitimated by some practices than by others, the exact
character o f an economy will determine which instance is dominant” .
13 It is important to notice the twofold meaning o f the ‘economic’. First, as a region of 
society, together with the political and the ideological. Second, and more fundamentally, 
the economy can also appear, not as a sphere, region or level, but as the ‘base’, the mode 
of production. These are different substantial meanings o f the economy. This gets even 
more complicated as the economic region is also the structure in dominance o f the 
capitalist mode o f production. In other societies, other regions could be the structure 
which appears as socially dominant, i.e. the ideological in feudalism and the political in 
antiquity.
14 Clarke 1991a, 83 (fh. 18). Clarke also notes, that Poulantzas relaxes this functionalism, 
in that he sees a variety of superstructural forms as compatible with the needs o f any 
mode o f production.
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the actually existing social formations}^ But never, in empirical reality, has a 
mode of production had any concrete existence; never has a society been 
determined solely by the basic contradiction within a mode of production. In 
capitalist societies, for instance, the contradictions arising from the capital 
relation are overdetermined in multifarious ways. The levels of a capitalist social 
formation are never just determined structurally by the needs of capitalism. The 
internal contradictions of ‘the political’, for instance overdetermine the 
contradictions of the economic structure. Moreover, even in capitalist social 
formations, other modes of production, complete with their corresponding 
regional structures, exist in subordinate positions. The political level may 
incorporate moments of the political structures of different modes of production. 
One might even think of a situation where the political or ideological levels of a 
social formation with a dominant capitalist economy are still predominantly 
‘ feudal’.
The structural levels of social formations thus have their own history and their 
own temporality; they can exist in contradictory relationships with each other and 
with the economic base. Every level has, consequently, to be conceptualised 
independently as well as in conjunction with the other levels in order to capture 
the real diversity and complexity of a social formation at any moment of its 
existence. To study the conjuncture means therefore to analyse the concrete 
articulation of the different levels and instances, their hierarchical relations and 
complex overdetermination, and their function in this decentred totality. Change, 
however, is not the result of social agency, but of the interaction of the various 
regions and levels of a social formation. At the same time, social change is not 
the result of the playing-out of the fundamental economic contradiction itself as 
this is always overdetermined, and cannot therefore be understood immediately
15 This distinction is elaborated especially in Althusser and Balibar 1970.
16 In a social formation in which the dominant mode o f production is capitalist, it is thus 
perfectly possible to find that the ideological level is dominated by aristocratic values 
and ideas, which in turn will have severe consequences for the potential o f the 
development o f the economy, in which the feudal elements may fetter the development 
of the capitalist relations o f production.
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in terms of the general theory of the capitalist mode of production which Marx 
elaborated in Capital}^
The distinction between the abstractly determined mode of production and its 
laws, and the historical specificity of every conjunctural form in which the mode 
of production exists, seems to offer the possibility to insist on the primacy of the 
economic (if only in the last instance) while accounting for the obvious relevance 
of the superstructure. The promise of structural Marxism was its alleged ability 
to combine structural analysis with historical specificity, without lapsing into 
empiricism.
Whether Althusser’s Marxism can fulfil this promise must surely depend on its 
ability to specify the relation between theory and history in a way which lets the 
conjunctural level throw light on the structural, and vice versa, and so to 
“translate the determination of theoretical structures into the determination of 
historical structures”.'  ^ Yet it is precisely here that structural Marxism breaks 
down and issues into the most abstract speculation paired with the most 
empiricist description.^® It constructs the structural determinations purified “of 
any contamination by the obviousness of empirical history”, while the 
conjunctural level remains quite under-theorised.^' The abstractions of the mode 
of the production always remain abstract; they apply taxonomies derived from 
structural theory to empirical reality, but cannot absorb this reality. The real, 
concrete social formation, on the other hand, can only be understood in its 
singularity. The problem is thus not so much that Althusser neglects history, but 
that he neglects the relevance of history for social theory and vice versa. 
Structural Marxism consequently offers to historical materialism only the sharp 
“dualism between structure and history, absolute determinism and irreducible 
contingency”.^ ^
17 Althusser and Balibar 1970, 207. In that sense, then, Althusser can state that “the lonely 
hour o f the ‘last instance’ never comes”; ibid.
18 Thus Perry Anderson claims, against E.P. Thompson’s critique, that the concept o f the 
social formation is a not just a theoretical, but even a '‘'historiographic advance”; 
Anderson 1980, 68.
19 Comninel 1987, 83.
20 cf. Wood 1995a, 51.
21 Althusser and Balibar 1970, 105.
22 Wood 1995a, 5 1 .l t  may be noted that complete determination and absolute contingency 
are not necessarily all that different. The ability to taxonomically encompass this
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This dualism is at the heart of this approach’s inability to generate theories of 
social change and transformation. In order to account for change, it has to assume 
the existence, in a subordinate position, of the most developed mode of 
production in the most primitive social formation. History is then the inexorable 
rise to dominance of the capitalist mode of production. But even such 
evolutionism must, for want of agency that is not by necessity reproductive of 
existing arrangements, rely on the time-honoured Marxist (and liberal) conjuring 
trick of the development of the forces of production.^^ As soon as we turn from 
the reproduction of an existing mode of production in a complex social 
formation to the creation of a new society, structural Marxists have to promote 
the ‘last’ instance; the economy in its basest form, technology, is now the 
determining level. Althusserian Marxism only allows for description of social 
complexity and social change, not for its explanation. Comninel therefore 
concludes:
The inherent logical flaw o f the articulation o f modes o f production framework is a function 
o f its ahistorical nature: modes o f production can be elaborated in all their structuralist 
particulars, but no process exists to link and bridge them. Locating the modes o f production 
in historically detailed social formations, complete with complex ‘articulations’, in no way 
addresses what leads from one mode of production to the next. "^^
2.2.2. Lost Between Theory and History: Nicos Poulantzas 
While the further development of structural Marxism, especially in the work of 
Poulantzas, cannot pretend to solve this inability to theorise structural change, it 
may seem to offer the explanatory potentials at least for the analysis of 
conjunctural transformations within capitalism. By allowing for the 
transformative capacities of social classes within the limits of structural 
determination, he is able to question the automaticity of capitalist reproduction
complex overdetermined whole may be an advance over the economy-determines- 
everything type of ‘explanation’ of the orthodox Marxists; but the development of the 
actual relations between different levels o f a society is, as we have seen, only 
understandable contingently; whatever happens will be ‘explainable’ by some complex 
application of the law o f overdetermination, and can thus be understood in terms o f the 
functionalist necessity o f the changing articulation o f the mode o f production. O f course, 
to be able to explain everything is very much akin to explaining nothing at all.
23 Comninel 1987, 87.
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which Althusser seems to take for granted.^^ For if the totality is decentred, if 
political, economic, and ideological structures do not necessarily coincide in any 
social formation, then producing a ‘fit’ between these structures becomes a 
precondition for the reproduction of capitalism.
It is the function of the state to produce such a structural correspondence 
which is able to sustain an economic structure. The state has to integrate the 
whole by maintaining the ‘general interest’, which is, as this is a capitalist 
society, the interest of the capitalist class. But Poulantzas adds a further 
complication here: as the capitalist class is divided into different ‘fractions’, the 
task of the state is thus to produce a ‘power bloc’ which defines what counts for 
the general interest in a social formation.^^ Thus, different capitalist class 
fractions have to struggle for hegemony and in the process may have to make 
concessions to subordinate classes, in so far as they cannot simply disorganise 
them with the help of the repressive and ideological state apparatuses.^^ The state 
becomes reconstructed on the basis of the ‘general interest’ as constituted by a 
specific power bloc; but the state, in order to be able to fulfil its integrative 
function, also has to be an active party in the formation of a power bloc.^ ®
For Poulantzas, the state is thus not external to class; it is a condensation of the 
balance of class forces. The form o f state is rooted in the relations between social 
forces and their practice. Social practices thereby become divorced from the total 
structural determination they expressed in Althusser’s work. Structure and 
practice are different levels of the social whole. Yet the synthesis which
24 Comninel 1987, 88. Comninel goes on to question the notion that historical process can 
be understood in terms o f the progression o f modes o f production, especially if  these are 
limited to M arx’s five classical modes.
25 cf. Clarke 1991a, 86.
26 Clarke 1991b, 21.
27 Through the ‘power bloc’, dominant classes achieve hegemonic leadership o f a
temporary but firm alliance o f social forces which define the concrete forms in which the 
state maintains the cohesion o f society as a whole. In contrast to Althusser, who points 
mainly to the repressive and indoctrinating aspects o f the extended state, Poulantzas 
argues that the consensual side of hegemony should not be underestimated.
28 In later works, especially, Poulantzas insists that the role o f the state is not adequately
understood as a reflection o f the general interest as constructed in civil society. The state
is an active structure which is the crucial active element in the creation o f the power bloc
in a particular conjuncture: the “state itself is present in the generation o f class power; 
Poulantzas 1978, 45.
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Poulantzas offers is an uneasy one.^  ^ He leaves no doubt that he sees the 
construction of power blocs as concrete expressions of the ‘relative autonomy’ 
that political and ideological spheres enjoy within the limits o f the structure that 
determines these social formations in the ‘last instance’.
On the whole, class struggle is therefore reduced to a secondary role in social 
change. The reason why new hegemonies have to be constructed is still to be 
found in the primary development of the various levels of a social formation. The 
disarticulation of an existing hegemonic fit  between structures, according to the 
inherent logic of capitalist development itself, requires the rearticulation of those 
levels which have to take on the newly emerging tasks regarding social 
integration.^® The subject of history, in this approach, is still the structure, not any 
class or power bloc. But if class struggle can only reproduce the mode of 
production, then the possibility for structural transformation must be sought in 
the contradictions within the structure of the mode of production itself. But here, 
Poulantzas fails to specify any such inherent contradictions; these enter only at 
the level of practice. Practice, however, as we have seen, can only produce 
conjunctural changes in the articulation of the structural regions of a social 
formation. Fundamental structural change, as in Althusser’s work, remains a 
mystery, while conjunctural transformation remains a function of the structure.
The concept o f ‘conjuncture’ expresses the limits o f the possibilities open to the various 
classes engaged in a particular conflict. In the last analysis, political practice in a particular 
conjuncture determines how the structure will develop within limits which the structure itself 
defines. In principle the conjuncture may describe the transformation o f the structure as a 
possibility defined by that structure.^’
The fundamental source of many of the antinomies of structural Marxism as 
represented by both Althusser and Poulantzas is, as Simon Clarke suggests, its 
ontological differentiation o f material (economic) and social (political and 
ideological) structures. While they reject the explanation of social development 
in terms of the dialectic of the forces and relations of production, both accept the
29 In fact, as Jessop notes, Poulantzas emphasised each o f these sides in different works, 
swaying between voluntarism and reductionism; Jessop 1990a, 30.
30 cf. Bonefeld 1992, 95: “Class struggle played an important, but secondary role, 
determining the development and the particular configuration o f the structure o f the state 
in historically specific conjunctures. The systemic existence o f the relatively 
autonomous entities followed objectively given laws of development. The class struggle 
was seen as subaltern to the structural configuration of capitalism”.
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equation of the productive forces and relations with the ‘economic base’, of 
which the latter seem to constitute the defining element (but only, we have seen, 
if we exclude questions of structural transformation).
What are these relations of production? As the ‘social’ moments of politics 
and ideology have been externalised to ‘relatively autonomous’ regions, the 
relations of production can be nothing more than “the technical relations 
combining factors in material production”.^  ^ But class cannot be defined so 
narrowly; it has to refer to property relations, which Poulantzas understands as 
the social relations of production. And here, it must be noted, moments of other 
structural regions intrude in any social formation in the concrete definitions of 
ownership which determine the share of property of the surplus that accrues to 
property owners. ‘Class’, understood as ‘social relations of production’, thus 
comes to refer to the social relations o f  distribution}^ Production, in other words 
is a material, asocial practice/structure ; the social element enters when we look 
at who gets what: here ideological and political factors enter and the chances of 
differently endowed classes to shape the economic region becomes relevant. If 
we accept this proposition, then class as the operative factor concerning 
distribution cannot, by definition, be relevant in the transformation from one 
mode of production to another. Classes necessarily remain ‘supports’ of the 
structure.
2.3. Althusser*s Rebel Sons: Regulation Theories between Structure and 
Conjuncture
The structural distinction between material and social spheres of society, and 
the attempt to integrate them as interacting levels of a complex totality, is a 
characteristic not just of the work of Althusser and Poulantzas. It also pervades 
the ‘post-structuralist Marxisms’ which seek to maintain the insights gained by 
stressing the relative autonomy of the superstructures while escaping structural 
determinism. These approaches have given increasing importance to the
31 Clarke 1991a, 96.
32 Clarke 1991a, 81.
33 Clarke 1991a, 90.
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theorisation of the specific conjuncture; ‘social formations’ are thus promoted to 
a certain autonomous ontological status. It is on this basis that the “‘rebel sons’ 
of Althusser”, the authors of the various ‘regulation theories’ which emerged 
since the mid-1970s, have attempted to overcome the contradictions of structural 
Marxism.^ '^
As I will show in this section, the tension between instrumentalism and 
functionalism cannot be resolved in this way. Those regulation theories which, 
like Michel Aglietta and Alain Lipietz, retained the notion of a close link 
between the structure and the conjuncture reproduced this tension within their 
framework. Subsequent regulation theories have tended more and more to 
dissolve the connection between the conjunctural constellation and the mode of 
production.^^ The result is an increasing reliance on instrumentalist modes of 
argumentation. On the basis of their implicit distinction between the ‘material’ 
process of production and the ‘social’ (i.e. ideological, cultural, political, etc.) 
framework of production, these approaches have to rely on ‘social forces’ or 
‘classes’ to impart to ‘the state’ and ‘the economy’ a particular social character. 
The state and the economy are now abstractions, their institutional differentiation 
no longer expressing a particular historical form of social organisation. Instead, 
post-structuralist Marxists have to point to the instrumental agency of particular 
social groups to ‘fill’ these categories with social content.
2.3.1. Transcending Althusser: Aglietta’s Rebellion 
What distinguishes regulation approaches from structural Marxism is their 
problematisation of the reproduction of capitalism. Jessop argues that
Emerging in part out o f Althusserian structuralism, but intending to overcome the latter's 
assumption that structures somehow maintain themselves quasi-automatically without
34 Lipietz 1993, 98. Lipietz proclaims: “We ourselves are ‘regulationists’, in a way ‘rebel 
sons’ o f Althusser”, who have “interiorised what has been transcended”; ibid.
35 Jessop distinguishes four types of regulation theory (depending on whether their spatial 
focus is national or international, and whether their substantial focus is on the economy 
or on socialisation), and seven different regulation schools. Cox does not adhere to any 
one o f these ‘schools’; he adopts concepts, for his own purposes, from many o f these 
approaches, often altering their original content in the process. Perhaps it is this which 
lets Jessop, rather comically, dump Cox together in one category with ‘regime theory’ 
(Keohane, Krasner); Jessop 1990b, 160-62.
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effective social agency and without significant transformations, regulation theorists replaced
the notion o f ‘reproduction’ with that o f ‘regulation’/^
The problématique of reproduction is, however, not actually replaced, but 
reformulated by that of regulation. The most influential of the regulation 
approaches, French Regulation Theory in the original form developed by Aglietta 
(and extended by Lipietz), thus poses the question how capitalism is reproduced 
through different ‘modes of regulation’, given that capital itself undermines its 
own reproduction. The main economic problem is the stabilisation of 
accumulation. But French regulationists start not with capitalist accumulation in 
general. Instead, they look at different historically developing ‘regimes of 
accumulation’. A regime of accumulation can be defined as a particular macro- 
economic equilibrium of production and consumption.^^ Mass production, for 
instance, becomes possible only at a certain moment in the history of capitalism, 
when technology has developed sufficiently; but mass production requires mass 
consumption. Such an equilibrium cannot be assumed as in neo-classical 
economics; it has to be socially produced. A regime of accumulation, in other 
words, requires a corresponding ‘mode of regulation’ which aligns the wage 
relation, commodity relations, forms of monetary control (especially credit), and 
the forms of state intervention with the requirements of stable accumulation.^^ 
Together, the relation of mode of regulation and regime of accumulation can be 
understood as forming historically concrete ‘modes of development’ of capitalist 
societies.^^
Althusser’s argument that the superstructural levels are in charge of securing 
the stability of the whole is clearly present in this approach. Yet for the French
36 Jessop 1991, 71.
37 These regimes can be understood as the particular macroeconomic principles which
ensure the “fairly long-term stabilization o f the allocation of social consumption and 
accumulation”; Lipietz 1987, 14. According to Lipietz, this implies that the conditions 
o f production and the conditions of the reproduction o f wage labour have to be brought 
into correspondence; this depends on the articulation o f capitalism with other modes of 
production and reproduction (remnants o f feudal forms o f production, for instance, or 
household relations) and on the articulation of a “national economic and social 
formation” with the “outside world”; ibid.
38 Regulation does not solve the problems o f capitalism; regulatory modes are
contradictory reactions to the problems generated by the contradictory foundations of 
the mode o f production itself. They are, as it were, temporary mobilisations o f political 
resources against the tendential laws o f capitalism.
39 see Lipietz 1987 and Boyer 1990; cf. Becker 1989.
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regulationists, the reproduction of the whole can no longer be taken for granted. 
That the structural conditions emerge which sustain the base is a not guaranteed. 
The production of a structural correspondence which leads to a coherent mode of 
development is, as Lipietz notes, a “chance discovery” of the class struggle. I f  
new mode of development emerges, however, it must be understood as a 
historically specific articulation of the laws of capitalism.''® It reproduces a 
“structural invariant”, i.e. the capital relation, which generates the pressures to 
accumulate economically; but how accumulation takes place cannot be inferred 
from the ‘logic of capitalism’. This logic, in other words, is subject to change 
within capitalism, expressed by the structural forms in which the capitalist mode 
of production exists in specific modes of development. These are, in turn, the 
results of class struggle. Aglietta therefore concludes:
The study o f capitalist regulation ... cannot be the investigation o f abstract economic laws. It 
is the study o f the transformation of social relations as it creates new forms that are both 
economic and non-economic, that are organized in structures and themselves reproduce a 
determinant structure, the mode o f production.'"
These arguments imply a rather different understanding of the relationship 
between theory and history from that prevalent in structural Marxism. It rejects 
the opposition between theoretical and empirical realities. For the ‘mode of 
development’ is a theorisation of the conjuncture, which accords historical 
development an importance that goes beyond the variation of and deviation from 
pure theory. If these ‘modes of development’ constitute “successive stages of 
historical evolution” which manifest the fundamental laws of the overarching 
mode of production in different ways, if consequently the transformation from 
one mode of regulation to another “means rupture, qualitative change”, then 
history becomes inseparable and indispensable for theory."^ Such an approach, as 
Aglietta concludes, requires concepts which
40 Hübner 1990, 128-133. Hübner contrasts the structuralist concept o f articulation with
the post-structuralist one o f regulation theory: “While this construct serves structural 
Marxism to differentiate between social formations in which the capitalist mode of 
production may be more or less dominant ..., regulation theory uses it to expose the 
combination of different structures within a given capitalist formation” ; Hübner 1990, 
127 (my translation).
41 Aglietta 1987, 16.
42 Aglietta 1987, 20 and 12.
2. Theorists o f the Superstructure: From Gramsci to Althusser And Beyond 59
are transformed by the characteristic interplay which constitutes the passage from the 
abstract to the concrete and enables the concrete to be absorbed within theory. Theory, for 
its part, is never final and complete, it is always in the process o f development."^^
The concepts developed by French regulation theorists mediate between theory 
and history, rather than oppose one to the other. The static character of structural 
Marxism seems indeed to have been overcome without falling into economistic 
arguments about social change.
It is thus rather surprising if social theorists as sympathetic to this conceptual 
framework as David Harvey claim that, “within the regulation school, [there is] 
little or no attempt to provide any detailed understanding of the mechanisms and 
logics of transitions”."^"^ This incapacity comes down to the unresolved 
relationship between structural necessity and contingency, which in this approach 
has to be understood in terms of the requirements of accumulation and the 
vagaries of class struggle, respectively.
We have seen that the emergence of a mode of regulation corresponding to a 
regime of accumulation is a functional necessity for the reproduction of the 
capitalist mode of production. Regulation theorists are happy to admit to this 
functionalist argument which they regard as salvaged by their insistence that the 
emergence of a fitting mode of regulation is no necessity. But this ‘restrained 
functionalism’ takes as given the emergence of the regime of accumulation itself. 
It is the exhaustion of prevailing forms of production and accumulation which 
makes the emergence of a new regime of accumulation, based on more 
productive technologies and work organisation, and of a new mode of regulation 
necessary. The latter provides the adaptation of individual behaviour to the 
emerging accumulation regime, which thus appears as an ‘independent variable’.
The structural Marxist distinction between the material (or economic) and the 
social dimensions of society is reproduced in the analytical distinction between 
regime of accumulation and mode of regulation. It leads, here, to a similar de 
facto economism or even techno-determinism, as economic change is first 
reduced to its ‘material’ aspect before it is related back to the social levels of the 
system by emphasising the social framework which makes a regime of
43 Aglietta 1987, 15.
44 Harvey 1990, 179.
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accumulation viable. The emergence of a ‘fit’ between the material and the social 
is, as we have seen, a question of the results of class struggles. Just why these 
theoretically indeterminate class struggles have led, historically, to a succession 
of different modes of development in which such fits were successfully generated 
remains open to question. Put differently, why is it that the autonomous state 
ends up fulfilling the functional requirements of capitalist accumulation in a 
particular stage of development? Arguably, those regulation theorists who posit 
the reproduction, in each specific period, of a ‘structural invariant’ which makes 
all these periods equally (if differently) capitalist, can only avoid overt 
functionalism by assuming that class struggles are necessarily reproductive of 
capitalism. But functionalism remains implicit in the shift of the problématique 
from reproduction to regulation.'^^
2.3.2. Hegemonic Projects 
Structural Marxism was incapable of explaining the structural transitions 
between modes of production. Aglietta does not even attempt to tackle this 
question. Rather, his aim is to produce a dynamic account of capitalist 
development which recognises the ruptures between different forms of this mode 
of production. It seems that he has little more to offer with respect to the 
transformations between capitalist modes of development than Althusser had on 
structural transition. Other regulationist approaches have, often in recognition of 
these limits, striven to reduce the functionalist element by expanding the role 
they accord to class agency. Whereas Aglietta understood the problem of social 
reproduction mainly in economic terms, with other levels coming in to support 
accumulation, these ‘societal’ approaches grasp this problem in terms of the 
reproduction of society as a differentiated whole with possibilities for crisis not 
restricted to accumulation (political, legitimation).
45 Cf. Becker 1989, 240-243. On the issue o f the functionalist relation between regime of 
accumulation and mode o f regulation, see Robles 1994, 77. Robles also notes that 
regulation theory’s emphasis on class struggle has the character o f a “ritualistic 
affirmation” ; ibid., 78.
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These dimensions are captured by developing the ‘Gramscian theme’ of 
hegemony which we have already seen in its Poulantzian incarnation/^ 
Poulantzas’s idea that a structural fit between the moments of a totality may be 
produced by the hegemony of a particular class fraction which was able to 
universalise its interests becomes reformulated in a way which also leads beyond 
Aglietta’s understanding of the relationship between accumulation and 
regulation. For now we can see the struggle for hegemony not only (and against 
Poulantzas) as a struggle about the mode of regulation; we can also understand it 
(against Aglietta) in terms of the pursuit of different ‘accumulation strategies’. 
Different ‘hegemonic projects’ correspond to a number of possible regimes of 
accumulation at any conjuncture, so that the emergence of a accumulation regime 
is no longer an objective given. Which accumulation strategy emerges as the 
dominant depends on the ability of the related hegemonic projects to integrate an 
‘hegemonic bloc’. On the basis of such a ‘hegemonic bloc’ of social forces, it is 
possible to conceive of the correspondence between a regime of accumulation 
and a mode of regulation as a ‘historic bloc’, i.e. a “historically constituted and 
socially reproduced structural correspondence between the economic base and 
the political ideological superstructures of a social formation”.'^ *
But with these approaches, the economic focus typical of French regulation 
theory is by no means overcome; nor is its functionalist tendency extirpated. In 
the work of Joachim Hirsch, for instance, there is a curious mix of 
instrumentalist and functionalist elements. For Hirsch, the mode of regulation 
favoured by the hegemonic fraction is still simply an “expression of the material, 
socio-economic structure of society”. T h e  concrete historical content of the 
material structure is the result of class struggles (through accumulation 
strategies). But who are the struggling classes? The focus seems to be on the
46 Indeed, whereas Parisian regulation theory may be seen as a development mainly of
Althusser’s Marxism, the ‘societal’ approaches to regulation take their cue from 
Poulantzas. There are, obviously, many intersections. It should also be noted that 
references to Gramsci, hegemony, and historic blocs are not absent from the work of 
Aglietta and Lipietz; they hardly constitute a developed theory, however, and remain of 
little importance in their actual studies o f historical development.
47 the most important proponents o f this strategy are Jessop 1990a; Hirsch 1995a and
1995b; van der Pijl 1984 and 1998.
48 Jessop 1990b, 179.
49 Hausler and Hirsch 1987, 654 (my translation).
2. Theorists o f the Superstructure: From Gramsci to Althusser And Beyond 62
different class fractions of the ruling class, not on the struggle between capital 
and labour. As with most other structuralist and post-structuralist Marxist 
approaches (and in direct contrast to their role in the work of Gramsci), the 
fractions of the working class are mainly seen as supports of different dominant 
fractions. In this sense, it is appropriate that Hirsch talks about class strategy, not 
class agency. Indeed, he admonishes:
the concept o f ‘strategy’ must not be misunderstood as implying a theory o f agency: the 
implementation o f an accumulation, and hegemonic, structure is always the result of 
structurally determined and contradictory class and group action, and thus a ‘process without 
a subject’.
Class struggle has, again, a rather limited role to play; and again there is no 
perspective for a conception of the reproduction of capitalism which would 
understand its dynamic as influenced by the potential of classes to disrupt the 
reproduction of capital. Structuralism and voluntarism still stand side by side 
without being reconciled.
However, the spectre of functionalism is finally overcome by the ‘social 
structure of accumulation’ approach (SSA) which argues that accumulation is 
only possible if the “general economic and social environment” provides 
“relative stability” and thus acts as an integrated ‘social structure of 
accumulation’ encompassing different institutions.^' The specific institutional 
structure reflects the balance of class power. This balance is, in turn, reproduced 
by the differential benefits which the market yields to dominant and subordinate 
classes through the influence which the social structure of accumulation has on 
prices. As there is no equivalent to the ‘regime of accumulation’, temporary 
crises are seen as the expression of social rather than economic contradictions. 
But these social contradictions are not an expression of the contradictions 
inherent in the capital relation, but result from changes in the balance between
50 Hirsch 1991, 13.
51 Gordon 1980, 12. The ‘social structure o f accumulation’ corresponds roughly to the 
‘mode o f regulation’ in Aglietta’s approach and is the form in which the contradictions 
internal to capitalism (struggles between capital and labour and competition between 
capitalists) become temporarily fixed in a set o f mutually sustaining institutions which 
facilitate accumulation.
2. Theorists o f the Superstructure: From Gramsci to Althusser And Beyond 63
classes which determine the relations o f distribution prevailing between them/^ 
Economic crises are consequences of social crises, as they lead to crises of 
profitability/^ A new structure of accumulation may emerge through class 
struggles which are, however, conditioned by the existing, but decaying, 
institutional structure, with a particularly important role for the state which is the 
crucial mediating institution between classes and relations of distribution.
What gets lost in conceptual terms in this approach with its emphasis on class 
struggle is precisely that which has been overemphasised in French and German 
regulation theories: the structural forms in which capitalism exists. The 
functionalism of the latter is overcome, but it reduces social struggles to pure 
power struggles, resulting in an impoverished conflict sociology, which abstracts 
from the specific capitalist character of these struggles and of the institutional 
forms within which they take place. The capitalist nature of the institutions 
within which this struggle takes place becomes a contingent aspect, theory is 
reduced to ‘middle-range’ considerations.^^ This may be part of the appeal of
52 Hirsch 1991, 13; as Hirsch notes, this explanation mirrors in curious ways the
explanation o f neo-liberal economists o f the world-economic crisis o f the 1970s and 
1980s.
53 Jessop 1990b, 182-83. Where French regulation theories typically point to the
exhaustion of the potentials o f a regime of accumulation in their explanation o f crisis, in 
the SSA approach it is the profit-squeeze through increasing demands by the working 
classes and the growing costs o f political forms o f stabilisation.
54 A similar development, however, is visible in recent Parisian regulation theory, 
especially in the work of Robert Boyer. Boyer moves beyond Aglietta’s value- 
theoretical starting point, which focused on the different forms o f the institutionalisation 
o f the law o f value and thus the different historical expressions o f the economic laws 
characteristic o f capitalww. Boyer argues, by contrast, that what exists are multiple 
capitalLs/w5 which cannot be understood by reference, even if  historically broken, to the 
law o f value. Still, it is crucial to notice that all regulation theories hold fast to the notion 
o f capitalism as a particular structure o f accumulation. What Boyer’s move implies is a 
substitution o f Aglietta’s abstract concepts, which were to be enriched in the move from 
the abstract to the historical concrete which tries to understand the structural forms o f a 
mode o f development as the living forms in which capitalism and its laws exist 
historically. Instead, in the price-theoretic variants o f regulation theory, the institutional 
forms themselves become emphasised. Different institutions characterise different 
capitalisms; Boyer 1990. What gets lost in this move is a clear conceptualisation o f the 
relationship between the constant and variable elements o f the socio-economic system 
called capitalism; cf. Hübner 1990, 212. The capitalist character o f the institutional 
structure takes second place behind the determination o f the functional or historical 
relations between the institutions o f a ‘social formation’. The reproduction o f the 
‘structural invariant’ over the span o f various modes o f development thereby becomes a 
secondary, almost incidental aspect o f social change.
55 On the complex and problematic relationship between structural and institutional forms
in French regulation theories, especially in the work o f Aglietta and Boyer, compare 
Robles 1994, 78-80.
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such approaches, but it comes with certain drawbacks: by assuming capitalism 
and its reproduction while focusing on the concrete institutional forms of 
capitalist development, capitalism as a historical phenomenon is rendered into a 
background condition whose historical specificity is no longer theorised.
Concluding this survey of post-structural Marxism, we can see that the 
attempts to resolve the tensions between functionalism and instrumentalism, 
which appeared as soon as Marxist theorists began to move from the ‘mode of 
production’ to the ‘social formation’, did not lead to satisfactory solutions. As 
long as these theorists tried to make a theoretical link between these two levels of 
abstraction, the tension remained.^^ If they avoided such a linkage, it led to 
structural-functionalism (as in Althusser’s original formulation), or to 
instrumentalism and voluntarism (in the Social Structure of Accumulation 
approach). But each of these ‘solutions’ entails not only a one-sided 
understanding of structure and agency, but also a divorce between the abstract 
and the concrete. Ultimately, the ‘conjuncture’ becomes independent of the mode 
of production and replaces this concept as the basis for historicisation. The 
conjuncture itself becomes the historical ‘unit of analysis’, as in Robert W. Cox’s 
‘neo-Gramscian’ International Political Economy. Cox, in effect, takes the 
trajectory of ‘immanent revolt’ to its logical conclusion, while remaining, as I 
will argue in the next chapter, a true ‘rebel grand-son’ of Althusser.
56 But even this attempt remains problematic. Brenner and Click conclude their historical 
critique o f Aglietta by noting: “The general weakness o f Regulation Theory, paradoxical 
though this may seem, is its failure to take adequately into account the broader system of 
capitalist social-property relations that form the backdrop to their succession of 
institutionally defined phases” ; Brenner and Click 1991, 105.
3. HISTORICAL STRUCTURES OF
CAPITALISM: NEO-GRAMSCIAN IFF
3.L The Althusserian Detour
‘Neo-Gramscian’ theory began to flourish in IR/IPE just when it lost its sway 
among social theorists. The contribution it made to the methodological and 
substantive reorientation of the discipline cannot be overestimated. In particular, 
Robert Cox’s ground-breaking articles of the early 1980s have retained all the 
force which enabled them to challenge the ahistorical and positivist dogmas of IR 
so successfully; more than any other contribution, they provided the openings 
which allow critical theories of IR and IPE (including this thesis) to flourish on 
the barren grounds left by Morgenthau and his successors. While Cox’s work is 
influenced by many other theorists, among them Karl Polanyi and Fernand 
Braudel, the central role of his Gramscian conceptualisation of hegemony to his 
overall approach is quite obvious.' What is less obvious is the Althusserian 
lineage which continues to shape it. Cox himself adamantly distinguishes his 
historicist approach from structuralist versions of Marxism
There is a Marxism which reasons historically and seeks to explain, as well as to promote, 
changes in social relations; there is also a Marxism, designed as a framework for the analysis 
o f the capitalist state and society, which turns its back on historical knowledge in favor o f a 
more static and abstract conceptualization of the mode o f production.^
Embracing the former (‘historical materialism’), Cox rejects the essentialism, 
scientism, and functionalism of Althusser and Poulantzas. Their focus on the 
structure of the capitalist mode of production, he argues, makes it impossible to 
see the always concrete and historically constructed nature of society, in which 
human nature and social structure are transformed by the agency of ‘social 
forces’ on the basis of existing social relations. This interplay of structure and 
agency, Cox argues, can best be conceptualised in a ‘historical structure
1 The influence of Polanyi and Braudel is also sfrong in many regulation theories; cf. Hirst 
and Zeitlin 1991, 18; Hirsch 1993, 197.
2 Cox 1996b, 97.
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approach’ that conceptually captures historical change and allows for the 
identification of structural contradictions and potentials for collective 
transformative action. The structuralist legacy which sees social actors as mere 
supports of structures has, here, finally been overcome. No longer is the 
importance of class agency reduced to the determination of the concrete forms in 
which structural necessities deriving from the mode of production would be 
expressed historically in the appropriate political and ideological structural 
forms. Social forces are no longer seen as inevitably reproductive of an 
underlying essence. The problematic of social change is thus redefined and 
radicalised.
Yet if Cox goes further than most other post-structuralist Marxists to recover 
the historicist and subjectivist side of Gramsci, his work may nevertheless be 
best understood as a further step in the trajectory of historical materialist 
theorising that we have followed in the preceding chapter. This trajectory is 
marked by the reaction against structural-functionalism. I have tried to show that 
as long as the ‘economic base’ is taken to be a ‘material’, ‘asocial’ realm which 
gains its historically concrete political, ideological, cultural and social content 
only through its interaction with (or constitution by) these various 
‘superstructures’, this reaction predictably takes the form of an increasing 
dissolution of the conceptual link between the ‘mode of production’ and the 
‘conjuncture’. In this sense, Cox’s neo-Gramscian approach can be understood as 
the most radical negation of Althusser’s original starting point (and therefore as 
part of a continuum which has Althusser as one pole and Cox as the other), 
which yet remains tied to it by its acceptance of the material/social distinction.
In spite of the welter of concepts which Cox appropriates from Althusser and 
Poulantzas,^ as well as from their rebel sons and fellow grandsons (especially the 
SSA theorists), the argument of this section is definitely not that Cox is a 
representative of structural Marxism.'^ What I hope to show in this chapter is that
Among these concepts is the ‘mode o f development’, the distinction between 
‘synchronic and diachronic’ readings o f structures, and the ‘social relations of 
production’ (which in Cox’s work assumes a deeper ontological status in his taxonomy 
o i ‘modes o f social relations o f production’); Cox 1987, 1, 6, 11-15, 129, 406 (fh. 7). 
Gartner 1993, without much ado, brands Cox’s approach ‘Poulantzian’; but the obvious 
similarities between Cox and Poulantzas are superficial, as similar concepts assume a 
different role and meaning in Cox’s work.
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some of the limits of Cox’s reconstruction of historical materialism, especially its 
instrumentalist tendencies, are a product of the problematic foundations it 
inherited from Althusser’s appropriation of the Gramscian legacy.
3,2, Social Forces and Hegemonic Practices
Cox rejects those theories that seek to periodise history on the basis of the 
concept of the mode of production. Instead, capitalism should be seen as a 
particular ‘mode of development’, which is defined not by a particular relation of 
production (the ‘capital relation’), or by even by private property, but instead 
refers to economies in which “reinvestment is geared to profit-maximisation in a 
market context”.^  Understood as a mode of development rather than production, 
capitalism can be seen to entail very different production relations:
the capitalist mode of development has spawned several distinctive modes o f social relations 
o f production. To bracket these all together as a single capitalist mode o f production 
confuses things that are significantly distinct.^
But actual capitalist societies will not be organised economically by just one 
‘mode of social relations of production’. The Althusserian notions of articulation 
and overdetermination are clearly present when Cox goes on to suggest that 
concrete capitalist societies will combine ‘modes of social relations of 
production’ in different ways and will also incorporate modes of social relations 
of production which have emerged in other (non-capitalist) modes of 
development.^ Each of these modes can be analysed ideal-typically on its own 
terms, each with their respective social relations of production, and then be 
regarded in its real historical relations with others.* Ultimately, Cox argues, these 
real historical relations can be analysed not just at the level of individual states.
5 Cox 1987, 407 (fh. 7).
6 Cox 1987, 406 (fh. 7).
7 André Drainville correctly notes that the way in which Cox sees the construction of 
neoliberalism is reminiscent o f Althusser’s concept o f overdetermination; Drainville 
1994, 114.
8 According to Cox, twelve distinct modes o f social relations o f production are still
present in the contemporary world economy; they give rise to the following social
production relations: subsistence, peasant-lord, primitive labour market, household, self- 
employment, enterprise labour market, bipartism, enterprise corporatism, tripartism, 
state corporatism, communal, and central planning; Cox 1987, 32. Those modes 
highlighted are generated by the capitalist mode of development
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but also as integrated globally: “The social map of the world can be plotted as a 
hierarchy of interconnected modes of social relations of production"/
How are these hierarchical relationships constructed historically? According to 
Cox, it is the “social context of production”, shaped decisively by the state, 
which determines what is produced and howT This social context will also 
determine the patterns of relations between the modes of social relations of 
production. For Cox, the
hierarchy established among types o f production relations (which ... is one o f the tasks 
undertaken by the state) constitutes a structure o f accumulation. The extraction o f surplus 
flows from the subordinate and weaker levels o f production to the dominant or stronger.
The ‘structure of accumulation’ refers, in Cox’s categorial framework, to the way 
in which surplus is distributed, rather than to the form of its creation.’^  
Accumulation has to be distinguished analytically from production in order to 
avoid ahistorical abstractions.
How the economy is structured is thus not to be derived from certain qualities 
inherent in production in general, or even capitalist production more specifically. 
While Cox accepts the theoretical centrality of production for the understanding 
of societies, he argues that no economic determinism can be inferred from this 
proposition. Production has a “certain logical precedence”, but not a historical 
primacy over the state and civil society. Indeed, it is the organisation of political 
power rather than the development of production that constitutes the dynamic 
element of social life.’^  Yet the heuristic focus must be on the ways in which
9 Cox 1989, 40.
10 Cox 1987, 11 and 17ff. Indeed, Cox argues that “the principal structures of production
have been, if  not actually created by the state, at least encouraged and sustained by the 
state. ... In historical time, production has been more shaped by the state than shaping of 
it”; Cox 1987, 5.
11 Cox 1987, 5. Similar to the SSA approach, Cox’s structure o f accumulation denotes the
“social and political power context o f production”, which determines who gets what of 
the surplus product. Curiously, the concept o f the social structure o f accumulation is not 
developed to a comparable standard as in the SSA approach. In particular, the intricate 
institutional set-up which SSA theorists analyse in order to show precisely how  the 
economy is socio-politically regulated, is underdeveloped in Cox’s work. It is as if 
hegemony leads directly to an efficient functioning of a new structure o f accumulation.
12 International hegemony is thus always to be seen as a structuring o f the relations
between various forms of production which privilege some more than others, and as 
these forms o f production are not equally distributed in space they have differential
consequences for people not only according to their social position but also to their
geographical location in a given world order.
13 Cox 1987, 5 and 399.
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political power is used to organise the economy. Politics, for Cox, is not the 
abstract pursuit of power for its own sake; it is the politics o f  production which is 
at the centre of his theory. The relationship between power and production is 
reciprocal: Production “generates the capacity to exercise power, but power 
determines the manner in which production takes place”.
For Cox, it is the ‘social context’ of the global structure of accumulation which 
serves as the basis for periodising history. This social context can be represented 
as a nexus of three structures: social forces, state/society complexes, and world 
orders. Each of these structures, which Cox understands as “persistent social 
practices” can in turn be thought of as constituted by an interrelated set of ideas, 
institutions and material capabilities. But social practices, unlike in Althusser’s 
structuralist theory, are not necessarily reproductive of the structure; structures 
condition and shape, but do not determine practices. Social actors, therefore, are 
no mere ‘supports’ of structures, they are conscious and purposive agents, whose 
identities, ideas and capacities cannot, however, be grasped on the basis of 
methodological individualism.
Predictably, Cox’s approach has been reproached, from a Marxist perspective, 
for falling into “Weberian indeterminacy”.’^  According to Peter Burnham, the 
relations between various structures, the ‘spheres’ of politics and economics in 
particular, appear in neo-Gramscian IPE as contingent and mechanic, i.e. as 
externally related parts of an empirical whole with no underlying unity. Yet Cox 
does not accept the crucial Weberian notion that the spheres or structures of 
society are autonomous, operating according to immanent principles, yet 
combining to generate specific historical processes. How the economy and the 
polity relate to each other, for instance, is determined by the conscious agency of 
social forces:
In periods o f fundamental changes in global and national structures, the conventional 
separations o f politics, economics, and society become inadequate for the understanding of 
change. ... Fundamental changes have to be grasped as a whole. This whole is the
14 Cox 1987, 1.
15 Burnham 1991, 77. Ironically, Cox has also been attacked, from a Weberian
perspective, as an orthodox, class-reductionist Marxist; cf. Hobson 1998b, 356-57. The
Weberian aspects o f Cox’s work have been subjected to incisive scrutiny by Mittelman,
who highlights especially the limitations o f the ideal-type for a critical theory of 
international transformation, and o f the individualistic foundations o f W eber’s approach; 
Mittelman 1998, 82ff.
3. Historical Structures of Capitalism: Neo-Gramscian IPE 70
configuration o f social forces, its economic basis, its ideological expression, and its form of 
political authority as an interactive whole. Antonio Gramsci called this the blocco storico or 
historic bloc.’^
The structures of society do not possess distinct logics which derive from the 
‘nature’ of the economy or the timeless laws of international politics. The state is 
not conceptualised as an irreducible unit which acts on the basis of some inherent 
raison d ’état; nor can it be reduced to either the ‘logic of anarchy’ or the ‘logic 
of capital’. The state is a historically changing structure with specific functions 
and aims, which are inscribed into the state by those social forces which have 
managed to universalise their particular social purposes and to present them as 
the ‘common sense’ of their epoch.
It is in ‘civil society’ that social classes become conscious of their aims and 
interests, and in which they struggle for hegemony. It is here, that they create 
(often shaped by the state itself), a new historic bloc of social forces, which 
redefines the “limits of the possible” for the state, other social forces, and 
individuals. The ‘historic bloc’ thus constitutes the “structure of structures”, 
through which the ‘structure of accumulation and the ‘form of state’ are 
integrated in a mutually reinforcing way, and linked to the political and economic 
structures of world order.’* At this point, Cox makes his most important 
contribution to post-structuralist historical materialism. Whereas the French 
regulation theorists have, by and large, taken the national state to be the locus of 
economic regulation, and the national economy to be the relevant object of 
regulation, Cox attempts to show that national economies are integrated into 
larger, international structures of accumulation constituted by international 
hegemonic practices.’^
But how do we conceptualise the political constitution and regulation of the 
world market in an international system where there is no uncontested authority
16 Cox 1993b, 259.
17 Cox 1996b, 105-107. The social institutions and the ideologies o f an epoch “will be
universal in form, i.e., they will not appear as those o f a particular class, and will give 
some satisfaction to the subordinate groups while not undermining the leadership or vital 
interests o f the hegemonic class”; Cox 1993 a, 58.
18 Cox 1987, 395.
19 For French regulationist attempts to include international dimensions o f accumulation
and regulation, compare the rather neglected work of Jacques Mistral, especially Mistral 
1986; also Lipietz 1987. For an excellent overview o f the different strands o f regulation 
theory, see Robles 1994.
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to impose such regulations? For Cox, international hegemony is not simply based 
on the pre-dominance of a particular state. To begin with, he insists that 
international hegemony is always premised upon aspects of consensus and 
ideological incorporation, through which the particular national interests of the 
hegemonic state assumes some degree of universality. Moreover, international 
hegemony has its roots in the domestic ‘historic bloc’ of the hegemonic state: it 
is the “outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a 
dominant social class’’.^® Hegemonic practices will thus reflect not simply a 
desire for imperial aggrandisement, but are to be related to the social purposes of 
the ‘historic bloc’. In this sense, hegemony has always to be conceived of as 
hegemony for  a specific project of capitalist accumulation which reflects the 
balance of powers between classes domestically, and between states as well as 
transnational classes internationally. According to Cox,
Hegemony at the international level is ... not merely an order among states. It is an order 
within a world economy with a dominant mode o f production, which penetrates into all 
countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex o f 
international social relationships which connect the social classes o f the different countries. 
World hegemony is describable as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political 
structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three. World hegemony, 
furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down 
general rules o f behaviour for states and for those forces o f civil society that act across 
national boundaries - rules which support the dominant mode o f production.^’
With this perspective, Cox effectively subverts the orthodox agenda of IR/IPE, 
in which hegemonic states appear as facilitators of cooperation between 
sovereign states. The point of reference for Cox’s theory of international 
hegemony is no longer the problem of cooperation under conditions of anarchy, 
but the hierarchal relations in the world market and the interstate system, 
constituted through the internationalisation of a specific historic bloc. It is at the 
level of world order that Cox finally attempts to periodise world history as a 
succession of ‘historical structures’, each institutionalising different ordering 
principles and each constituting a ‘framework for action’ with different 
implications for the patterns of conflict and cooperation between individuals.
20 Cox 1993 a, 61. The application o f the concept o f hegemony to the international realm is 
questioned by Germain and Kenny, who argue that a Gramscian theory o f hegemony 
would presuppose both a global civil society and a ‘global political society’ i.e. some 
international form o f state; Germain and Kenny 1998, 14-17.
21 Cox 1993a, 61-62.
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classes and states. Different historical structures also constituted the world 
economy in very different ways, which yielded benefits mainly to the hegemonic 
state/society complex and its co-opted social and political allies.
3.3. Regaining Historical Specificity: The Concreteness of Capitalism
The publication of Robert Cox’s seminal 1981 article, which outlined his 
‘historical structure’ approach, not only highlighted power relations beyond the 
state (without neglecting the domestic and international agency of states), it also 
put the problem of international transformation firmly on the agenda of IR/IPE. 
Yet in certain respects, the greater sensitivity to structural transformation, which 
Cox achieves by emphasising the ruptures between ‘historic blocs’, also entails a 
narrowing of the questions that a critical social theory of IR/IPE would have to 
pose in order to historicise international relations. For Cox, it is the great 
advantage of his approach that it does not start from ‘abstract’ categories like 
capitalism or modernity. Against John Ruggie’s emphasis on the transition from 
the middle ages to modernity, he insists on the need for greater historic 
specificity:
For Fernand Braudel, a historical structure is the longue durée, the enduring practices 
evolved by people for dealing with the recurrent necessities o f social and political life and 
which come by them to be regarded as fixed attributes o f human nature and social 
intercourse. But, particularly with regard to the world system, how long is the longue durée? 
Ruggie pointed to the breaking point between medieval and modern world orders, but have 
there been other breaking points since then? What is the proper periodization o f world 
orders? I am inclined to answer yes, there have been further breaking points, and to suggest a 
succession o f mercantilist, liberal {pax Britannica), neo-imperialist, and neo-liberal {pax 
Americana) orders.^^
But are these ‘breaking points’ between historical structures of the same nature 
as the rupture between the Middle Ages and modernity (or, in a Marxist 
perspective, between feudalism and capitalism)? Cox himself indicates that these 
historical structures are different forms of the capitalist ‘mode of development’. 
If this is the case, then it would seem imperative to conceptualise the
22 Cox 1996b was first published in Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, Vol. 10,
No. 2, 1981, 126-155.
23 Cox 1996c, 55; cf. Ruggie 1983a and 1993.
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fundamental institutions and dynamics of capitalism beyond their periodical 
variation in historical structures.
The importance of this problem becomes obvious when we consider the neo- 
Gramscian interpretation of current processes of globalisation as leading from a 
Westphalian to a post-Westphalian system, and thus to a world order no longer 
based on sovereignty. '^^ The implication is that the institution of sovereignty 
extends over all the historical structures of the capitalist mode of development at 
least up to the period of hyper-liberal globalisation. Moreover, sovereignty is not 
a transhistorical background condition, but a socio-spatial form of organising 
political authority that is clearly of historical origin. But in this case, we cannot 
limit ourselves to analysing the changing functions of states in the context of 
different historical structures. The historicisation of the sovereign state cannot be 
fully achieved by showing how the interests and functions have been constituted 
by changing hegemonic blocs; if we think of social institutions as ‘petrified 
practices’, then we also have to excavate the social practices and relations which 
underlie and sustain sovereign statehood as such. Put differently, it is insufficient 
to distinguish between different forms o f state’, we have to theorise and 
historicise the state form, too.
Precisely because Cox posits the transcendence, rather than just the re­
articulation of sovereign statehood and the Westphalian state system, we have to 
conceptualise the fundamental institutions of capitalist modernity as historical 
institutions. In this sense, Cox refusal to locate the transition to modernity and 
the transformation between historical structures on two different levels of 
abstraction, obscures the fundamental historicity of sovereignty, as well as of 
capitalism or modernity more generally, even while contributing to their 
concrétisation. Simon Bromley points out the self-limiting implications of this 
approach for the development of a critical social theory of IR/IPE:
the neo-Gramscians have singularly failed to develop a theoretical, as opposed to a 
descriptive, specification of the principal structures o f the international system. For no 
amount o f discussion o f such themes as ‘hegemony’, ‘historic blocs’ and ‘transnational 
capital’ adds up to a theory of the modem states system or of the world market.^^
24 Cox 1992, 142-44.
25 Bromley 1995, 232; cf. Boyle 1994.
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Does that imply that we have to return to the iron laws of capitalism and 
conceptualise capital as an essence which imposes itself on society? On the 
contrary: what is necessary is an extension of Cox’s concept of the historical 
structure to capitalism itself. If capitalism is, as Cox argues, “driven by the 
opportunities for realizing profits in the market”, then we have to ask how the 
general ‘framework for action’, which makes it possible for the pursuit of market 
opportunities to hold sway, is socially constituted. For it seems that it is this 
framework for capitalist action which allows a capitalist rationality to emerge; 
which makes people seek profits through sales in the market (rather than through 
investments in the means of coercion which in pre-capitalist societies offered 
much more effective and lucrative access to wealth); and, finally, which allows 
money to expand its value in the process of production and circulation. In other 
words, Cox’s understanding of capitalism as a mode of development, in which 
considerations of profitability determine investments, begs the question what 
kind of social relationship constitutes the political and economic framework 
which makes the capitalist market possible, and which leads individuals to 
pursue profits by investing in the means of production.^^
The theoretical consequence is that the emergence of capitalism or modernity 
has itself to become the crucial point of reference for our attempt to historicise 
the international system, and capitalist modernity more generally.^^ Moreover, in 
conceptualising the transformations of historical structures within the capitalist 
mode of development, we have to explicitly theorise the relationship between the 
‘framework for action’ which constitutes capitalist accumulation as a historical 
possibility and tendency, and the concrete ‘historical structures’ which link 
particular structures of accumulation to particular forms of state through the
26 Cf. Cox 1989, 40: “In capitalist development, investment and output are determined by 
anticipations of what the market will make profitable. In redistributive development, 
these decisions are determined by politically authoritative redistributors according to 
political criteria and priorities. The accumulation processes in each o f these two modes 
o f development in practice work through distinct yet changing clusters o f production- 
relation modes”.
27 Cox does in fact provide an account of the transition from feudalism to capitalism as a 
gradual build-up o f capitalist elements taking place between the twelfth and nineteenth 
centuries; Cox 1987, 51. Yet this account is heavily teleological and relies on the 
orthodox pluralist model o f economic expansion and political consolidation, (with each 
process reinforcing the other), and the odd ‘bourgeois revolution’ thrown in for good
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agency of social forces. But this would once again raise the whole set of 
problems regarding functionalism which the regulation theorists, who pursue just 
this project, were unable to overcome.^*
Cox is only able to avoid this problem because he severs the link between 
capitalism and its ‘social formations’ or ‘conjunctures’; in this way, the 
conjuncture itself becomes the ‘historical structure’. He has not developed a 
conceptual vocabulary which allows us to understand historic blocs as forms in 
which capitalism becomes concretised or instantiated. Cox refers to Braudel’s 
distinction of the historical times of the longue durée, the conjuncture, and the 
event. Situating the historic bloc on the level of the longue durée, he begs the 
question as to which historical time then refers to capitalism (or modernity). This 
raises the problem of the appropriateness of Cox’s understanding of historical 
times. For Braudel, the longue durée is the time-span which encompasses the 
life-span of civilisations, those tectonic movements in cultural and material life 
which last centuries. This is the “infrastructure” of society: “All the stages, the 
thousands of stages, all the thousand explosions of historical time can be 
understood on the basis of these depths, this semistillness”.^ ^
But is this the same historical time which Cox’s historical structures capture? 
None of the periods of historical development which he develops last more than 
a few generations, belonging to that level which Braudel seems to exclude 
categorically from the “time of societies” -  and thus from social science proper -
measure which made sure that political impediments to further capital accumulation 
would be overcome were necessary; Cox 1987, 117-18.
28 This problem is present, it will be remembered, in the work o f Joachim Hirsch. His 
critique o f the price-theoretic variants o f regulation theory is nevertheless poignant and 
to some extent applicable to Cox, too: “If  the statement that ‘every society has its own 
crisis and conjunctures’ (Boyer) is to be taken seriously, and yet the construction o f a 
reasonably stringent relationship between general capitalist structural and developmental 
determinations on the one hand, and the historical formations with their transformation 
processes on the other, remains elusive, then theory o f history, indeed, is replaced by 
historical description. Then, room remains, at best, for spatially and temporally limited 
middle-range theories”; Hirsch 1990, 29 (my translation).
29 Braudel 1980, 33. Indeed, for Braudel the longue durée is all but beyond history, not 
itself a historical timeframe at all; it underlies and is only marginally affected by history; 
compare p. 75: the '''‘longue durée is the endless, inexhaustible history of structures and 
group o f structures. ... This great structure travels through vast tracts o f time without 
changing; if it deteriorates during the long journey, it simply restores itself as it goes 
along and regains its health, and in the final analysis its characteristics alter only very 
slowly” .
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as “belonging to the time of man, of our own brief, transient lives’’.^ ® Even 
allowing for the historicity of time-spans themselves, it is hardly conceivable 
how, for instance, the three decades of the Pœc Americana can be described in 
terms of Braudel’s concept of the longue durée. Cox’s historical structures 
would be much better located at Braudel’s conjunctural level of cycles and 
rhythms not quite as slow as those of the longue durée}^
The problem here is not really Cox’s questionable adoption of Braudel’s 
concepts. After all, there are good reasons to depart from Braudel’s particular 
conceptualisation of different historical times: it exhibits a structuralist form of 
argumentation which completely reduces individuals and social groups to 
structural determination; the longue durée appears as a prison from which no 
escape is possible. There is no role for purposive action as a determinant of 
history. The real agents of history are its structures which are reified into forces 
external to society.^^ So it is only reasonable to avoid much of the content of 
Braudel’s abstractions.
30 Braudel 1980, 12. It is remarkable that this formulation, which equates ‘social time’ with 
the longue durée, is already a mitigation of his formulation in his work on The 
Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age o f  Philip II. There, he related 
the levels o f structure, conjuncture and event to geographical, social and individual time 
(quoted in Santamaria and Bailey 1984, 79). The life-span of an individual, in this 
perspective, would thus be part o f the history o f events. Stephen Gill seems to refer to 
the earlier distinction when he equates the longue durée with ‘social’ rather than 
‘geographical’ time; Gill 1993, 44. But even within this time-span “sometimes, a whole 
century lasts but a moment”; Braudel 1980, 12.
31 The conjuncture itself refers to the expansion and contraction o f material conditions and 
the concomitant social, cultural, technological, and political situations; Braudel 1980, 
75. It pertains, particularly, to the ups and downs o f Kondratieff-cycles, underlying 
which is the long-term tendency of growth since the 17th century, which Braudel 
understands as a succession of world economies; ibid., 80-82. Cox’s périodisation of 
modem history on the basis o f world order and state structures corresponds well to these 
long cycles o f conjunctural development.
32 Clark 1990, 182-85; Santamaria and Bailey 1984, 80. According to Clark, Braudel is no 
less structuralist and deterministic than the Althusserian Marxists: but he is a positivist 
where they are essentialists. His historical studies are “relentlessly descriptive and 
taxonomic” and he neglects political history as part o f the history o f events or, at best, 
conjunctures, instead relying on evolutionist and teleological arguments about 
economic, social and cultural development; Clark 1990, 192-95. Gerstenberger notes 
that Braudel relies mainly on economic modes o f explanation o f social change, 
especially the rise of productivity. She identifies an underlying modernisation- 
theoretical perspective which takes for granted the direction o f history towards 
modernity and the overcoming o f forms o f life unconducive to modernity. Teleology 
displaces explanation; Gerstenberger 1987, 125. Gerstenberger concludes her excellent 
critique o f Braudel by claiming that his ahistorical universalisation o f the dynamic o f the 
forces o f production renders him a “brilliant metaphysician” who turns typological
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The real problem with Cox’s usage of the concept of the longue durée is that it 
fosters an understanding of historic blocs as discrete chunks of history, each 
embodying a petrified structural constellation. No ‘meta-structure’ exists on 
which capitalism as a mode of development could be located. These structural 
chunks seem to be capitalist as a matter of fact; transitions between historic blocs 
do not lead beyond the capitalist mode of development. The question, surely, is 
why that should be so. In other words, any theory of social transformation which 
tries to explain structural change and yet accepts that certain elements in the 
basic constitution of these societies are not themselves subject to these 
transformations, has to pose the problem of the relationship between continuity 
and change. If such continuity is accepted, then it is a theoretical sine qua non 
that the reproduction of the continuous elements is problematised in conceptual 
and historical terms. Cox does not provide the necessary framework for these 
problems.. As a mode of development, capitalism disappears almost completely 
in theoretical terms, while being all-pervasive empirically. Most crucially, it has 
no theoretical purchase in the explanation of the transitions from one capitalist 
historic bloc to another. As a category, capitalism remains theoretically vacant.
The consequence is that Cox has to tacitly restrict the problematic of structural 
change to the transformations within capitalism. With any consideration of a 
‘structural invariant’ excluded from the theorisation of social change between 
discrete totalities, Cox has in fact undertaken a simple promotion of ‘social 
formations’ or ‘conjunctures’ of capitalism (in Althusser’s sense) to historical 
structures in their own right. While the structuralised entities of the regulationists 
had still provided intermediate concepts between the mode of production and 
concrete reality, they have lost this role in the neo-Gramscian perspective. But by 
usurping the place of the mode of production, they have not actually bridged the 
gap between abstract and concrete; they have simply replaced one abstract 
concept, i.e. capitalism, with a another, albeit historically more limited one. 
Indeed, by structuralising the conjuncture, this approach runs into similar 
difficulties regarding the explanation of change between historic blocs as
condensations o f statistical regularities into causalities while rejecting to formulate 
causalities in explicit form; ibid., 132 (my translation).
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Structural Marxism had with the explanation of transformations between modes 
ofproduction.
In a way, Cox has replaced the grand structuralism of the capitalist mode of 
production by a structuralism en miniature of the ‘historic bloc’, without 
satisfactorily accounting for the processes of transition between structures. Cox 
insists that these processes can only be explained by close empirical study, 
guided by hypothesis derived from the study of earlier transformations. A 
number of theorists have, however, highlighted the voluntarist and 
instrumentalist tendencies of Cox’s approach.^^ Globalisation, in the neo- 
Gramscian perspective, seems to be a product of the will of ‘transnational 
capital’ and its allied private and public bureaucracies in the leading states. The 
explanation of the demise of the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the postwar period and 
the rise of a global, neoliberal order relies on an instrumentalist argument, 
pointing to the new ""bourgeois conquérants ”" which imposes its interests in the 
form of a new set of economic, political and world order structures.^'' The role of 
the state in this process is that of perpetrator and victim at the same time; the 
results of its restructuring are to the benefit of some, especially transnationally 
orientated, class fractions and to the detriment of others.
This voluntarism of the dominant class is also the only way in which Cox’s 
approach can gain a leverage for critique. His critical theory of world order has 
to focus on the manipulative activities of the bourgeois conquérants or other 
fractions of the dominant class, because it is its disposition over power and 
distribution, which (though involving some concessions to subordinate classes) 
determines the force with which the market will impose itself upon the 
subordinate classes. Both the sovereign state and the (world) market are, in this 
approach, “content empty”, as Peter Burnham puts it. The economy, in particular, 
is ‘neutral’ prior to the imposition of specific social purposes on its operation 
through the creation of a structure of accumulation.^^ This instrumentalist 
account is necessary because it is only in this way that Cox can elucidate how the
33 Cf. Drainville, 1994; Germain and Kenny 1998, 18.
34 Drainville 1994, 114; on the “bourgeois conquérants”, see Cox 1996a, 297.
35 Burnham 1991, 89.
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economy benefits some classes or class fractions more than others. For it is only 
through the ‘social context’ that ‘the economy’ becomes socialised.
3.4. Conclusions
We have noted at the beginning that for Cox, in contrast to structural Marxists 
and regulation theorists, social agency is not necessarily reproductive of social 
structures. Consequently, Cox’s neo-Gramscian perspective seemed to be able to 
avoid structural-functionalism. Yet following the discussion so far, this claim can 
no longer be maintained without qualifications. Indeed, its bias towards 
reproduction seems to be all the greater in the neo-Gramscian perspective as it is 
banished from its problématique. Only because Cox presumes the reproduction 
of capitalist social relations in different ‘modes of social relations of production’, 
can he reject the attempt to understand changes in the ‘social context’ of 
production as a reaction to the functional requirements of the mode of production 
or the economic sphere.
But by taking the ‘modes of social relations of production’ as his starting 
point, Cox not only defines the specific ‘social relations of production’ in a 
concrete form, he also presupposes capitalist production relations as an attribute 
of these different modes. Precisely because Cox treats these ‘modes of social 
relations of production’ as ‘monads’ with their own internal dynamics, which 
presume the existence of capitalism and capitalists, he can sacrifice the 
conceptualisation of capitalism as a historical totality concretised in different 
forms. Capitalism in this account becomes, to some extent, naturalised, its 
continued existence assumed rather than explained.^^
By focusing on the reconfiguration of the structures of production, states and 
world order, Cox leaves unproblematised some of the most fundamental
36 Cox’s historicisation o f social development has consequences for our understanding of 
emancipatory potentials in the present. The potential which Cox locates are not those 
which point to any perspective beyond capitalism. Structural transformation refers now 
to the change of the form in which the economy is embedded in society, in which the 
inclusiveness o f the historic bloc is enlarged. It is not the search for emancipatory 
potentials which transcend capitalism, but for change within capitalist society. This is 
obscured by the abandoning of the category o f capitalism and the tacit equation of 
socialism with the ‘self-defence o f society against the market’.
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categories of IR and IPE. The consequence is a seeming incapacity to account for 
the fundamental institutions of modernity themselves, rather than their variations. 
Moreover, by obscuring the difference between fundamental and less far- 
reaching transformations, by placing the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
at the same level of abstraction as that between, for instance, the Pax Britannica 
to imperialism, Cox blurs rather than highlights historical specificity. Moreover, 
the périodisation of history based on a ‘historical structure’ suffers from the 
under-theorised relation between the abstract and the concrete, between ‘mode of 
development’ and ‘historic bloc’.
The point here is not that capitalism is always the same, or that we can develop 
an abstract theory of capitalism which ignores its different historical forms. The 
thrust of the argument is, instead, that by focusing directly on the concrete forms 
of capitalism we tend to take too much about capitalism for granted. There can 
be nothing more sterile than the alternative between theorising capitalism in the 
abstract or in its concrete historical forms; patently, we have to do both. That we 
are confronted with such a presumed alternative, however, is precisely the legacy 
of Althusser and the resulting inability to bring together the concrete and the 
abstract without falling into structuralism and functionalism or instrumentalism 
and voluntarism.
The challenge to develop a historical materialist framework, which does not 
construct the concept of capitalism in a static and deterministic way, which 
recognises that the ‘mode of production’ can be structured politically and 
culturally in distinct ways that cannot simply be ‘read o ff the ‘base’, and which 
is able to theorise the relationship between capitalism in the abstract and 
capitalism in the concrete -  this challenge has not been met fully by any of the 
structuralist Marxists or their increasingly rebellious descendants. This would 
require a different way of overcoming the base/superstructure model, which does 
not accept the idea that the economy is social only insofar as social actors have 
consciously structured its modus operandi. This is precisely the task which a 
diverse number of Marxist theorists have set themselves. They have in common 
that they seek to overcome the limitations of the base/superstructure model 
without framing their alternative within the parameters set by Louis Althusser.
4. BEYOND BASE/SUPERSTRUCTURE: 
RENEWING HISTORICAL 
MATERIALISM
4.1. Capitalism: Structure, Historical Structure, or Structured Process?
The Marxist notion of history as a succession of ‘modes of production’ has 
lent itself to structuralism, as well as to technological and economic forms of 
determinism, and underpinned the worst excesses of teleological theorising. It 
has thereby served as much to squeeze history into a theoretical straitjacket, 
elaborating general historical laws in ahistorical grand theories, as it has helped 
to illuminate the historical specificity of the periods it distinguishes. But if the 
modes of production framework is a problematic tool for the analysis of 
historical societies as well as structural change, this does not imply that 
capitalism cannot be conceptualised systematically.’ Nor does it mean that we are 
faced with the alternative of either establishing the immutable laws of capitalism, 
working themselves out historically with iron necessity, or dissolving the notion 
of capitalism into some more historically specific concepts with their own set of 
laws or regularities.
The alternative lies in the conception of capitalism, not so much as a structure 
but as process. For E.P. Thompson, the conceptualisation of historical 
development as process allows us to understand history as
open-ended and indeterminate eventuation - but not for that reason devoid o f rational logic 
or o f determining pressures - in which categories are defined in particular contexts but are 
continuously undergoing historical redefinition, and whose structure is not pre-given but 
protean, continually changing in form and in articulation.^
The concept o f the ‘mode o f production’ may indeed be most useful with regard to 
capitalism. After all, it was from the study o f this historical society that it derived, only 
for its fundamental aspects to be abstracted from their historical determinations and 
elaborated into a transhistorical model o f social organisation. The reason for its potential 
usefulness in the analysis o f capitalist societies is that only here are forces and relations 
o f production the dynamic elements of social process; see Comninel 1987.
Thompson 1978a, 84. This section draws strongly on E.P. Thompson’s reformulation of 
historical materialism in Thompson 1978b; compare also Holloway 1991, 239ff and 
Clarke 1991a, 1991b and 1991c. Clarke argues that “capitalist production is not a
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Capitalism, understood in this sense, has to be conceptualised as a historical 
category capable of absorbing the development and transformations of this 
society into its concept. This alternative retains the categorial emphasis on 
capitalism while embracing the neo-Gramscian caveats against its ahistorical and 
static conceptualisation. We have to take seriously Marx’s acknowledgement 
(more seriously, perhaps, than Marx himself did), that “the present society is no 
solid crystal, but an organism capable of change, and constantly engaged in a 
process of change”.^
But a processual theory cannot be constructed by freezing history into 
structural models representing the development of capitalism at a specific 
conjuncture. Such ideal-typical constructions, even if the ‘synchronic’ account of 
the functional fit between structures is accompanied by an emphasis on their 
‘diachronic’ dislocations and class conflicts, may narrow the distance between 
the abstract and the concrete. Yet they do not mediate the gap itself; worse still, 
they do not even allow us to theorise the gap, as it is itself concealed."* As a 
result, “Cox’s taxonomic innovations”, which combine Marxist and Weberian 
elements, have yielded a “more static and comparative framework rather than a 
fully dynamic and historical materialist” approach.^
Instead of ideal-typical concept formation, the development of the notion of 
capitalism as process has to be saturated by the analysis of the actual history of 
this form of society. But a social theory of capitalism cannot simply be a 
historiography of the endless variations and permutations of modem societies. 
We not only have to analyse the concrete actuality of capitalism in all its 
manifold appearances, but to uncover its abstract and generic existence in the
structure with a given foundation, it is a process whose reproduction depends on its 
reproducing its own foundations”; Clarke 1991c, 190. I will return to the problem of 
reproduction at the end o f this chapter.
3 Marx 1977, 93.
4 Cf. Bonefeld et al. 1992, xvi.
5 Mittelman 1998, 83. Thompson’s notion o f ‘structured process’ is directed not only 
against those approaches which set structure against process, but also, as Wood notes, 
against those which see structures undergoing processes. “This distinction reflects an 
epistemological difference: “on the one hand, a view o f theoretical knowledge - the 
knowledge o f structures - is a matter o f ‘static conceptual representation’, while motion 
and flux (together with history) belong to a different, empirical sphere o f cognition; and, 
on the other hand, a view o f knowledge that does not oppose structure to history, in 
which theory can accommodate historical categories, ‘concepts appropriate to the 
investigation o f process’” ; cf. Wood 1995b, 79.
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concrete, without in the process reducing the latter to the necessary products of 
the former. The abstract concept of capitalism can never be an ‘independent 
variable’, directly and causally linked to the concrete. The concrete is always, to 
some extent, contingent and irreducible. And yet, concrete ‘facts’ cannot be 
understood as isolated data, related to each other only by coincidence. Their 
meaning and relevance arises only within particular historical totalities, to which 
they have to be related in thought.
For Thompson, the infinity of variations of capitalism has always to be 
understood within the confines of an epochal context characterised by the 
dominance of a specific “logic of social process”.^  In the modem period, this 
“logic of capitalist process has found expression within all the activities of a 
society, and exerted a determining pressure upon its development and form”.^  
But instead of a determination of historical development by the ‘laws of motion’ 
of capital, the notion of a logic of social process suggests determination in terms 
of the exertion of pressures and the setting of limits. The history of capitalism 
can thus be understood as a “stmctured process”, subject to determinate pressures 
yet only partially determined.* Such a theory would not understand the ‘limits of 
the possible’ as constituted by specific historic blocs and embodied within 
particular historical stmctures. Instead, it asks how the capitalist logic of social 
process itself sets limits to the particular forms in which capitalism exists and, 
indeed, can exist, without assuming that the concrete existence of capitalism is 
directly given by the requirements or internal dynamics of capital.
The question then is: what generates these pressures which stmcture historical 
process? Thompson does in fact locate the fundamental social dynamic of 
capitalism in its ‘mode of production’. Conceptualised by Marx as an “integral 
stmcture”, this concept is taken by Thompson to explain the possibility and 
necessity for capital to expand, but also for capitalist social relations to be 
reproduced in the process of capital’s self-valorisation. In this sense, the mode of
6 If  we can still speak o f capitalism as a ‘system’, this is “because o f (a) conformities in
the ways in which the parts are related to the whole, giving a totality informed by
characteristic concepts, and (b) because o f an identity in the logic o f social process”;
Thompson 1978c, 357.
7 Thompson 1978a, 62.
8 Thompson 1978a, 98.
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production specifies the “rules of capital” which structure the process of 
capitalist development.^ But Thompson is adamant that a “capitalist mode of 
production is not capitalism”. T h e  development of capitalism, for all the 
pressures exerted by capitalist social relations, for all the limits posed by the 
capitalist mode to the development of social institutions and the realisation of 
social ideals within societies organised on its basis, cannot be understood directly 
in terms of the unfolding of capital according to its inherent conceptual logic.”
If, as Thompson insists, historical materialism nonetheless has to pursue 
knowledge of capitalism as a totality, then this totality can only be theoretically 
reconstructed through close empirical and historical study. This has to show not 
only how the mode of production impresses itself on all aspects of social life, but 
also how capital and its particular dynamic itself is reproduced and continuously 
reconstituted through these social relations, and for that reason itself forever 
changing and mutating. But if so, then society cannot be understood as a 
conglomeration of spheres and levels, each interacting with the other, yet always 
externally related to each other. How could law, for instance, be confined to a 
‘level’ when, historically, it was present “at every bloody level; it was imbricated 
within the mode of production and production relations themselves (as property- 
rights, definitions of agrarian practice)”?'^
What can be discerned in these remarks, and in the historical work of E.P. 
Thompson more generally, is a conception of historical materialism which points 
beyond the base/superstructure dichotomy, without reneging on the idea that 
class relations are the dynamic centre of any class society. For these arguments 
make it plain that the key to capitalism, as to any other form of society, lies not in 
giving prominence to ‘spheres’ other than the economy. It lies in recognising that 
the ‘superstructures’ constitute the ‘base’ itself. The ‘material base’ consists of 
all those social relations which together constitute the mode in which production
9 Thompson 1978a, 153.
10 Thompson 1978a, 154. The problem, according to Thompson, is the “move from the
circuits o f capital to capitalww; from a highly-conceptualised and abstracted mode of
production, within which determinism appears as absolute, to historical determination as
the exerting of pressures, as a logic o f process within a larger (and sometimes 
countervailing) process”; Thompson 1978a, 163.
11 Cf. Wood 1995a, 58f.
12 Thompson 1978a, 96.
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and distribution are organised in a historical form of society. Derek Sayer argues, 
consequently, that the ‘base’ must be understood as
comprising the totality o f social relations, whatever these may be, which make particular 
forms o f production, and thus o f property, possible. These social relations are 
simultaneously forms o f material relation o f human beings to nature. This totality is Marx’s 
‘groundwork o f society’, and its extensiveness indicates why he could plausibly treat 
material production as being synonymous with production of ‘the society itself, i.e. the 
human being in its social relations’.'^
If this argument is accepted, then we have to stop talking about an ‘economic 
base’ as opposed to political, ideological, juridical ‘superstructures’, with the 
former determining the latter directly or in the last instance, structurally or 
through class strategy.
4.2. The Separation of Politics and Economics
The historical materialist perspective developed so far provides the basis for a 
conceptualisation of capitalism that rests neither on a mono-causal economic 
determinism, nor on the vacuous and ahistorical methodological pluralism of 
much of IR and social theory. But how does this perspective allow us to 
understand the historical specificity of capitalism?
I have argued in chapter 1 that the recognition (by Janice Thomson and John 
Ruggie, among others) that political and economic spheres are only separated in 
modernity is crucial to the historicisation of the categories through which we 
conceptualise the origins and development of modem society. It is the 
precondition for a non-evolutionistic interpretation of the rise of capitalist 
modernity. It makes it possible to see, as Anthony Giddens points out, that
the emergence o f modem capitalism does not represent the high point (thus far) o f a 
progressive scheme o f social development, but rather the coming o f a type o f society 
radically distinct from all prior forms o f social order.'"*
13 Sayer 1989, 77. Thompson similarly notes that the ‘base’, if we want to use this term at 
all, is “not just economic but human - a characteristic human relationship entered into 
involuntarily in the productive process”. While he does want this to be taken as a denial 
that “the ‘economic movement’ has proven to be the ‘most elemental and decisive’”, he 
goes on to argue that “social and cultural phenomena do not trail after the economic at 
some remote remove; they are, at their source, immersed in the same nexus of 
relationship”; Thomson 1978a, 194.
14 Giddens 1985, 31-32.
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But many of those who might readily agree with Giddens that capitalist 
modernity is indeed radically different from all other forms of society would 
nevertheless reject the idea that politics and economics are separable in all 
periods of capitalist development. They would follow those who, like E.H. Carr, 
maintain that by the 1920s, at the latest, the “illusion of a separation between 
politics and economics -  a belated legacy of the laissez-faire nineteenth century -  
had ceased to correspond to any aspect of current reality”.’^  Cox similarly argues 
that the separation of politics and economics had its ideological foundations in 
the hegemony of the historic bloc that underpinned the Pax Britannica. This 
separation became “blurred” when states assumed, with the rise of 
Keynesianism, “a legitimate and necessary overt role in national economic 
management”.
For Giddens, by contrast, the separation of politics and economics is not just a 
discursive or ideological construct; nor is its analytical value restricted to the 
liberal period of European development. Conceptually, it should be understood to 
refer not to the non-intervention of the state in the economy, as “based in the 
capitalist labour contract”, but as designating the institutional “insulation” of 
these two spheres, “whereby relations between capital and labour are kept ‘ non- 
political’ Therefore:
The insulation o f the economic and the political should ... not be equated with 
competitiveness in labour and product markets. Such a view has often been taken by those 
influenced by classical political economy, even where in other respects they have been 
critical o f it. The classical economists tended to identify the sphere o f the ‘economic’ with 
the competition o f independent and autonomous capitalist firms, in which any form of state 
intervention breaches the division between economy and polity. This not only greatly 
underestimates the ways in which the existence o f an insulated ‘economy’ depends on the 
state in the first place, it suggests a decline in the scope o f the ‘economic’ with the increasing 
state intervention in productive activity. But what is usually termed the ‘intervention’ of the
15 E.H. Carr 1981, 117. According to Carr, “Marx was dominated by nineteenth-century 
presuppositions” when “writing as if economics and politics were separate domains, one 
subordinate to the other”. Like those who insist on the primacy o f the political, he failed 
to understand that “Economic forces are in fact political forces” ; Carr 1981, 116.
16 Cox 1996b, 104. Elsewhere, Cox suggests somewhat contradictorily, that politics and
economics are generally separated in hegemonic phases (including, presumably, the Pax
Americana), while this separation breaks down in non-hegemonic periods and in times
of transition; Cox 1987, 107. It is thus unclear, whether the separation o f politics and
economics is a product o f one particular hegemony, or characteristic o f all hegemonic 
phases.
17 Giddens 1981, 128
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State may have the consequence of actually protecting the insulation o f the economy -  in 
fact, it may even be its necessary condition,’*
The implication is thus not a liberal understanding of state market relations, 
but a particular understanding of the underlying unity of politics and economics 
even in the most liberal periods. Even when the state does not intervene strongly 
in the economy, or when hegemony does not prevail, the institutionally separated 
spheres of the political and the economic are internally related to each other, in 
that their very separation is a consequence of the commodification of labour and 
the establishment of absolute private property.’^
Capitalism is unique, then, in that here - and only here - the analytical 
distinction between political and economic structures or spheres corresponds to 
their institutional separation. Only in capitalism do these ‘spheres’ acquire 
something like a dynamic of their own and appear to follow some innate laws, 
which seem to stem from the nature of the pursuit of wealth or power 
themselves. There is no need to accept early-nineteenth century laissez-faire 
ideology for reality; even the most liberal ‘night watchman state’ was strongly 
involved in economic development. Yet for all the interventions of the state in 
the economy, for all the economic restrictions placed on political action by 
economic interests and resources, in short, for all the reciprocity between 
economic and politics, these spheres assume an autonomy which they do not 
have in non-capitalist societies. In fact, it was only in capitalism that a concept of 
the economy could emerge. In a very real sense, pre-capitalist societies did not 
have ‘economies’, as Karl Polanyi pointed out.^°
But did people not always produce, trade, and exchange goods? Have they not 
always striven for wealth? Polanyi certainly overstates his case when he suggests 
that only since the nineteenth century have people begun to put the pursuit of 
wealth at the centre of their lives. The crucial point, however, is that only with 
the insulation highlighted by Giddens does something like a self-referential realm 
emerge in which productive activities are governed, to a large extent (but never 
exclusively), by considerations of profitability. The control over property in the
18 Giddens 1985, 135-36.
19 Cf. Giddens 1981, 122; Giddens 1985,211.
20 Polanyi 1957, 44-46.
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means of production, rather than the possession of political authority, is here the 
decisive aspect in the dynamic of productive and commercial development.^’ 
Capitalism, and with it the separation of politics and economics, emerges when 
the control over objects becomes the regulating instance of the “allocative” 
dimensions of social life, and the control over people is relegated to a socially 
delimited sphere of ‘the political’.
For Giddens, this argument provides the basis for a critique of Karl Marx’s 
theory of history in that it allows us to see that it is only in capitalist societies that 
allocative resources drive societal change. Before the rise of capitalism, the 
control of, and struggles over authoritative resources was much more important 
for the process of social change. This also implies that class conflict cannot be 
the ‘prime mover’ of history, as class (which Marx defined by the relation of 
people to the means of production) necessarily refers to the control of allocative 
resources (which for most of history was less important than the control of 
authoritative resources). An essential aspect of the uniqueness of capitalism is, 
therefore, that class only assumes a central role in this society, both in terms of 
the organisation of production and exploitation and with regard to its general 
developmental dynamic; only capitalism is a “class society”, whereas pre­
capitalist societies were only “class-divided”. Classes existed, but their conflicts 
did not form the central axis of social organisation and transformation.^^
Giddens’ critique of the Marxist understanding of pre-capitalist societies, and 
of their discounting of the fundamental differences between pre-capitalist and 
capitalist societies, is highly pertinent. In as much as Marxists take class relations 
to be ‘productions relations’ in all historical forms of society, they are in danger 
of radically misunderstanding pre-capitalist history, including the transition to
21
By contrast, in feudalism “social labour is ... mobilized and committed to the 
transformation of nature primarily through the exercise o f power and domination - 
through a political process. Hence, the deployment o f social labour is, in this mode, a 
function o f the locus o f political power; it will differ as this locus shifts position”; W olf 
1982, 80. In capitalism, on the other hand, “the social allocation o f resources and labour 
does not, on the whole, take place by means o f political direction, communal 
deliberation, hereditary duty, custom or religious obligation, but rather through the 
mechanisms o f commodity exchange”; Wood 1995c, 29. The separation of politics and 
economics, understood in this way, is also implicit in Robert Cox’s definition o f the 
capitalist ‘mode o f development’; cf. ch. 3, fh. 26.
22 Giddens 1981, ch. 9.
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capitalism. At a minimum, Marxists have to be able to accommodate this aspect 
of Giddens’ critique. Does this mean that they have to give up on the idea that 
pre-capitalist societies were ‘class societies’ and that class struggle is central to 
fundamental historical change?
Perhaps not, but this presupposes that the Marxist concept of class is 
redefined. Class relations may be better understood as ‘property relations’ than as 
‘relations of production’. Pace Giddens, we should not regard ‘class’ as 
inherently ‘economic’, expressing differential access to allocative resources; the 
reason is that property itself only became an economic category in capitalism. 
Giddens’ transhistorical identification of property with ‘allocation’ (control over 
things, and ultimately over nature), and of political power (control over people) 
with ‘authorisation’, effectively allows the separation of politics and economics 
to creep back into his framework.^"* This prevents Giddens from developing an 
account of the transition to capitalism which does justice to his demand for a 
‘discontinuist’ interpretation of history, as he continues to rely on the traditional 
model of economic commodification and political rationalisation.
It may be more fruitful, instead, to historicise the category of class itself by 
pointing out that the forms o f property through which surplus is appropriated 
vary from society to society.^^ In feudalism, for instance, it was the property in 
the means o f violence rather than production which gave access to socially 
produced surplus. Only in capitalism is the form of property that mediates 
exploitation ‘economic’, pertaining to the control over things rather than people; 
only in capitalism is surplus appropriated within the process of production itself; 
only in capitalism, therefore, are class relations also ‘relations of production’.
The crucial point here is that, in capitalism, social power does not enter the 
sphere of ‘material production’ from outside, to give the relationship between 
humanity and nature a concrete social purpose. The existence of a separate 
economic realm presupposes the reorganisation of social power, which leads to 
the privatisation of the power to extract surplus. As Ellen Meiksins Wood argues, 
the transition to capitalism can be conceived as a “long process in which certain
23 Giddens 1981,92.
24 Giddens 1981,46-52.
25 The argument of this paragraph draws on Brenner 1985b; Wood 1991 and 1995b.
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political powers were gradually transformed into economic powers and 
transferred to a separate sphere”. This process, at the same time, left the political 
‘sphere’ devoid of any direct implication in the process of appropriation.^^ In that 
sense, “capitalism represents the ultimate privatization of political power”.^ ’ The 
privatisation of some forms of political domination in the economy is paralleled 
by the reconstitution of the impoverished political dimension as a ‘public 
sphere’. This abstraction allows the capitalist state to represent itself as the 
embodiment of the ‘general interest’, even as its very existence is premised upon 
the privatisation of the power to exploit and its relocation to a ‘private’ sphere of 
‘economics’. According to Wood,
The state - which stands apart from the economy even though it intervenes in it - can 
ostensibly (notably, by means of universal suffrage) belong to everyone, producer and 
appropriator, without usurping the exploitive power o f the appropriator.^*
4.3, Modi Vivendi; Towards a Theory of Capitalist States and Markets
The discussion so far has highlighted the inadequacy of supplementing the 
‘economic’ base with the social ‘superstructures’ and softening some of the more 
deterministic and economistic tendencies of orthodox Marxism. The process 
through which capitalist class relations emerged was simultaneously the process 
through which relations of domination, rooted in the control of authoritative 
resources, were abstracted from processes of exploitation and allocation. In this 
sense, the very autonomy of the ‘purely political’, public capitalist polity, and of 
the private economy based on a market system are both understandable as ‘social 
forms’ of the ‘capital relation’.
The challenge for historical materialism is to develop a conceptual vocabulary 
that allows us to combine in thought the very real autonomy of the political and 
the economic in capitalism, and the fact that this autonomy is only apparent in
26 Wood 1995c, 36.
27 Wood 1995c, 40.
28 Wood 1995c, 40. This is not to suggest that the public sphere has to be democratic in
every capitalist society. That this is not the case has been amply demonstrated by 
history. But it points to the possibility o f liberal democracy in which abstract citizenship 
in the public sphere is made possible by the abstraction o f ‘economic’ relations of
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light of their underlying unity. Bertell Oilman seeks to capture this duality by 
developing the Hegelian notion of an ‘internal relation’ between these ‘forms of 
appearance’. In this perspective, politics and economics do not simply interact 
with each other ‘externally’, as spheres with an independent ontological reality; 
they are not simply “elements-in-relation”, but are differentiated “elements-of- 
relation”, whose meaning cannot be understood by abstracting them from this 
relationship, as they could not exist outside of this relation.^^
Ultimately, these arguments lead us to conceptualise institutional orders like 
the state and the market as social relations, and even, more specifically, as 
production relations. In this perspective, the capitalist state, like the capitalist 
market, are to be understood as social forms assumed by the capital relation, as 
organisational loci, in which particular aspects of this relation become petrified. 
They are the institutional products of the abstraction of coercive power from the 
process of surplus appropriation.^® But while these forms are the forms o f  
appearance of capital, they are also its modes o f existence?^ The capital relation 
is not an economic relation; it can exist only in and through differentiated social 
forms, such as the ‘political’ state and the ‘economic’ market.
Having started from the argument that political, social and cultural structures 
must be shown as operating within the base, it becomes possible - now that we 
have found the social relations which appear in petrified form as institutions or 
structures - to reformulate this notion. For the relations of production which are 
at the ‘base’ of society must encompass all those structures and institutions 
which we have discovered to be social relations. In that sense, capital as a social 
relation encompasses not only the market, but also the state. To go even further: 
the autonomous political form of the state is a relation o f production.
The concept of production which is implied by these arguments can, of course, 
no longer be defined economically in a narrow sense. In the process of producing
domination and exploitation from political control. Giddens 1985, 207; Giddens 1981, 
210-13 and 220-229.
29 On these concepts, see Oilman 1976, 26-40. As Thomas notes, to ground particular
relationships between politics and economics in the ‘fits’ generated by hegemonic blocs 
is insufficient, as it does not recognise that their relationship is an internal one even if it 
is not mediated by hegemony; cf. Thomas 1994, 135.
30 cf. Holloway and Picciotto 1991, 114ff.
31 cf. Bonefeld, Gunn and Psychopedis 1992, xv.
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commodities, human beings in definite social relationships also produce and 
reproduce the social relations which make capitalist production possible; society 
itself has to be understood as produced}^ Production refers not just to the 
production of material goods, but to the production of the social relations, 
institutions and ideas which make it possible for material goods to be produced 
in a specific historical form, in particular social relations and which, in turn, are 
reproduced through ‘economic’ production. Capitalist relations of production are 
not something confined to the economic ‘sphere’, nor can the state and the 
market be understood in abstraction from the social relations which produce 
them as distinct institutional orders.^^ These are the social relations by which 
capitalist society is produced and reproduced. Clarke therefore argues that
the economic, in the narrow sense, the political and the ideological are not defined abstractly 
as fi’ameworks within which relations of production are subsequently to be defined, as 
politically and ideologically constituted and reproduced relations within which material 
production takes place. Rather, the economic, political and ideological are form s which are 
taken by the relations o f  production. Political and ideological relations are as much relations 
o f  production as are strictly economic relations within which production takes place.^^
Social form, in the sense developed by Clarke, can be understood as “the 
modus vivendi of antagonistic relations”, and its development as “the way in 
which contradictions are reconciled’ (Marx)”.^  ^ This cannot but be a dynamic, 
conflictual process. Consequently, social forms have to be conceived of as “form 
processes”, not as static and unchangeable things: “The determinate forms of 
capital are not only the forms of existence of capital, but the form-processes 
through which capital is reproduced”. I n  other words, social forms are not the 
modes of existence of capitalist relations of production by virtue of some 
structural set up of capitalist society; they do not ‘express’ class relations as a 
matter of fact. As Simon Clarke argues:
32 Karel Kosik comes to the same conclusion by accepting ‘the economy’ (but not the 
‘economic factor’) as the material base, while expanding the meaning o f the ‘economic’: 
“Economics is not only the production o f material goods; it is the totality o f the process 
of producing and reproducing man as a socio-historical being. Economics is the 
production o f material goods but also o f social relations, o f the context o f this 
production”; Kosik 1976, 115.
33 cf. W olf 1982,21.
34 Clarke 1991a, 84-85; cf. Sayer 1989
35 Bonefeld 1992, 105.
36 Holloway 1991, 239.
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The separation o f the economic and the political is not an objective feature o f a structure 
imposed by the logic o f capital, it is an institutional framework which is only imposed on 
capitalist relations o f production through a permanent class struggle, a framework which is 
accordingly a constant object o f class struggle, which is only reproduced and transformed 
through that struggle/^
Capitalist social relations could not exist apart from these forms and they 
could not exist only ‘economically’. This should not be taken to mean that the 
relations between social forms engendered by capitalist relations of production 
are simply functionally complementary. On the contrary, these relations are 
deeply contradictory precisely because they are constituted as parts of the 
‘ensemble of social forms’ of capitalist society which are yet autonomous (and 
not just relatively). Capital can indeed only be reproduced through all the forms 
which this social relation takes. It cannot be reproduced as a purely economic 
phenomenon through the ‘circuits of capital’ alone; capital does, in particular, 
require the state to reproduce the property rights and the ability for capital to be 
reinvested profitably.
Even if we add the caveat that this does not mean that the state actually fulfils 
these ‘functions’ (or even always tries to), this argument may seem to re-admit an 
orthodox class-reductionism. It should be noted, however, that while the 
capitalist state and the capitalist market are ultimately forms of the capitalist 
class relation, the very autonomy of the political sphere in capitalism prevents us 
from understanding state policies as determined by class strategy, even if the 
latter is understood in terms of the construction of hegemony rather than 
immediate instrumental control. Grounding the capitalist nature of the ‘modem 
state’ in the capital relation allows us to interpret capitalist political processes as 
taking place within the ‘limits of the possible’ set by capitalism’s logic of social 
process, without claiming that state actions are directly given by instrumental or 
structural causation, or by functional requirements of capital. This step, clearly, 
takes from historical materialism some of the explanatory powers which 
positivist and deterministic Marxism claimed for itself. But, given the
37 Clarke 1991b, 46; cf. 1991b, 61 and 1991c, 190. Bromley notes that “in the political 
sphere, the sovereign form o f the polity must be actively maintained by the 
subordination of state activities to the rule o f law and money and through the 
bureaucratic exclusion o f the people from the means o f administration” ; Bromley 1995, 
240-41.
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weaknesses of the explanations produced on this basis, the move towards an 
interpretive historical materialism entails only limited costs.
It has to be noted, however, that the emphasis on the concept of social form 
can easily lead into static modes of analysis. This may find expression either as a 
‘deep sociology’ of modernity which, similar to Althusser’s structuralism, is 
incapable of bridging theory and history. Or it may find expression in an 
approach in which the institutions of capitalist society assume quasi-personal 
character and petrify into things, and which reifies them into unchanging 
building blocks which motor around in history according to their inbuilt dynamic 
conferred upon them by ‘capital’. In short, there is the danger of formalism. 
History may indeed be understood as the movement of the forms of capitalist 
social relations of production. But this movement of the forms must not be 
allowed to become a substitute for the real history of the production, 
reproduction and reconstitution of these forms by ‘real, living individuals’.
The social forms in and through which capitalism exists do not exist apart 
from human praxis. To understand capitalism as a ‘form process’ with a 
particular logic of social process is impossible without a conception of agency 
that recognises, as Thompson puts it, the “crucial ambivalence of our human 
presence in our own history, part subjects, part objects, the voluntary agents of 
our involuntary determinations”.^ * Thompson refuses to reduce human praxis to a 
narrow conception of rational action (which effectively takes the ‘rules of 
capital’ as given and presents them as having their sources within individuals). 
His arguments for a historical materialism that conceives of social being and 
social consciousness as dialectically related rather than as locked in a 
deterministic, uni-directional relationship, point to the ways in which cultural 
and ideological forms of capitalist society can be conceptualised: as attempts to
38 Thompson, quoted in Trimberger 1984, 221. Cf. Wood 1995b, 92. Also see Kosik 1976, 
119: “Marxism is no mechanical materialism that would reduce social consciousness, 
philosophy and art to ‘economic conditions’ and whose analytical activity would entail 
revealing the earthly kernel o f spiritual [geistige] artefacts. Materialist dialectics on the 
contrary demonstrates how a concrete historical subject uses his material-economic base 
to form corresponding ideas and an entire set o f forms o f consciousness. Consciousness 
is not reduced to conditions; rather, attention is focused on the process in which a 
concrete subject produces and reproduces a social reality, while being historically 
produced and reproduced in it h im self. On Kosik’s understanding o f the economic, see 
above, fii. 32.
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make sense of a world, and of their places in a world, in which the objects and 
social forms which they produce gain power over their lives as if they were 
independent of them, seemingly following laws of their own.
Thompson insists that the cultural mediation of social being has to consider the 
existing cultural resources which people mobilise in order to understand what is 
happening to them in their ‘material lives’. Forms of consciousness cannot be 
read off the ‘material base’, as in the mechanical materialism of Feuerbach 
against which Marx argued so vehemently. Ideas and concepts do not reflect 
production (to be understood in the wide sense outlined above) in a passive way; 
they arise from the active appropriation of life in thought.^^ By the same token, 
‘the material’ is not a pre-social realm; production is always premised on specific 
class relations. In addition, however, it has to be recognised that “the activity of 
material production is conscious activity”.'^ ® Thus, while consciousness does not 
have an existence independent from ‘modes of production’, neither can the 
development of the latter be understood in abstraction from the conscious praxes 
of historically situated men and women.'*’ We therefore have to ask not only how 
being finds expression in consciousness, but also how the conscious praxis of 
real human beings becomes a moment of the ‘material base’ of capitalist society 
itself and shapes the way in which the dynamic of capital permeates society as a 
whole. Culture and ideology can hence no longer be understood as levels which 
may or may not fit the dominant economic structure; the point is rather to 
understand how ‘culture’ is an aspect of the material production and reproduction 
of capitalism (of the struggles for and against its reproduction).
Have we, after all, ended up with the old concept of the ‘expressive totality’? 
For it seems that here, too, it is proposed to understand capital ‘in the totality of 
its relations’. But the concept of totality suggested here is not quite Lukacsian: 
rather than to take the forms merely as the ‘expressions’ of capital I argue that we 
should understand social forms as constitutive of the concrete existence of 
capital. The capital relation is constituted by the internal relation between state 
and market, and the development of the social forms of capitalist society, as well
39 Kosik 1976, ch. 1.
40 Wood 1995a, 67.
41 Sayer 1989, 86-93.
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as their concrete historical relation to each other, reconstitute the capital relation 
itself. The social struggles which re-form the state and the market also trans­
form the nature of capital within the limits of the capitalist logic of social 
process.
The perspective outlined here also implies a need for a much more historical 
approach to the mental construction of the totality of capitalist social relations. 
While the emergence of the social forms organising the capitalist logic of social 
process does indeed mark a fundamental rupture in the flow of history, this 
cannot be taken to mean that all the institutions (or all aspects even of, say, the 
state form) of the modem epoch have been produced by - and are specific to - 
capitalism. There is a very real danger in any approach which starts from some 
notion of totality or system that it reifies empirically existing institutions as a 
necessary moment of the historical nature of a given social totality. The present 
approach, by contrast, not only enquires into how capital finds expression in 
particular social forms, but also how these forms in turn constitute the capital 
relation. This also implies that we have to ask how those aspects of, for instance, 
the capitalist state that have their origins in pre-capitalist history themselves 
become constitutive of capital’s concrete existence.
Capitalism, then, is never capitalist in all its aspect. The social forms in which 
capital as a social relation manifests itself often carry “historical legacies”.'*^ 
What Marx observed of mid-nineteenth century Germany may still be tme today, 
though not to the same degree: “We suffer not only from the living, but Jfrom the 
dead. Le mart saisit le v i f ' f  These aspects may add to the contradictions of 
capitalism and become the focus of concrete conflicts and stmggles. Human 
praxis is therefore “wo/ only the production o f  [the] new but also a - critical and 
dialectical - reproduction o f  the old 'f^  Moreover, the cultural resources which 
concrete individuals are able to mobilise in their attempts to come to terms with 
the reality they confront, may partly have developed in circumstances which long 
preceded the present, under different conditions of capitalism or, indeed, in pre­
capitalist societies. As Karel Kosik notes.
42 Wood 1995c, 26.
43 “The dead man clutches onto the living”; Marx 1977, 91.
44 Kosik 1976, 85.
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The society which gave birth to the genius of Heraclitus, the era in which Shakespeare’s art 
was generated, the class in whose ‘spirit’ Hegel’s philosophy was developed, have 
irretrievably vanished in history. Nevertheless, the ‘world o f Heraclitus’, the ‘world of 
Shakespeare’ and the ‘world o f Hegel’ continue to live and exist as living moments o f the 
present because they have enriched the human subject permanently!^^
4.4. Conclusions
The point of historical materialism is not the establishment of general laws of 
the determinations between the different spheres of society, but the attempt to 
find answers to the question why, in capitalist societies, spheres of action seem to 
be fragmented. By developing a historical and sociological argument, in which 
history and theory are dialectically related rather than opposed as different levels 
of analysis, a historical materialist approach would be able to make visible the 
historical and social content not just of the various structures of capitalist society, 
but of the separation of structures itself. It has been argued that this separation is 
a form of social power, one which has to be understood before we can analyse 
the mutual relationships between political, economic and other structures.
The crux of this argument is that the heuristic pivot of analysis should not be 
the ways in which the political sphere intervenes in the economic in order to 
create stability, provide legitimacy, and secure the profitability of capital. To 
make sense of modernity, both the institutional separation of politics and 
economics, their structural interaction, and their co-constitution in the capitalist 
labour contract all have to be combined in thought. To focus on just one of these 
aspects of modernity is to mystify its historical nature, and tends to universalise it 
in different ways.
The consequence of the argument that politics and economics are separate in 
capitalism is not the re-affirmation of the ideological representation of the 
relationship between the ‘night-watchman’ state and the ‘free’ market of classical
45 Kosik 1976, 85. Cf. Sayer 1989, 96: “Societies exist in time, and cannot be made sense 
o f otherwise. Erscheinungsformen equally have an historical dimension, even if it is 
never independent o f people’s ‘materialistic connections’”. It is this historical dimension 
which specifies the limits under which ‘people make their own history ... under the 
given and inherited circumstances with which they are confronted’. Sayer therefore 
suggests: “Amongst these ‘given and inherited circumstances’, ... the cultural legacy of 
the past must be reckoned a powerful material constituent o f the present, framing present 
experience, informing ‘phenomenal forms’” ; ibid.
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liberalism. It is, most emphatically, not that politics and economics can be 
adequately studied by different disciplines, each of which abstracts specific 
social processes from the totality of social relations. On the contrary, the form of 
historical materialism outlined in this chapter does not, as Ellen Meiksins Wood 
emphasises, recognise any strong disjunctures between politics and economics. 
Indeed, it sets out from the notion that “the ultimate secret of capitalist 
production is a political one”.'^  ^ Capitalist production presupposes capitalist 
relations of production. The emergence and reproduction of these relations, 
which take the form of separated institutional orders, can be understood in terms 
of a privatisation of political power in the ‘economy’ which is yet internally 
related to the political, legal, cultural, and other forms which make such private 
production possible.
The reproduction of capital is thus inseparable from the reproduction of the 
distinctiveness of its social forms. This does not imply that capital is always the 
same; on the contrary: social praxis changes the forms of capital and thereby 
constantly reconstitutes the ‘laws’ of capital and the ways in which the 
imperatives of capital impinge on social individuals. But as long as the capitalist 
relations of production are reproduced in these processes, the ‘logic of process’ 
of capital cannot be suspended completely. This logic of process is socially 
produced; it is not unchangeable, not working according to iron laws. But its 
imperatives are the products of the relations in which people enter involuntarily 
and there is a limit to how far these imperatives can be transformed and modified 
without threatening the underlying social relation itself.
46 Wood 1995c, 21.
5. THIRD TIME RIGHT? ‘OPEN MARXISM’ 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
5,1, The Problem of Hhe International*
Non-reductionist Marxism is possible, I have argued in the preceding chapter, 
if we take ‘the economy’ to be, not an a-social sphere of ‘material’ relations, but 
a particular form of social organisation that emerges, along with other 
specifically capitalist social forms, when capitalist class relations come into 
existence. While this approach does locate the very possibility for an 
‘autonomous’ economy and an equally ‘autonomous’ state to exist in particular 
class relations, it does not maintain that everything about the economy or the 
state has thereby been said. It certainly does not imply that particular economic 
or political processes can be explained directly by reference to the interests of the 
dominant class or ‘hegemonic bloc’.
This qualification also applies to foreign policy and the patterns of 
international relations in the modem period. In this respect, too, historical 
materialism cannot reduce international politics to capitalism’s ‘laws of motion’ 
or the agency of capitalists. However, it can and must provide an account of how 
the relations between capitalist states mediate the dynamics and contradictions of 
capitalist society. The first step in the development of a historical materialist 
theory of the international is to find an answer to a question which orthodox 
IR/IPE theorists do not even pose, namely how to account for the existence of an 
interstate system in a historical period in which the social relations of surplus 
extraction are essentially non-territorial. The challenge is here to decode the 
system of sovereign states exercising political authority over territorially 
delimited realms as a form of existence of the capital relation.
This may seem not much of a theoretical challenge given that we have already 
shown that the separation of politics and economics is the basis for the existence 
of the abstractly political state of capitalist modernity. Even though the form- 
theoretical renewals of Marxism that we have surveyed in the preceding chapter
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appear to assume that ‘the capitalist state’ exists in the singular -  or at least do 
not explicitly problematise the fact that the capitalist state exists only as part of a 
system of states -  we may yet be able to simply extend the argument to the 
international sphere.' In fact, this assumption that theories of ‘the capitalist state’ 
can provide the basis for the theorisation of the multiplicity of capitalist states 
underlies the ‘third wave’ of historical materialist theories of international 
relations that emerged in the 1990s.^
These theories draw heavily on the ‘capital relation’ approach of Bonefeld, 
Clarke, Holloway and Picciotto, on the ‘political Marxism’ of Brenner and 
Wood, and on the ‘internal relation’ approach of Oilman, to ground the modem 
international system in capitalist social relations. They all take the specifically 
capitalist separation of politics and economics (or, more precisely, the social 
relations which give rise to, and find expression in, this separation) to be central 
to theorising the modem intemational system.^
In order to better understand the contribution and the distinctiveness of the 
‘third wave’ (which, while far from being homogeneous, is marked by important 
commonalities), I will first situate it in the development of Marxist thinking on 
the intemational system. It will be shown that the central question asked by 
Marxists about intemational relations has changed significantly over time. Marx
Cf. Barker 1991, 204: “One might get the impression from [Holloway and Picciotto] as 
from a mass of other Marxist writings on the state, that capitalism has but one state. 
Where it is acknowledged that the beast is numerous, the implications o f that very 
concrete fact are not developed at all”.
If  we regard the classical Marxist theorists o f imperialism as the ‘first wave’, and world- 
systems theory as the ‘second wave’ o f historical materialist theorizing o f the 
intemational, then the work of Marxist scholars such as Mark Rupert (1995), Peter 
Bumham (1990, 1991, 1994) and Justin Rosenberg (1994), as well as Simon Bromley 
(1995, 1996, 1999), Chris Boyle (1994), Dan Diner (1993) and Jens Siegelberg (1994) 
may count as the ‘third wave’. Just as the ‘second wave’ o f neo-Weberian theories of 
intemational relations distinguishes itself from the authors o f the ‘first wave’, such as 
Skocpol (1979), in that it no longer takes the anarchical intemational system as given, so 
the ‘third wave’ o f Marxist IR theories finally seeks to problematise the capitalist 
intemational system as a social form. On the waves o f neo-Weberian IR theory, see 
Hobson 1998b.
So far, these efforts have not been noted by the systematisers and disciplinarians o f IR 
and IPE. In the US, at least, Marxism (which so far, in the form o f ‘world-systems 
theory’, had been present in the academic discourse under the label o f ‘globalism’ or 
‘structuralism’) seems to have lost its status as a serious and influential perspective in 
the usual triadic representations of the discipline, to be replaced by ‘constructivism’. See 
the representation o f relevant IR/lPE debates in the special 50th anniversary issue of 
Intemational Organization, collected in Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1999b; also
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and Engels, in as much as they considered intemational relations at all, were 
mainly concerned with the effects of war and of the foreign policy of specific 
states on the likelihood of revolution in European countries. The classical 
theorists of imperialism and their successors were concerned with explaining the 
effects of changes in capitalist production on the foreign policy of states whose 
existence as separate political units was taken for granted. By contrast, the 
problem that has become central in recent years is how to establish the capitalist 
nature of the modem system of sovereign territorial states.
The second part of this chapter will look at the answers given by Peter 
Bumham, Mark Rupert, and Justin Rosenberg. These authors draw on the results 
of the Marxist debate over the nature of the capitalist state which emerged in the 
1970s and 1980s, and which has given rise to a ‘form-theoretical’ reformulation 
of the Marxist understanding of the state. I will argue that their work does not, in 
the end, provide a satisfactory answer to the question they pose; at best, they 
offer a partial determination of the modem intemational system as a social form 
of capitalist society. They are ultimately unable to account for the exclusive 
territoriality of capitalist statehood. For while the form-theoretical reconstmction 
of Marxism allows us to understand why capitalism needs and entails statehood, 
it does not explain why capitalism is fractured politically along 
territorial/national lines -  and hence the existence of multiple and distinct 
capitalist states. This is not to say that these approaches are without merits; on 
the contrary, they go far to point the way to a Marxist theory of the intemational. 
Ultimately, however, they fail to resolve the question which has marred Marxism 
from its very origins, namely why capitalist politics assumes a geopolitical form.
5.2. War and Revolution: Marx and Engels on International Relations
To the authors of the Communist Manifesto, the relations between states were 
of secondary interest. In particular, Marx and Engels seemed to agree with their 
liberal contemporaries that the importance of war in social life had declined since
compare Stephen Walt’s argument that realism, liberalism and constructivism (rather 
than ‘radicalism’) today form the central paradigms of IR/IPE; Walt 1998.
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the Vienna Congress. This tendency, Marx and Engels suggested, was the result 
of the development of capitalism:
The national differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more 
vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom o f commerce, to the 
world-market, to uniformity in the mode o f production and in the conditions o f life 
corresponding thereto”.'^
This argument did not imply the end of the state as such, which would only 
become possible with the end of capitalism. In the meantime, capitalist states 
remained the guarantors of private property, and the means of sustaining 
capitalist class relations. But the more the “universal interdependence of nations” 
developed, the more would the conflicts between states be overshadowed by the 
struggles between the antagonistic classes of global capitalist society.^
Such, at least, was the perspective of the 1848 Communist Manifesto. 
Subsequently, its authors paid increasing attention, especially in their historical 
studies and journalistic work, to the influence of the foreign policy of particular 
states, as well as to the concrete dynamic of intemational relations in their era, on 
the likelihood of revolution in specific European countries.^ They argued that 
while a revolution was most likely to occur first in Germany, it was unlikely to 
succeed while Russia remained the guarantor power of the social status quo. 
From this concern followed a keen interest in the issues which might divide 
Russia and Pmssia, and more generally led to increasing conflicts between the 
European Great Powers. The extension of the revolutionary process to 
encompass the whole capitalist world depended on a revolution in Britain, which, 
in the view of Marx and Engels, financed the suppression of movements for 
radical démocratisation and socialism. But revolution in England would only be 
possible after a socialist revolution in France, which might then lend support to 
Irish movements for colonial liberation or contribute to a crisis of the British
4 Marx and Engels 1998, 36.
5 Cf. Linklater 1996, 119-124. As Linklater points out, Marx and Engels thought of the
form o f class struggle as national; the goal, however, was the transformation o f the 
global society constituted by capitalist production relations.
6 This paragraph draws on the excellent study by Terry Kandall 1989. Already in 1848, 
Marx and Engels “had advocated that Germany carry out a revolutionary war against the 
Russians to keep the revolution on the Continent moving, shift the revolution in
Germany to the left, and ‘call in question the entire European balance o f power’ by
restoring Poland”; Kandall 1989, 43.
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imperial system in Asia, thus undermining the British economic and social 
system at home. As Terry Kandall argues, for Marx and Engels,
the class struggle in Europe after 1848 could be fought only by altering the nineteenth- 
century form o f Russian and English imperialism versus the proletarian revolution. And this 
would occur only when the secondary contradictions between states resulted in a 'world­
wide war' between the ‘proletarian revolution and the feudalistic counter-revolution’.^
In various ways, war between the states could therefore contribute to the 
success or failure of social revolutions. To some extent, the causes for wars in 
the capitalist epoch may be found in the tensions between national states, each 
pursuing strategies of world market expansion, pitching national bourgeoisies 
against each other.® In declining states, especially, this may increase the chances 
for successful revolution. This generates a powerful interest in cooperation 
between the national ruling classes of different states. But war may also be a 
direct result of the class struggle itself, and ascending states may rely on it to 
disrupt the transnational organisation of the working class, and to integrate its 
members as individual subjects (and later citizens) into particular nation-states.^ 
Engels, in particular, increasingly stressed the potential for war to foster 
nationalism and chauvinism, leading peoples to fight for their national existence, 
rather than classes to struggle for social revolution.’® This second form of war 
does not, in the capitalist period, simply internationalise a supposedly ‘domestic’ 
conflict, but also seeks to domesticate a transnational social struggle.
Military conflict between capitalist states can thus be an expression of “intra­
capitalist competition” as well as of “national war”. According to Erica Benner, 
Marx and Engels did not integrate these aspects of capitalist intemational 
relations. Moreover,
in failing to draw a systematic connection between intra-capitalist competition and national 
war, Marx and Engels also failed to offer satisfactory explanations of two related 
developments which were gathering powerful momentum by the 1870s: the build-up of
7 Kandall 1989, 57. Kandall concludes that “contrary to popular academic opinion -  Marx 
and Engels held a systematic conception o f the intemational system of states in the 
nineteenth century. The relations within that system, in Marx and Engels’ theoretical 
conception, are conditioned by, but not reduced to, the uneven development of 
capitalism and the class conflicts within nation-states, as well as the political military 
capacities o f states ( ...)  and the historical memories resulting from wars and revolutions; 
ibid.
8 cf. Benner 1995,211-12.
9 Kandall 1989,55.
10 Linklater 1996, 124-26; Kandall 1989, 53; Benner 1995, 213.
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military power within the state apparatus, and the political integration o f the working classes 
into separate nation-states. These developments were highly conducive to the survival and, 
indeed, the strengthening o f national particularism in an era when it was becoming more and 
more difficult than ever for particular states and peoples to opt out o f a global economy.' '
While clearly recognising the danger of a shift of loyalty from class to nation, 
Marx and Engels were unable, Benner suggests, to explain this tendency, given 
their view of capitalism as necessarily producing greater polarisation between its 
classes. The historical development of capitalist modernity witnessed, quite 
contrary to the predictions of the Communist Manifesto, increasing levels of 
conflict between nation-states together with the pacification of class conflict. 
This process can only be understood if we stop to assume that capitalist industry 
had de-nationalised economic processes and start to give more prominence to the 
“role played by the state and intemational competition in the development of 
capitalism”.'^
What, precisely, this role is cannot, however, be established on purely 
empirical grounds. The failure of Marx and Engels lies deeper, I suggest, than 
their lack of attention to the interaction between national states and the world 
market. Their fundamental short-coming is that they do not even provide a 
theoretical basis for the existence of a system of national states in the modem 
period, which is, after all, based on transnational social relations of surplus 
appropriation. Indeed, when Marx, in Capital /, sets out to determine the laws of 
capital accumulation, he notes:
In order to examine the object o f our investigation in its integrity, free from all disturbing 
subsidiary circumstances, we must treat the whole world o f  trade as one nation, and assume 
that capitalism is established everywhere and has taken possession o f every branch of 
industry.'^
The first volume of Capital, of course, explicitly seeks to establish the abstract 
laws of motion of capital. Yet this raises the question whether the abstraction 
from the real multiplicity of capitalist nations and states is indeed a useful 
procedure. At the very least, this would necessitate a theoretical argument to 
demonstrate that the ‘law of value’ obtains within and across bounded nation­
states in the same way, and to the same extent, as it does within the fictitious
11 Benner 1995,212.
12 Benner 1995, 217.
13 Marx 1977, 727 (emphasis added).
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global nation. Alternatively, it requires the explication of the modifications of the 
law of value in intemational transactions, and an answer to the question whether 
different forms of world market integration lead to different modifications. Most 
of all, however, it requires a theory that accounts for where the states of really 
existing capitalism came from and what roles they play in capitalist modernity.
Marx and Engels themselves, in any case, did not enquire into these problems. 
While the world market tendency of capital is obvious, and the impossibility for 
capital to exist other than in the form of distinct and competing individual 
capitals is immediately clear, such is not the case with the territorial 
fragmentation of capitalism’s political space. Thus when Marx and Engels argue 
that civil society (biirgerliche Gesellschaft) “embraces the whole commercial and 
industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the State and the nation”, 
it is simply not sufficient to add that this transnational civil society also “must 
assert itself in its external relations as nationality, and internally must organise 
itself as State”.’'* Nor does it explain the existence and roles of national states 
when he suggests soon after that the state “is nothing more than the form of 
organisation which the bourgeois necessarily adopt both for internal and external 
purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests”.'^
These remarks, as one observer accurately notes, are “essentialist, underived 
and unfounded quasi-analytic statements which are ultimately of a rather 
descriptive nature”; they presuppose, rather than examine, “the multi-state nature 
of the world market.'^ Exactly why capitalist civil society must take political 
shape as a system of national, territorial states - and just what compels the 
bourgeoisie to adopt a national state, rather than one that is, for instance, spatially 
co-extensive with the capital relation - is not answered by Marx or Engels.’^
14 Marx and Engels 1978b, 163.
15 Marx and Engels 1978b, 187.
16 Braunmühl 1978, 166.
17 Elsewhere, Marx explains the national state o f  capitalist modernity in a more historical
vein: “Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, 
systems o f taxation, and governments, became lumped together in one nation, with one 
government, one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier, and one customs 
ta riff’; Marx and Engels 1998, 10. This argument raises the question why the process of 
capitalist state-formation stopped with the establishment of the nation-state and did not 
proceed to the creation o f states which integrated separate interests, etc. at an even 
higher level, and ultimately as global state.
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5.3. From Imperialism to Dependency
The next generation of Marxists were confronted with a very different 
intemational system than their predecessors. As Fred Halliday suggests, their 
attempt “to theorise the intemational system around the concept of imperialism, 
by which they meant inter-state strategic rivalry, is one of the most ambitious and 
creative ever made”.’* The classical Marxist theorists of imperialism responded 
to the transformations of capitalism in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
which Marx and Engels recognised but were unable to conceptualise: namely, the 
rising levels of intemational conflict between the developed capitalist states, and 
the increasing incorporation of the working class into nation-states. These 
theorists therefore finally posed the problem of the relationship between the 
national state and the world market, and of the role of the state in global 
accumulation.
Bukharin and Lenin suggested that even while capitalism became global and 
brought about intemational interdependence, it also became increasingly marked 
by the division of global capital into rival national blocs. As a consequence of a 
supposedly inevitable tendency towards the centralisation and concentration of 
capital, competition was all but eliminated within state boundaries, while states 
themselves began to advance the interests of their national monopolies in the 
world market. Thus, according to Bukharin, the intemationalisation of the 
economy and of capital was accompanied by the ‘nationalisation’ of capital 
interests. While economic intercourse and interdependence increased with the 
export of commodities and, characteristically for the period of finance capitalism, 
the export of money capital, this did not lead to a harmonisation of the interests 
of individual capitals in the world market, which appear as state monopoly 
capitals. As Bukharin argued: “The process of the intemationalisation of 
economic life can and does sharpen, to a high degree, the conflict of interests 
among the various ‘national’ groups of the bourgeoisie”.’^  Thus, the tendency for 
capital to expand beyond the borders of any given state does not, under 
conditions of the dominance of finance capital, lead to increasing transnational
18 Halliday 1994, 56.
19 Bukharin 1972, 61.
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political integration of capitalist states, but to their increasingly vicious politico- 
economic competition and ultimately to war.
The emergence of finance capitalism through increasing centralisation and 
monopolisation of capital is, for Bukharin, a response to the contradiction 
between the growth of the forces of production and their limitation by the 
national organisation of production. Imperialism is thus an aspect of the 
“adaptation of modem society to its conditions of existence”:
there is here a growing discord between the basis o f social economy which has become 
world-wide and the peculiar class structure o f society, a structure where the ruling class (the 
bourgeoisie) itself is split into ‘national’ groups with contradictory economic interests, 
groups which, being opposed to the world proletariat, are competing among themselves for 
the division o f the surplus value created on a world scale ... The development o f the forces 
o f production moves within the narrow limits o f state boundaries while it has already 
outgrown those limits. Under such conditions, there inevitably arises a conflict which, given 
the existence o f capitalism, is settled through extending the state frontiers in bloody 
struggles, a settlement which holds the prospect o f new and more grandiose conflicts.^°
The notion of a new relationship between state and capital, as a result of the 
emergence of monopoly capitalism, was also taken up by Lenin. The change in 
the character of capitalism is taken to account for the difference in the dynamics 
of intemational relations compared to the period of ‘competitive capitalism’ in 
which Marx wrote. It forces capitalist states to divide the world in the interest of 
their national capitals.^' The unequal development of the productive forces 
within each of the contending imperialist powers gives rise to constant demands 
for the redivision of the world economy, which is ultimately decided by the 
relation of force between states.F inally , for both Lenin and Bukharin, the 
‘super-profits’ that can be derived from the monopolistic exploitation of colonies 
are cmcial for the maintenance of the capitalist system, as it allows the European 
mling classes to integrate the working classes of their respective countries by 
offering them higher wages and social security standards.^^
After 1900, questions of war and intemational relations thus emerged at the 
centre of Marxist theories of capitalist development. These theories no longer 
assumed the world market competition was driven by the actions of economic 
actors in the economic sphere. The state and its foreign policy became cmcial
20 Bukharin 1972, 106.
21 Lenin 1973, 88-92
22 Lenin 1973, 144.
5. Third Time Right? 'Open Marxism ' and the International System 108
concerns for Marxist revolutionaries, as the activities of states no longer simply 
threatened the success of revolutionary activities within particular countries, but 
undermined the will and capacity of the ‘world proletariat’ to struggle for radical 
social transformation. If it became harder, therefore, to convince workers of their 
necessary exploitation and immiseration under capitalist conditions, it became 
imperative to show that any improvements in living standards and even 
participatory rights was premised upon the extension of exploitative relations 
across the world. Even more vital, however, was the demonstration that 
capitalism now necessarily meant imperialism, and that imperialism, in turn, 
necessarily led to world war. In this sense, the critique of capitalism shifted, to 
some extent, from exploitation to war, even though the classical theorists of 
imperialism retained the notion of an indissoluble relationship between the two.
But if ‘the international’ came to play a much more prominent role in the 
classical Marxist theories of imperialism than it had had in the work of Marx and 
Engels, the depth of the questions asked about intemational relations was limited. 
Cmcially, while the (changing) content and function of the capitalist state in 
capitalist accumulation was subjected to sustained analysis, the nation-state as a 
social form was taken as given?^ As Anthony Brewer points out, Lenin never 
explained why finance capital organised itself at the level of territorially bounded 
states, and why ‘countries’ are “a relevant unit” in the process of imperialist 
expansion; indeed, his “crucial failing” is his “failure adequately to theorise the 
place of the nation state in the world economy”.^ ^
23 Bukharin 1972, 161-67.
24 This failure is, perhaps, completely justifiable, given the pressing need for answers to
questions raised by the transformations in capitalism and the national mobilisation o f
workers for war, which were to inform the evaluation o f the possibilities for 
revolutionary action under given circumstances. Today, however, after the fall o f the 
‘socialist’ regimes established under the leadership o f the main theorists o f imperialism, 
and in conditions o f capitalist ‘globalisation’, which seems to open the possibility not 
only for the strengthening o f ‘global governance’ (a possibility that was emphatically 
denied by Lenin and Bukharin), but also for the transcendence o f the institution of 
sovereignty, these questions can no longer be ignored.
25 Anthony Brewer, 1990, 122; cf. Harvey 1985, 143; Mann 1988, 140: “Why should
rivalry between capitalists be between ‘national’ blocs o f capital? Not a word in Marx, 
in Hilferding, in Lenin or in the rest o f the orthodox Marxist tradition serves as an 
explanation o f these factors. ... Nation-states are presupposed in the Marxist theory of 
imperialism”.
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Dependency theorists have built, to a considerable extent, on the theories of 
imperialism of the early twentieth century. In as much as they are concerned with 
the ties of domination and exploitation between core and peripheral states, they 
tend to take capitalist statehood as given, though they highlight the role of 
external force in the creation of dependent states. World-systems theorists, by 
contrast, have sought to locate the emergence of the modem intemational system 
of sovereign states in the general process of the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism. This simultaneity, according to Wallerstein, was not coincidental but 
systematic: the dissolution of the universal empire of the European Middle Ages 
was the precondition for the emergence of a capitalist world economy, allowing 
capitalists to make use of political differences. The interstate system is therefore 
the necessary form of politics under capitalism.^^ Indeed, Chris Chase-Dunn 
argues that “the interstate system of unequally powerful and competing states is 
the political body of capitalism”.^ ^
Capitalism, in this perspective, is “not possible in the context of a single world 
state”; it can only exist in an inter-national form and needs to reproduce the 
“division of sovereignty in the core (interimperial rivalry)”.^ * A world state 
would allow for the control of resource allocation, and thereby undermine the 
capitalist market. But the emergence of such a world state is highly unlikely 
within the framework of capitalism. Not only does the “multicentric interstate 
system” make possible the emergence and reproduction of capital and for 
markets to determine prices and profits to a great extent, but capitalism, in turn, 
makes for the reproduction of the modem interstate system, thereby underpinning 
the balance of power. For capitalists are able, because of the international 
mobility of their assets, to limit the budgets which states pursuing world-imperial 
strategies have at their disposal.^^ Intemational capitalists generally have an 
interest in preventing world empire not only because of the possibilities for 
economic control such a form of political organisation potentially affords to 
subordinate social forces, but also because of the “overhead costs” world empire
26 Wallerstein 1979.
27 Chase-Dunn 1991, 107.
28 Chase-Dunn 1991, 142 and 150.
29 Chase-Dunn 1991, 155-56.
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entails: “Capitalists want effective and efficient states -  that is, states which 
supply sufficient protection for successful capitalist accumulation at cosf'?^
World-systems theory, it may be concluded, does provide a theory of the 
interstatcMg^j of capitalism’s global social system. It is thus able to ground the 
dynamic of modem intemational relations in the particular historical character of 
the capitalist epoch, rather than having to rely on a transhistorical logic of ‘war’. 
Yet its mixture of stmcturalism, functionalism and instrumentalism diminishes 
the value of its theory of ‘the intemational’. Moreover, its ability to show the 
systemic and historical relationship between the national state and the world 
market in capitalism rests on a highly problematic understanding of what 
capitalism is and how it came into existence. This particular theory of the rise of 
capitalism is premised upon the economism, determinism and evolutionism 
which can no longer provide the basis for a critical social theory of modemity 
and its intemational system. Most importantly, world-systems theory builds on a 
model of historical transformation which reads the operation of a separate 
economic sphere back into the pre-history of capitalism, and is therefore 
fundamentally ahistorical.^'
5.4, *Open Marxism * and the System of Sovereign States
The international system thus remained a weak spot of historical materialism 
until the early 1990s. The work of Mark Rupert, Peter Bumham, and Justin 
Rosenberg in particular has finally laid the groundwork for a Marxist 
conceptualisation of ‘the intemational’.^  ^ Despite the differences in their 
respective approaches, they share the fundamental concem of grounding the 
social forms of the international in the capital relation and to make visible their 
character as the specific expressions of determinate class relations. They also 
share the notion that the specifically capitalist character of the separation of 
politics and economics is a key to the conceptualisation of the interstate system 
and its relationship with the world market. While these theorists draw on the
3 0 Chase-Dunn 1991, 114.
31 Cf. Brenner 1977.
32 Other contributions include Boyle 1994 and Bromley 1995 and 1996.
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innovations in historical materialism of the last 25 years, and especially on the 
Marxist state debate, it should be noted from the outset that they face the 
additional challenge of explaining the many capitalist states, where others have 
only discovered the sources of the capitalist state.
5.4.1. Burnham: National State, Global Accumulation and Capitalism- 
in-General
Peter Bumham explicitly situates his conceptualisation of the intemational 
system in the context of the ‘capital relation approach’ developed by Holloway, 
Picciotto, Clarke, Bonefeld and others. The focus of this approach is not how the 
political ‘superstmcture’ is determined by the economic ‘base’, but what kind of 
social relationship gives rise to the separation of political and economic realms 
which appear to be autonomous and to follow some endogenous logic.^  ^ The 
historical foundation of this separation, it is argued, is the emergence of capitalist 
production relations, which are marked by the privatisation of the power to 
extract surplus, thus leaving the state to organise the general conditions of 
accumulation and exploitation. In that sense, the autonomy of the state is only 
apparent, as it is premised upon the reproduction of the capital relation.
At the same time, this capitalist state is quite independent from the directives 
or interests of individual capitalists or capitalist class fractions. As capital can 
only exist in the form of numerous and competing individual capitals, it cannot 
impose a particular strategy of accumulation on the state. On the contrary, capital 
relies on the state to define and organise the ‘general will’ of capital, by 
continually imposing the market as the form through which not only capital and 
labour, but also individual capitals among themselves relate to each other. The 
state does so mainly through the impersonal means of the law, property rights 
and money. The state, in short, “must seek to maintain the rule of the market” 
and to secure the general conditions for capital accumulation.^'* In fact, the state 
is the only possible social form for the organisation of the ‘general interest’ in
33 Burnham 1991, 87; Bumham 1994, 228; Holloway and Picciotto 1991, 112.
34 Bumham 1990, 180. Cf. Bumham 1991, 89: “The state as an aspect o f the social 
relations o f production must be seen as (sic!) one remove from the interests o f particular 
capitals since the form o f the state dictates that its role is to address the contradictory 
foundations o f accumulation in the guise o f meeting the interests o f capital-in-general” .
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capitalism. Bumham thus rejects even sophisticated attempts to ground the state 
and its changing role in the economy in terms of the social formation of 
hegemonic coalitions, as the state cannot simply be the condensation of private 
interests.
The state, for Bumham, is a cmcial form of capitalist society; it does not stand 
in a zero-sum relationship with the market, as the globalisation thesis suggests, 
but has an intemal connection with this other fundamental form of the capital 
relation. Moreover, capitalist society has always been a world society, and in that 
sense, Burnham suggests, we should follow Marx in seeing “capitalism as a 
single social system in which state power is allocated between territorial 
entities”.^  ^ The implication is that competition between individual capitals is 
complemented by competition between national states which aim to secure the 
reproduction of ‘their’ capitals in the world market.
Competition between capitals ... is not confined within a domestic economy. The 
accumulation of capital within the domestic economy depends on the accumulation o f capital 
on a world scale. The role o f the capitalist state is to express the ‘general interest’ o f capital. 
However the national form of the state implies that the state can only constitute this ‘general 
interest’ on a national basis. Nation-states therefore have a similar relation o f conflict and 
collaboration as individual capitals.^*^
The consequent “inter-imperialist rivalry” between national states is limited, 
however, by their common interest in maintaining global capitalism and 
accumulation. Competition and cooperation are complementary strategies of 
states, though realism and liberalism have absolutised one to the detriment of the 
other.
But the question why “[njational states ... are the political form of capitalist 
social relations” is not answered -  or even posed -  by Bumham. If the state is 
regarded as ‘ capital-in-generaT, then clearly the derivation of the territorial or 
national form of the state needs an explication which can tell us why capital-in- 
general is territorially fragmented and thus only partial. Capital is a global social 
relation and capitalist society a world society; so why is the general interest of 
capital realised and operationalised at the level of territorial segments of this 
world society? Surely to answer the question “what kind of society exists in the
35 Bumham 1994, 229.
36 Bumham 1990, 185.
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form of differentiated political and economic realms” can only lead us to 
conceptualise ‘the state’ as a capitalist relation of production; it does not, 
however, allow us to derive the territorially fragmented character of ‘the 
political’. That the capitalist state does not exist in the singular but as one among 
many is thus not directly given by the capital relation.
5.4.2. Rupert: Capitalist International Relations as Second Order 
Alienation
The same conceptual problem is apparent in Mark Rupert’s characterisation of 
intemational politics as “a kind of second order alienation”.^  ^ In capitalism, 
Rupert argues, the products of human labour take on the semblance of autonomy 
from its producers; they confront them as the objectified form of their productive 
powers, as “alien and hostile forces” which appear to have a life of their own. 
The relationship between these objects seems to be regulated by their inherent 
qualities, rather than by the social relations between their creators, and are thus 
able to present themselves as objective facts to which social life has to adapt. 
Positivist theories of social science take these facts as their starting point and 
never penetrate to the social relations which underlie them, thereby 
dehistoricising and fetishising the social order of a given period.
Rupert, by contrast argues that the power which the objects of human labour 
have achieved over social life has its roots in the private appropriation of the 
products of individual labour. This privatisation, moreover, implies a 
differentiation of political and economic forms of power; these spheres 
consequently seem to be related externally rather than internally. But the form of 
the abstract political state is just as much an expression of the alienated relations 
between individuals mediated by things as the market.
The modem political state developed within and is integral to a political-economic system of 
class rule -  a state-society complex in which property is assigned to the private sphere as a 
primordial individual right, and hence is exempted from ongoing political dialogue in the 
public sphere.^*
37 Rupert 1995, 33.
38 Rupert 1995, 24.
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The public sphere of political action organised within the state is thus an 
impoverished realm premised upon the relinquishing of a substantial part of 
societal self-determination and its subordination to the market.
The ‘modem state’ thus has its foundation in the capital relation. Rupert is 
adamant, however, that this cannot be taken to imply that the role of the state and 
its relationship to the market is fixed. Drawing on Marx and Gramsci, he 
suggests that the “stmctured separations of state-society and politics-economics 
in capitalist social formations” can be bridged through the agency of a “historic 
bloc”.^  ^These formally separated realms periodically achieve a transient unity (or 
more precisely a temporary functional correspondence) as they are brought into a 
purposive relationship which allows for the pursuit of specific strategies of 
accumulation for which social hegemony has been secured. In this way, the 
potentially contradictory relationship between these realms is articulated in a 
functional whole, though the underlying dynamics of capitalist society prevent 
these structural ‘fixes’ from becoming permanent.
Rupert here relies heavily on the notion of hegemonic class coalitions 
imparting a particular social purpose onto the state, thereby shaping the way in 
which the state seeks to secure the reproduction and stability of capitalism as a 
whole. His theorisation of the capitalist state is in this respect less prone to the 
functionalism of Burnham’s understanding of the role of the capitalist state. But 
is Rupert better able to provide an explanation of the national form of the 
capitalist state than Bumham? Rupert argues that
insofar as the formal separations of state and society, o f public and private, o f the political 
and economic aspects o f life, are integral to the historical reality o f capitalism, we may say 
that capitalism and its manifold relations o f alienation are the necessary context within which 
the historical construction o f sovereign states -  understood in the modem sense as 
functionally specialized administrative-coercive, ‘political,’ organizations -  becomes 
possible."^ ®
But again, this only allows us to understand the abstract character of the 
capitalist state, not its territorial shape, which Rupert does not problematise. He 
suggests that “national and intemational should be constmed as two aspects of an 
intemally related whole, a whole which is in some sense capitalist and
39 Rupert 1995,29
40 Rupert 1995, 32-33.
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alienated”.'^ ' But why capitalist politics should take this differentiated form is left 
open. At most, Rupert’s approach can explain why the territorially bounded 
sovereign state took the form of an abstracted realm of the political and became 
the organisational centre of political action in capitalist society -  itself a huge 
advance over the Weberian fetishisation of the state. But this perspective can not 
explain why the abstract state has to be (and historically took shape as) a 
territorial state in the first place. To characterise the relations between such 
abstract states in terms of alienation certainly helps us to understand the 
dynamics of international relations -  what it is that is contested in this 
geopolitical form -  but it does not provide an explication of the fact that global 
capitalism is organised politically through the medium of a system of national 
states.
5.4.3. Rosenberg: Sovereignty and the 'Empire o f Civil Society ’
Implicit in Rupert’s and Burnham’s untheorised assumption that the capitalist 
state is a national state is a particular understanding of the emergence of the 
capitalist mode of production. Rupert notes in this vein that “the system of states 
... emerged historically along with capitalist production”.T h i s ,  of course, is a 
perspective which is widely accepted, notwithstanding the many alternative 
theorisations of exactly how this process took place. It points to the Tong 
sixteenth century’ with its rising long-distance trade, increasing commodity 
production, the rise of the middle classes and the emergence and consolidation of 
the ‘modem’ state which controls the means of violence in a territorially 
circumscribed area, best exemplified in the absolutist state. Justin Rosenberg, by 
contrast, argues that neither was the early modem world economy capitalist in 
nature, nor was the absolutist state a capitalist state."*^  For him, the rise of 
capitalism dates from the late eighteenth century, and it was in this period that 
the sovereign state emerged.
Even more explicitly than Rupert, Rosenberg equates the abstractedness of the 
political in capitalism with state sovereignty. In fact, he suggests that we define
41 Rupert 1995, 32.
42 Rupert 1995, 33.
5. Third Time Right? ‘Open Marxism'and the International System 116
sovereignty “as the social form of the state in a society where political power is 
divided between public and private spheres”/'* Cutting through the familiar 
debates in IR as to whether increasing economic interdependence implies the 
demise of state, this allows us to see that the consolidation of sovereignty and the 
creation of the capitalist world market were coeval. Both were made possible by 
the abstraction of ‘the political’ from production and exchange. This process 
simultaneously allows for the creation of a homogeneous political space in which 
formally equal citizens relate directly to the state, and independent wielders of 
political authority become subsumed under state authority; and for the 
“porousness” of the boundaries of these states for the private activities of 
economic subjects.'*  ^ “The possibility of an intemational economy”, Rosenberg 
concludes, “is thus structurally interdependent with the possibility of a sovereign 
states-system”.'*^
This argument, however, is apt only to establish the compatibility of the 
territorial or national state with the global existence of capitalist class relations 
and a world market; it does not establish why capitalism politically exists or, 
indeed, needs to exist in the form o f an interstate system. Indeed, this fact does 
not seem worth explaining to Rosenberg. Noting that a world state has never 
existed he concedes that anarchy, as a generic attribute of the relations between 
independent states, is not limited to any particular historical epoch. He insists, 
however, that multi-stateness does not tell us much about the dynamics of 
specific intemational systems. Hence, the task facing IR is precisely to develop a 
theory of capitalist anarchy.'*^
For what distinguishes the modem form o f geopolitical power is not that it is exercised by a 
plurality o f independent units (anarchy in general), but that it no longer embodies 
personalized relations o f domination (which cancel the formal independence o f the 
dominated), being impersonal, mediated by things. It is this stmctural shift which explains 
why the units are no longer empires but bordered, sovereign states. This anarchy, anarchy as 
a structurally specific social form, is persistently obscured by being conflated with the 
transhistorical generalization ‘anarchy in general’.'**
43 Rosenberg 1994, 42, 92, 123 and 135ff.
44 Rosenberg 1994, 129.
45 Rosenberg 1994, 131.
46 Rosenberg 1994, 87-88. A similar argument is made, from a realist perspective, by 
Janice Thomson, 1993.
47 Rosenberg 1994, 139.
48 Rosenberg 1994, 146.
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Yet this is already conceding too much to Realism. Feudalism, for instance, 
would be ill understood if described as ‘anarchic’."*^ In fact, Rosenberg himself 
introduces a more concrete, and rather different, historical perspective when he 
argues that capitalism involved the “historical shift from empire to states- 
system”.^ ° But surely this process took place before the eighteenth century, and 
thus, on the basis of Rosenberg’s own argument, before the rise of capitalist 
social relations. Rosenberg seems to acknowledge as much when he elsewhere 
distinguishes the process of state-formation in the early modem period, involving 
the centralisation and bureaucratisation of political authority, from the capitalist 
transformation of the state, the latter “lagging some way behind” the former.^' 
Here he accepts that the differentiation between intemal and extemal, which was 
the consequence of state formation, far preceded the capitalist separation of 
politics and economics - without drawing any theoretical implications.
The problem which surfaces here is a more general one with Rosenberg’s 
argument: while he succinctly contrasts pre-capitalist and capitalist societies and 
their stmctural characteristics, he does not provide a dynamic historical account 
of the rise of capitalism and its relationship to state formation. His argument 
remains often schematic, especially with respect to the timing of the cmcial steps 
of the transition to capitalism, and thus to the social forms and stmctural 
dynamics which different social orders entail. The reason may be that he 
attributes too much creative force to the capital relation. Even if we accept that 
capitalism emerged only at the end of the eighteenth century, we should not 
assume that it creates its world from scratch; capitalist political forms, for 
instance, took shape in institutions of domination that had been generated by the 
processes of state-formation since the late-feudal period.^^
Clearly, absolutist sovereignty was fundamentally different from capitalist 
sovereignty based on ‘general impersonal rule’, and only the capitalist 
abstraction of political power from surplus appropriation allowed for the 
consolidation of sovereignty beyond what was possible in absolutism where legal
49 Cf. Fischer 1992; Hall and Kratochwil 1993. These issues will be taken up in greater 
detail in the following chapter.
50 Rosenberg 1994, 155.
51 Rosenberg 1994, 130.
52 Cf. Strayer 1970, ch. 1.
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privileges and corporate or regional particularism remained necessarily 
pervasive. And yet, absolutist forms of sovereignty, which developed with the 
transition from feudalism’s parcellised personal domination to absolutism’s 
generalised personal dominion, had already achieved the demise of empire and 
the emergence of the separation of intemal and extemal -  if, admittedly, 
imperfectly.^^ That capitalist general impersonal rule should find expression in 
the form of territorial states claiming exclusive sovereignty over their bounded 
realms, can therefore only be understood in a historical context. Neither 
capitalism nor absolutism gives us the modem sovereign state in its entirety.
It is hard, then, to completely follow Rosenberg’s conclusion that “[bjehind 
the contemporary world of independent equal states stands the expropriation of 
the direct producer”.^ '^  Rosenberg, like Rupert and Bumham, conflates the 
abstracted character of capitalist politics, which derives from the privatisation of 
the power to extract surplus, with the sovereignty of the capitalist state. But the 
sovereignty of political mle in capitalism does not necessarily entail its national 
boundedness. Once we clearly recognise the distinctiveness of the process 
whereby intemal and extemal stmctures became differentiated from the 
separation of politics and economics, it becomes necessary to pose the question 
of the capitalist character of the state and the interstate system in different terms. 
No longer can we derive the national state and the interstate system from the 
capital relation and take them to be the straightforward “geopolitical expression 
of a wider social totality”.^  ^ We have to first ask why the capitalist system does 
have a geopolitical expression at all. If state-formation and the supercession of 
universal empire has its origins in a social logic which precedes the rise of 
capitalism, as Rosenberg himself suggests at places, then we have to find a way 
of conceptualising the totality of capitalist social relations in ways which allow 
for the recognition that not every organisational or institutional form of our 
epoch was itself brought into existence by capitalism.
53 Gerstenberger 1990, 497-532.
54 Rosenberg 1994, 172.
55 Rosenberg 1994, 55.
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5.5. The Challenge of Territoriality
The Marxist theories of intemational relations surveyed above ultimately fail 
to meet the challenge, set out by Halliday, to explain the “specificity and 
effectivity of distinct states within a single economic totality”. They take the 
territorial boundedness of the capitalist state as given and proceed to ground the 
interstate system in essentially the same conceptual operations in which the 
Marxist state debate sought to derive the capitalist state. In this way, the 
theoretical problem of why capitalist political space is territorially fragmented 
disappears from view.
But unlike their predecessors, Rupert, Rosenberg and Burnham cannot afford 
to ignore this question, as it is thrown into sharp relief by the very changes in 
Marxist theory designed to overcome the base/superstructure model and the 
pitfalls of economic determinism. For the Marxist theorists of imperialism, for 
instance, it was still possible to side-step the problem of multiple capitalist 
polities, assuming as they did that certain states were capitalist because they were 
directed by the bourgeoisie. States, in other words, were capitalist by virtue of the 
actions of capitalists on them. At least within their own framework, states could 
he taken as given, however unsatisfactory this remains from the perspective of a 
critical social theory of intemational relations.
However, once we begin to define the capitalist character of the ‘state’ at the 
much higher level of abstraction, which marks the Marxist state debate, this 
becomes plainly impossible. The question why the capitalist state embodies only 
a territorially circumscribed subset of the capitalist relations of domination 
becomes unavoidable. For nothing in the argument that capitalism entails the 
abstraction of political from economic power leads to the conclusion that 
political power needs to be organised by multiple and competing centres of 
territorially organised sovereignty.
Is the theoretical impossibility to show that the same historical process which 
leads to the separation of politics and economics (i.e. the expropriation of the 
direct producers) also entails the emergence of system of sovereign states, a real 
problem? In any case, is it not a well-established fact that the modem state and 
the capitalist economy did arise in tandem, as at least Bumham and Rupert seem
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to agree? In this case, it might be argued that the problem is simply one with 
Marxism itself, and with its tendency to overextend the explanatory powers of 
the concept of capital. After all, other - non-Marxist -  approaches, most notably 
John Ruggie’s work on the medieval-to-modem transition, have shown how the 
separation of the political and the economic and the differentiation of the intemal 
and the extemal are part of the rise of modemity. By not taking both of them to 
be expressions of the transition to capitalism, but as autonomous stmctures 
following independent logics of modemisation, these approaches seem able to 
avoid the theoretical conundrums which face Marxist theories of the intemational 
system.
It is here that it becomes useful to retum to the non-deterministic Marxism 
developed since the late 1970s. But rather than trying to derive a capitalist 
interstate system from the same theoretical foundations which in the earlier 
debates had yielded only ‘the state’, we have to pursue a more historical path to 
understanding the geopolitical stmcture of capitalist political space. On this path, 
we can follow some of the most creative attempts to explicate the rise of 
capitalism in non-economistic and non-circular terms, the ‘political Marxism’ of 
Robert Brenner and Ellen Meiksins Wood. This perspective also provides the 
basis for Rosenberg’s claim that the world economy of the early modem period 
was not a capitalist world economy, but remained based on the age-old 
exploitation of price differentials between segmented markets. But even if there 
was, pace Ruggie and the majority of historical sociologists,^^ no capitalist 
development (and thus no separation of politics and economics) in absolutist 
Europe, there certainly emerged, pace Rosenberg, a system of sovereign states 
and the differentiation of intemal and extemal spheres. It is thus not the late- 
eighteenth century structural shift from personalised relations of domination to a 
system of impersonal relations mediated by things, “which explains why the 
units are no longer empires but bordered, sovereign states”.^ ^
56 But see Skocpol 1979, 55.
57 Rosenberg 1994, 146 (also compare fh. 51). John Hoffman notes that “Rosenberg is
surely correct to emphasize that an analysis o f the state and sovereignty must focus on 
the centrality o f change”. But he also points out that the discontinuity that Rosenberg 
posits seems arbitrary: “it does not follow that because the capitalist state is different 
from its predecessor, it alone can be said to have sovereignty”; Hoffman 1998, 33. 
Hoffman adds that Rosenberg, like Hinsley, is “right to see the modem state as different.
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5,6, Conclusions
I have argued that the interstate-ness of capitalist political space cannot be 
derived from the nature of the capital relation. Instead, as I will try to show over 
the next two chapters, it should be regarded as a ‘historical legacy’ from pre­
capitalist development. This is not to advocate a methodological pluralism that 
posits the autonomy of different social structures, each supposedly following 
endogenous logics. Such an approach would be fundamentally ahistorical as it 
ignores the very historicity of the separation of politics and economics, which the 
‘radicalised ontology’ of contemporary Marxism correctly emphasises. We have 
to start from historical totalities rather than transhistorical interacting structures 
that produce history as they interact. The relevant historical totality to the 
conceptualisation of the system of sovereign territorial states is capitalism. But 
while theoretical analysis shows that capitalism can no more exist without as 
state than it can exist without a market, it cannot explain the existence of 
multiple capitalist states.
Taking the intemational character of global capitalism to be a contingent 
aspect of capitalism raises the question of how to theorise capitalism as a totality. 
While Marxist theorists of IR have posited the need to start from the 
consideration of social totalities, they have spent little time on explicating their 
understanding of this concept, nor have they engaged with its troubled history in 
Marxist theory from Lukacs to Althusser and beyond. I have argued that not all 
social forms of really existing capitalism are necessarily or in all respects the 
emanations of the capital relation, as the Lukacsian concept of ‘expressive 
totality’ suggests. In this sense, rather than simply taking them to be intemal to 
capitalism, certain institutions should be theorised as internalised. This avoids 
both the Weberian pluralism of ontologically irreducible stmctures, and the 
Marxist tendency to reduce every aspect of modem social life, including the 
interstate system, to a necessary expression of capital.
but wrong to assume that because it is different it has nothing in common with its 
predecessors. A critical view o f sovereignty is one which stresses both continuity and  
discontinuity in historical analysis”; ibid., 41.
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58 Cf. Jay 1985.
6. TOWARDS MODERNITY? ABSOLUTISM, 
CAPITALISM, AND STATE FORMATION 
IN POST-FEUDAL EUROPE
6.1. Theorising the Transition to Modernity
At the heart of the reconstitution of IR/IPE as a genuinely social science able 
to recognise the historicity of its object is the conceptualisation and theorisation 
of modemity. The assumption of a realm governed by eternal laws of human 
nature or an immutable anarchical stmcture enabled IR theorists to ignore the 
foundational problem of the social sciences: the qualitatively new mode of 
ordering social relations that emerged sometime between the 15th and 19th 
century.' But to be able to judge whether current domestic and intemational 
changes take place within the modem regime of power or constitute a transition 
to some other mode of authority, we have to develop a theory of modemity that 
encompasses the intemational system.
The most important engagement with the problem of modemity and its 
relevance for IR/IPE can be found in the work of John Ruggie. Accepting 
Waltz’s description of the intemational stmcture as anarchic, he suggests that the 
concept of stmcture is underdefined in terms of its ordering principles. Modes of 
spatial differentiation of political authority shape the anarchic intemational 
stmcture in historically variable ways, producing distinct pattems of interaction. 
For Ruggie, the modern intemational system is defined by the principle of 
exclusive territoriality, which gradually replaced the parcellised, overlapping 
forms of sovereignty of feudalism starting with the Italian Renaissance. The 
transition from the medieval res Christiana to a multiplicity of territorially 
contiguous and sovereign states represents significant, indeed epochal change in 
the nature of the intemational system.^
1 Rosenberg 1994.
2 Ruggie 1983a, 274; Ruggie 1993, 168.
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According to Ruggie, the emergence of sovereign territoriality is structurally 
linked to the simultaneous consolidation of private property; both reproduce 
atomistic forms of sociality. Consequently, “the early modem redefinition of 
property rights and reorganization of political space unleashed both interstate 
political relations and capitalist production relations”.^  That capitalism and the 
modem state are, as Hintze put it, “inextricably interrelated”, is of course a 
mainstay of Marxist, Durkheimian and Weberian historical sociologies, though 
there is considerably less agreement as to the precise causations and 
determinations through which they are linked in the transformation to capitalism 
or modernity.'^ Ruggie insists on the inter-action (rather than one-way 
determination) of political and economic (and cultural) processes, yet his is not a 
naïve methodological pluralism. Indeed, he notes that the very differentiation of 
social spheres itself is a product of the transition to modemity. In feudalism, 
political, economic and other forms of power were undifferentiated and wielded 
by individual lords. The same process that produced the differentiation of 
extemal and intemal spheres also generated the separation of public and private 
spheres, as formerly private and personalised political power was consolidated 
into a public realm over which the state claimed final authority. Productive 
activity, conversely, was privatised with the obliteration of collective, political 
controls.^
Recognition of the historicity of these social spheres is indeed fundamental to 
any theory of modernity that seeks to avoid circular forms of ‘explanation’. 
Consider, for a moment, Wallerstein’s argument, which can be considered typical 
of the tendency to read capitalism back into its pre-history and thus arrive at an 
evolutionist account of the transition to the modem period. In the world-systems 
perspective, capitalism is conceptualised as a system of generalised market 
exchange. How does it arise? From the expansion of trade, says Wallerstein, for 
trade undermined the stmctures of feudalism. It needed but a kick-start (new 
trading routes) to bring it into overdrive, and after sufficient rattling and shaking, 
the old scaffold broke down. So the expansion of trade explains the
3 Ruggie 1983aa, 281.
4 Hintze 1975a, 452; Wallerstein 1979; Hall 1996.
5 Ruggie 1993, 151.
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universalisation of trade and exchange. The logic of the market is here posited as 
a universal force; economic forces inexorably led to global capitalism. 
Evolutionism, however, is an excuse for explanation, not the thing itself.^ 
Unfortunately, Ruggie himself does not completely avoid this popular 
tendency, despite a generally more complex argument. The source of the 
undermining of the feudal system of power was, according to Ruggie, the 
increasing ‘dynamic density’ of transactions in this society. Expanding 
communication, settlements, markets, and a new commercial ethos changed the 
economic landscape. Monétarisation enabled princes to take advantage of new 
military technology and more efficient organisation, like mercenary armies; 
intemal pacification became possible. The consequence: “existing social 
arrangements were strained to the point of collapse”.^  Though Ruggie adds an 
epistemological level (the dominance of single-point perspectives privileging 
absolute sovereignty and property) in order to account for the particular 
resolution of the stmctural crisis of feudalism, his argument rests on a rather 
ahistorical materialism.* It presupposes, in feudalism, an economic sphere with 
an autonomous logic. Here, too, the market, as the driving force of dynamic 
density, appears not as a social institution, but as a transhistorical force shaped by 
institutions which, in the end, have to adapt to the inherent needs of the market. 
Thus, Ruggie argues, in this respect following the lead of North and Thomas, that 
the rediscovery of Roman private law made it possible to satisfy the 
requirements o f  efficient economic organisation.^
What emerges is a picture of political and economic interaction in the process 
of the ‘medieval-to-modem shift’ rather than an account based on a theorisation 
of undifferentiated power in the hands of individualised lords. Production, trade 
and commerce were part of a dynamic economic sphere in which an economic 
rationality oriented toward efficiency was operative, reinforced by state demands. 
As a consequence, Ruggie’s ‘dynamic density model’ offers an essentially
6 Wallerstein 1979. The notion o f capitalism as rudimentarily present in every society,
waiting to be liberated from its fetters, is widespread among Marxists and liberals; see 
Braudel 1984, 620. For a critique, see Brenner 1977; Wood 1991, 6-11.
7 Ruggie 1993, 154.
8 Ruggie 1993, 152-60, 169. The underlying economism is even clearer in the work of
North and Thomas (1973), on which Ruggie relies heavily for these issues.
9 Ruggie 1983a, 282 and 1993, 152-55.
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quantitative account of the collapse of feudalism. In this respect, his argument 
parallels the superficiality he derides in theories of current change to a 
postmodern international system: process simply overwhelms structure.’” If, as 
Ruggie maintains, the “basic structure of property rights ... characterizes an 
entire social formation",” including the international system, then it is imperative 
that the ways in which the structure of feudal property rights is reproduced and 
transformed be conceptualised in terms of the undifferentiated character of 
political and economic power.
Now, if feudal lordship - which according to Finer is at once administrative, 
military, economic and judicial - compounds public and private ‘executive 
functions’, then the dynamic of feudal society would seem to derive from the 
forms through which these lords reproduce themselves individually and 
collectively.’^  There does not appear much room for economic development 
independently of the interests of these units of political and economic power. In 
this society, then, “military action, and political and economic striving, are 
largely identical, and the urge to increase wealth in the form of land comes to the 
same thing as extending territorial sovereignty and increasing military power”. 
Economic development, in feudalism, cannot be governed by economic criteria 
of efficiency. The reason is that the interests of what are the dominant economic 
(as well as political) actors of feudal society, i.e. feudal lords, are not best served 
by increasing the efficiency of production, but by raising the efficiency of 
exploitation through extra-economic means. Indeed, the forms of reproduction of 
feudal lords, based on the coercive extraction of surplus, all but prevent 
economic development, precisely because it is not productive efficiency that 
counts.
To understand economic development in feudalism, we have to start from the 
consideration of the social relations which constitute feudal lords as social actors 
wielding both political (authoritative) and economic (allocative) power. The 
dynamic of these social relations, I will argue, is decisively shaped by the
10 Ruggie 1983a, 285.
11 Ruggie 1983a, 282.
12 On the character o f feudal lordship, see Finer 1975, 87.
13 Elias 1994, 296; on the absence o f a concept o f the economy in feudal society, cf.
Polanyi 1957, 46-52.
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struggles over the control of ‘authoritative’ resources; conflicts over ‘power’ 
seem to be decisive for the nature of social development under feudalism. But 
only if we constantly remind ourselves that, in dealing with feudalism, relations 
of domination also constitute relations of exploitation (in a very different and 
much more immediate way than in capitalism), can we develop an account of the 
structure and transcendence of feudalism that does justice to the specificity of its 
constitutive social relations.’"^
The conceptual key to the explanation of the transition to modemity, it would 
seem, lies in taking seriously the real inseparability of political and economic 
forms of power in feudalism.’^  From this starting point, it should be possible to 
develop the broad outlines of a theory of the transition to modemity that includes 
the intemational system as an integral part. I take for granted that intemational 
relations shape processes of state-formation and economic development. But that 
does not require us to accept an essentially ‘realist’ ontology of the intemational. 
We have to go beyond the assertion that ‘war makes states’ and develop an 
understanding of the intemational system itself, as a social sphere whose nature 
is subject to historical transformation. In the following chapter, I will try to
14 Michael Mann argues, very much against the thread o f the argument presented in this 
thesis, that (advanced) capitalist states are simultaneously political and economic 
phenomena, as they redistribute large amounts o f the wealth produced within their 
boundaries. By contrast, he suggests, the states o f medieval Europe “redistributed very 
little o f contemporary GNP. The separation between economic and political 
functions/organizations was clear and symmetrical -  states were political, classes were 
economic”; Mann 1986, 17. But ‘medieval states’ were precisely the fragmented 
systems o f rule in which state power was dispersed among feudal lords; and while these 
lords did not ‘redistribute GNP’ in the modem sense, they certainly appropriated a large 
part o f the surplus produced in this society by the peasants and artisans which stood in 
different forms o f dependence to them. It is in this sense, then, that there was a fusion of 
politics and economics in feudalism, and that it makes sense to speak o f politics and 
economics being separate in capitalism, even if, as Giddens notes, states are, o f course 
economically active in many ways; cf. chapter 4, fh. 18.
Giddens also takes up the important question of the class character o f feudalism raised 
by Mann. He stresses, as I do, that in this form o f society, it is the “co-ordination of 
authoritative resources”, rather than the “accumulation o f allocative resources”, that is 
the “more fundamental lever o f change”; Giddens 1981, 92. As ‘class’ refers to the 
control o f property (or lack thereof), and property is not central to the organisation of 
social life under feudalism to the same degree that political authority is, it follows that 
class relations remain subordinate in feudalism. An alternative, however, would be to 
historicise the concept o f class; as Comninel argues, feudal relations o f domination can 
thus be recognised as class relations, as they also constituted social property relations; 
Comninel 1987, 149-55 and 167.
15 The theoretical and conceptual implications of the capitalist character of the separation 
o f politics and economics, and their inseparability in pre-capitalist societies, are 
elaborated in a path-breaking essay by Wood 1995c.
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ground the particular dynamics of feudal and absolutist ‘geopolitics’ (for want of 
a better generic category that does not already presuppose the inter-national 
form) in the dominant social property relations of these periods. This will lead 
me to challenge the notion, propounded by Ruggie, that there has been a 
fundamental continuity in the structural organisation of intemational relations 
since the fifteenth century, based on exclusive territoriality.
In the present chapter, I will lay the foundations for this argument by taking 
issue with three standard topoi of historical sociology: that changes in 
technology, production or exchange can explain the demise of feudalism; that the 
demise of feudalism itself was the starting point for a general transition to 
capitalism; and that western Europe as a whole went through roughly similar or 
equivalent processes of ‘modernisation’. Building on the thesis originally 
advanced by Robert Brenner, I will suggest that a transition from feudalism to 
capitalism took place in England alone; continental European development, by 
contrast, was characterised by a radically different form of social organisation 
from which capitalist social relations were absent.'^ Yet the absolutist state is 
generally taken to represent - especially in its French form, which will therefore 
be at the centre of my analysis - the proto-type of modem statehood. Against 
such interpretations, I argue that the absolutist state should be regarded as 
fundamentally non-modem as it was premised on a stmcture of power marked by 
the continuing fusion of politics and economics.
6.2. Property and (Geo-)Politics in Feudal Europe
Capitalist modernity is characterised by the differentiation of an intemational 
from the domestic realm, as well as by the separation of politics and economics. 
Both these dualisms were alien to feudalism. As we have noted, the explanation 
of the transition from one to the other cannot be built on processual accounts that 
presuppose either or both these sets of differentiated spheres. What we need is an 
understanding of the feudal logic of process as stmctured by the prevailing
16 Brenner 1977, 1985a and 1985b; cf. Wood 1991; Mooers 1992; McNally 1988; 
Comninel 1987; also compare Parker 1996 and Elsenhans 1983.
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organisation of social power, where political and economic power is 
concentrated in the hands of individual lords/^
Markus Fischer, in an attempt to fit feudalism into the structural-realist 
straitjacket, recently argued that the dynamic of feudal social relations is 
governed by the imperatives of anarchy/* The individualisation of power, 
expressing itself in the distribution of the means of warfare through the whole 
nobility, leads him to describe feudal ‘conflict units’ (from castellans, free cities 
and bishops to kings and popes) as differentiated only in terms of power. Feudal 
society thus appears as a realm of geopolitics. Though this formulation captures 
an important aspect of feudalism, it raises two objections. Firstly, the area that 
now appears as anarchic (France in the ‘second feudal age’), had recently been 
relatively hierarchical and would soon after experience centralisation and state- 
formation. Yet such oscillation seems to be precluded by Waltz’s structural 
Realism, as intemational and domestic realms are reproduced through opposite 
strategies, namely balancing and bandwaggoning.’^  Secondly, Fischer’s lords 
appear as quasi-sovereigns; by abstracting from all elements of organised 
authority and hierarchy between lords (that existed even in eleventh century 
France), he effectively negates the concept of feudalism itself.
In fact, the dichotomy of hierarchy and anarchy is not applicable to the 
overlapping forms of ‘sovereignty’ characteristic of feudalism.^® With the 
modem state as our point of reference, the absence of a monopoly of violence 
does indeed seem to imply anarchy. Yet feudalism is as much a form of state as it
17 The argument in this section draws on Lâcher 1994. A similar interpretation o f feudal 
geopolitics, which also builds on the centrality o f the struggles surrounding the 
constitution o f politically constituted property emphasised by Brenner can be found in 
Teschke 1997.
18 Fischer 1992; cf. the incisive critique by Hall and Kratochwil 1993 and the reply by 
Fischer 1993.
19 Waltz 1979, 126. The problem with the dichotomy of anarchy and hierarchy also applies 
to different forms o f feudalism: was Angevin England, with its much more developed 
hierarchy than in the classical case o f northern France, an ‘anarchical sphere’ or a 
‘state’?
20 Ruggie insists that what demarcates feudalism from modemity is not the absence of 
anarchy but a different form o f spatiality. One is left to wonder what the space of 
anarchy is if the differentiation o f extemal and internal realms is only produced by 
modemity. If  the feudal “system o f mle was inherently intemational”, as Ruggie notes 
(1983a, 274), then anarchy, defined as the absence o f mle, does not seem to be an 
appropriate structural principle o f this system. Janice Thomson, by contrast, rightly
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is a geopolitical system. According to Otto Brunner, the dualistic structure of 
authority, expressed in the institutions of state power and legitimate self-help 
when rights are injured (feud), embodies the fundamental constitutional principle 
of the medieval state. The notion that these two elements should be clearly 
distinguishable in the form of an intemal realm governed by law and an extemal 
realm of power politics, is itself the product of the sovereign state that 
demarcates domestic and intemational spheres.^’ The relevance of this argument 
is that it allows us to see the feud not just as a stmggle between Tike units’; it 
also involves a ‘vertical’ dimension that concems the distribution of rights and 
privileges within the feudal state. The (geo)politics of feudalism includes the 
stmggle over ‘public’ authority, and thus over the location and distribution of 
political authority. The changing meaning of lordship is not primarily determined 
in the stmggles for security between lords of similar status. The rights and 
powers constituting lordship can only be understood in relation to the rights 
pertaining to the institutions at the apex of the feudal state, kingship in particular.
The medieval system of power involves a further hierarchical dimension: 
feudal anarchical government is also a mode of domination in which the 
relations between the individual organisers of violence are inextricably linked to 
their relationship with the mass of subjected people on which the possibility of 
lordship depends. In other words, the authority that feudal lords privatised and 
accumulated not only comprises the relations of relative sovereignty between the 
members of the dominant class; it also constitutes the relations of dominance of 
its individual members vis-à-vis the peasantry. In that relationship, political and 
legal rights also confer access to economic surplus, enabling lords to reproduce 
themselves as lords. Here is the core of the real unity of political and economic 
power in feudal society. It can best be grasped, as Robert Brenner suggests, if we 
understand feudal property as politically constituted.
The form of property which helps us understand both feudal (geo)politics and 
its economic dynamic, is not ownership of the means of production, but property
suggests the need for further alternatives like localised or deterritorialised authority; 
Thomson 1994, 160 (fh. 36).
21 Brunner 1984, 4, 17 and 108; on the ‘feudal state’, cf. Rowen 1980, 16.
6. Towards Modernity? Absolutism, Capitalism, and State Formation in Post-Feudal Europe 131
in a share of political authority/^ The development and transformation of 
feudalism has thus to be conceptualised by reference to the structures and 
institutions that assign differential access to the means of coercion: the law, 
customs, privileges, the state. For individual lords, the social reproduction of 
their property depended both on the maintenance of the domination of the 
peasantry and on their ability to compete with each other (both vertically and 
horizontally). Feudal (geo)politics is more than a struggle for security in an 
anarchic environment: it is a form of contestation of feudal property relations. 
Both dimensions of conflict implied similar strategies for reproduction: the 
investment in the means of violence and coercion. Political rather than economic 
accumulation consequently patterned the ‘economic’ dynamic of feudal society.^^
If these concepts circumscribe the structure of feudal society, we now have to 
take note of the different ways in which lordship, and hence feudal property 
relations, can be constituted. In what was to become France, increasing parts of 
the free population were subjected, during the Carolingian age, to a manorial 
regime through the gradual fusion of domestic and land lordship. '^* The granting 
of immunities to the lords of these estates (closely related to the attempts of the 
Carolingian kings to strengthen their state through vassalage) afforded them 
increasing juridical and political authority over their dependants.^^ The latter thus 
lost their right to be commanded and tried by the king’s ‘officials’.
Only when these officials themselves started to appropriate regal authority 
(favoured by the ‘barbarian’ invasions of the ninth and tenth centuries), did banal 
lordship emerge. The territorial principalities of these counts did soon dissolve, 
with the castle now emerging as the nucleus of feudal organisation.^^ Banal 
lordship was territorial; it extended arbitrary power from personal dependants to 
the population of a territory. It was “a form of legitimized and organized pillage.
22 Brenner 1985b, 232; Wood 1995d, 272-73. cf. Giddens 1981, 92.
23 Brenner 1985b, 229-41. Brenner employs the concept o f ‘political accumulation’ to
refer to the process o f feudal state-building. Here, it denotes the process o f expansion of 
coercive powers by individual lords, which may be ffagmentive or integrative o f larger 
entities.
24 On land, domestic, and banal lordship, see Duby 1978, 174-77. Domestic lordship
constitutes arbitrary power over personal dependents (slavery being its extreme form); 
land lordship relates to land and confers only limited rights to services, leaving tenants 
personally free.
25 Bloch 1961, 245; Duby 1978, 90f.
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tempered only by the resistance of village communities"/^ Banal lordship 
marked a decisive step in the reorganisation of medieval society. It involved a 
complete redefinition of social status: free came to mean noble, while enserfment 
was the lot of the non-noble population except for a relatively small number of 
knights and ministeriales?^ The intensification of lordship through the 
appropriation of banal authority was paralleled by geographical expansion that 
replicated feudal institutions everywhere in the periphery of the old Frankish 
empire: the Norman conquest of England, the Spanish Reconquista, the German 
expansion into the Slavonic East and the crusades in the Mediterranean area. 
Whereas early medieval warfare was limited to temporary forages for plunder 
and slaves, it now served the permanent conquest of land and peasants.
In England it was only after the Norman Conquest that “a manorial regime of 
exceptional rigour” was imposed on the peasantry. Its character was shaped by 
the particularly strong fusion of personal and land lordship.^® Serfdom, in 
England, was the product of intra-lordly cooperation, backed up by the public 
justice of the royal courts (which also sustained freeholds that continued to exist 
here); banal lordship was never able to develop in England. The states of both 
England and France were completely ‘feudalised’ during the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries, though with rather different consequences for the position of the 
English and French kings in their respective realms, depending on the dominant 
form of lordship. In England, the powers of the ban, though regularly contested, 
remained with the king. There was thus never the same parcellisation of 
sovereignty in England as in France. The English state was, in this epoch.
26 Bisson 1994, 6-12; Bloch 1961, 394-401.
27 Duby 1978, 176. On the role of the peace o f god in this process, see Poly and Boumazel
1991, 151-62.
28 Bonnassie 1991, 57; Poly and Boumazel 1991, 352.
29 Bartlett 1993, 306-08.
30 Bloch 1961, 244; Duby 1968, 194; On the general differences between English and
French feudalism, see Bloch 1960 and Hilton 1990. During the period of economic 
expansion, parts o f the manorial demesnes were leased out to peasants in return for 
labour services and rents. There was even some relaxation o f exploitation in the 12th 
century. But with increasing scarcity o f the land due to continuing population growth, 
the lords were able, because of their relatively strong collective position, to reinforce 
manorial exploitation. In fact, the thirteenth century saw the establishment o f a degree of 
unfreedom in England which was unprecedented here. Those who held demesne lands as 
tenures were subjected to the private Jurisdiction o f the manorial lords (much like 
peasants in the Carolingian period of the Frankish empire) with regard to their 
relationship to the lord and his other serfs.
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singularly strong. In France, the intensification and externalisation of lordship 
contributed to a certain consolidation of relations between lo rd s .B u t, as in 
England, the feud remained a legitimate, and widespread form of intercourse 
between nobles, fuelled not least by the need to replenish landed resources for 
the acquisition of new vassals.
These differences in the forms of feudal property relations, with their 
corresponding patterns of conflict and cooperation, will help us to understand the 
distinctive ways out of the crisis of feudalism in England and France. Their 
commonalities, however, explain the general character of the feudal crisis of the 
fourteenth century. The dynamic of conflict in this society included, as a crucial 
dimension besides geographic expansion and the reorganisation of rights and 
privileges, the struggle for the redistribution of land (and its cultivators).^^ 
Military competition was endemic to feudal society. Yet its content was as much 
‘economic’ as it was ‘political’; conflict was always about ‘economic’ power. 
Indeed, the long-term development of the medieval economy was decisively 
shaped by the political dynamic of feudal society. It reflected the strategies for 
reproduction that the structure of feudal property relations imposed, 
differentially, on lords and peasants.
For feudal society as a whole, both in England and in France, the consequence 
of the enserfment of the peasantry was a period of rapid economic expansion. 
More surplus had to be produced by the serfs in order to keep up with the 
increasing demands of banal lords in France and the manorial lords in England.^^ 
This also stimulated the growth of towns and market exchange. The consumption 
patterns of the nobility, marked by the need for arms and the conspicuous 
demonstration of social status, were central to the rise of long-distance trade. But 
in the end, feudal property relations limited economic development; the 
economic expansion of the high middle ages was built on increasing labour input 
rather than rising labour productivity. Little of the produced surplus was 
reinvested in the production process. For lords, the path to increasing wealth was 
through the investment in the means of violence, useful for both conquest and the
31 Poly and Boumazel 1991, 357.
32 Elias 1994, 294-98.
33 Duby 1978,229.
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further squeezing of the peasantry. Innovation in military technology abounded, 
but the peasantry still tilled the soil with wooden ploughs for their heavily 
armoured m a s te rs .F o r  the direct producers, the immense burden left few 
resources to be ploughed back into the land, which led to the degradation of the 
soil -  a problem that was exacerbated by the increasing use of marginal lands as 
populations grew. Crisis was thus inevitable, but the general crisis of the 
fourteenth century was, at heart, a feudal rather than a demographic crisis:
As the peasants’ surplus tended to reach its limit, and indeed to decline with the drop-off of 
population, the lords’ build-up of more powerful instruments to redistribute it via coercive 
extraction and warfare tended to quicken, thereby creating the conditions for catastrophic 
crises of the economy and society as a whole.^^
It is the nature of feudal property relations, then, which explains the economic, 
social and political crisis of the late medieval period, and its protracted character. 
But were the pains and the agony of the slow collapse of feudalism also, as 
conventional wisdom has it, the birth pangs of modemity -  a beast among whose 
many ugly heads we have to number the capitalist economy and the sovereign, 
territorial polity?
6,3. Transformations and Transitions: Absolutism and Capitalism in Early 
Modern Europe
At the end of the century of feudal crisis, peasants everywhere in western 
Europe regained their personal freedom, though many forms of social and legal 
dependence persisted. The end of serfdom, and the concomitant weakening of the 
feudal nobility, are decisive landmarks in most stories of the ‘rise of the West’. 
The demise of feudal relations itself is usually attributed to the rise of long­
distance trade and monétarisation. The market, in other words, is conceptualised 
as ‘external’ to feudalism; its expansion gradually undermining the dominance of 
the aristocracy. With the dismantling of the repressive institutions, the individual 
is set free to pursue private interests, to chase market opportunities. Capital 
accumulation and economic growth is the result, although it may be retarded by
34 Bartlett 1993,61.
35 Brenner 1985b, 242.
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the survival of archaic institutions; their persistence would finally be broken 
when the perpetually rising middle classes have risen enough to assert their 
dominance by revolutionary force. The variations are many, but the story is a 
familiar one.
Of the objections made to this paradigm, two seem especially pertinent. 
Firstly, the rise of the market has led to rather different forms of ‘production 
relations’ and economic dynamics in eastern Europe, western Europe and 
England. Wallerstein’s solution, of course, is to call it all ‘capitalism’, though 
with different forms of labour control.Secondly , it has been argued that 
markets were by no means an alien element in feudal society. They were closely 
linked to its forms of domination and appropriation, which they sustained while 
being limited by them. They allowed the rise of a bourgeoisie making gains from 
unequal exchange and interests. Yet even while adding a further actor with 
particular interests to the (geo-)politics of feudalism, this non-capitalist 
bourgeoisie remained part of the feudal system; the burghers’ trade did not break 
through what Polanyi identifies as the “limited and unexpansive nature of the 
market pattern, as such”.^ ^
These arguments indicate the need to distinguish between forms of markets 
with rather different dynamics. Ellen Meiksins Wood argues that there is a 
decisive difference between capitalist and pre-capitalist markets. Whereas the 
latter provides opportunities for exchange and market production, the former 
constitutes an imperative for individual producers to produce for the market.^* 
This is the case when the livelihood of individuals depends on their capacity to 
reproduce themselves through their gains from market exchange. Yet in order to 
do so, they will have to produce competitively. In a society that reproduces such 
a form of market, investment and innovation in the means of production will 
characterise economic development. The consequence is a unique dynamic of 
secular and systematic economic growth based on raising productivity. This is 
not to say that there will not be economic crises or that political institutions
36 Wallerstein 1974 and 1979; On the problems o f Wallerstein’s world-systems
perspective, see Brenner 1977; Skocpol 1977; Gourevitch 1978.
37 Polanyi 1957, 54-57; on markets as ‘internal’ to feudalism, of. Merrington 1976 and
Press 1989.
38 Wood 1999a, 5-8; Wood 1994.
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cannot encumber or promote capital accumulation; it is a very specific form of 
market nevertheless. It allows us to abstract, in capitalism, an economic sphere, 
which appears to work according to an autonomous logic. Its corollary is the 
abstractedness of the political sphere. No longer directly implicated in the 
appropriation of surplus, politics becomes about ‘rule’. But this is not the ‘very 
beginning’, as Ruggie suggests; it was the result of the transformation of 
property relations through a ‘political’ process in which the pre-capitalist 
(geo)politics o f  domination and appropriation destroyed its own structural basis.
The question that has to be posed if we want to understand the rise of 
capitalism is how lords and peasants both became market dependent. This is not 
the case as long as lords can mobilise political means to extract surplus. The 
transition to capitalism, in other words, presupposes the dissolution of the unity 
of political and economic power; the other prerequisite is that peasants lose their 
non-market access to the means of subsistence. The focus, hence, is no longer on 
the cities, the bourgeoisie, commerce and trade; it is,on  agrarian property 
relations. Without going into the details of the transition, it has to be noted that in 
the struggles during the crisis of feudalism, English serfs were able to achieve 
personal freedom. They were unable, however, to gain property rights to the 
lands they occupied; these were understood to be the property of their former 
manorial lords. Lords were able, subsequently, to transform copyholds into 
leaseholds, for which they could charge market rents.^  ^ French lords, similarly, 
had to grant freedom to their serfs, but while they also retained de jure  property 
rights on their lands, they had to accept that rents and entry-fines were fixed on a 
low level."^ ° In fact, peasants were thus able to assert effective ownership over 
their plots. In England, then, landlords lost their extra-economic powers of 
surplus appropriation, and peasants possession of their means of subsistence; 
French peasants, on the other hand, did not become market dependent for their 
reproduction.
The reason for this divergence, according to Brenner, lies in the ""advanced 
self-organization of the English ruling class in the medieval period” with its 
relatively cooperative relationship between nobility and king in the absence of
39 Clay 1984, 69ff.
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banal lordship. This system was not strong enough to prevent peasant flight and 
resistance in the face of strongly declining population levels. Yet with intra­
ruling class competition thus checked, lords were not forced to sell their demesne 
lands to serfs in order to raise cash.' '^ In France, by contrast, feudal state-building 
had taken another form. The French royal dynasty, reduced to a seigneurie 
among many in the ‘second feudal age’, now tried to re-centralise regal powers in 
competition with the rest of the aristocracy. Slowly extending its control over 
territory and people, the monarchy had to gain access to surpluses against the 
nobles with which it competed. The monarchs thus backed the peasantry in its 
struggle with the lords for personal freedom and the security of peasant lands, in 
order to impose royal taxes and justice."*^
A capitalist market, along with a capitalist society, only emerged in England 
during the early modem epoch.'^  ^ It was the unintended result of localised 
struggles between kings, aristocrats and peasants for their reproduction as kings, 
lords and peasants - a product, therefore, of very particular circumstances, not of 
the broad sweep of history. To be sure, capitalist development required the prior 
development of commerce and trade; but nothing in the general expansion of 
markets made capitalism necessary or led directly to its rise.
Brenner’s argument represents a fundamental break with the tendency to 
universalise capitalism by tacitly reading its consequences back into its 
prehistory. It enables him not only to escape the circularity that mars most 
‘explanations’ of the transition but yields an account of the rise of the capitalist 
economy and the ‘modem’ state that is radically different from the dominant 
‘Rise of the West’ approach. Where the different versions of this paradigm 
attempt to explain the modemisation of westem Europe in terms of some 
common cultural, political or economic forces sweeping the region forward with
40 Salmon 1975, 40-42; Goubert 1973, 126.
41 Brenner 1985b, 292f; Subsequently, aristocrats tried to make up for their declining 
incomes by external wars and finally by factional strive, leading to descent into civil war 
in the mid-15th century.
42 Brenner 1985b, 287; cf. Salmon 1975, 22ff; Parker 1983, ch. 1.
43 The question whether the Dutch Republic may represent another case o f capitalist 
development, or whether a further distinction between ‘commercial’ and capitalist 
agriculture is necessary, is too complex to answer in the present context. The case o f  the 
USA also has to be set aside here, although a capitalist dynamic seems well established 
here by the eighteenth century.
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changing standard bearers, Brenner makes an argument for two fundamentally 
different paths out of feudalism. Capitalism and absolutism are not forms of 
economic and political organisation respectively, which might combine, in 
particular countries, in various ways. They are radically different social totalities. 
Capitalism, in this perspective, emerged endogenously only in England; 
continental westem Europe, by contrast, was by and large set on a pattern of 
absolutist development.' '^^ England and France were qualitatively different, not 
quantitative variations.
6.4. Feudalism to Capitalism: The Singularity of England
The unintended self-transformation of the aristocracy from a feudal into a 
capitalist class that took place in England was the consequence of social 
struggles informed by the different ‘strategies for reproduction’ which English 
feudalism had imposed on peasants, lords and kings. This process undermined 
the ability of lords to extract surpluses by coercive means. Crucially, the 
dissolution of the unity of political and economic powers in the hand of 
individual lords was not accompanied by their concentration in the state. Instead, 
the English state increasingly became the locus of political organisation (in the 
modem sense), while the appropriation of surplus became based on economic 
forms of property, in tum guaranteed and regulated by this state. Capitalist 
property relations thus gave rise to a very distinctive form of both politics and 
economics; their distinctiveness lies precisely in their relative insulation from 
each other.
Economically, these property relations became expressed in the form of a 
system of agrarian capitalism. Much has been made of the emergence of large- 
scale farming in early modem England. A precondition of this development was
44 That is, o f course, an exaggeration as there were many non-absolutist states in early 
modem Europe. Any comprehensive theorisation of social change in Europe will have to 
take these into account. Absolutism was, however, the most important form o f social 
organisation, defining the character o f the epoch, not least in its intemational aspect. 
France, on which I will focus here, was the most dominant and influential state.
45 In the orthodox paradigm, as Charles Beik notes, “France and England are treated as 
directly comparable, and their respective governments are viewed as interesting 
variation on the common theme o f the rise o f the Westem industrial nation-state ... This 
orthodoxy continues to be repeated despite the findings o f a generation o f social
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the ability of post-feudal lords, to assert their proprietorship of demesne lands, 
especially through the use of variable entry fines. Gradually, they could thus 
increase lands under leasehold tenure, regulated by common rather than 
customary law.'^  ^ At the same time, and especially in areas where customary 
rights on possession of copyholds were more favourable to tenants, successive 
enclosure movements destroyed the viability of subsistence farming by denying 
peasants access to common fields."^  ^Both processes contributed to the creation of 
larger estates, but the more crucial consequence was the break-up of common 
rights and obligations over the land. It allowed richer peasants and tenants 
leasing consolidated farms from noble landowners to undertake land-improving 
m easures.Tenants in particular were forced by their situation in the property 
structure of this society to enhance the productivity of their estates. They had to 
produce efficiently enough to pay both wages and economic rents in order to 
keep their leaseholds, and, by outbidding other tenants, to expand their holdings 
in order to make additional efficiency profits.'^^
But why did English landlords allow their tenants sufficiently long leases for 
them to undertake investments and profit from them? Why did they not, as did 
French nobles on those lands they actually controlled, raise rents to extraordinary 
levels, leaving little for tenants to re-invest?^° It was precisely the lack of 
opportunities for investments in politically constituted property that forced the 
English noble landowners to rely on incomes from landed property for the 
reproduction of their social status. Without access to more profitable and 
honourable political forms of appropriation, they had to develop into an 
entrepreneurial aristocracy with an interest in the ability of their tenants to 
reinvest gains, even if these were slow to manifest. Within the tenantry, this 
economic dependence led to the amplification of existing differences; those 
unable to hold their place in the competitive race for tenures joined the
historians that French society was structurally very different from English society in the 
sixteenth to eighteenth centuries”; Beik 1985,4.
46 Hilton 1973, 157ff.
47 On the different forms of enclosures, not all o f which were coercive, see Clay 1984, 69-
91; Holdemess 1976, 77.
48 Thirsk 1989: 8ff.
49 Brenner 1985b, 301.
50 Forster 1970, 1610-13 ;Jones 1967a, 14.
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proletarianised class of agrarian (and industrial) labourers/' Crucially, then, large 
parts of the population became dependent on the market for their reproduction. 
This market imposed competitive imperatives unlike any other market in history 
had done before. The consequences of an economy dominated by a logic of 
economic rather than political accumulation help us understand the pattern of 
economic development leading up to the industrial revolution.
While the debate about the timing of the English ‘agricultural revolution’ 
continues, it has become clear that the unprecedented productivity gains of the 
eighteenth century were only the peak of a longer process, which started in the 
seventeenth or even sixteenth century. There is now a tendency to see the whole 
period as revolutionary in terms of agricultural productivity.^^ The levels of 
investment and innovation which made this possible were quite unique to 
England. This allowed for the drastic reduction of people engaged in agriculture 
(from 76 percent to 36 per cent of the total population), which went together with 
a population increase by 350 per cent between 1500 and 1800.^  ^ Crises of 
subsistence became less and less pronounced in England, which nevertheless did 
not become dependent on food imports. Most significantly, the general crisis of 
the seventeenth century affected England to a much lesser degree than its 
continental neighbours.^'' The high productivity of English agriculture allowed 
for the development of industry by releasing labour power and created a mutually 
reinforcing cycle of agricultural and industrial demand. This, in tum, made 
possible the development of a national economy based not primarily on luxury
51 Sharpe 1987, 134. This interpretation of the emergence o f the landlord-tenant-labourer
triad largely follows the work of Robert Brenner (1985b). Alternative accounts 
concurring in their emphasis on the importance and uniqueness o f this development, yet 
keeping more with tradition in stressing the rise o f the yeomen, have been proposed by 
Parker 1996; Mooers 1991; and McNally 1988.
52 Overton 1989, 9 and 13f. Compare Thirsk 1987; Beckett 1990, ch. 1. The debate started
in the late 1960s. See the contributions to Jones 1967b. Important contributions have 
also been made by Kerridge 1969; and Wrigley 1985.
53 Population growth in other European countries was between 50 and 80 per cent during
this period. Urbanisation increased five-fold (to 27.5 per cent) while it stagnated in the
rest o f western Europe (at 10 per cent). Whereas 100 persons employed in agriculture 
provided food for 132 persons outside o f agriculture in 1520, by 1800 the ratio had 
grown by 88 percent (100:248). In France, the relationship was 100:138 in 1520 and 
100:170 in 1800. But Wrigley notes that this difference may well underestimate the 
difference in productivity between England and France. See Wrigley 1985, 720-26.
54 Holdemess 1976, 9-24 and 233.
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products; the mass of population commanded, on aggregate, significant buying 
power.
If the emergence of a dynamic economy in early modem England was one 
major product of its capitalist property relations, the ‘underdeveloped’ form of its 
state was another. On the one hand, the English state achieved the 
monopolisation of force and the demilitarisation of the aristocracy at a 
comparatively early time; this was not accompanied, on the other hand, by the 
imposition of a highly rationalised and bureaucratic state apparatus using its 
monopoly of violence to subordinate civil society to its own ends. This reflects 
the peculiarly political character of the English state, which did not develop into 
an organisation geared to political appropriation. Though taxation rose to very 
high levels in the eighteenth century, it did not so much provide a means for the 
extraction of surplus from the direct producers by a class organised as state. 
Where political power was used for personal economic advantage, it was defined 
as abuse, as corruption. Instead, the propertied classes taxed themselves in order 
to advance purposes defined collectively in parliament.
The English state has consequently been described as a “committee of 
landlords”.^  ^Ellen Wood argues that capitalist property relations gave rise to
a formally autonomous state which represented the private, ‘economic’ class of 
appropriators in its public, ‘political’ aspect. This meant that the ‘economic’ functions of 
appropriation were differentiated from the ‘political’ and military functions o f rule - or, to 
put it another way, ‘civil society’ was differentiated from the state - while at the same time 
the state was responsive, even subordinate, to civil society.^*^
However, there were, as yet, severe limitations to the responsiveness of the 
state to the capitalist classes. The separation of politics and economics was 
subject to manifold contestations. Most importantly, the monarchy itself 
remained interested in expanding not just its dominion but in increasing its 
extractive powers in order to reshape its relations to the aristocracy. The desire to 
do so derived in parts from contemporary notions (heavily influenced by 
absolutist ideology) of the position of the monarch in human communitas. As 
important, however, was the desire of English queens and kings to take their 
rightful position within the European community of emperors, kings and princes.
55 Moore 1966, 19.
56 Wood 1991, 28.
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which required their ability to compete for power, status and honour. Before we 
can return, in the next chapter, to the political and economic development of a 
capitalist society in England, it is necessary to consider the formation of an 
absolutist society in France (and elsewhere on the European Continent), and its 
consequences for the dynamic of early modem geopolitics.
6.5. Feudalism to Absolutism: The Case of France
Few phenomena seem to signal more clearly the transition to modemity than 
the rise of the absolutist state with its high level of centralisation, 
bureaucratisation and the monopolisation of legitimate violence. There is, of 
course, no shortage of approaches highlighting the ‘archaic’ features of 
absolutism, which were only gradually swept away by protracted processes of 
‘modemisation’. Perry Anderson goes even further when he conceptualises 
absolutism as a transitional mode of production mediating between feudalism 
and capitalism.
For Anderson, the absolutist state (of which he takes England to be a 
“peculiarly contracted variant”)^ ’ was the instrument of an aristocracy threatened 
by the rise of commodity production in the interstices of feudalism. That process 
had destroyed feudal relations of appropriation and domination; the aristocracy 
had to reorganise itself politically in order to maintain its grip on society and the 
surplus of the peasantry. But the centralisation of the means of coercion in the 
absolutist state could not stop the increasing autonomy of the economic sphere, 
and the bourgeoisie benefited from policies like mercantilism.^* Absolutism was 
hence a cmcial link in the “value-added process” leading from feudalism to 
capitalism.^^ Its emergence presupposed the separation of politics and economics, 
its demise occurred with the subordination of the political sphere under the rule 
of a victorious revolutionary bourgeoisie.
57 Anderson 1974, 113; on the problems o f this formulation, discounting the difference
between absoljitist and constitutional monarchical government, see Gourevitch 1978, 
424 and 436.
58 Anderson 1974, 15-59, esp. 18; cf. Cox 1987, 114-15.
59 Anderson 1993, 17.
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Yet absolutism may be better understood as a fundamentally pre-capitalist 
form of society, devoid of any interstitial propulsions to develop a capitalist 
market.^® There was commercial and financial activity and market exchange, but 
the bourgeoisie engaged in these pursuits was a non-capitalist class. Many 
economic historians have noted the low degree of development of agriculture and 
industry in France (and relative to England) during the age of absolutism. 
Agricultural productivity, if not output, was almost stagnant well into the 
nineteenth century.^' French ‘proto-industry’ attracted only limited investments. 
As Skocpol notes, commerce and industry “remained symbiotically tied to - and 
limited by - the social and political structures of agrarian-imperial France”.^  ^It is 
tempting to ascribe this pattern of stagnation, and the absence of a discourse of 
‘improvement’ similar to that in England, to cultural factors preventing French 
peasants, landlords and manufacturers from wanting to chase market 
opportunities. The particular development of social property relations in France 
(and much of continental Europe) provides a more plausible key to the 
explanation of both economic stagnation and the rise of the absolutist state.
The ability of peasants to assert de facto proprietorship over their small­
holdings gave them the possibility to reproduce themselves outside of the 
market; their subsistence did not depend on production at a competitive rate. 
Peasants certainly did exchange goods on local markets (not least to obtain 
money for certain levies), but they did not systematically produce for the
60 This is not to deny the importance o f monétarisation and mercantile wealth to the rise of 
the absolutist state. While these phenomena neither brought about the decline of 
feudalism nor the rise o f capitalism, it is clear that the availability o f money was 
necessary for the centralisation o f power; mercantile wealth at the same time limited the 
arbitrariness of sovereigns; cf. Hirschman 1977; Weiss and Hobson 1995, 62.
61 Jacquart 1974, 166f.; Crouzet 1990, ch. 1; Lloyd 1983, 92f.; Goubert 1973, 36-42 and 
68. The widely accepted picture o f very different paths o f agrarian development between 
England and France has recently attracted some challenge. But Parker notes that critics 
fail to distinguish between output and productivity. Eighteenth-century expansion was 
marked by increasing output after a severe crisis o f subsistence, not the emergence o f a 
more productive agriculture; Parker 1996, 207-217.
62 Skocpol 1979, 55. Mooers argues that proto-industry actually “served to retard the 
transition to factory-based production” as merchants financed a putting-out system of 
production that did little to change the forms of production; Mooers 1991, 60. Proto­
industry itself presupposed a sluggish agriculture. Peasants tried to increase their 
incomes in addition to the produce o f their lands in order to maintain themselves as 
peasants. Proto-industry and modem industry are thus opposites rather than part o f a 
temporal continuum.
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market.^^ Nor could they, even if nature or culture had endowed them with the 
urge to truck, barter and trade. Their survival could best be secured by producing 
a broad range of goods and avoiding specialisation and dependence on events 
beyond their control, not least highly unstable market prices. Moreover, little 
remained usually of surpluses after payment of taxes, levies and remaining 
seigneurial dues and fines, leaving very limited possibilities for reinvestment into 
the means of production. Increasing output could only be achieved -  and was 
achieved in Malthusian upswing phases - through increasing labour inputs, tying 
most of the population of France to agriculture. The necessary long-term 
consequence was the periodic decline of the productivity of land. '^^
The predominance of peasant property also helps to explain the absence of an 
entrepreneurial landed class in France. Noble and bourgeois landowners were 
generally unable to build large commercial farms, with the exception of some 
areas of the Paris basin. But even there, lands remained subject to the same 
customary regulations of the village community as peasant plots themselves.^^ 
Absolutist monarchs continued to guarantee peasant property, strengthen the 
peasant community and extend their own judicial system.^^ The king’s state also 
denied the nobility the possibility to break up common farming through political 
means in the form of coerced enclosures. Given endemic land-hunger, 
landowners were still able to extract often extraordinary economic rents, leasing 
out plots to peasants seeking to supplement their own subsistence production. 
Yet little of that money found its way back into agriculture or industry.
The reason was the availability of alternative forms of investment into 
politically constituted property, which promised higher and more secure returns 
on agricultural and commercial wealth. The ‘rational’ path not only to power and 
status but to wealth, was to invest in the means of appropriation represented by 
state office. Bourgeois fortunes were part and parcel of the absolutist property 
system. Indeed, as Skocpol argues, the bourgeoisie was part of a “basically 
unified dominant class - one that appropriated surplus directly and indirectly
63 Brenner 1989, 289; Forster 1970, 1603.
64 The development o f French agriculture follows closely the ‘peasant model’ delineated
by de Vries 1974, 4-6.
65 Comninel 1987, 184-191; Brenner 1985a: 62-3 (fh. 111).
66 Root 1992.
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from peasant agriculture”.^  ^ The rediscovery of Roman private law did indeed 
contribute to the development of the notion of absolute property, superseding 
medieval concepts; it thereby certainly aided the rising fortunes of the 
bourgeoisie, just as it helped peasants to claim property over their plots. But the 
decisive form of absolutist private property was the ownership of a part of the 
state in the form of an office.^* If there was an incipient differentiation of public 
and private spheres, these realms did not correspond to political and economic 
spheres;^^ it had more to do with demands for a private space in which religion 
and thought could be free from the requisition of loyalty by the sovereign. Nor 
was the state itself a political institution in the sense it acquired in the nineteenth 
century. The “tax/office structure” (Brenner) of the absolutist state expresses, or 
is the form and locus of, the continuing unity of both political and economic 
power, of domination and exploitation.^®
If the absolutist state enabled the aristocracy to wield its class power in new 
and more ‘efficient’ forms, it cannot be reduced to a simple ruling-class choice 
imposed by an endangered feudal nobility. Late medieval French monarchs, as 
we have seen, contributed actively to the crisis of the aristocracy. But the 
emergent absolutist state also provided nobles with an alternative to the 
decentralised system of domination and exploitation. By co-opting the nobility 
through a range of corporate and individual privileges, it also added to the 
administrative and military capacities of the state.’’ However, the monarchy also 
created a new nobility, partly in order to lessen its dependence on post-feudal 
magnates, but also in order to raise funds for its wars. The duality of conflict and
67 Skocpol 1979, 56.
68 Compare Bormey 1991, 360: “Absolutism can be viewed as a set o f arrangements, 
unique to a particular country, by which the civil power operated to protect private 
property rights such as those enshrined in public offices and annuities...” .
69 On the different ‘objects’ to which ‘public’ and ‘private’ referred in Roman, medieval, 
absolutist and modem times, see Bmnner 1984, 122-125. It also needs to be emphasised 
that private property even o f productive assets was not necessarily capitalist property; cf. 
Comninel 1987, 181. It cannot be assumed that the strengthening o f property rights via 
Roman Law created capitalist property relations, as many authors do; cf. Anderson 
1974, 24-28; North and Thomas 1973.
70 Wood 1991, 23: “The state itself was a primary instrument o f appropriation, a private 
resource for public office-holders. ... Office in the absolutist state represented a 
‘centralization upwards’ o f feudal exploitation, in which peasant-produced surpluses 
were appropriated in the form of tax instead of rent”.
71 Beik 1985, 13; Tallett 1992, 190.
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cooperation between monarchy and aristocracy remained at the heart of French 
development. Struggling for their share of a relatively fixed peasant surplus, 
necessary to sustain their political and social status, lords strove individually and 
collectively to limit the powers of the monarchy and to extend their own 
appropriative powers. Aristocratic revolt, however, was restricted by the need to 
rely on the state in the suppression of peasant revolts.
Absolutism was premised upon the coexistence of monarchical claims to 
sovereignty and aristocratic assertion of privilege and pre-eminence. Internally, 
absolutist societies remained characterised by a strong particularistic dimension. 
The very definition of absolutism, the authority of the monarch to make laws 
without the agreement of their subjects, seems to have corresponded more to the 
aspirations than the reality of the kings even of France. A wealth of studies has 
shown the limits to state power, the rivalry between political and legal 
institutions drawing on different forms of legitimacy, the continuing existence of 
feudal powers, and the low degree of territorial contiguity.Their control over 
military organisation remained tenuous in many respects. The tension between 
absolutist centralisation and local as well as corporate particularism would be 
misunderstood, however, if we dissolved it in the notion of the monarchical state 
as a ‘modernizing’ force imposing itself on archaic political institutions. The 
history of absolutism does not tell a story of the victory of a rational state geared 
to the pursuit of public interest over forces abusing state power for private 
concems. It is a history of conflicts between opposing yet mutually dependent 
claims to property in and of the state and the peasant surplus it yielded. Though 
monarchs legitimated their claims to resources by reference to extemal threats, 
the ‘public’ character of the king’s war is highly problematic, as I will try to 
show in the following chapter.
The absolutist state itself should thus not be understood as the instrument of 
either the aristocracy (including both the noblesse de robe and noblesse d ’épee) 
or the monarchy, but as an “independent, class-like surplus extractor” that 
afforded access to surplus to different privileged groups.^^ Conflict between these 
groups about their relative shares remained pervasive. This was not a ‘modem’
72 Collins 1995, 1-5; Henshall 1992; Mettam 1990; Parker 1989; Parker 1983, esp. 136ff.
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state, not even in an underdeveloped form/'* Absolutist property relations found 
expression in a form of sovereignty that was premised not on generalised 
impersonal rule, but on generalised personal domination that remained 
necessarily riddled by privilege and particularism/^
6,6, Conclusions
In preceding chapters, I have argued that capitalism is not so much a particular 
form of ‘economic’ action (based on the rational pursuit of profits), but a way of 
ordering society. Capitalist society involves the emergence of a distinct sphere of 
‘the economy’, in which decisions over production and distribution become 
subordinated to considerations of profitability, as people become dependent on 
the sale of commodities (including their labour power) in the market. Its 
concomitant is the emergence of a ‘political’ state which, while guaranteeing 
private property and regulating and even governing the economy, is not directly 
implicated in the private appropriation of the surplus product. This understanding 
does not accept that capitalism is nothing but the free economic activity of utility 
maximising individuals. Such a positivist conceptualisation reduces history to a 
evolutionistic teleological developmental process. It also falls short of the 
requirements for a historicisation of social relations, as it is premised on an 
essentialist reading of ‘human nature’ which is unable to recognise that 
humanity’s nature is precisely its historical becoming.
To theorise the emergence of capitalism, hence, entails more than an account 
of how the political institutions that restricted ‘free’ economic activity were 
undermined by the dynamic nature of economic and technological change. It 
entails more, even, than an account of how institutions conducive to the rational
73 Brenner 1985a, 55.
74 Nor, according to Root, did it create a modem society in order to serve the pursuit of
raison d ’état: “If  modernization means the creation o f a society based on competition 
and individualism, on the destruction o f corporate bodies, and on the institution of
private property, then the state of the Old Regime did not play a modernizing role”; 
Root 1992, 14.
75 On the distinction between generalised personal domination, contrasting to feudal 
private personal domination and capitalist generalised impersonal rule, see 
Gerstenberger 1990, 497-532 (who includes England in the first category). On the
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pursuit of profit were created under pressure from ‘material’ progress or the 
needs of sovereigns locked into perpetual conflict. In both formulations, 
capitalism is given as a starting point; as Braudel points out: “capitalism has been 
potentially visible since the dawn of history”.^  ^ Historical narrative simply 
recounts how the seeds broke through even the hardest obstacles, were nurtured 
by interested groups, produced the fruits which strengthened those who ate from 
them, and finally overshadowed all other forms of social organisation while 
expanding its roots to feed on ever more distant and deep-seated sources of 
energy to maintain its metabolism.
That capitalism is expansive and tends to subsume more and more areas of 
social life under its manic logic is undeniable. But it may be precisely the 
stunning dynamism of capitalism, its undeniable ability to create commodities 
and to expand commodity relations, that misleads us into attributing to the 
products of human labour a revolutionary force which, at least prior to the rise of 
capitalist property relations, they did and could not have. Only when social 
theorists recognise the radical distinctiveness of capitalism as a form of social 
organisation will history and historical sociology free itself from the grip of the 
‘economistic fallacy’ identified by Polanyi.
Historical materialists would do well to heed Polanyi’s critique. While there 
are important elements in Marx’s work which provide essential ingredients to the 
formulation of a challenge to the orthodox model (and all its variations), it 
remains mired, even in its most mature formulation in Capital, in the ideological 
constructions of liberal political economy in two respects. Firstly, much of 
Marxism partakes in what Ellen Meiksins Wood has termed the ‘bourgeois 
paradigm’ In this framework, the bourgeoisie is uncritically equated with 
capitalism, which consequently is regarded as something that happens, at least to 
begin with, in the cities and towns. Yet the only transition from feudalism to
personal character o f Louis XIV’s authority as maître to all his fidèles, see Kaiser 1990, 
142 and Rowen 1980, 30-35 and 75-92.
76 Braudel 1984, 620. According to Braudel, there were signs far in advance o f its final
triumph which announced the coming o f capitalism: “the rise o f towns and o f trade, the 
emergence of a labour market, the increasing density o f society, the spread o f the use of 
money, the rise in output, the expansion o f long-distance trade”; ibid.
77 Polanyi 1977.
78 Wood 1991,3-19.
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capitalism, the one that took place in England, was not primarily an urban affair; 
ironically, the capitalist class par excellence in England was the aristocracy! The 
bourgeoisie of France, on the other hand, while busily trading and exchanging, 
was not a capitalist class.
What, then, of the French Revolution, the classical case of a bourgeois 
revolution which supposedly marks the decisive stage of capitalism’s long birth 
process? It is with good reason that the now dominant ‘revisionist’ 
interpretations of the French Revolution have thoroughly debunked the notion of 
a revolution made by capitalists to serve capitalist purposes. In fact, most of the 
revisionists have come away from their studies unable even to identify a 
capitalist class in pre-revolutionary France, as the forms through which the 
bourgeoisie and the aristocracy gained their incomes was rather similar.^^ In 
England, of course, the differences between aristocracy and bourgeoisie also 
became less prominent during the early modem period -  but with a decisive 
difference. Just as the bourgeoisie and aristocracy of France were constituted as a 
single class reproducing itself through politically constituted property, so the 
English gentry and aristocracy were a single capitalist class, reproducing itself 
through economic accumulation.*® In the bourgeois paradigm, however, the 
differences between England and France are constmcted as variations in the ‘rise 
of the capitalist West’. As such, it presents a “composite picture formed largely 
by the retrospective superimposition of the French revolutionary experience upon 
the example of English capitalism, and, conversely, an interpretation of the 
French political experience in the light of English economic development”.*'
Secondly, Marxism after Marx has privileged those elements of its liberal 
materialist heritage that underpinned its evolutionistic, economistic and 
deterministic tendencies. Not surprisingly, one of the victims of the interpretation
79 Doyle 1990; cf. Lucas 1973; Furet 1981. Outlines of a new social interpretation o f the
French Revolution not based on the narrative of the capitalist bourgeoisie’s perpetual
rise are developed by Comninel 1987, 196-205. The dominant interpretation o f the 
French Revolution, however, is now ‘cultural’; cf. Hunt 1986. Skocpol notes that many 
revisionist approaches, despite their inability to locate a capitalist class, implicitly rely 
on the grand scheme o f the rise o f the capitalist West. Skocpol, by contrast, asserts the 
non-capitalist character o f early modem French development; Skocpol 1979, 54-60 and 
174-179.
80 Cf. Zagorin 1965, 51.
81 Wood 1991,4.
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of the transition to capitalism outlined so far has to be the time-honoured ‘mode 
of production’ framework that Marx inherited from classical political economy 
(where it figured large in the guise of ‘modes of subsistence’),*^  and which 
played such a fateful role in the rigid schématisation and even strait-jacketing of 
history in the hands of Marxist theorists. Its limits, even as a broad scheme, are 
highlighted by the inability to fit in absolutist society.
Perry Anderson has, famously, sought to portray absolutism as a transitional 
mode of production between feudalism and capitalism which amalgamated 
elements of both.*  ^ I have argued, by contrast, that absolutism was a radically 
non-capitalist form of social organisation; its political apex was decisively 
characterised by use of the power of the state in the process of exploitation. But 
if the absolutist state showed a fundamental continuity with feudalism in that 
politics and economics continued to be non-separated, absolutism cannot simply 
be reduced to feudalism. Absolutism was as different from feudalism as the latter 
was from the ‘slave mode of production’ of classical antiquity. The differences 
between these societies may be better understood in terms of the “specific 
economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct 
producers”.*"^ The limited number of successive ‘modes of production’ may thus 
have to make way for a notion of ‘modes of exploitation’ with which absolutism 
could be grasped as a historical society sui generis.
Such a ‘modes of exploitation’ framework has the added advantage of 
precluding the presumption of a necessary evolutionary movement through 
history at whose end stands capitalism (and, eventually, socialism). Once we 
recognise that capitalism is not simply commerce writ large - that it is more than 
an extension under more favourable institutional circumstances of age-old 
practices of buying cheap in one market in order to sell more dearly in another - 
it becomes clear that its emergence is the product of contingent local conditions. 
These conditions, I have argued, existed in England during the early modem 
period. But they did not obtain by any historical necessity. Capitalism, in short,
82 Comninel 1987, 140-44.
83 Anderson 1974, ch. 1.
84 Marx 1971,791.
85 On ‘modes of production’ and ‘modes o f  exploitation’, see Comninel 1987, 155 and 
174.
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need not have come into existence at all. Having come into existence in a 
particular place and time, however, the question arises as to how capitalism was 
able to expand and ultimately to encompass the whole world. One thing is clear, 
though; the conditions under which societies subsequently were transformed in a 
capitalist direction were very distinct from those which obtained in the original 
English case. The English experience can thus not serve as a generalisable 
‘model’ of capitalist transformation.
7. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF THE 
ANCIENREGIME
7.1. The Limits of Territoriality
The early modem period brought, for western Europe and beyond, momentous 
changes. Both the ‘universal empire’ and the feudal (geo-)politics of the Middle 
Ages were undermined as emperors and nobles alike found themselves 
confronted by projects of state-formation which led, over time, to the 
consolidation of sovereign, territorial statehood. For John Ruggie, as we have 
seen, territoriality is the defining characteristic of the modem intemational 
system. As such, it is part and parcel of modemity and of the process of 
modernisation, which also includes, in this perspective, the emergence of 
capitalism, of an individualistic subjectivity, and so forth.
The presumption of such a ‘package deal’ for westem Europe as a whole has 
been challenged in the preceding chapter. I have argued that, apart from England, 
European states did not go through a period of capitalist development after the 
demise of feudalism. As I have shown for the case of France, the pattem of 
economic development as well as the nature of the absolutist state there 
expressed and institutionalised non-capitalist social property relations. In as 
much as the early modem period did indeed witness the triumph of territorial 
statehood, then, we have to question the almost universally claimed linkage 
between territorial state-formation (and therefore the rise of an interstate system) 
and the rise of capitalism.
But is the premise itself valid? There have always been those -  historians in 
the main -  who have rejected the argument that a modem system emerged before 
the nineteenth century, and thus refused to be impressed by the supposed 
modemity of the ‘Westphalian’ system.' More recently, Stephen Krasner has 
questioned whether states could actually be called ‘sovereign’ before the 
nineteenth century, given their limited control over their territories and the
cf. Hinsley 1967; Duchhardt 1999.
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militarily active parts of their populations/ These authors, however, while 
questioning the degree to which early modem states have approximated the 
ideal-type of sovereignty, do not challenge the underlying model itself, which 
posits a fundamental continuity - if not identity - between the states of the early 
fifteenth and the late twentieth centuries. The state remains the same, at least for 
the purposes of IR theory, even if this state was, before the nineteenth century, as 
yet imperfectly integrated and consolidated. The trajectory itself, from feudal 
anarchy to the anarchy of the system of sovereign states, is not in question.
The approach presented here, by contrast, does not accept this trajectory, at 
least not in as much as the conclusion is concerned that is usually derived from 
it: that the intemational system which emerged after the breakdown of feudalism 
is, in its stmctural aspects, the same that exists today or - allowing for the 
possibility that we have finally progressed beyond ‘modem’ intemational 
relations - that had existed at least up to the period of contemporary 
globalisation. As I have sought to show in the preceding chapter, the absolutist 
states which principally formed the Westphalian system were not simply 
relatively but absolutely non-modem. They were riddled by local and corporate 
particularisms not so much because they had not yet advanced far enough along 
the road to full modemity, but because the social property relations prevailing 
within them did not allow for the generality of abstract, impersonal mle which 
capitalism permits. Absolutist territoriality and capitalist territoriality are 
fundamentally different forms of organising the relations of domination and 
exploitation -  or what may be called the social relations o f  sovereignty.
And yet, if absolutist territoriality is not commensurable with the form of 
territoriality that emerged after the general transition to capitalist modemity since 
the nineteenth century, it certainly did mark an important transformation of the 
geopolitical dynamic. Though the logic of political accumulation, which was at 
the origin offeudal state-building in the late middle ages, remained central to the 
absolutist (geo)political system, absolutist intemational relations do not simply 
betray a ‘feudal logic’ as Perry Anderson contends.^ Nor can we discount the 
territorialisation of sovereign authority which took place during the early modem
Krasner 1993 and Thomson 1994.
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period, as Justin Rosenberg seems to do. As we have seen in chapter 5, 
Rosenberg considers modemity to be characterised by the separation of 
economics and politics as well as the differentiation of internal and external 
realms. But whereas Ruggie argues that both these processes began in the 
fifteenth century, Rosenberg seems to locate them in the nineteenth century
In the present chapter, I will suggest that both approaches suffer from the 
assumption that the emergence of capitalism and of the sovereign, territorial state 
are coeval. Instead, I will argue that the separation of the domestic and the 
intemational has different social and historical roots than the separation of the 
political and the economic. Most cmcially, absolutist territoriality did 
differentiate domestic and intemational realms, however imperfectly, and thus 
constituted a system of states that can be called anarchical. Anarchy, here, has a 
concrete historical rather than simply analytical content: it signals the negation of 
the feudal (geo)-political system with its complex mix of autonomy and 
hierarchy between the wielders of military force. The relationship between the 
mlers of bounded territories claiming extemal sovereignty was necessarily quite 
different from intra-lordly competition. Replacing the feud, war between 
sovereign territorial states was no longer about the negotiation of the relative 
position of the warring parties in a hierarchical system conferring differential 
access to political property rights. Relations of exploitation thus became 
intemalised, even while absolutist geopolitics remained driven by the 
extemalised imperatives generated by absolutist property relations, in particular 
the need for territorial conquest.
The first purpose of this chapter is thus the development of a framework for 
the interpretation of intemational relations in a historical epoch in which intemal 
and external realms became increasingly differentiated, but in which statehood 
was not yet premised on the abstraction of politics from economics. Implicit in 
this line of argument is the suggestion that territoriality as such is incapable of 
defining modem international relations. While territoriality (and the anarchical 
relationship it constitutes between ‘conflict units’) marks an important element
3 Anderson 1974, 31-33 and 57-58.
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of continuity between the absolutist and the capitalist intemational systems, it is 
only through the analysis of social property relations (and the ‘social relations of 
sovereignty’ which they entail) that we can gain an appropriate historical 
understanding of particular geopolitical dynamics. It is this aspect, rather than the 
mode of spatial differentiation (Ruggie), or the dynamic of interaction (Wendt), 
that provides the key to the particular ‘logic of anarchy’.^
The second task of the present chapter is to establish that, contrary to the thrust 
of Weberian historical sociology, geopolitical rivalry can no more explain the 
transition to capitalist modemity than the expansion of markets, trade and 
bourgeois influence (or any pluralistic combination of ‘economic’ and ‘political’ 
accounts). In particular, the transition from absolutist to capitalist sovereignty 
cannot be understood as a continuous process of consolidation and 
‘modemisation’ in response to intemational competition. Weberian historical 
sociologists have suggested that such competition is not only more important in 
explaining state formation than the requirements of the capitalist economy, but 
that the development of capitalism itself has been decisively advanced by states 
seeking to enhance their ability to compete in the intemational system. Jacob 
Viner similarly pointed out that mercantilist strategists regarded the 
maximisation of political power and the fostering of economic wealth as equally 
important aims of states, which would have to reinforce each other in order to 
guarantee the continuing existence of any particular state. Charles Tilly locates 
the ultimate source of state-formation in the war-prone conditions in the late 
medieval and early modem periods. As princes had to fight ever more costly 
wars, they were forced to increase the state bureaucracy, especially their 
apparatus for taxation: “War wove the European network of national states, and
As I have argued in chapter 5, Rosenberg’s argument is rather ambiguous and can be 
sustained precisely because he remains unclear about the timing o f the transition to 
capitalism; cf. above, chapter 5, fh. 51.
Critics of Waltz’s neo-Realism have sought to historicise the intemational system on the 
basis o f distinct logics o f anarchy; cf. Ruggie 1993; Wendt 1987; Buzan, Little and 
Jones 1993. The present approach is distinct in that it does not accept anarchy as a 
timeless attribute o f the intemational system. Anarchy is itself a historical product o f the 
demise o f the feudal geopolitical system of authority. But within this post-feudal 
anarchical system, different logics o f anarchy have existed; I will argue below that 
W endt’s concem with pattems of interaction can be fruitfully linked to the ‘social 
relations o f sovereignty’ emphasised here.
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preparation of war created the intemal stmctures of the states within it”.^  To 
increase revenues, states strove to promote capitalist development through 
mercantilist strategies/
Early modem states most certainly did pursue mercantilist policies, not just in 
absolutist France, but also in capitalist England and in the Dutch trading empire; 
yet the Realist image of homogenisation in the face of intemational competition 
(which is also present in much of Weberian historical sociology), is ultimately 
misleading/ As I will show, military conflict in the early modem period did not 
tend to strengthen the king and his state; the aristocracy was able to maintain or 
even extend its regional and corporatist powers. The transcendence of the 
Standestaat (‘state of estates’) and the rise of monarchical absolutism after the 
mid-seventeenth century,^ was not so much the result of a victorious monarchy 
imposing the new order on the aristocratic defenders of privilege and 
particularism, but of a negotiated settlement.
The general point that needs to be emphasised is that the pressures of the 
intemational system are always (except perhaps in some cases of direct conquest) 
refracted through the prism of the social property relations prevailing within 
these states. Thus absolutist Spain, for instance, was never able to develop a form 
of monarchical absolutism similar to France because of aristocratic resistance 
(and despite the loss of geopolitical competitiveness). Moreover, even where 
states pursued mercantilist policies, these strategies did not, except in the English 
case, foster capitalist industries; instead, they represented rationalisation 
strategies within the context of existing property relations. Political and 
economic ‘modemisation’ in absolutists states did not contribute to the 
increasing realisation of the telos of a ‘modem’ economy and state (whose 
modemity is supposedly defined precisely by highly rational action in these
6 Tilly 1992, 76.
7 cf. Hall and Ikenberry 1989,40.
8 On homogenisation, see Waltz 1979; Halliday 1994, ch. 5.
9 The category o f absolutism is here used in two ways: on the one hand as a form of
organising society which prevailed from about 1500-1800; and in reference to the 
institutional form in which Juridical, legislative and executive power becomes 
concentrated in the person o f the prince or king. The latter is here taken to be a sub-set 
o f the former. In order to distinguish these meanings, I will refer to ‘monarchical 
absolutism’ when I specifically address the political institutions of the later absolutist 
period.
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‘spheres’), but reflected the distinctive rationality of social agents situated in an 
absolutist ‘framework for action’.
This, then, leads to the third aim of the present chapter, which is to explain 
how capitalism spread beyond its origins in England. England itself was 
unequivocally part of the absolutist intemational system of the early modem 
period.'® Indeed, I will argue that while English foreign policy objectives gave at 
least partial expression to the needs and requirements of the capitalist civil 
society and economy which uniquely developed here, English foreign policy 
during this period can only be understood in its absolutist geopolitical context. 
Moreover, England’s ‘capitalism in one country’ could only survive the vicious 
dynamics of absolutist intemational competition through adaptation. Cmcially, 
this did not take the form of an absolutist transformation, but was achieved 
through the establishment of a fiscal-military’ state apparatus after the successful 
anti-absolutist revolutions of the seventeenth century.
For most of the early modem period the pressures of adaptation ran from the 
continent to Britain; this began to change when the dynamic of capitalist 
development in Britain led to the Industrial Revolution. In this particular context, 
intemational competition now led to pressures for capitalist modemisation in 
order to withstand the geopolitical and economic advantages which Britain 
reaped from its pioneering role. The consequence was a series of revolutions 
from above which imposed capitalist social relations on continental European 
societies and transformed the states themselves which were the agents of this 
process. When capitalism spread during the nineteenth century, first to westem 
Europe and then the globe, it entailed a new form of politics. At the same time, 
the social space of capitalism was pre-configured by the territoriality of authority
10 It should be noted that the argument proposed here is different in kind from the familiar 
claim, happily bashed by Realists o f all stripes, that states with differently constituted 
states pursue different foreign policies. Realists are quick to point out that the foreign 
policy o f the Soviet Union after 1917 very quickly adhered to typical great power 
behaviour predicted by Realist theory. But even if this claim can be maintained, it does 
not follow that an intemational system constituted by ‘communist’ states would have the 
same logic and dynamic as the capitalist one within which the Soviet Union was 
situated. It is this level o f abstraction, the constitutive principles o f different historical 
international systems, that I am concerned with in the present chapter. These constitutive 
principles are premised on the social relations of sovereignty o f the states which shape 
the system; states with other social constitutions will have to adapt to the systemic 
dynamics extemalised in this way.
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that had been generated by absolutism. There is thus indeed continuity in the 
spatial organisation of the intemational system since the early modem epoch; 
territoriality and the anarchical system of territorial states preceded capitalism. 
Yet the content of politics and intemational relations began to change with the 
universalisation of capitalism.
7.2. The Pre-Westphalian System (-1450-1648)
In as much as military conflict in the early modem epoch was increasingly an 
affair fought out between the princes of independent territorial states, its 
fundamental source can be found in the domestic pressures for territorial 
expansion. Territory was not just - or even primarily - of strategic importance; it 
gave access to material wealth. Europe, to its princes and kings, “was like an 
estate map, and war was a socially acceptable form of property acquisition”." 
According to Garrett Mattingly profit, next to honour, was a motive for war 
deemed acceptable by contemporary political society. “Profits were reaped in 
booty, ransoms and indemnities, and above all in taxable conquests”.’^  Extemal 
conquest was thus a highly rational form of social expansion, adding to the pie 
available for distribution in a society with definite limits to intemal expansion of 
wealth. It also promised to strengthen the king’s position within the state and 
increasing revenues available to himself rather than the aristocracy. Territorial 
expansion, then, was part and parcel of the expanded reproduction of the 
absolutist property system.
That many wars were motivated by considerations of honour and gloire does 
not diminish the centrality of territorial expansion; hence the pursuit of honour 
through the conquest of territory. Moreover, with constant competition for 
positions in the next round of territorial redistribution on the basis of dynastic 
politics, honour is hard currency in such a system of personalised power. Indeed, 
absolutist kings and princes, not states, were the sovereigns of this system. The
11 Hale 1985, 22.
12 Mattingly 1988, 116; cf. Bonney 1991, 98. When scholars insist that to early modem
monarchs, “economic considerations came low on the agenda: trade was not the métier
of kings” (Tallett 1992, 16-17), the importance o f the economic aspects o f ‘political’
pursuits should be remembered.
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personal dominion of great dynasties over a variety of territories constituted the 
building blocs of intemational politics. Concepts like ‘national interest’ are 
highly problematic in such a system, where princes are quite willing to exchange 
their territories for more substantial ones in the roulette of dynastic politics.
If from the standpoint of the sovereigns the game was inter-dynastic rather 
than inter-state politics, the picture of early modem geopolitics becomes even 
more complex once we consider ‘domestic’ challenges to monarchical 
sovereignty. Military conflict certainly was not yet restricted to interactions 
between territorially bounded containers of power, and consequently not a 
phenomenon of the intemational sphere alone. Noble magnates could still, well 
into the seventeenth century, mobilise autonomous and legitimate military force 
against their ‘sovereigns’.’^  At stake was their independent dominion and 
income, to be defended against a state that not only offered opportunities for 
prestige and enrichment, but also threatened to subordinate their autonomy to the 
sovereignty of the monarch. The dynamic of geopolitical conflict, with its 
extreme volatility, was decisively shaped by the conflicts over state-formation 
between the monarchy and aristocracy, influenced in tum by their relations with 
the peasantry and burghers.Indeed, the geopolitics of this era may best be 
understood, as David Kaiser argues, as a “general stmggle among the European 
aristocracy for economic and political power”.
This struggle took place in both the domestic and intemational realms, which, 
though stmcturally distinguishable here, remain highly blurred. It was
13 On France, see Bérenger 1989. An old myth sees state formation taking place in the 
context o f the decline of the aristocracy, which is in tum related to the increasing 
monétarisation of ‘the economy’, or to the greater success o f king’s in mobilising money 
for the acquisition o f increasingly expansive military armaments. For the case of 
Germany (Franconia, more specifically), Hillay Zmora points out that the princes 
engaged in state-building were actually dependent on the financial support and 
cooperation from their aristocrats. In tum, these aristocrats were able to further expand 
their incomes through the rights conferred on them in retum for the financial pledges: 
“The regalian and other superior rights exercised by pledge-holders and office-holders, 
the ‘state-power’ they wielded, could be hamessed by them in their seigneurial capacity 
to the ruthless collection o f rents, dues and tithes”; Zmora 1996, 54.
14 Not to mention military conflict involving individual possessors o f coercive force 
reproducing themselves outside the emerging state: robber barons, pirates, etc.; cf. 
Thomson 1994.
15 Kaiser 1990, 7. For Kaiser, the fundamental units o f this geopolitical system are 
aristocratic networks rather than territorial states; 1990, 8. He notes: “W ar in that period
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predominately about the negotiation of the relations o f sovereignty’, at stake was 
the constitution of these societies themselves.’^  Almost every ‘external’ war 
fought by a ruler against other sovereigns was at the same time a war against 
their own aristocracy, whether directly or indirectly.'^ The extreme volatility of 
the pre-Westphalian intemational system, leaving Europe hardly a year of peace 
between 1450 and 1660, derives from these lines of conflict. Religion, because of 
the close relationship of dominion and transcendental legitimisation, was among 
the most potent cultural media through which competing claims were articulated 
(without being reducible to this aspect). Protestantism allowed aristocrats to 
formulate their opposition to the concentration of power in the monarchy. But 
while religion added to the acrimony of this stmggle, at its root was the control 
over the state as the central form of surplus appropriation and the chances for the 
reproduction and improvement of their social positions that this implied for these 
groups. Sovereignty was fundamentally a problem of the proprietorship of the 
state and the access to surplus, which it afforded. Sovereignty was a claim to 
property o f  the state
The struggle over sovereignty was decided, during the course of the 
seventeenth century, in favour of the monarchs and princes. The general 
recognition of the principle of extemal sovereignty after the Peace of Westphalia 
went hand in hand with the consolidation of intemal sovereignty.'^ But can this 
be explained by the success of monarchs in the ‘wars of state-building’? Contrary 
to historical-sociological arguments, with their tacit teleological foundations, 
extemal pressures did not translate into the ability of the kings to subordinate the 
• aristocracy. The consequence of the “century of destmctive chaos” (Kaiser), the 
endless wars between 1550 and 1650, was not the strengthening of the central 
state apparatus, but the complete social and geopolitical breakdown, with no side
was the very essence o f aristocratic politics, as well as one o f the means by which the 
aristocracy drew resources from the rest o f society”; 1990, 2.
16 Perhaps the best treatment of these issues is Rabb 1975, especially pp. 60-82; cf. Sorel
1947, 46-47.
17 cf. Mattingly 1988, 116.
18 On sovereignty and the state as property o f the monarchy, see Black 1990, 150; Symcox 
1973, 4-5. Cf. the fascinating study o f French proprietary dynasticism by Rowen 1980.
19 Cf. Wendt 1992, 413. Wendt emphasises the role of sovereignty as a norm excluding
non-state actors from the geopolitical system, rather than as a brute fact created by the 
state.
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able to secure victory.Indeed, the position and role of the aristocracy was often 
enhanced in these conflicts, not least because its powers were strengthened by the 
state itself. Standing armies were still based on the feudal ban, and mercenary 
forces were commanded by aristocrats of often doubtful loyalty. In their struggles 
for sovereignty, monarchs had to rely on the nobility itself, caught in a dialectic 
of empowerment and subordination.
If military conflict over sovereignty as well as wars of expansion had as their 
decisive core the access to peasant surplus, the latter was increasingly strained by 
the limits to productive expansion and increasing appropriation which this 
(geo)political property system implied. Declining output in tum amplified 
conflict over its distribution; the whole system undermined itself. Its most 
vicious expression was geopolitical, erupting in the Thirty Years’ War.^' It may 
indeed be the recognition of the unviability of intra-mling class relations that 
made the absolutist consolidation of the second half of the seventeenth century 
possible. Theodore Rabb suggests that
the frightful specter o f total anarchy raised by the new military tactics, the unprecedented 
slaughter, and the lawlessness o f intemational relations, seemed to have brought Europe to 
the edge o f the abyss. The shock o f unbridled chaos, o f a myriad o f competing claims 
battling each other to extinction, made thoughtful men realize that these reckless assertions 
o f private will were the surest road to disaster.^^
The aristocracy, whether out of thoughtfulness or se lf interest, began to accept 
its incorporation into the ancien regime, its transformation into courtiers and 
officers with derivative rather than autonomous powers. It tried to save the 
absolutist property system and its own privileged reproduction by excluding the 
most destmctive forms of intra-mling-class competition. It did so not least 
because it had a need for the full force of the state in a situation of diminishing 
revenues and increasing peasant revolts against the high levels of exploitation. Its 
acceptance of a truly monarchical standing army not only marks the 
externalisation of war; it simultaneously created an instrument for the protection 
of tax collectors and the repression of peasant rebellions.
20 Kaiser 1990, 15-22 and 135-37; Tallett 1992, 188-205.
21 On the crisis o f the seventeenth century, see Kaiser 1990, 22-24; Rabb 1975. Also Aston
1965.
22 Rabb 1975, 119.
23 Anderson 1988, 22-30.
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7,3. The Westphalian Order (-1648-1815)
The supersession of the Standestaat signalled a consolidation of territorial 
statehood. Yet this was not, as Ruggie would have it, sovereign territoriality 
“hammered home by war”.^ '* Instead of portraying monarchical absolutism as the 
institutional form of a monarchy victorious over its intemal detractors we have to 
emphasise the negotiated quality of this s t a t e . T h e  incorporation of the 
aristocracy came at a high price. For the king’s state itself became more 
aristocratic, with a noble class assured of its privileged position within this 
society, not just in terms of prestige and status, but also with respect to the access 
to surplus commanded by the state. Conflict between the aristocracy and 
monarchy remained high; cmcially, however, such conflict lost its geopolitical 
dimension. Intra-mling class competition was now primarily a non-military, 
domestic affair. By contrast, geopolitics - though driven more than ever by the 
needs for extemal expansion in order to secure the new domestic order - now 
became a relation between persons of sovereign authority no longer placed in a 
hierarchical system of politically constituted property (though a hierarchy of 
‘prestige’ remained). These sovereigns had a right to war and conquest. 
Territorial rather than hierarchical redistribution came to dominate the dynamic 
of inter-sovereign relations. The domestication of the aristocracy was thus also 
an externalisation of geopolitics.^^
In this respect, Ruggie is right to argue that the consolidation of territoriality 
entailed a new principle of intemational legitimacy: “private wars ceased to be 
tolerated, and war making came to be universally recognised as an attribute of 
sovereignty”. Yet he commits an astonishing error of judgement when he 
suggests that the state now became, in its intemal and extemal aspects, the 
organisational locus of the ‘public order’:
A fundamental shift was occurring in the purposes for which power could be deployed by 
rulers and be regarded as socially legitimate by their subjects. Internally, legitimate power 
became fused with the provision of public order, steadily discrediting its deployment for
24 Ruggie 1993, 162-63.
25 Duindam 1994, 42; Tallett 1992, 190.
26 While the differentiation o f intemal and extemal spheres became more pronounced, the
attribution of different logics respectively, one characterised by the mle o f politics, the
other by the sway of force, is rather questionable; cf. Walker 1993, ch. 8. Absolutism 
remained fundamentally coercive in both respects.
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primitive extraction and accumulation. Externally, legitimate power became fused with 
statecraft, steadily discrediting its deployment for primitive expansion and aggrandizement.^^
Ruggie’s argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the early 
modem state, especially in its absolutist form which Ruggie takes to correspond 
most strongly to the ideal-type of the territorial state. He takes the monarchy to 
be the representative of modemity, which imposes its forward-looking project on 
the feudal aristocrats; the latter are seen as defending their personal privileges 
and interests against the general interest of the ‘public’ state. Yet far from being 
the representative of the public interest, the absolutist project of state building 
signalled the monarch’s claim to the state as his patrimony and private property. 
‘The state’ is here not so much an institution of public authority, but the 
instrument which allows kings to privatise political power. The absolutist state is 
thus always first and foremost the king’s state, the organisation through which 
kings seek to replace one form of political accumulation with another - equally 
non-modem -  one.
At first sight, this characterisation of the absolutist state may appear as a retum 
to the school-book versions of monarchical absolutism criticised in the last 
chapter, which evoke images of complete power by a single tyrant over all social 
life.^* These studies suggest that the concept of absolutism is strongly misleading 
and obsolete. Yet if we take the essence of monarchical sovereignty in 
absolutism to be the claim to the state as a form of politically constituted 
property, we can understand both the innovations of monarchical absolutism and 
its inherent restrictions as a necessarily limited form of organising authority. For 
the project of the absolutist monarchy was not the establishment of all- 
encompassing control, but the attempt to rob all other repositories of power of 
their autonomy, and to make them derivative of the king’s patrimonial state, even 
while accepting that authority would de facto remain dispersed. The aristocracy 
inevitably had to be part of the king’s state in a privileged (though no longer 
autonomous) position.
The consequences can be seen even with respect to the very territoriality of 
absolutist authority. Important though the consolidation of territorial sovereignty
27 Ruggie 1993, 161-162.
28 Compare chapter 6, fh. 72
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was, as authority was now wielded over the inhabitants of a more or less 
bounded area, it did not overcome the personal character of authority. This was 
still, in the eighteenth century, a Europe of ‘composite monarchies’.^  ^ Domains 
and territories were not as fragmented as in the previous period, and princes 
strove to establish the contiguity of possessions, while having to accept the 
idiosyncratic privileges of the estates of each territory or even their separate 
administration. The only force binding these domains together was the king or 
prince himself.^° And this bond was not always strong. Dynastic accumulation 
was accompanied by disaggregation as a consequence of the vagaries of 
succession or exchange. With every succession, the existence of the ‘state’ itself 
was in question, closely linking domestic and intemational crises.^*
With power concentrated in the sovereign’s person, wars of succession 
became, more than ever, the dominant feature of the ‘international’ politics of the 
Westphalian epoch (up to the Napoleonic era), which were at the source of all its 
major wars. Kratochwil is therefore right to argue that:
Quite contrary to the ‘state-building’ literature following Hintze’s or Tilly’s argument for the 
fimctional imperatives driving the consolidation o f states in an anarchical environment, the 
prevailing order even in the eighteenth century was still largely dynastic ... The point driven 
home by wars of succession is not that ‘anarchy’ ( ...)  prevailed, but rather that the dynastic 
property arrangements often led to the most bitter fights.^^
What, then, is the meaning of the raison d ’état which is widely held to have 
become the expression of territorial sovereignty? It does not seem to pertain to 
the abstract interests of ‘the state’, but still refers to the personal interests of the 
sovereign, the dynastic proprietor of a conglomerate of territories.^^ This is, in
29 Elliott 1992, 70. Elliott suggests that one o f the reasons for the resilience o f this state of 
affairs lies in the ability o f princes to marshal the resources o f one territory against 
rebellions in another; 1992, 69.
30 Kunisch 1992, 25-26. Kunisch notes that this is the case even for the most advanced 
states like Prussia. Cf. Elliott 1992; Black 1990, 192.
31 Luard 1992, 202.
32 Kratochwil 1995, 30-31. Kratochwil’s argument that the dynastic element decreased in
importance during the eighteenth century contrasts with Kunisch 1992, 22-23; Sorel 
1947, 27-28. On the international consequences o f proprietary dynasticism, see Symcox 
1973,2-7.
33 “The imperatives o f dynastic aggrandizement and prestige and the vagaries o f dynastic
change ... compromise any attempt to present the intemational relations o f the period in 
terms o f distinct and defined national interests”; Black 1990, 3. Symcox notes:
“Personal gloire, dynastic prestige and reason o f state often added up to the same thing”;
1973,6.
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fact, the raison de prince, shaped as much by the challenges to the domestic 
reproduction of his own position as by intemational imperatives.
Proprietary dynasticism is also at the heart of the early modem balance of 
power, which has to be understood in terms of a balance o f  dynasties rather than 
of territorial states. Indeed, the balance of power required and legitimised the 
subordination of core elements of the institution of sovereignty to its operation. 
Successions, unavoidably, were thoroughly intemationalised affairs, which could 
not be left to domestic institutions to decide, as they could bring about major 
revolutions in the balance of power. '^  ^ The balance itself did not work as a 
mechanism independent of volition but as an objective to which individual states 
bound themselves. Indeed, acting to preserve the European balance was 
understood to potentially contradict individual member’s interests, clashing as it 
did with the interest in territorial expansion and personal gloire?^ This may be 
the reason for its rather poor success: the fundamental principle of foreign policy 
was expansion rather than security. Not even the preponderance of opposing 
forces deterred Louis XIV or Frederick II from pursuing ‘opportunities’ for 
aggrandisement. Many kings sought territorial change, with scant regard for the 
mles and requirements of the balance. Princes sided with an already dominant 
Louis XIV in his campaigns to share the spoils. For some time at least, they 
joined the advancing revolutionary armies of France instead of building an 
alliance against it. Time and again, bandwaggoning rather than balancing was the 
preferred strategy, for it was the short-term extension of existing territories rather 
than the preservation of the status quo which formed the interests of absolutist 
princes.^^
The dynastic balance of the Westphalian system could not contain the bellicose 
impulses of the absolutist monarchies. Indeed, it seems to have worked best 
when it could be used to justify the predatory schemes of the great powers for 
their weaker neighbours’ territories; in the name of the balance, compensations
34 Luard 1992, 150-52. The Spanish Succession illustrates the argument.
35 Black 1990, 162; Gulick 1967, 33. For Realists, the balance o f power is o f course a
general principle of intemational politics rather than an institution o f a specific 
international order (but see Krasner 1988). English School realism, by contrast, gives 
prominence to the question of the origins o f modem international society and the 
balance of power. For an insightful exposition, cf. Butterfield 1966.
36 Luard 1992, 335 and 347-352; cf. Rosecrance and Lo, 1996.
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for the dynastic or military expansion of a dynasty or state could be demanded. 
Successive peace treaties tried to re-establish a balance by such ‘proportional 
aggrandisement’, authorizing the separation and extermination of small states. 
The period also produced numerous plans for the break-up of France, Spain, 
Austria or Prussia.^^
If the balance thus did little to secure the survival of the units of the early 
modem intemational system, the idea of the balance may also have done more to 
fan than to restrain conflict. With the consolidation of territories and boundaries, 
expansion became more difficult for sovereigns and their states. That did not 
prevent states from seeking even small territorial gains -  hardly surprising, given 
their intemal constitution. Even though few lasting changes to the map of 
westem Europe were made since this period, many territories changed their 
masters several times. But small gains of one side constituted a big threat to the 
others. While many wars were fought over minor territories, the “near-equality” 
of states (or dynastic conglomerates) also made sovereigns tread more cautiously 
for fear of retaliation. States, as Hinsley notes, “exhibited a kind of 
schizophrenia, the outcome of the conflict between their urge to expand and their 
need to be careful”.^ *
It is difficult, at this point more than ever before, to distinguish strategic and 
‘economic’ values attached to territorial conquest. Clearly, a geopolitical system 
based on territorial states and intemational anarchy acquires a specific 
momentum of its own. It does force sovereigns to react strategically to each 
others pursuits; it makes it necessary to react to the strengthening of potential 
opponents by increasing intemal strength and seeking allies, thus contributing to 
what to sovereigns must have appeared like a security dilemma. The 
competitiveness of the intemational system also provided a powerful stimulus for 
the rationalisation of the state apparatus and increasing the efficiency of domestic
37 Gulick 1967, 70-72; Luard 1992, 201-203. As Sorel notes: “Louis XIV’s treaties for the 
regulation of the Spanish Succession caused a complete rearrangement o f the map of 
Europe, a strange changing o f dynasties and an astonishing migration o f sovereigns and 
governments”; Sorel 1947, 33.
38 Hinsley 1967, 177.
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resource mobilisation (implying, not least, a further tum of the screw on peasant 
surplus).^^
But rationalisation does not imply 'modernisation' (or even homogenisation). 
The intemational system contributed to the reproduction of different systems of 
politically constituted property within the state and the proprietary character of 
the state itself. The logic of political accumulation produced by intemal property 
relations was thus buttressed from outside, reinforcing the continuous investment 
in the means of violence, both intemally and extemally. Warfare, in this dual 
determination, was indeed “not the ‘sport’ of princes, it was their fate”."^° But if 
this dynamic seems to be describable in Realist terms, the pattem of interaction, 
as we have seen, can only imperfectly be understood in terms of the balancing of 
power. The expansive impulses generated by their systems of property relations - 
rather than the premium put on security by the anarchical intemational system 
formed by these states - help us understand the failure of the Westphalian system 
to find a balance.
What emerges is a particular logic of anarchy, characterised by a very high 
degree of military and diplomatic competition. Differentiating between types of 
‘security systems’ under conditions of anarchy, along the lines explicated by 
Alexander Wendt, may be useful in delimiting the Westphalian from the 
capitalist intemational system."*^  Wendt suggests that anarchy is compatible with 
rather different pattems of interaction between states, which can be ranged on a 
continuum that leads from ‘competitive’ over ‘individualistic’ to ‘cooperative’ 
security systems. Anarchy is only the ‘permissive cause’ of conflict: the 
strategies of individual states cannot be derived from this structural principle. 
Whether states pursue ‘self-help’ policies, depends on their security identities. 
While Wendt is mainly concemed with the shaping of identities and interests by
39 Mercantilism is another o f these means, usually identified as one o f the sign-posts
towards modemity. Justin Rosenberg proposes an interpretation o f mercantilism, and the 
pattems o f international trade in the early modem epoch, as dominated by a 
fundamentally pre-capitalist logic; Rosenberg 1994, 40 and 91-122; cf. McNally 1988; 
on the non-capitalist nature o f merchant ‘capital’, see W olf 1982, 79.
40 Anderson, 1974: 32.
41 Wendt 1999, ch. 6. Note that Wendt does not break down the anarchy-hierarchy
dualism, nor does he ask how an anarchical intemational system emerged in Europe. 
Like Ruggie, he accepts the transhistorical existence o f anarchical intemational relations
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the experiences of interaction between states, he also notes the importance of the 
intemal stmctures of these states. Indeed, the arguments presented above suggest 
that what states can make o f anarchy in any particular historical situation is 
constrained by their (or by the most dominant states’) intemal stmcture. Intemal 
identity and interest formation is, in this sense, more fundamental to the character 
of intemational politics, than the process of interactions; ultimately, anarchy is 
what states are made of.
Competitive security systems, in which self-help considerations (maximisation 
of relative gains) dominate foreign policy, emerge when predation looms large in 
the experience of states and their sovereigns. The absolutist intemational system, 
both before and after the Peace of Westphalia, approximates this image. As I 
have tried to show, the predatory character of their foreign policy was inherent in 
their intemally constituted identity. Their domestic systems of property relations 
forced them to pursue expansive rather than security-oriented strategies. This 
basic constitution of intemational relations did not change with the consolidation 
of sovereignty in the Westphalian system. The mutual recognition of their 
‘territorial property rights’ by sovereigns did indeed, as Wendt suggests, function 
“as a form of ‘social closure’ that disempowers nonstate actors and empowers 
and helps stabilise interaction among states”.'^  ^ Especially by subordinating the 
aristocracy, sovereignty transformed the dynamic of intemational relations, 
ending the aristocratic war of all against all. Yet the strengthening of sovereignty 
did not give rise to an ‘individualistic’ security system, in which states pursue 
absolute rather than relative gains, as Wendt seems to suggest. The dynamic of 
conflicts between sovereign states was more controlled, especially on the theatre 
of war itself, but competition remained vimlent. Hence the intemalisation of 
sovereignty norms did not, as Wendt suggests, make states “more respectful 
toward the territorial rights of others”.'^ ^
while basing his historicisation of this structure on pattems o f interaction rather than 
modes o f differentiation.
42 Wendt 1992,413.
43 Wendt 1992, 414-15. “Sovereignty transforms this system [the Hobbesian state of 
nature] into a Lockean world o f (mostly) mutually recognized property rights and 
(mostly) egoistic rather than competitive conceptions o f security”; ibid., 415-16.
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The system of sovereign states of the Westphalian epoch was thus a small step 
along the continuum of anarchical systems; but it was still dominated by the logic 
of predation rather than security. In this situation, the experience of states could 
not but reproduce the competitive nature of the early modem geopolitical system. 
Only with the generalisation of capitalism - a process promoted by the very 
competitiveness of the intemational system under the impact of English 
industrialisation, as we shall see -  did it become possible for an individualistic 
security system to emerge.
7,4, England: Capitalism in One Country and Absolutist Geopolitics
The intemational system constituted by absolutist states had powerful effects 
on their intemal development without, however, generating a transition to a 
modem form of mle, based on the separation of political and economic authority. 
In the case of England, by contrast, social stmggles over property relations had 
led to the development of a capitalist economy and a form of mle abstracted from 
direct implication in the organisation of exploitation. English state development 
during the early modern period was shaped in many ways by its involvement in 
an intemational system driven by imperatives of territorial expansion; but the 
historically unique character of the English state was not thereby submerged.
This is not to say, that England’s was a purely capitalist state. It was bom from 
feudal state-building, in which the monarchy had assumed a relatively dominant 
position. And the monarchy’s role in the early modern period cannot be reduced 
to that of an executive branch of government, operating within the parameters set 
by political society. In fact, much conflict arose from monarchical attempts to 
establish greater or even absolute authority. It is striking, however, that such 
conflict did not prevent the nobility from contributing to the strengthening of the 
state after the demise of feudalism. The English state achieved the 
monopolisation of the means of violence more effectively and long before the 
Continental states.'^ '* Having lost its ability to reproduce itself through coercive
44 Historical sociologists emphasise the role o f extemal threats in the ability o f monarchs 
to monopolise the means o f violence. As we have seen, the constant wars in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in fact, tended to strengthen the magnates. It may
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surplus extraction from the peasantry, the nobility accepted its demilitarisation. 
In retum, it demanded effective protection by the state against those ‘bastard 
feudal’ magnates who still tried to improve their fortunes by coercive 
redistribution of available surplus, as well as against challenges to their economic 
property rights from tenants and village communities.
Though rather ‘weak’ in terms of its ability to impose itself on society, the 
English state was also more unitary than absolutist states could ever become.'^  ^
The state, rather than the king, was (or increasingly became) sovereign. Whereas 
continental social conflict was characterised by the stmggles over the 
development of monarchical sovereignty, with the aristocracy trying to restrict 
the sovereign authority of the king’s state and to preserve their independent 
powers, English social conflict was a stmggle about the control o f  the state and 
thus the locus of sovereignty.'^^ While there was tenacious factional strife, there 
was no military conflict between the forces of centralisation and those of regional 
and corporate particularism, which was at the heart of the geopolitical dynamic in 
westem Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Involvement in 
the great European aristocratic war was thus limited.
The suspiciousness of the parliamentary classes, fearing the strengthening of 
the monarchy’s control over the state, in tum restrained the state’s ability to wage 
war. In order not to strengthen parliamentary rights in exchange for extraordinary 
taxes, English monarchs generally pursued security rather than expansion in 
relation to the Continent (though not against the disorganised neighbours on the 
British Isles). The few ventures of English monarchs into the European fray
well be the relative security of the realm, that allowed  English nobles to give up their 
independent military forces (though that they should want to do so derives from their 
new forms o f reproduction). Otherwise, nobles might well have found it in their interest 
to maintain their military power and organise defence along neo-feudal lines in order to 
fend off the domestic dangers that a monarchical army implied. Insularity was an 
important factor contributing to the possibility o f the English path; it was not, however, 
constitutive as Hintze implied, arguing that the “main explanation for the difference in 
the way political and military organization developed in England and France ... lies in 
the difference in the foreign situation”; Hintze 1975b, 199.
45 Brenner 1993, 652-53.
46 Ellen Wood notes that “even by the more rigorous standards o f Bodin, it was England
more than France that met the requirements o f a true state, with a unified locus of
political authority. The conceptual clarity o f the French idea [of sovereignty] was a 
response to the absence in reality o f an ‘absolute’ and ‘indivisible’ power” ; Wood 1991, 
44.
47 John Brewer 1990, 4-7; Rosenberg 1994, 137.
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actually weakened their domestic position/* Paradoxically (at least in the terms 
of the state-building literature), the monopolisation of the means of violence, 
went hand in hand with the transformation of England into a “marginal power in 
the great European struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries”, which 
did not even field a standing army because it was opposed by the Tudor 
monarchs for fear of strengthening the nobility/^
Foreign policy played an important role in the Stuarts’ attempts to establish 
absolute authority; along with taxation and religion, it was a crucial issue 
organizing conflict over sovereignty. It was not opposition to war per se - and to 
the additional taxes this implied -  that led parliament to oppose the foreign 
policy of the Stuart kings. Conflict arose because “throughout the seventeenth 
century, monarchs tended to undertake specific wars -  and pursue particular 
foreign policies -  of which the parliamentary classes could not approve”.^ ® These 
kings tried to strengthen their own position domestically and in the European 
community of princes through dynastic policies and the projection of power in 
ways that were apt to endanger the Protestant Settlement. The monarchy did not 
pursue some abstract, and objective ‘national interest’ for which they required 
additional means from egotistic and provincial parliamentarians. Rather, two 
different sets of interests vied for the definition of the raison d ’état. The Stuart 
kings were fought so bitterly precisely because absolutist ambitions were not 
simply about a different form of government but a different form of society. They 
threatened personal liberties as well as the security of capitalist private property 
and the incomes landlords derived from it. The English state was threatening to 
become a ‘class-like competitor’ to the capitalist landed class whose conditions 
of reproduction were thus at risk.
Intemational relations, then, shaped English political development in the 
Reformation period in important respects. During the seventeenth century, forces 
outside the ‘political nation’ were decisive in shaping the outcomes of rebellions 
and revolutions, precisely because of the demilitarisation of the English nobility: 
Scottish troops and the London ‘mob’ in 1640/41; and Dutch forces decided the
48 Zolberg 1980, 708.
49 John Brewer 1990, 7-13.
50 Brenner 1993, 648 (emphasis added) and 662.
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fate of absolutism in England in 1688. But only after the Glorious Revolution did 
England itself assume an active role in the intemational system. The triumph of 
capitalist forces in the revolutions of the seventeenth century did not, therefore, 
generate a particularly pacific foreign policy. England (from 1707 Great Britain) 
“acquired a standing army and navy. She became, like her main rivals, a fiscal- 
military state, one dominated by the task of waging war”.^ ’ To a large extent, we 
can understand the militarisation of the English state as a response to the 
competitive intemational system dominated by absolutist powers. With the 
consolidation of the absolutist state in general, and nearby France emerging as 
hegemon under Louis’s XIV mle in particular, the security of England’s territory 
and constitution became more precarious.
That the response to this threat was not bandwaggoning (as Charles II had 
tried) but balancing presupposed the reconstitution of the ‘national interest’. 
Parliament’s war against absolutism and William’s III war against French 
hegemony and its dynastic aspirations merged in the new English foreign 
policy.Convergence of extemal interests did not preclude continuing conflict 
over the extent of the crown’s prerogatives. Sovereignty now was with the king 
in parliament, with parliament being the dominant element; but the monarchy 
remained an organ of the state with aspirations beyond its constitutional role in 
order to pursue the king’s dynastic and personal interests. Parliament, in tum, 
jealously guarded its rights to control the army and navy and to taxation.”  It also 
increasingly pushed for a blue water strategy of overseas expansion and the 
protection of trading routes. But only gradually did colonialism take pre­
eminence over Britain’s continental strategy.”  Significantly, British colonialism 
was not geared to imperial aspirations within Europe. The aim here remained 
security rather than expansion; by employing its resources as a “means of
51 John Brewer 1990, 27; O ’Brien and Hunt 1993.
52 Zolberg 1980, 710; McKay and Scott 1983, 46-47.
53 Doyle 1981, 225; John Brewer 1990, 43 and 147.
54 Baugh 1988. It would be a mistake, however, to see English foreign policy in the
eighteenth century, as Eric Hobsbawm does, as determined solely by commercial 
motives. Hobsbawm 1990, 49. Most importantly, ‘commercial motives’ where 
themselves shaped by the competitive dynamic o f the absolutist geopolitical system, 
becoming expressed in terms o f a mercantilist strategy pursuing relative gains. Cf. 
Christie 1982, 51; Crouzet 1996, 437; John Brewer 1990, 167-74. Whereas French
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keeping Europe divided”, Britain kept the leading European states absorbed by 
their desperate attempts to gain advantages over their continental rivals/^
The development of capitalist social property relations in England gave rise to 
a form of state radically distinct from that of absolutist France. But England’s 
capitalist state did not exist in a geopolitical (or historical) vacuum; its 
institutional development reflected outside pressures, filtered through social 
property relations. Intemational relations contributed to the strengthening of the 
state apparatus and its ability to govern civil society. That the high levels of 
taxation it was able to impose did not lead to economic and financial crisis bears 
witness to the strength of capitalist production and its gradual penetration of 
com m erce.W ar itself contributed positively to capitalist development and the 
industrial revolution in England.^^ But it could have this effect - rather than the 
strangulation of production and finance by the logic of political accumulation - 
only because of the prior differentiation of an economic sphere, with its inherent 
necessity for investment and innovation in the means of production.
7.5. The European Transition from Absolutism to Capitalism
Capitalism, according to the argument outlined so far, was a local ‘invention’, 
the result of the unintended consequences of struggles over the reproduction of 
feudal property relations. For three centuries, English capitalism and continental 
absolutism coexisted, influencing each other in manifold ways without, however, 
losing their fundamental distinctiveness. Most importantly, there had been no 
endogenous development of capitalist property relations (or forms of production) 
within absolutist societies.
When capitalism spread to the states of continental Europe during the course 
of the nineteenth century, it was externally induced. Under the impact of the 
Industrial Revolution, the geopolitical pressures that had previously forced 
Britain to adapt to the pressures of absolutist geopolitics, now transmitted the
mercantilism did not generate a dynamic o f self-sustaining economic (or even narrowly 
industrial) development, in England it did contribute to economic development.
55 Hinsley 1967, 184.
56 Mooers 1991, 166.
57 O ’Brien 1994; Crouzet 1996; Weiss and Hobson 1995, 113-17.
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pressures generated by unprecedented economic growth back to the Continent, 
As with the original emergence of capitalism in England, the ‘transposition’ of 
capitalism to the Continent was a ‘political’ process that derived from threats to 
the social reproduction of politically constituted property relations. In the case of 
the transition from absolutism to capitalism, this threat was primarily 
geopolitical}^ The very competitiveness produced by the predatory character of 
absolutist states rendered the external reproduction of the classes organised in 
and as the state in Continental Europe highly precarious once a member of this 
system developed military capabilities like those generated by industrialisation.^^ 
The crucial point that needs to be emphasised is that just as the expansion of 
trade did not lead to the emergence of a capitalist economy, so the competitive 
pressures of the early modem international system by themselves cannot explain 
the process of capitalist modernisation. Strategies of ‘rationalisation’ pursued by 
continental states seeking to boost their competitiveness always remained 
bounded by the rationality generated by the absolutist socio-political property 
system. Absolutist geopolitics reproduced the internal logic of political 
accumulation that was at the heart of these pre-capitalist state/society complexes. 
Only now, confronted by the sheer material success of capitalism, did their 
competitive strategies begin to transcend this system in order to preserve the 
privileged domestic position of the (post-) absolutist ‘state classes’. In this 
respect, too, the absolutist period was not transitional in any teleological or 
evolutionist sense; it did not inevitably point to a more truly modem system 
beyond itself which its own intemal dynamics helped to bring about.
Capitalism, hence, was ‘transposed’ from England to continental Europe by a 
series of ‘revolutions from above’ or ‘passive r e v o l u t i o n s I t  was imposed on
58 Wood 1991, 159; this geopolitical threat did not only come from outside, as the 
consequences o f the industrial revolution led to military advantages, but also arose from 
the decreasing ability o f European manufactures to compete against British goods, 
which undermined the economic foundations of military power.
59 Cf. Hall 1996, 68. That is not to say that only a perceived threat from Britain induced 
passive revolutions. In the case o f Prussia, for instance, it was the defeat against 
Napoleon which triggered off the permanent revolution from above. But emulation of 
the model which had enabled Britain to almost single-handedly finance the Napoleonic 
wars promised a strengthening o f the military powers of the state beyond what was 
possible by rationalisations within the absolutist property system.
60 Wood 1991, 102-5. According to Cox, a ‘passive revolution’ refers to a situation in 
which a powerful state influences the revolutionary development within other societies
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non-capitalist societies by pre-capitalist ‘state classes’ for geopolitical purposes 
in which capitalist production figured only as an instrument. The political 
character of the social transformations taking place in most European societies in 
the nineteenth century is of course an established theme in historical sociology. 
According to Giddens, to cite just one example, “[cjapitalism developed within a 
military ‘cockpit’ in which the expansion of industrial production very soon 
came to be seen by all ruling groups as the sine qua non of national survival”.^ ' 
Where my analysis differs is in the interpretation of the rupture that was brought 
about by these policies: not as an extension and culmination of long-standing 
socio-economic tendencies within these societies, but as a fundamental break 
with their previous path of historical development. Industrialisation not only 
revolutionised the economy of these societies; it presupposed the transformation 
of their social and political orders.
A huge enclosure movement swept western Europe during the nineteenth 
century, as states now gave up the peasant protection policies sustaining the 
absolutist tax base. Seigneurial rights and dues were abolished and where 
serfdom still existed, as in Prussia, states now fostered the prolétarisation of the 
peasantry and the concentration of landed property.^^ The dominant form of 
property was reconstituted, by political means. Private property in the means of 
production, rather than the means of coercion, now became socially and 
economically dominant. The structural rupture that resulted from these processes, 
especially the commodification of labour power (which implies more than wage 
labour, namely the market dependence of the direct producers), created a new 
form of market in western Europe, which was, as Polanyi argues, self-regulating 
and thus “radically different from even its immediate predecessor”.^ ^
in ways not inherent in their own social structures. Powerful states are “precisely those 
which have undergone a profound social and economic revolution and have most fully 
worked out the consequences of this revolution in the form o f state and o f social rela­
tions”; Cox 1993a, 59; cf. Gramsci 1971, 116.
61 Giddens 1981, 190; cf. Weiss and Hobson 1995, chs. 3-4;
62 Gildea 1987, 16-19.
63 Polanyi 1957, 250
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That is not to say that states conformed to the role liberal laissez-faire ideology 
ascribed to it.^ "^  States certainly did interact in many ways with the economy, 
promoting and regulating production, finance and trade. Indeed, the more 
prominent role that the state generally assumed on the Continent may go some 
way to explain the relative decline of the British economy in late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. As Ellen Wood argues, the problem was increasingly the 
existence in Britain of “a state and a dominant culture all too well adapted ... to 
the economic logic of capitalism”. Some of the Continental states, by contrast, 
were more successful in a competitive world economy precisely because they 
were “able to resist and counteract the contradictory impulses of capital”.^  ^From 
the moment of its expansion, then, capitalism did not produce a world in its own 
image; it came to dominate global social life by establishing a complex 
relationship between the old and the new. If there is any value in studying the 
emergence of the “pristine culture of capitalism” in E ng land , i t  certainly does 
not lie in abstracting a timeless model of capitalist development which we would 
expect to find replicated in all subsequent cases.
7,6. Conclusions
The capitalist transformation of European states, societies and economies 
during the nineteenth century was not the product of endogenous developmental 
dynamics. This argument, which goes against the grain of conventional wisdom, 
is sure to raise severe objections. For while it is quite clearly recognised in 
economic history and historical sociology that the capitalist transformation of 
Russia’s economy and society was induced externally under the impact of 
declining international competitiveness, such is not the case for western Europe, 
which is supposed to have undergone a long process of capitalist development 
whose origins may reach as far back as the twelfth century.
64 There is a tendency in Polanyi’s work, or at least in that o f scholars influenced by it, to 
understand the disembedding of the economy in terms o f non-interference by political 
forces; Polanyi 1957. But capitalism can be politically regulated, within limits, by 
political institutions without overcoming the fundamental differentiation o f  political and 
economic spheres.
65 Wood 1991, 167-169; compare Weiss and Hobson 1995, 129 and 203.
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But in as much as France is typical for western Europe as a whole (an 
hypothesis tacitly underlying my argument, which would, however have to be 
subjected to more historical analysis, for instance with regard to the Dutch case), 
this region was not embarked on capitalist development during the early modem 
period. Moreover, rather than interpreting continental European development as 
‘deficient’ when measured against the English yardstick, I have argued that 
English and European patterns of development represent two radically distinct 
forms of society and social logics of process which did not point towards an 
identical or even similar future. If their futures were eventually joined under a 
common, capitalist, horizon, this was the result of the staggering success of 
economic development in Britain after the onset of the Industrial Revolution. 
Mediated by the absolutist international system, this development produced 
pressures of adjustment on the absolutist states which could no longer be met 
within the existing relations of domination and appropriation. The impetus for 
these transformations, in other words, did come firom outside rather than from 
within these societies; they were a result of the injection of a capitalist element 
into the dynamic of absolutist international relations.
In many respects, the European transitions to capitalism were therefore similar 
to the Russian case. The ‘state classes’ of nineteenth century western Europe 
promoted the capitalist transformations of their own societies once the products 
of capitalist development in England began to undermine their ability to 
reproduce themselves. Within the western European countries themselves, there 
had been no endogenous process of capitalist development; capitalism was 
imposed on these societies by absolutist state classes as a means of maintaining 
the international competitiveness of the states which afforded them access to 
politically constituted forms of property. This threat to their reproduction, I have 
argued, was not so much an intemal one: it stemmed from their declining 
competitiveness in the international system, whose predatory dynamic was itself 
the result of the logic of political accumulation on which absolutist states were 
premised.
66 Wood 1991.
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To some, this argument may seem rather instrumentalist and ‘top-down’; it 
certainly appears to contradict the demand for an account that takes seriously the 
dialectics of agency and structure, which I have emphasised in earlier chapters. It 
should be considered, however, that structure and agency do not relate to each 
other in the same way throughout history; this relationship is itself a historical 
one. Furthermore, the question whether particular processes have been more 
forcefully advanced by dominant or subordinated classes cannot be decided on 
the basis of a priori considerations. Social theories do not become 
instrumentalist by privileging agency over structure, or one form of social agency 
over another, in any particular historical instance.
Thus, the role of the peasantry in the original transition to capitalism in 
England was quite distinct from, and much more important, than in the case of 
the general transition from absolutism to capitalism in continental Europe. 
Similarly with the aristocracy and the monarchy; whereas in the English case the 
emergence of capitalist social property relations was unintended, in the European 
case it was clearly a conscious strategy. This does not mean that ruling class 
choices can explain the whole process of transformation in the nineteenth 
century. Once we consider the particular processes of capitalist transformation in 
different countries, movements of resistance, for example, will become very 
important. Yet the general capitalist transformation can best be understood in the 
context of the geo-political threats to the reproduction of the absolutist state 
classes who re-invented themselves as capitalist classes and/or bureaucratic 
elites.
It has to be emphasised, however, that neither in the original transition in 
Britain, nor in the subsequent expansion to Europe, could the process of 
capitalist development be understood as an ‘economic’ process. The emergence 
of an ‘economy’ was precisely the result, not the precondition, of the rise of 
capitalism. For this reason, even though the dynamic of feudalism appears - in 
modem terms - political, the ‘politicist’ explanations of the transition to 
modernity proposed by some historical sociologists are just as problematic as the 
economistic ones favoured by many Marxists and liberals. The underlying 
concept of politics is an abstract one, divorced from (though of course interacting 
with) economic power. Politics and economics are seen as two different sources
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of power, the former being privileged in these accounts.Technology usually 
acts in both economistic and politicist formulations (and pluralist combinations) 
as the deus ex machina that explains historical change; teleology remains 
rampant.
If we nevertheless interpret the rise of capitalism as a political process (as it 
involved, for example, the often violent (geo-)political struggles between actors 
that are commonly regarded as ‘political’, like kings, lords, etc.) it is because we 
cannot leave our modem categorial framework behind completely. But only by 
rigorously historicising these categories can we hope to escape a modernisation 
perspective in which the end point is given from the beginning, because we read 
capitalist modernity into its pre-history. Only by taking seriously the notion that 
pre-capitalist politics is fundamentally different from capitalist politics (not just 
in content, but in form, too), can we hope to do justice to the world-historical 
rupture that the transition to capitalism entailed. The very political processes 
through which the political power to exploit (political, because it was based on 
allocative resources, which, as we have seen, were constituted through relations 
of domination) was privatised and evacuated into the ‘economic sphere’, 
transformed the nature of the relations of domination.
The ability to extract surplus through ostensibly non-political, contractual 
relations, however, required the empowerment of economically constituted forms 
of property (i.e. property in the means of production rather than coercion). This 
empowerment of things to mediate the process of surplus appropriation 
presupposed the separation of men and women from their means of reproduction. 
This was, again, an eminently political process, which left them, as Marx 
observed, free not only of personal dependence, but free of the ability to secure 
their livelihood without having to sell their labour-power to those who control 
the means of production. In every aspect, the creation and constitution of the 
capitalist market was the result of a political reorganisation of the social 
relations of exploitation and domination
With this evacuation of coercive power from the relations of surplus extraction 
(replaced by an ‘economic’ compulsion that forces people to reproduce
67 Hall 1996, 34.
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themselves in the market), the meaning of ‘politics’, too, undergoes a profound 
transformation. It becomes, for all the interventions of states, ‘abstracted’, 
‘alienated’, or ‘insulated’. Here are not only the origins of the private economy, 
but of the political, public state as well. In nineteenth-century Europe, politics 
“became the state’s field to play, held not to be properly part of capital relations 
or religion but a sphere unto itself’.^ * Where the boundary between politics and 
economics lies is the subject of intense social conflicts, which pervade the 
history of capitalist modernity; their relationship is not fixed. But it is important 
to recognise that the creation of a ‘self-regulating’ private economy and an 
‘autonomous’ political and public state are coetaneous, and co-constitutive of 
capitalism. In other words, it is only capitalism that produces an autonomous 
state; or perhaps more precisely: only capitalism allows civil society to become 
autonomous from the state. In this sense, the abstraction of ‘the political’ from 
‘the economic’ marks a fundamental restructuration of the relations o f  
sovereignty within the state of continental Europe.
The separation of politics and economics, then, was the consequence of the 
reconstitution of social property relations along capitalist lines. No longer was 
the state the primary organisation of surplus appropriation from which a 
privileged class derived its income. The post-absolutist state classes continued to 
derive incomes and economic privileges from the state (though these increasingly 
came to be identified as corruption rather than legitimate property). But the state 
accepted and advanced the insulation of an economic sphere, thus allowing for a 
logic of economic accumulation to develop. Crucially, this logic of accumulation 
was not contained by political boundaries; capitalism allows not just for 
commerce and trade across borders, but also makes possible the transnational 
organisation of the extraction of surplus. States can insert themselves in the 
(potentially) transnational system of exploitation in various ways; certainly, they 
are not made helpless and redundant by this transformation.
Yet the fundamental fact remains that this transformation also entails a change 
in the meaning of territoriality. As Rosenberg notes, the capitalist transformation
68 Grew 1984, 103; cf. Cochrane 1986, 88.
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creates states that are both more consolidated and more p o r o u s . In  that sense, 
capitalist territoriality is distinct from absolutist territoriality. However, the 
historical argument developed over this and the preceding chapters confirms the 
initial critique that had been their starting point: that the separation of intemal 
and external was not concomitant with the separation of politics and economics. 
If capitalist territoriality is different from absolutist territoriality, as I have 
argued, we still have to recognise that the political space of capitalist modernity 
is organised on the basis of exclusive territoriality not because of anything within 
capitalism, not because of anything in the nature of the capital relation, but 
because capitalism came to exist in and through the system of territorial 
sovereignties created through the process of political accumulation.^® For all the 
changes, and indeed the historical mpture it brought, the particular character of 
the capitalist transformation reproduced the boundaries of particular states as 
well as, more fundamentally, the boundedness of political communities. The 
political organisation of capitalist social relations in the specific form o f a 
multiplicity o f territorial states was not the creation of capitalism.
69 Rosenberg 1994, 131.
70 It may be objected that early modem England, too, was a territorial state; therefore, the 
argument that territorial statehood is a historical legacy from the pre-capitalist past into 
which capitalism was bom may seem to be unfounded. Yet in the English case, the 
highly developed feudal state stmctured the possibilities for political organisation once 
capitalism emerged; it also provided the basis for the kings’ attempts to strengthen their 
own domestic power. British territorial statehood was also strengthened, as we have 
seen, through Britain’s involvement in the absolutist intemational system. How the 
political stmctures o f the British state would have developed if the city-state rather than 
the territorial state had become the dominant political form in continental Europe is a 
counter-factual question that is hard to answer; on the possible ‘communal’ altemative 
to the territorial state, see Press 1989 and Spruyt 1994.
8. INCONGRUENT SPACES: NATIONAL
STATES AND GLOBAL ACCUMULATION
8.1, Modernity Reconsidered
Among the social philosophers, sociologists and social theorists of the 
nineteenth century, the idea that their century was witnessing a fundamental 
transformation was almost universal. Karl Marx, for instance, regarded the 
capitalist transformation of Germany and France (though not Britain) as only just 
beginning at the time of his writing. Similarly, as Raymond Grew, a leading 
historian of the period, points out, “[ujntil quite recently, most writing about the 
modem state took the nineteenth century as its touchstone”.' Today, by contrast, 
the origins of the ‘modem state’ tend to be located in the fifteenth or even twelfth 
century, while nineteenth-century developments are skipped over in the story of 
‘state-building’.
One reason. Grew suggests, may be that the nineteenth-century state represents 
an anomaly in the dominant account of the rise and rise of the state. The 
curtailing and dismantlement of the absolutist state under the impact of 
liberalism thus appears as a “digression in history’s larger course”.^  Grew 
moreover points out that, as nation-states emerged at the end of the nineteenth 
century - through movements of national unification or secession, as well as 
through the strengthening of the ties between the individual and the state - 
historical sociologists began to posit a direct line of continuity to the absolutist 
period. Ranke and other members of the German historical school could see even 
less of a rupture, as states seemed to be returning to their traditional business of 
expanding their power, if necessary by way of war. Continuities were also 
increasingly stressed in other respects. The mercantilist policies of the early 
modem state seemed quite similar to the neo-mercantilism of the imperialist and 
protectionist nation-state. The origins of capitalism were pushed back as far as 
those of the state itself, with antecedents reaching back into classical antiquity.
1 Grew 1984, 83.
2 Grew 1984, 84.
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The paradigm of ‘endless modernity’ (Albrow) was born in this period of 
nationalist reformation and imperialist expansion.
There have, of course, always been dissenting voices; unsurprisingly perhaps, 
most of them come from continental Europe. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie insists 
that the post-feudal period did not see a take-off of capitalism and modernity, but 
was characterised, into the nineteenth century, by economic non-development.^ 
From a more institutionalist perspective, the German historian Otto Brunner has 
argued for a fundamental continuity of historical development from 1000 to 1800 
(a thesis that has more recently been elaborated by Dietrich Gerhard).'* In this 
view, ‘Old Europe’ only came to an end with the industrial and French 
Revolutions. While these alternatives draw on economic and institutional history, 
the cultural roots of modernity in the sixteenth century have seldom been 
challenged until very recently. Michel Foucault’s distinction between a 
Renaissance episteme, a classical episteme which developed during the 
seventeenth century, and a modem episteme that emerged at the turn to the 
nineteenth century, may represent a departure in this respect.^ This argument has 
been echoed by Jens Bartelson, who argues that distinct forms of sovereignty 
correspond to these epistemic periods.^
There are numerous and substantial differences between these approaches and 
the one suggested here. Not least, they differ in their assumption (which mirrors 
that of the ‘modernisers’) that western Europe as a whole, underwent similar 
changes on the same historical trajectory. This is also the case with regard to 
those even more radical historians and social scientists who, like Amo Mayer, 
have highlighted the “persistence of the old regime” up to World War II, a thesis 
that has been echoed, in an IR/IPE context, by Sandra Halperin. According to 
Mayer, “[d]own to 1914 Europe was pre-eminently preindustrial and 
prebourgeois”.^  In a way, these scholars extend (or rather transfer) Perry 
Anderson’s notion of absolutism as a transitional form of society to the
3 Ladurie 1974.
4 Brunner 1968; Gerhard 1981; cf. Bodeker and Hinrichs 1991; Vierhaus 1992.
5 Foucault 1972; cf. Wittrock, Heilbron and Magnusson 1998.
6 Bartelson 1995, 85 and 186-188; c f  Wokler 1998.
7 Mayer 1981, 17; cf. Halperin 1997, 190: “the structure o f traditional society remained
intact in Europe until the beginning o f World War I”.
8. Incongruent Spaces: National States and Global Accumulation 184
nineteenth century and beyond. As Halperin puts it: “The expansion of capitalism 
... in Europe ... produced a socio-economic system that was capitalist in many 
institutional aspects of production but feudal in its social relations”.* Whereas 
Anderson sees the French Revolution as the final triumph of capitalism, Mayer 
and Halperin are much more sceptical; at most, this event and the industrial 
revolution appear as the starting points of the transition to modernity. This 
change in perspective results from their emphasis on industrialism rather than 
capitalism as the hallmark of modernity. The burden of proof that nineteenth 
century Europe, up to 1945, was not really ‘modem’ thus turns on their ability to 
show that the European economies were still largely based on agriculture and 
manufacture, and that the leading class which dominated these states politically, 
socially and culturally was the aristocracy rather than the bourgeoisie.
Descriptively, I find much that is useful in these works, more certainly than in 
the dominant variants, whether cultural, economic or geopolitical, of the 
modernisation model which posits an inexorable rise of modem states, 
economies, and individuals. In many ways, the historical perspective which 
underlies this and subsequent chapters of this thesis parallels that of Mayer and 
Halperin, interpreting the period between the Vienna Congress and World War II 
as transitional. However, I take this to be the transition from absolutism to 
capitalism, rather than from traditional to industrial society. This brings into 
sharp relief a historical and theoretical problem: the relationship between 
capitalism and modemity.
8.2, Capitalism or Modernity?
The starting point for this thesis has been the argument that in order to 
understand the nature of current processes of globalisation, we have to historicise 
the intemational system. The category which usually underlies similar attempts 
to historicise intemational relations is that of modemity; the task is then to 
conceptually grasp the specifically modern form of intemational relations. In the 
liberal and statist traditions, this would entail showing how the rise of the system
Halperin 1997, 189; cf. Mayer 1981, 20; Anderson 1974.
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of sovereign states is part and parcel of the more general rise of modemity, 
alongside cultural and economic processes. In the Marxist tradition, the notion of 
capitalism encompasses much the same phenomena that the category of 
modemity covers. However, Marxists have always been insistent that these 
phenomena are not autonomous, but are the superstmctural expressions, in the 
realms of politics and ideology, of the real innovation: the rise of a capitalist 
economy and a bourgeois class.
Following the arguments of the preceding chapters, the equation of capitalism 
and modemity can no longer be maintained. The category of modemity itself, 
which so far has served as an unproblematic point of reference for the 
historicisation of intemational relations and social life more generally, appears as 
increasingly problematic. As is evident from the argument so far, there is no 
longer a direct substantive or even temporal nexus between capitalism and 
modemity. ‘Capitalism’ can no longer, as for much of the Marxist tradition, 
simply subsume all the different dimensions of what has traditionally been 
thought of as ‘modemity’. If capitalism has only spread across Europe in the 
nineteenth century (and even then in a protracted way), then what are we to make 
of the great innovations of modemity: the scientific revolution, individualistic 
subjectivity, rationalist epistemologies foremost among them?
At best, their connection to capitalism becomes contingent; they are related to 
capitalism in England, but not on the continent. England, however, was rather 
‘deficient’ with respect to some cmcial aspects of ‘modemity’; we have already 
noted its under-developed, non-rationalised state, the very limited role of 
bureaucracy, and the custom-based system of law (in which Roman elements 
were of minor importance). Reinhart Koselleck, moreover, points out that the 
link between morality and politics (another benchmark of modemity, surely) was 
not severed in Britain, unlike in its absolutist neighbours.^ And, conversely, what 
of the Enlightenment, the very core of the ‘project of modemity’, which was (at 
least in its narrow eighteenth-century sense) mostly a continental affair.'®
9 Koselleck 1988, 53-59.
10 The ‘Scottish Enlightenment’, by contrast, would seem to owe its distinctive character 
precisely to the rather different socio-economic context o f British development.
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For Habermas, this project of modemity is marked by the “radical embrace of 
the future”, a future to be made and fashioned by human agency.” Rather than 
accepting the order within which they find themselves situated as given, human 
beings, in a particular part of the world (‘the West’), started to question not only 
the existing social order, but also the underlying cosmology which designated 
this order as necessitous. They thus became the subjects of their own world, 
which they constructed according to their innate rationality; in this pursuit, they 
were also able to draw upon their capacity to know the world as an object outside 
of themselves. Rational knowledge and instrumental rationality in acting upon 
the world gave these sovereign individuals increasing mastery over nature and 
over their own social life.'^ ‘Faustian individualism’ became the basis of a 
collective project of constmcting the future.
But capitalism was neither the product of this ‘promethean’ attitude, nor the 
material base on which such an ideology flowered. We have seen that the origins 
of capitalism have little to do with individuals rationally pursuing profit, and all 
with the creation of market dependence. The presuppositions and implications of 
such a system of market dependence, I have argued, can only be grasped on the 
basis of a notion of capitalism as a social totality. Now, however, we are 
confronted with a complication in this argument. For many of the aspects of 
social life over the last two centuries, among them those which appear to us most 
distinctively modem, are in fact not intemal to capital as a social relation at all. 
As with exclusive territoriality, they simply cannot be decoded as social forms of 
capital. So while we live in the epoch of capitalism rather than modemity, we 
have to be careful not to attribute too much generative power to capital. We 
cannot, for instance, unmask the ‘modem’ subject as the abstract individual of 
capitalist society, as C. B. Macpherson’s theory of possessive individualism 
sought to do.” Nor can we decipher Cartesian rationalism as the science of a 
bourgeoisie driven by the urge and need to conquer the world (market).
11 Habermas 1998b, 197 (my translation).
12 Therbom 1995, 126-27.
13 Macpherson 1972. Heilbron argues that the discursive construction o f the ‘homo
economicus’ cannot be directly related to the rise o f capitalism, or to the increasing
influence o f the bourgeoisie; Heilbron 1998.
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Boaventura de Sousa Santos has therefore suggested that a strict distinction 
between capitalism and modemity should be made. “Modemity and capitalism 
are two different and autonomous historical processes”. Modemity emerged 
during the sixteenth century, while capitalism came to dominance after the tum 
to the nineteenth century. “From then on, the two historical processes converged 
and interpenetrated each other, but in spite of that, the conditions and dynamics 
of their development remained separate and relatively autonomous”. T h i s  
resolution has much to commend it; but it remains unsatisfactory as it takes 
capitalism to be a phenomenon of the ‘economic sphere’, while modemity is 
taken to belong to the cultural and political realms.
More pertinent, therefore, is the solution indicated by Ellen Meiksins Wood, 
who suggests that the ‘project of modemity’ has its roots in the social stmggles 
surrounding the intemal organisation of absolutism. In these stmggles, the non­
capitalist bourgeoisie advanced universalistic ideas to undermine the privileges 
of the nobility in the competition for access to state offices, not to legitimise and 
promote a capitalist transformation of society.'^ This perspective suggests the 
need to distinguish between ‘absolutist-bourgeois modemity’ and ‘capitalist 
modernity’ as two social totalities.'^ The point here is not to suggest that there is 
an essential continuity between the two forms of modemity. On the contrary, it is 
to emphasise not only that these two modemities are incommensurable and that 
absolutist-bourgeois modemity did not generate within itself the forces which led 
to capitalist modemity; it is ultimately to assert the limited utility of the category 
of modernity itself. At the same time, it becomes possible on the basis of this 
distinction to ask in what way aspects of absolutist-bourgeois modemity continue 
to shape and configure capitalist modemity during the nineteenth and twentieth
14 Santos 1995, 1. Santos adds: “Modemity did not presuppose capitalism as its mode of 
production. ... Conversely, the latter, far from presupposing the sociocultural premises 
o f modemity for its development, has coexisted with, and indeed thrived in conditions 
that, viewed from the perspective o f the paradigm o f modemity, would definitely be 
considered premodem or even antimodem”; ibid.
15 Wood 1997a, 546. Wood notes: “I have no wish to reduce the Enlightenment to cmde 
class ideology; but the point is that in this particular historical conjuncture, in distinctly 
non-capitalist conditions, even bourgeois class ideology took the form o f a larger vision 
o f general human emancipation, not just emancipation for the bourgeoisie but for 
humanity in general”; ibid., 548.
16 This differentiation is based on W ood’s distinction between bourgeois and capitalist 
modemity; Wood 2000 and 1991, ch. 1.
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centuries, not just in the political and cultural realms, but also in the economic 
‘sphere’. However, this does not imply an interpenetration of ‘equals’. There is a 
very definite sense pervading Wood’s argument that capitalism is universalising 
itself and subordinating the ‘historical legacies’ of absolutist-bourgeois 
modemity to its logic of process.’^
It is, then, the notion of totalisation, rather than totality, which has to be at the 
centre of the interpretation of capitalist development over the last 200 years. The 
notion of totalisation must be one of the least popular in today’s social sciences. 
Some readers will predictably take this tum in the argument as proof that 
historical materialism, in the end, cannot escape from its methodologically 
reductionist and, worse, politically totalitarian foundations. I may not even be 
able to convince them to read on by reassuring them, as many Marxists have 
done before, that I regard capitalism as a form of social organisation that is 
inherently contradictory and which by necessity produces fragmentation and 
differentiation. Nor will these readers take comfort from my assertion that it is, 
after all, capitalism itself that is not only totalising but also inherently totalitarian, 
given its tendency to subsume all social relations, all cultural creations, and even 
nature itself, under its manic logic. Consequently, they will not give much credit 
to (or at least doubt the viability and indeed desirability of) the political project 
underlying this thesis, which is to insist on the need to overcome capitalism in 
order to make possible the full development of the potentials of human 
individuality.
Having said all this, I should also point out some of the more immediate 
benefits of a switch from totality to totalisation for the interpretation of capitalist 
development. For this shift in perspective implies that, whatever may be the case 
today, in the past really existing capitalism was not what Marx termed a ‘mature 
totality’. Consequently, to analyse the process of capitalist development 
exclusively through the prism of ‘capital in the totality of its social relations’ 
would be highly misleading. As Marx noted even the leading industrial states of 
nineteenth-century continental Europe, Germany among them, suffered
not only from the development o f capitalist production, but also from the incompleteness of
that development. Alongside the modem evils, we are oppressed by a whole range of
17 Wood 1997a, 554 and 558.
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inherited evils, arising from the passive survival o f archaic and outmoded modes of 
production, with their accompanying train o f anachronistic social and political relations. We 
suffer not only from the living, but from the dead. Le mort saisit le vif}^
The perspective of totalisation implies that ‘historical legacies’ become 
progressively subsumed under the capital relation. In this sense, capitalism 
certainly has become more ‘total’ than it had been during the first half of the 
nineteenth century when it started its bloody march across the world. Yet the 
perspective of totalisation, of the increasing subsumption and internalisation of 
aspects of social life that do not derive from the capital relation itself, has to be 
complemented by considering the ways in which really existing capitalism was 
and is structured or configured by historical legacies.
To argue, for instance, that Enlightenment thought was not a form of 
consciousness developed through the experience of capitalism and its logic of 
process is not at all to say that Enlightenment thinking did not play an important 
role in the practical, scientific, moral and aesthetic experience of the last two 
centuries. The forms of consciousness that emerged during the early modem 
period, from Renaissance humanism to the Enlightenment (which did not simply 
accompany but often directly challenge the prevailing social orders), continued to 
shape the way in which men and women conceived of their world, even as it 
became transformed by capitalism. They provided them with reasons for resisting 
or promoting this transformation, and moulded their perceptions of the 
possibilities for, and limits to, individual and collective agency.
In the end, however, we live in the age of capitalism. The legacies from 
absolutist-bourgeois modemity are losing their ability to stmcture capitalism’s 
existence. Returning to Wood’s argument, we can now see that this is what the 
contemporary debate on postmodemity so inadequately reflects (given that it 
misunderstands capitalist modemity as the direct continuation of the 
Enlightenment project). For Wood, what is distinctive about the present 
conjuncture is that capitalism has finally become ‘total’. After the end of World 
War II, “capitalism has become for the first time something approaching a 
universal system”. Only since then has capitalism “tmly penetrated every aspect 
of life, the state, the practices and ideologies of mling and producing classes, and
18 “The dead man clutches onto the living”; Marx 1977, 91.
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the prevailing culture"T What some Marxists, seeking to ground postmodemity 
in material relations, have sought to conceptualise as postmodern capitalism is 
thus
not just a phase o f capitalism. This is capitalism. I f ‘modernity’ has anything at all to do with 
it, then modemity is well and truly over, not created but destroyed by capitalism. The 
Enlightenment is dead.^°
It is this perspective which will guide my attempt to conceptualise the 
development of the relationship between the capitalist world economy and 
society on the one hand, and the territorial state and system of sovereign states on 
the other. I will suggest, however, that we cannot take for granted - even today, 
as capitalism has come to correspond more closely to its own concept - that the 
process of subsumption has been completed. In fact, I will contend that pre­
capitalist dimensions of statehood have not yet become completely internalised. 
It is precisely the territorial aspect of capitalist statehood which speaks to this; a 
complete subsumption would entail the emergence of a ‘global state’ (a concept 
which I will leave deliberately unspecified for the time being). The question of 
whether we are currently witnessing the transcendence of territorial statehood is, 
of course, at the heart of the globalisation debate. Wood is certainly right to 
criticise the spatial terms on which this debate takes place, and to stress that
we must now talk about the new world order not Just in essentially geographic terms, nor 
simply as the liberation and spatial expansion o f some perennial ‘economic’ logic, but as a 
continuing process o f social transformation -  a social transformation that increasingly 
subjects human beings, their social relations and practices to the imperatives o f capital 
accumulation.^'
At the same time, it is clear that accumulation takes places within spatial 
parameters. These parameters are not fixed; they are, as a generation of radical 
geographers has taught us, themselves socially constituted and have profound 
social implications.^^ The geographies of accumulation and exploitation, of class 
relations and intemational domination, thus have to form an integral part of the 
study of capitalist development as a process of the widening and intensification 
of relations of market dependence. This is all the more the case if the
19 Wood 1997a, 551; cf. Lowy 1998; 17-18.
20 Wood 1997a, 559.
21 Wood 1997a, 554.
22 Cf. Lefebvre 1991; Harvey 1982 and 1985; Smith 1984; Soja 1989; Neil Brenner 1999.
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accumulation and social reproduction of capital continues to be structured by an 
element of social reality that does not have its origins in the capital relation itself, 
and thereby not only to influence the global relations between capital and labour 
(as well as many other forms of domination and exploitation), but also the 
patterns of war and peace.
Capitalism rather than modemity is the category which allows us to make 
sense of our historical period. Such has long been the claim of Marxists. But if 
we are to understand the dominant way of ordering social life over the last two 
centuries as capitalist, we can only do so by moderating our claims for which 
historical phenomena and processes the category of capitalism can encompass. In 
particular, I have argued that capitalism simply cannot be equated with 
modemity; Marxists cannot go one better than ‘bourgeois theorists’ simply by 
collecting all the things that are usually designated ‘modem’ and then declare 
confidently that they all emanate from capital. Capitalism, as E.P. Thompson 
insisted, is more than capital. The cmcial task is, instead, to show how the 
institutions and modes of thought which absolutist-bourgeois modemity 
generated became part of capitalist modemity, both by shaping and being shaped 
by the capitalist logic of process.
A general discussion of the ways in which absolutist-bourgeois ‘modemity’ 
and capitalism interpenetrated is beyond the scope of this thesis, though this 
issue will by necessity intmde in this and the subsequent chapters in an ad hoc 
way. The central concern of these chapters is the conceptualisation, in a historical 
and dynamic perspective, of the changing relationship between the state and the 
world market. In this context, I will ask how the historical legacy of exclusive 
territoriality stmctures capitalism’s logic of process, and how, in tum, ‘state 
space’ is subsumed under capital.
23 The concept o f ‘state space’ derives from Henri Lefebvre. According to Neil Brenner, 
“Lefebvre conceives state space in terms of three fundamental elements -  national 
territorial space; an integral grid of state sociospatial organization composed o f politico- 
institutional and administrative configurations, built environments, and symbolic 
monuments; and the mental space produced by the state” ; Brenner 1997, 146.
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8.3. Capitalist International Relations?
The implicit claim here is that capitalism, rather than modemity, is also the 
appropriate concept for the historicisation of the intemational system -  even 
though the very fact that capitalism has an intemational system cannot be 
explained by reference to capital itself. In other words, it is suggested that we 
understand more about the intemational relations of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries if we start from capitalism rather than from the ‘stmcture’ of the 
intemational system or, more restrictively, from the nature of geopolitics in the 
period in which the interstate system was bom. And yet, we will not understand 
the intemational relations of capitalist modemity at all if we stop with capitalism 
and abstract from the heritage of capitalism’s pre-history. For the 
conceptualisation of the intemational system, this implies that the altemative 
between which Chris Chase-Dunn would have us choose, namely whether 
capitalism and the intemational system follow autonomous logics or are 
constituted by a single logic, is too narrow. '^  ^ At least for the history of 
international relations in capitalist modemity up to now, the answer has to be: 
neither.
Have we ended up with Weberian pluralism after all, as many Marxists will 
undoubtedly charge? Some historical sociologists have indeed argued that 
capitalism did not give rise to the intemational system of territorial states. Theda 
Skocpol, in particular, has argued that
The international states system as a transnational structure o f military competition was not 
originally created by capitalism. Throughout modem world history, it represents an 
analytically autonomous level o f transnational reality -  interdependent in its structure and 
dynamics with world capitalism, but not reducible to it.^^
Michael Mann, too, has persistently pointed out the weakness of the Marxist 
notion that intemational relations between sovereign states are a by-product of 
capitalism. Similarly to the argument suggested here, Mann claims that “the 
multi-state system was in place well before capitalism emerged”:
24 Chase-Dunn 1991, ch. 7. Chase-Dunn's argument is that “the capitalist mode of 
production exhibits a single logic in which both political-military power and the 
appropriation o f surplus value through production o f commodities for sale in the market 
play an integrated role”; ibid., 131.
25 Skocpol 1979,22.
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One point must be made clearly -  there is nothing in the capitalist mode o f production which 
itself ‘requires’ a multi-state system. The two are contingent. Indeed, [capitalism’s] 
requirements for political regulation and military expropriation ... would be met more 
efficiently by a single, universalistic state, at first European-wide, then global in scope.^^
For Mann, this argument implies that there is an autonomous dynamic of 
‘militarism’ that derives from the fact of multi-stateness itself. The prevalence 
and logic of warfare, which was “a constant right through European history”, is 
not fundamentally affected by capitalism. War neither fulfils a functional role for 
capitalism (though it is useful in the process of ‘primitive accumulation’ and 
expropriation), nor does capitalism’s emergence into the European state system 
lead to the pacification of intemational relations.
But there is more to social science than methodological pluralism and 
economic determinism; neither will do. The Weberian tendency to reify the 
intemational system as an autonomous and even unchanging stmcture and to 
posit ‘war’ as a relentless force imposing itself on social actors has already been 
identified as one of its main problems. In its stead, I have suggested that 
geopolitical systems must themselves be conceptualised as historically 
constituted on the basis of the prevailing social property relations. While this has 
been recognised by some Weberian critics of Weberian historical sociology,^^ 
their alternatives remain circumscribed by their dogmatic pluralism, which has 
its source in a naturalistic and evolutionistic understanding of capitalism. Like 
their historical sociological ancestors, they cannot see that capitalism is more 
than an economic sphere, that it involves a whole set of stmctures and 
institutions which make it possible for people to become and remain dependent 
on the market for their livelihood.
Capitalism is a social system that entails, among other things, a definite form 
of statehood: a ‘purely political’ state that is abstracted from the exploitation of 
surplus, yet internally related to capitalism as it makes possible the private 
appropriation of surplus on the basis of the control over economic forms of
26 Mann 1988, 139. Mann continues: “It is true that many historians argue that the multi­
state system encouraged the competitive dynamism o f capitalist development; that is 
competition between states, as well as enterprises, encouraged growth. 1 accept this 
argument. But if so, this was an empirical fact, not a functional requirement” ; ibid. In 
this respect, my approach differs strongly from Mann’s, as it does not even accept an 
empirical relationship between state-formation and capitalist development.
27 Mann 1988, 140-42.
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property. In this sense, even though the concrete policies of the state can never be 
reduced to capitalist class interests or the functional requirements of capital, the 
capitalist state is never just a state in capitalist society. It is never just a set of 
institutions that has evolved along an autonomous trajectory of ‘the political’ 
(and perhaps in conjunction with an equally autonomous realm of ‘militarism’), 
which for some more or less determinate reasons begins to interact with a 
‘capitalist economy’. The critique that Richard Ashley levelled against the ‘first 
wave’ of historical sociologist theorists applies equally to the ‘second wave’:
The problem in Tilly’s and Skocpol’s writings, I think, is a tendency to rely upon an abstract 
and ahistorical understanding o f capitalism consistent with its own reigning ideology. 
Capitalism thus appears as a purely economic relation, a form of production relations 
distinguishable from politics, the state, and the nation-state system. The nation-state system 
can only appear as an exogenous force, a limit, or a condition characterized (after Weber) in 
terms o f its own unique control over violence. It then becomes possible to advance the theme 
o f the anarchic ‘structure’ o f intemational politics, the situational imperatives it imposes 
upon local development possibilities, and, hence, the causal priority of intemational politics 
over the development o f capitalism.^^
The problem with historical sociology is thus not simply its naïve and 
uncritical appropriation of traditional Realism, as some of the ‘second-wave’ 
critics of the ‘first wave’ of Weberian historical sociology would have us believe, 
but is related to their misconception of capitalism.^® Ashley is, however, also 
highly critical of the argument that the nation-state system preceded capitalism:
Despite the tendency to associate realism with a system o f states whose ‘anarchic structure’ 
is said to predate and condition the emergence of capitalism in Europe, realist power politics 
cannot be reduced (as Tilly, Skocpol, and Giddens tend to reduce it) to the status o f an 
exogenous constraint on capitalist development, an antecedent condition, a hold-over from a 
premodem order.^'
28 Cf. Hobson 1998a and 1998b; Hobden 1999.
29 Ashley 1987, 430 (fri. 8).
30 According to Hobson, the ‘first wave’ o f Weberian historical sociologists, and especially
Theda Skocpol, have emphasised the autonomous role o f the state in historical change. 
“However, at times the system o f states has been singled out as the sole determining 
variable, leading to a geopolitical reductionism, which in tum justifiably lends credence 
to the critique o f [Weberian historical sociology] as merely a sociological realism”; 
Hobson 1998a, 288.
31 Ashley 1987, 423. The point that Ashley seeks to make here is the one which 1 have 
tried to refute in the previous chapters, i.e. that the intemational system o f territorial 
states is a social form of capitalism. In remarkably similar terms to Rupert, Bumham and 
Rosenberg, Ashley suggests: “critical analysis should regard the partially autonomous 
community o f realist power politics as the historically specific political relation -  the
global public sphere, as it were - o f a world capitalist system. ... [R]ealist power politics
should be grasped as a community whose normalized practices and rituals o f power 
mobilize global resources, discipline practices, and thereby clear and delimit spaces of
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While I have argued the territorial intemational system preceded capitalism, I 
do not think that this must necessarily lead to the conclusion (at least within the 
present framework, whatever may the case with Weberianism)^^ that “realist 
power politics” are an “exogenous constraint on capitalist development”. Ashley 
here seems to reproduce the misleading altemative between pluralistic interaction 
(here with a presumption of the relative primacy of the political) and the notion 
that whatever exists in capitalism exists because o f  capitalism. The cmcial point, 
however, is that the intemational system of capitalist modemity is no longer 
exogenous, but has become intemalised into its fundamental logic of process.
The perspective of totalisation, I have suggested, provides a viable altemative 
which allows us to understand capitalist development as both a stmctured and 
open-ended process. It is open-ended, firstly, because even within capitalist 
modemity it is far from clear that capitalism can ever become identical with its 
own concept and thus achieve its telos; it is unclear, in other words, whether a 
complete subsumption of historical legacies is possible. Secondly, even if this 
were the case, the contradictory nature of capitalism itself renders all attempts to 
constme the totalisation of capitalism as a wholly progressive march towards 
perfect political community (whether at the national or the global level) 
hopelessly ideological; totalisation also implies the totalisation of the 
contradictions of capitalism. Finally, it is also open-ended, because while the 
contradictions of capitalism, and the stmggles surrounding its reproduction, 
allow us to glimpse the immanent possibility of a radically different way of 
ordering social life, the achievement of a socialist altemative is not the necessary 
outcome of the totalisation of capitalism. History has no telos; and even capitalist 
development, despite capital’s totalising dynamic, does not follow an inexorable
domestic politics wherein recognizably capitalist subjects can secure their 
dom inance...” ; ibid. However, the question why this should be so, why capitalism is 
'‘'dependent upon the competent and skillful action o f  knowledgeable subjects o f  a 
realist power community’’ {ibid., 424 emphasis in the original) is, I suspect, not 
answered by Ashley -  or else I do not understand his answer.
32 At least in the case of Anthony Giddens, Ashley addresses his critique to the wrong 
person. Indeed, Giddens (1981, 12) strongly emphasises that “capitalist states emerged 
as nation-states: the association between capitalism and the nation-state was not the 
‘accident o f history’ that it has appeared to many Marxist and non-Marxist historians 
alike”. This is o f course rather dubious claim in itself. The argument that capitalism and 
the ‘modem state’ necessarily developed together is much more popular among Marxist
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path to the identity of really existing capitalism with its own concept. Moreover, 
just how and in what aspect capital becomes more total in particular historical 
processes cannot be conceptualised on the basis of an ‘ideal history’.
8.4. Territoriality and the World Market (A Second Cut)
Capitalism exists, politically, in the form of a system of abstract sovereign 
states not for reasons immanent to capitalism but for historical reasons. 
Moreover, these historical reasons do not derive from the particular character of 
early (i.e. mercantile, agrarian or manufacturing) capitalism, but as a result of the 
processes of political accumulation since the feudal period, which dominated 
European historical development until the nineteenth century. This argument 
raises two broad sets of questions for a historical materialist theory of 
Intemational Relations: firstly the subsumption of the state and intemational 
relations under capitalism; and secondly the way in which territoriality continues 
to shape capitalism.
8.4.1. The Internalisation o f  the International System
What are the consequences of the capitalist reconstitution of society for the 
nature of the state and the dynamic of the intemational system? Against the 
argument that there is an essential continuity between the early modem and the 
nineteenth and twentieth century state (and state system) as both are premised on 
the exclusive territoriality of ‘mle’, I have argued that the transition from 
absolutist to capitalist sovereignty is of fundamental importance. In particular, 
the presumption of continuity obscures the cmcial reconstitution of sovereignty 
from a property relation to a purely political relationship in capitalist societies, 
and thus the related transformation in the character of territoriality based on 
generalised impersonal mle.
Most fundamentally, the state and its sovereignty was ‘hollowed out’: 
territoriality became exclusive with respect to political space only, while the
and non-Marxists (including, pace Ashley, most Weberian historical sociologists) alike, 
than the positions Giddens and Ashley attribute to them in this respect.
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privatisation of appropriative power allowed for the organisation of surplus 
extraction across boundaries through the productive employment of contractually 
secured labour/^ As a consequence, the old problématique of sovereignty (i.e. the 
assertion and rejection of claims to universal empire and the securing of the 
territorial integrity of a state’s polity, society and economy) was supplanted by a 
new problématique which has increasingly come to dominate the discourse of 
sovereignty ever since: the ability of states to shape their societies’ destiny in the 
face of world economic and social interdependence.^'^
But the internalisation of the interstate system may be the most protracted of 
all the processes through which capital becomes total. It presupposes that the 
separation of politics and economics in the domestic realm has been completed, 
that post-absolutist state classes have lost their grip on the state, that the conflicts 
between capital and labour have replaced (or at least supplanted) those between 
the capitalist bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, the monarchy, and so on. 
Moreover, it presupposes the completion of these processes not just in one state, 
but in most states, at least those which dominate the intemational system. Such a 
reconstitution is thus a gradual process. And yet, if there is any point to the talk 
about the emergence of a 'postmodern’ intemational system, we should look for 
its roots not in or around 1973, but in the nineteenth century transition to 
capitalist sovereignty and property relations. It is this revolution which arguably 
underlies the redefinition of state identities and interests since 1945 which have 
so patently changed the nature of intemational relations.
Does that mean that capitalism as such is peaceful, that contemporary military 
conflict derives from the ‘non-capitalist’ elements in capitalism? Such a claim 
would surely be untenable. As Michael Mann notes,
more and more o f the globe has been caught up in the transition from ‘backwardness’, 
through an era o f massive expropriation, coercive labour forms and military violence, to a 
more institutionalized integration into capitalism and free wage labour.^^
Where no pre-capitalist states existed to intemalise this political process of 
capitalist expansion, imperialist forms of primitive accumulation were employed. 
Even if capitalist statehood had been spatially coextensive with the capitalist
33 Cf. Diner 1993, 17-24; Rosenberg 1994.
34 Diner 1993, 38ff.
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economy from its birth, the expansion of capitalism beyond its existing 
boundaries is an inherently violent process. Market forces only begin to operate 
when politico-legal force has set in motion the process of primitive 
accumulation, the separation of the direct producers from their means of 
subsistence. But what if this process of global primitive accumulation has been 
completed and all states have become mature capitalist states? Jens Siegelberg 
notes in his important attempt to develop a Marxist theory of the relationship 
between war and capitalism:
Only when capital has run through all the intermediate stages of its own development 
towards self-valorising value does the possibility emerge for violence to be foregone as an 
economic force. For only capitalism possesses within itself social mechanisms for the 
permanent increase o f labour productivity and o f society’s wealth, which make the 
application o f direct force in the appropriation of the products o f other peoples’ labour 
unnecessary.^*^
The process of capitalism’s maturation, according to Siegelberg, does not only 
make possible the pacification of class relations in a way that was unthinkable in 
pre-capitalist societies, but it also creates the conditions for the pacification of 
the relations between states, which no longer have to engage in external 
expansion in order to sustain the system of politically constituted property within 
their boundaries. With an expansive mode of material reproduction existing 
within and across each state, territorial expansion loses its compulsive character.
In this perspective, patterns of warfare over the last 200 years have to be 
regarded as accompanying the imposition of capitalist social relations in Europe 
and beyond, whether war serves the control and transformation of non-capitalist 
areas, or results from externalisation of the contradictions and tensions within 
countries undergoing capitalist ‘modernisation’. With many countries still in the 
process of the transition to capitalist modemity, which others have long 
achieved, there has been an increasing bifurcation of the intemational system. On 
the one hand, there is a more or less pacified ‘zone of peace’ in which 
competition usually takes economic forms; on the other hand, there are the 
‘zones of turmoil’ in the ‘underdeveloped’ world, in which military force and
35 Mann 1988, 138.
36 Siegelberg 1994, 58 (my translation).
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economic competition still go hand in hand.^  ^ In between, it should be stressed, 
there are changing spaces of engagement which see the use of military power by 
members of the zones of peace seeking to contain local instabilities and to 
maintain the ‘rules of the game’ of capitalist accumulation.
In terms of Wendt’s continuum of security systems, it may be possible to argue 
that capitalism at least creates the possibility (if not necessity) for a move from a 
‘competitive’ to an ‘individualistic’ system -  as it similarly creates the possibility 
for, but not the necessity of, liberal democracy.^* Can we expect, then, that the 
future of capitalist development will bring a progressive universalisation of the 
‘zone of peace’ as capital becomes more total? Only if we accept the neo­
classical understanding of capitalism (which finds its correspondences in the 
marginalist interpretations of capitalism and the state in sociology, political 
science and IR/IPE), with all its deficiencies and deformations. The capitalist 
economy is not a self-equilibrating process; it has an inherent tendency to over­
accumulation. Capital accumulation gives rise to uneven development between 
countries and regions; it also leads to severe social tensions and, as Karl Polanyi 
emphasises, even threatens the very possibility of social life itself.
For Polanyi, this social and cultural contradiction at the heart of market society 
was a central element in the “breakdown of nineteenth century civilization”, 
which culminated in two world wars.^  ^ By contrast, Siegelberg (like Mayer and 
Halperin) sees these wars as an aspect of the protracted rise of capitalism rather 
than springing from its internal contradictions. He suggests, however, that while 
economic competition increasingly replaces military competition, there is a 
possibility that war might once again become more likely even within the 
capitalist core. The reason is that economic competition itself has become so 
rampant and destructive that it leads to economic crises and social disintegration, 
which in turn threaten democracy and the pacification of domestic and 
international relations."*®
37 Cf. Singer and Wildavsky 1996; by contrast to Singer and Wildavsky, the argument 
developed here suggests that these two zones are inherently related to each other.
38 Of Wendt 1999, ch. 6.
39 Polanyi 1957, 249.
40 Siegelberg 1994, 100. There is an obvious link in Siegelberg's theory to the ‘democratic
peace’ thesis, which has been highlighted by W olf 1995. It should be noted, however, 
that Siegelberg does recognise that threats to democracy and international peace arise
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The contradictions of capitalist class society, then, are prone to take a 
geopolitical form even when states have been subsumed under the capital 
relation. It could be argued, however, that this is itself a consequence of the 
incomplete internalisation of the state’s territoriality and the interstate system. 
The state has not been fully subsumed until capitalism’s political and economic 
spaces are co-extensive -  in other words, until the multi-stateness of capitalist 
political space has given way to a ‘global state’. As long as an interstate system 
structures capitalist modernity, such contradictions can and will find expression 
in geopolitical competition and war.
Capitalism, to conclude, transforms the state, the social relations of 
sovereignty and the international system; it has also, at least so far, reproduced 
the international system of territorial states. The states which constitute this 
capitalist international system are no longer the states of the absolutist period. 
Every aspect of their statehood, even the nature of their territoriality has 
undergone profound transformations. The boundaries of the state have, with the 
rise of a capitalist world market, been transformed from limits into barriers. 
What were insurmountable restrictions on pre-capitalist forms of social 
organisation become mere barriers that capital could overcome. Among these are 
not just social, but also national limits: “capital drives beyond national barriers 
and prejudices as much as beyond nature worship."" But capitalism has not 
obliterated the boundedness of political space (and thus of political community). 
The final frontier for capitalism has not been overcome once capital has 
penetrated every nook and cranny of the globe, every country, every social 
relations, every aspect of human culture; the final frontier is the boundedness of 
statehood itself. Marx himself noted:
But from the fact that capital posits every such limit as a barrier and hence gets ideally
beyond it, it does not by any means follow that it has really overcome it, and, since every
from the same historical process that made them possible in the first place: the rise and 
expansion o f capitalism.
41 Cf. Marx 1993, 650: “The limits which it tore down were barriers to its motion, its 
development and realization. It is by no means the case that it thereby suspended all 
limits, nor all barriers, but rather only the limits not corresponding to it, which were 
barriers to it” .
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such barrier contradicts its character, its production moves in contradictions which are 
constantly overcome but just as constantly posited/^
What are the contradictions that arise from the persistence of national 
boundaries, if only as barriers rather than limits? And can the forces unleashed 
by capitalism ever overcome this final frontier of exclusive political 
territoriality?
8.4.2. The Territorial Configuration o f Capital
An answer to these questions can only be framed if we look at the 
interpenetration of capital and territoriality from the other side and ask how 
territoriality of political authority has come to structure capital’s logic of process. 
What are the implications of this territorial pre-figuration for the way in which 
capital operates, for the fundamental laws of motion and contradictions of 
capitalism? More specifically, how does territoriality shape the nature of 
competition between individual capitals? How does it structure the relations 
between classes domestically and internationally? How does it affect the way in 
which the world market is regulated by territorial authority? And in what way is 
the operation of the law of value itself modified in the world market context by 
the fact that the circulation of capital is mediated by national currencies?
There is a clear limit to what we can say about these issues on a theoretical 
level. Territoriality, in itself, does not structure anything. Only through the 
agency of states and social classes, which in their competitive struggles (both 
horizontal and vertical ones) draw on the resources provided by territorial 
authority, does the territorial form of statehood become imbricated with the 
social and spatial reproduction of capital. Not only is the relationship between 
territoriality and capital’s logic of process a dynamic one, it can also, ultimately, 
only be understood in a historical perspective. Yet, as David Harvey points out, 
for too long social theory has taken space relations and geography as unchanging 
background conditions in which history takes place. It is crucial, therefore, to set 
out the conceptual issues involved in introducing a historical and geographical 
materialist perspective. Harvey rightly emphasises the need not just for greater
42 Marx 1993, 410 (emphasis in the original).
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attention to geographical differences, but also for a historical geography of 
capitalism. As he notes, Marx did not provide more than the starting points for 
such a perspective: “His political vision and his theory are ... undermined by his 
failure to build a systematic and distinctively geographical and spatial dimension 
into his thought”. Harvey however rejects the presumption that such a spatial 
theory of capitalism “can be reduced to a theory of the state”."*^
This is an important point, as it cautions us against taking state territoriality to 
be the only spatial scale of relevance. Capitalism, even in the abstract, is not an 
a-spatial mode of organising social life. Even a fully totalised capitalism would 
not be pure temporality, as postmodern capitalism’s organic intellectuals 
proclaim. Even as capitalism is producing abstract space, capital accumulation 
always takes place in specific spatial geographies and in particular places. As 
Michael Storper notes, economic activity is “territorialised” (or ‘localised’) in as 
much as it depends on resources specific to a particular locale.'^ '  ^ The very 
dynamic of global accumulation itself presupposes the non-identity of the places 
of accumulation, production and distribution. Moreover,
capital is not perfectly mobile in any o f its forms. Certainly money capital moves with great 
swiftness and to great distances in search o f more advantageous combinations o f inputs and 
markets, labourforces and technology. Yet in order to produce surplus (value), firms must 
build up a productive apparatus consisting o f  fixed capital, workers, land, political alliances, 
and so forth -  all with a local base.'*^
This leads to a more general point. Capitalist spatiality can never be simply 
and immediately global (or local, or national). Following Henri Lefebvre, Neil 
Brenner argues that we can understand the historical geography of capitalism
as a multi-layered scaffolding of intertwined, coevolving spatial scales upon which 
historically specific linkages between processes o f capital accumulation, forms o f state 
territorial organization, and patterns o f urbanization have been crystallized. Lefebvre rejects 
the attempt to attribute causal primacy to any single spatial scale: local, regional, national.
43 Harvey 1985, 143.
44 Storper 1997, 20. ‘Territorialisation’ in this usage does not refer to ‘state space’; cities, 
regions or countries could be the relevant ‘place’. Also note that places are, in this 
perspective, not given by what nature has endowed them with; they are socially 
produced.
45 Storper and Walker 1989, 47. Compare this to the standard position summarised by 
Porter: “In a world of global competition ... location is no longer relevant. Geography 
and political boundaries have been transcended. The firm, in particular, can shed its 
locational identity or dependency entirely”; Porter 1994, 35.
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and global social relations overlap within the same worldwide territorial grid o f capitalist 
m odernity/^
For Lefebvre, the state scale, though not determining, is crucial in the 
production of capitalist space. This centrality is not least the result of the 
globalisation of national statehood itself, of the universalisation of territorial 
sovereignty as the prevailing form of organising statehood in capitalist modernity 
since the late nineteenth century and particularly since decolonisation.
The territorial space constituted by the state is thus of particular relevance for 
the spatial geography of capitalist modernity. Most fundamentally, territoriality 
has a profound effect on the social and spatial organisation of social classes. By 
fracturing the social space of capital along territorial lines, it conjoins a 
horizontal dimension to the vertical relationship between classes within each 
state. It fragments the classes of capitalist modernity (capital and labour foremost 
among them) on a particularistic basis, and prevents the transnational dynamic of 
class struggle from becoming decisive. This fragmentation should not be 
absolutised, as social scientists, enthralled (whether as supporters or critics) by 
the spectacle of nation-state formation, tended to do for more than a century.
Capitalism does constitute a world economy and society that transcends the
territorial state; yet it is clear that states are not merely functional or
administrative sub-units of the larger world system.
As a result, the world market and society cannot be understood directly in 
terms of the economic competition between individuals or firms and the social 
conflicts between capital and labour over property, production and distribution. 
Class identities and interests always have a transnational dimension in
capitalism, but the territoriality of political authority means that particular 
amalgamations of class interests and ‘national interests’ will be of decisive 
importance in shaping the historical geography of capitalism in any given 
conjuncture. It valorises the territorial state as the basic spatial point of reference. 
In important respects, capital constitutes itself as ‘national capital’; as Engels 
suggested, the modem state is “essentially ... the ideal personification of total 
national capital”.'*’ Much earlier, Marx and Engels had noted that in the process
46 Neil Brenner 1997, 145.
47 This claim in Engels’ Anti-Dühring is quoted in Barker 1991, 209.
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of capitalism’s development, independent provinces and their institutions 
“became lumped together in one nation, with one government, one code of laws, 
one national class-interest, one frontier, and one customs tariff’/^
It should be noted that Marx’s developmental sketch of the capitalist state (like 
most of Marx’s other historical schemes and many of his historical accounts) is 
contradicted by the present analysis. Even where nation-states were formed, 
during the nineteenth century, by agglomeration, the original ‘provinces’ had 
been territorial states. What Marx describes is part of the replacement or 
supplantation of dynastic states by nation-states (through social incorporation and 
spatial integration), not the emergence of territorial statehood as such. Also, this 
account leaves open the question why state-building stopped at the level of the 
nation-state rather than moving on, by further agglomeration, to the construction 
of a world state. But the crucial point here is that, in as much as states came to 
organise national segments of social classes politically, two consequences 
follow: firstly, competition in the world market is not directly between individual 
capitals, but is mediated by state boundaries; and secondly, this enables the state 
to organise the external projection of national class interests through foreign 
policy, diplomacy, and military force.
The first point is important in that it implies that the law of value has different 
effects in the national and the international spheres.'’^  In Marx’s abstract theory of 
capital, which regarded “the whole world of trade as one nation”, the allocation 
of socially necessary labour to the various branches of production is explicable 
on the basis of the law of value. What amount of abstract labour time is 
necessary is shaped, inter alia, by the market in which producers compete. If the 
whole world is a single nation, then the necessary labour time will be determined 
on a global basis; consequently, there will also be a single global average profit 
rate.
But what if the world market is segmented by the boundaries of states? While 
state boundaries are indeed unprecedentedly porous for the flow of commodities 
and money in capitalism, and thus allow for the possibility of a world economy.
48 Marx and Engels 1998, 10 (emphasis added).
49 On these issues, see especially Busch 1974, 38-53; compare Braunmühl 1978 and 
Neusiiss 1972, 125-147.
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they still have the crucial effect of modifying the law of value. In particular, they 
make the national market primary in determining necessary labour time and the 
average rate of profit. The reason for this effect is the existence of different 
national currencies. The law of value cannot organise the allocation of socially 
necessary labour time on a global scale in any direct way, as national values are 
mediated by exchange rates.
This is, of course, the basis for a liberal world market, which allows relatively 
less productive capitals from underdeveloped countries to compete in the world 
market with more productive capitals from core countries. The relative protection 
afforded by the undervaluation of currencies to capitals which would be unable 
to compete directly (if located within the same national economic space) is what 
makes an international division of labour possible. However this is an 
international, i.e. territorial, division of labour; the world market thus constituted 
is formed not by firms but by nationally delimited spheres of circulation within 
which firms are located.
This leads us to the second point. The world economy is, of course, not simply 
the harmonious realm of mutually beneficial exchange that economic theory has 
seen fit to emphasise. If state boundaries constitute ‘national collective capitals’, 
then the competitiveness of individual capitals in the world economy is shaped 
decisively by the comparative advantages of the ‘country’. Consequently, as 
Realists in their particular one-sided representation of the international political 
economy have stressed, the boundary mechanisms of the territorial state and its 
economy can become offensive weapons in the struggle for world market shares 
and profits. Exchange rates, tariffs, and subventions can all be moments of 
competition policies by states designed to bolster the competitiveness of their 
national capitals.
Why should states do this? The actions of states, even with respect to the 
national and international economy, cannot be reduced to the interests of 
dominant classes or the purposes of ‘hegemonic blocs’, even though classes and 
interest groups do, of course, seek to influence state policies. But in important 
respects, the autonomy of states with respect to policy is quite real. This 
autonomy is, moreover, reinforced against the attempts by particular classes or 
class fractions to impose their particular interests, by the ‘Janus-faced’ character
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of the capitalist state. But, as I have emphasised before, this cannot form the 
basis of a statist theory which attributes an autonomous logic to political 
development. The state, at least in its aspect as an abstract political entity, is 
internal to the capital relation. By maintaining the boundaries between the 
political and the economic (in the sense of keeping property relations 
depoliticised), the state reproduces the class character of capitalist modernity. 
Any state, however, that does nothing more than to guarantee capitalist property 
relations and the sanctity of contracts will soon face severe problems. The 
legitimacy of the state has become tied up with its success in securing 
accumulation and profitability. Moreover, the state itself becomes reliant on the 
material sources provided by the private economy for its own survival and 
expansion.
In many ways, then, the fate of the state is bound up with the fortunes of the 
private economy. Yet while capitalist states have become involved in the 
economy in order to secure the conditions for their own reproduction as well as 
that of capital, they are faced with two problems. On the one hand, their 
interventions can themselves disrupt capital accumulation and thereby undermine 
the preconditions for the stability of the state and capital. On the other hand, 
states do not even have complete control over the background conditions of 
successful capital accumulation and social pacification as many of them are 
located beyond the grasp of their territorially grounded political authority. The 
abstract nature of capitalist political authority is fundamentally limited. Indeed, 
as long as the separation of political and economic spheres is maintained, there 
can be no real self-determination of the national political community through the 
sovereign state. ''Cuius regia, eius oeconomica” is not a viable principle of 
capitalist sovereignty and territoriality.^®
But while the state cannot, in capitalism, constitute an economy that is 
completely contained by ‘state space’, the role of the state in the social and 
spatial structuration of the world economy remains crucial. Most importantly, the 
territorial segmentation of capitalist political space means that the role of the
50 Diner 1993, 21. ‘Neo-mercantilist’ economic policies are therefore quite different from 
earlier forms of mercantilism; the national economies they constituted were integrated 
into the capitalist world economy; cf. Latham 1997, 434.
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State is quite different in the domestic and international contexts. As long as an 
international system exists in capitalist modernity, even mature capitalist states 
will play a decisive ‘geo-economic’ role. Internally, these states are abstracted 
from the ‘economic sphere’; their central politico-economic role is the 
maintenance of competition and the provisioning of the rule of law. Successful 
economic reproduction presupposes a high degree of neutrality vis-à-vis 
individual competitors within the ‘national economy’. In the external context, by 
complete contrast, the “state represents the interests of the national capitals in the 
international competitive struggle with all available political and economic 
means’’.^ '
In the world market, therefore, states are themselves parties in the competition 
for world market shares, rather than guarantors of the market as such. For this 
reason, Dan Diner argues, the domestic separation of politics and economics is 
“inconceivable in the sphere of world society”.^  ^Political and economic forms of 
power mesh (rather than interact) in the international politics of capitalist states; 
this finds expression in persistent attempts of particular states to structure the 
world economy and the international division of labour. These endeavours to 
alleviate the deleterious consequences of the “territorial non-coincidence” of the 
political and economic spaces of capitalist modernity have long been at the heart 
of IPE. A central aspect of the struggle for hegemony is the attempt to impose a 
particular political framework on the world economy by internationalising the 
authority of one state (or perhaps group of states).
8.5. Conclusions
The “territorial non-coincidence” of statehood and world economy in capitalist 
modernity is crucial for understanding the social and spatial development of 
capitalist modern i ty .The  reasons for this non-coincidence of capitalism’s 
political and economic spaces is, I have suggested in earlier chapters, not
51 Busch 1974, 271.
52 Diner 1985, 336-40.
53 The centrality of the “territorial non-coincidence” o f world market and sovereign state
has been addressed by Murray 1975, 108.
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derivative of the capital relation itself; yet its consequences for structuring 
capital’s logic of process in the capitalist age are profound. At the level of the 
individual territorial state, this finds expression in a tension between the state’s 
need to maintain the ability of ‘its’ capitals to successfully reproduce themselves 
on an expanded scale (and thereby to create the conditions for the reproduction of 
the state).
At the level of the totality, the territorial non-coincidence results in a 
contradiction. The particular state form of capitalist modernity, the territorially 
bounded state, is the only basis on which the ‘general (class) interest’ can be 
organised. The requirements for the reproduction of capital, of its accumulation 
and profitability can thus only be met at the national level. This leads not only to 
an ‘ overdetermination’ (to use this terrible term for once) of economic and class 
competition with political forms of competition; it also raises the possibility, as 
Robin Murray noted, that the ‘state functions’ required by global capital cannot 
be successfully met by national states.
This is not to say that the relationship between territorial statehood and the 
world market tendency of capital is the fundamental contradiction of capitalist 
modernity. I accord place of pride to the contradiction at the heart of the capital 
relation: that between capital and labour. This relationship, in turn, finds 
expression in a whole range of further contradictions. To name but a few: 
between use-value and exchange value; between production and realisation; 
between private accumulation and appropriation and its public, political 
presuppositions. The contention, then, is that each of these relationships is 
structured by the contradiction between political territorialisation and economic 
and social globalisation.
In many ways, the Marxist discussion of the 1970s over the 
internationalisation of capital, which located the contradiction in the inability of 
national states to provide the necessary state functions for the social and 
economic reproduction of increasingly global capital, has anticipated, and even 
set the parameters for the contemporary globalisation d e b a t e . I f  so, they may 
also have to share some responsibility for the limits of this debate, in particular
54 Murray 1975, 129.
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those which stem from the particular question they sought to answer: what are 
the consequences of the increasing transnationalisation of production for the 
national state and the national economy. As for globalisation theorists, the 
nation-state is here turned into the unquestioned starting point in a progressive 
historical scheme, even while its future is put in question by the forces which 
drive this progression towards true social, political and economic globality. This, 
however, is a serious misrepresentation of the economic and historical geography 
of capitalist modernity, as I will seek to show in the next chapter.
55 Palloix 1975; Hymer 1975.
9. BEYOND THE ‘TERRITORIAL TRAP’: 
TOWARDS A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY 
OF CAPITALIST MODERNITY
9.1. The ^Territorial Trap  ^and the ^Nationalist Conceit*
The central argument of this thesis is that the exclusive territoriality of 
political authority that prevails in capitalist modernity was not itself a product of 
the emergence of capitalist social relations. While capitalism entails the 
separation of political and economic power, we cannot derive from this argument 
an explanation for the empirical fact that the sphere of the political is fractured 
by territorial boundaries demarcating sovereign spaces. Moreover, I have argued 
that the separation of politics and economics, and the differentiation of internal 
and external realms, did not even have the same historical origins. In the 
preceding chapter, I have sought to spell out the conceptual and theoretical 
implications of this argument with respect to our understanding of capitalism and 
‘modernity’. In particular, I have argued that the continuing existence of 
territorial statehood in capitalist modernity must have profound consequences for 
the way in which capitalism’s logic of process is structured both spatially and 
socially.
But while these arguments tell us something about the tensions and 
contradictions which the “territorial non-coincidence” of capitalism’s political 
and economic spaces generates, they do not in and of themselves allow us to 
understand the concrete development of capitalist modernity. Firstly, the 
argument presented so far cannot as such explain the concrete historico- 
geographical patterns and political-economic relationships between national 
states and the world economy that have existed over the last 200 years. The 
relationship between politics and economics is not fixed and unchanging. To 
note their unique formal separation in capitalist modernity is clearly not enough; 
the question that has to follow immediately is how are they related, ostensibly as
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‘autonomous spheres’, in different historical phases of capitalist development/ 
The same applies to the relationship between the national state and the world 
economy, where this question arises in a more complex way, and to the 
relationship between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ arrangements. Moreover, although 
the elements of contradiction and totalisation emphasised earlier introduce a 
necessary dynamism into our understanding of capitalism, they cannot 
themselves determine the concrete historical process. How capitalist modernity 
developed over the last 200 years, in other words, cannot be read off its 
constitutive social forms and their relations with each other. Any attempt to 
squeeze the history of capitalism into a rigid succession of ‘stages’ is futile.
If the contradictory relationship between territorial statehood and world market 
relations cannot explain the particular social and spatial forms of capitalist 
development, it can no more provide a direct answer to the question why the 
territorial state became more rather than less dominant in the political economy 
and geography of capitalist modernity. That the territorial state assumed this 
centrality, however, is undeniable. For at least 100 years after Marx’s death, the 
dominant tendency was the further territorialisation not just of political authority, 
but increasingly also of civil society and the economy. The social sciences, even 
including modem economics, began to take ‘national society’ and the ‘national 
economy’ as their unquestioned ‘units’ of social life -  so much so that the social 
sciences ended up in what John Agnew has termed the “territorial trap”. Socio- 
geographical space becomes regarded as frozen, held in place by the formative 
powers of the territorial state. Instead of limiting the problématique of IR/IPE to 
the question of how these states relate to each other, Agnew demands that we 
should launch a new research agenda that centres on the
historical relationship between territorial states and the broader social and economic 
structures and geopolitical order (or form o f spatial practice) in which these states must 
operate. It has been the lack o f attention in the mainstream literature to this connection that
1 To argue for the centrality o f the separation of politics and economics is not to suggest
that there is no ‘interaction’ between these spheres, or that states do not play an 
important role in the regulation and reproduction o f ‘the economy’. Clearly, this role has 
become more important over the last century, and even in our neo-liberal times it is far 
from marginal or reducible to liberal ideology. To repeat, however: this does not negate 
the specifically capitalist separation o f political authority from surplus appropriation.
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has led into the territorial trap. In idealizing the territorial state we cannot see a world in
which its role and meaning change.^
The force of Agnew’s important contribution to a non-state-centric IR/IPE is 
somewhat diminished, however, by his acceptance of the notion that state- 
centrism, though it has become obsolete in recent decades, was adequate to the 
period since 1875. Along with other critics of state-centrism, he regards social 
relations in the era of ‘rival imperialisms’ as almost completely containerised. 
Moreover, Agnew also follows the conventional notion of a “secular trend in 
spatial practice” which leads from a supposedly highly territorialised division of 
labour under “early industrial capitalism” to a genuinely global division of labour 
since the late 1960s.^ Globalisation means, in this perspective, the break-up of 
the cage which the nation-state had erected around society.
I have suggested in chapter 1 that these approaches take as absolute what are 
only tendencies which actualise different potentialities of capitalist modernity. 
The age of rival imperialism, for instance, saw not only the containerisation of 
social relations but also, and in very close relationship, their further expansion. 
To focus on just one of these dimensions of modem development is highly 
misleading. A large number of studies have by now reacted to the globalisation 
thesis by pointing out that the world economy of the imperialist period was in 
many respects more highly integrated than today’s world market.Moreover, this 
world economy was not simply an ‘international’, as opposed to ‘global’ system, 
the former involving trade, the latter transnational production. The imperialist 
world economy was not simply based on ‘arms-length trade’ in which nationally 
produced goods were exchanged across boundaries. Levels of foreign direct 
investment were relatively high, and, as Glyn and Sutcliffe argue, “every 
available descriptor of financial markets in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries suggests that they were more fully integrated than they were before or
2 Agnew 1994, 77.
3 Agnew 1994, 66-67 and 69-70. Martin Albrow, despite his perceptive critique o f state-
centric social theory, similarly agrees that sovereign nation-states after the 1870s
successfully controlled ‘their’ society, making the nation-state the ultimately definitive 
institutional structure o f (high) modernity; Albrow 1996, 43.
4 Hirst and Thomson 1999, ch. 1; Sutcliffe and Glyn, 1999; Bairoch and Kozul-Wright
1998.
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have been since"/ The classical Marxist theorists of imperialism, of course, saw 
the specificity of the imperialist world economy in the dominance of the export 
of capital instead of goods (as in the period of free trade)/
There is, hence, a danger that the critics of state-centric IR/IPE leave the 
‘territorial trap’ only to become entangled in the ‘nationalistic snare’. Indeed, as 
Cameron and Palan note, the paradox of the contemporary globalisation debate is 
that “the concepts of the nation-state and the national economy have never been 
so widely and uncritically accepted as at the time of their (alleged) passing’’.’ 
Even most critics of state-centrism accept the self-representation of the nation­
state as the true spatial and social embodiment of political community at face 
value, when the real task for a critical theory of IR/IPE is to overcome the 
nationalist conceit. This conceit lies not in taking the nation-state seriously, but 
in accepting its claim to have been the sole source of power, the ultimate 
container of society, and the primordial unit of space during the century from 
1870 to 1970. In reality, the territorial state of capitalist modernity always 
mediated the dynamics and contradictions of a capitalist world society.
In order to understand the changing nature of this mediation, it is necessary to 
move beyond the dichotomy of ‘national’/international and global’ as if they 
were successive stages of modem social organisation. Instead, we have to look at 
the changing spatialisation strategies of states, classes and firms, which structure 
successive historical epochs. These spatialisation strategies may be understood as 
different ways of dealing with the fundamental tensions and problems which the 
territorial non-coincidence of capitalist statehood and world economy poses to 
actors, whether political, social or economic. The dialectic of nationalisation and 
globalisation, of the territorialised and the de-territorialised preconditions for the 
reproduction and expansion of the capital relations, thus has to become the focus 
of IR/IPE. Within this dialectic, we may then be able to distinguish particular 
regimes of socially produced space which mediate capital’s inherently global 
class relations.
5 Glyn and Sutcliffe 1992; 82.
6 Cf. Lenin 1973, 72.
7 Cameron and Palan 1999, 53.
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In the present chapter, I will seek to outline (and no more than outline!) such a 
historical geography of capitalist modernity. Before we can enter the historical 
fray, however, we have to engage with one more central concept of contemporary 
IR/lPE: hegemony. Whereas the national/global dichotomy represents the 
dominant spatial lens, the notion of hegemony is the prevailing form in which 
IR/lPE seeks to capture the social dimensions of distinct world orders. 
Hegemony, more precisely, is the concept through which theorists of the 
international endeavour to understand the way in which the most powerful states 
bridge the national and the global by internationalising their authority.
9,2, Hegemony?
The concept of hegemony has had an astonishing career in IR/IPE. Originally, 
it had been adopted by Realists to make up for the limits of its traditional focus: 
the balance of power. Hegemony is supposed to explain why, in a world of self- 
help and competition for relative gains, world economic integration is possible. 
In short, the existence of liberal world economic regimes is thought to be the 
consequence of the strong concentration of economic and military capabilities in 
the international system. This approach has been criticised as ahistorical. John 
Ruggie has argued that while the Realist concept of hegemony introduces a 
crucial focus on the “internationalisation of political authority”, it remains 
inadequate. In particular, it ignores that the international regimes established by 
hegemonic powers always represent a
fusion o f power with legitimate social purpose. The prevailing interpretation of international 
authority focuses on political power only; it ignores the dimension o f social purpose. The 
problem with this formulation is that power may predict the form  o f the international order, 
but not its content}
As Ruggie notes, not only did the Dutch hegemony of the seventeenth century 
establish or support a mercantilist rather than liberal economic order; even 
between the liberal orders of the Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana, there 
are important differences which reflect distinct relationships between politics and 
economics in both the domestic and international contexts.
Ruggie 1982, 382.
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This argument was pushed further by the introduction of Gramscian elements 
by critical International Political Economists. Like Ruggie, these scholars 
emphasise the need to add an ideational dimension to crude power politics; 
hegemony is held to be possible only on the basis of a certain degree of 
consensus between the dominant and subordinate sides of social and 
international orders. For neo-Gramscian theorists, this implies a further 
historicisation of hegemony, as not only the content, but also the social forces 
that underpin international authority, are to be theorised as changeable. The 
cyclical Realist story of the ‘rise and fall of the great powers’ has then to be 
supplanted with an account of the rise and fall of domestic and transnational 
‘historic blocs’ which managed, for a while, to internationalise their 
particularistic social and national interests. If we want to understand the 
construction and demise of hegemons, moreover, we can no longer rely on 
abstract generalities about the way in which ‘the economy’ impacts on ‘the state’, 
and vice versa; what is necessary is a theory of the relationship of specific social 
forces to particular regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation.^
I have already noted (in chapter 3) some of the problematic implications of this 
‘strong’ conceptualisation of hegemony. Most importantly, it all but severs the 
crucial link between ‘structure’ and ‘conjuncture’, leaving the abstract and the 
concrete unmediated next to each other. In that way, the concept of hegemony 
comes to carry a heavier historical and theoretical weight than it can bear. For the 
social nature of particular domestic and international orders is now derived 
entirely from the purposes imbued to them by specific social forces.
There is, however, an even more important problem: hegemony itself is a 
fundamentally ahistorical concept which has been abstracted from one particular 
period, the Pax Americana, and imposed on social and international orders in 
which there is no basis for a consensual grounding of the relations of domination. 
In other words, it is impossible to historicise world orders on the basis of a 
distinction between the contents transported by international authority structures, 
while ignoring that the very possibility of hegemony is itself premised on
Cf. Cox 1996b and 1987; Lipietz 1987. Other critical accounts which accord centrality 
to the notion o f hegemonic cycles and periods include the important works by Arrighi 
1994; Taylor 1996; and Agnew and Corbridge 1995.
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historical preconditions which certainly did not exist before the nineteenth 
century. For as long as relations of exploitation were premised on relations of 
domination, the room for consensus over the nature and purpose of political 
authority, as well as over distribution, was closely circumscribed. While there 
may have been hegemony in the Realist sense in the early modem period, the 
more theoretically sophisticated Gramscian concept of hegemony, while valuable 
in the study of post-1945 world order, is inapplicable in this context.
But even within capitalist modernity, the forms through which states seek to 
internationalise their territorially-based political authority cannot be 
circumscribed by the concept of hegemony (whether Realist or Gramscian). As 
Robert Latham notes, the so-called Pax Britannica itself does not meet most of 
the criteria for a ‘hegemonic’ ordering of international relations.^' While 
Britain’s role in Latin America, Africa and Asia was clearly very strong, in 
Europe it was but one member of an international system (the Concert of Europe) 
whose purpose it was to prevent the dominance of one power. To be sure, Britain 
was interested in preventing the ascendance of France and Russia (and later 
Germany) largely because it regarded its formal and informal empire as most 
important to its economic development and unique geopolitical role; but to claim 
that this constitutes some form of ‘hegemony’ seems dubious at best.
Even with respect to the ordering of the ‘liberal world economy’ of the mid­
nineteenth century, the role of the British state and classes in consciously 
imposing or negotiating a particular structure on world trade and finance seems 
s m a l l . I  have earlier emphasised the role of the geopolitical pressures emanating 
from Britain, which forced upon the continental European states a series of 
capitalist revolutions from above. Crucially, however, this process took the form 
of internal ‘adaptations’ which, while seeking to emulate the British industrial 
revolution through the imposition of capitalist property relations, also gave rise 
to very different state/society relations in continental Europe. Not only was the
10 Even if we accept the usefulness o f the realist concept o f hegemony for the early
modem period, the claim that Genoa or Holland can be regarded as hegemonic (i.e. 
dominant) in different parts o f this historical period is itself very doubtful. The 
Habsburg Empire and France would seem to fit the bill much better.
11 Latham 1997,425-431.
12 Latham 1997, 428-429; cf. McKeown 1983, 88.
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continental European state much more actively involved in economic 
development, the dominant social cleavages were also quite different from the 
British case.
Despite the significant role of British capital in the expansion of the industrial 
revolution to continental Europe, there was in no way an internationalisation of 
the dominant British ‘historic bloc’ that centred around political liberalism, 
laissez-faire and free trade. Indeed, Britain regularly tolerated or even supported 
the conservative monarchies of continental Europe in their mostly successful 
attempts to prevent liberal reforms and revolutions in their own realms.'^ When 
European countries converged towards freer trade after the 1860s, this was not 
the result of an internationalisation of British authority. As Hobson summarises: 
“Britain’s role in the diffusion of free trade in Europe has been greatly 
exaggerated. Britain proved unable to impose or even persuade other states to 
adopt free trade after 1846.'"'
Thus, if the notion of hegemony, and particularly in its Gramscian form, has 
any pertinence, it is with respect to the Pax Americana alone. Only in this phase 
of capitalist development has a clear internationalisation of a domestic ‘historic 
bloc’ (itself based on some degree of class compromise) and its social purpose 
been achieved through consensus formation in the international system and 
transnational society. There is, however, a further and related problem here. For 
Cox, the notion of hegemony can be equated with stability. The breakdown of 
hegemony signals, as in Realism, the breakdown of order and the rise of 
geopolitical rivalry between states. This was the case with the period of 
imperialism, when the Pax Britannica was replaced by a “non-hegemonic 
configuration of rival power blocs”. A s  with hegemony, imperialism appears as 
a transhistorical category that has to be filled with historical content by looking at 
its specific forms in distinct imperialist periods.
This dichotomy between imperialism and hegemony obscures more than it 
illuminates. Imperialism is not simply a period of non-hegemony and instability, 
a breakdown of the institutions of internationalised authority. Instead,
13 Cf. Hinsley 1967,222.
14 Hobson 1997, 200; cf. Keohane 1984, 35-38.
15 Cox 1996b, 106 and 103.
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imperialism may be better understood as one particular way of projecting 
national authority into the transnational space of capitalist world society. Its 
distinctive aspect is that it is directed not at the establishment of a generalised 
framework for the world economy, but that it seeks to constitute the relationship 
between nation-state and world market on a particularistic and exclusive basis. In 
this respect, imperialism represents one possible form of resolving, for a while at 
least, the tension between nationally organised political authority and 
transnational accumulation and reproduction.
Crucially, this form of politico-spatial organisation of the world economy 
emerged precisely when the construction of hegemony became, for the first time, 
a dominant tendency in the development of capitalist modernity -  at the domestic 
level. In both the domestic and the international contexts, then, hegemony is the 
result of a historical process; it is a category which itself has a limited historical 
existence. More concretely, the late-nineteenth century attempts at social 
integration through the cooption not just of restricted and elevated social strata, 
but through the incorporation - by legal, political and social means - of a large 
part of the population, were the first instances of a hegemonic strategy, at least in 
continental Europe.
The category of hegemony is then to be reserved for those forms of 
internationalised authority which are indeed based on a significant degree of 
domestic and international consensus formation between states and social 
classes.Hegem ony is but one form of ‘geo-economic order’ through which the 
relationship between nationals states and the capitalist world market is 
constructed. But what does this mean for those periods that can be neither 
understood as hegemony nor imperialism? What, specifically, do we do with the
16 Agnew and Corbridge (1995, 17) similarly note the problematic duality o f hegemony 
and imperialism in neo-Gramscian IPE. They suggest that imperialism may be 
understood as “‘competing’ hegemonies” (and aspiring hegemons) based in different 
states that, while confronting one another with different modes o f socio-economic 
organization, tacitly accept the same assumptions about the nature o f statehood and the 
rules of international behaviour. ... There is always hegemony, but there are not always 
hegemons”. Beyond competing state hegemonies, there is even the possibility, they 
suggest, to derive from Gramsci a notion o f hegemony “without state agency” ; ibid, 24. 
But this solution runs not just into the problem that it becomes even more difficult than 
in the more restrictive Gramscian reading to show how hegemony could exist in the 
international sphere without an ‘international’ or ‘global’ state; cf. Germain and Kenny
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Pax Britannica, if it is not a hegemonic order? And can recent forms of socio- 
spatial restructuring still be understood in terms of a reconstitution of hegemony, 
or do we have to think of new categories to capture the social and geographical 
specificity of the present? An alternative is indicated by the argument, suggested 
by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, that the emerging form of globalised 
authority may be best understood as a new form of ‘empire’. This “concept of 
Empire posits a regime that effectively encompasses the spatial totality, or really 
that rules over the entire ‘civilized’ world. No territorial boundaries limit its 
reign”.
The question of whether ‘empire’ is indeed the most appropriate concept for 
the theoretical grasping of contemporary socio-spatial restructuring takes us 
beyond the scope of this thesis.^* For now, it is important to note that the 
conceptualisation of international authority structures in terms of the rise and fall 
of hegemonic orders (whether interpreted as a sequence of dominant great 
powers or as a succession of transnational historic blocs) is not only historically 
problematic. It also detracts from the explication and theorisation of the changing 
nature of capitalist statehood as a spatial form.‘^
The following outline of geo-economic orders draws together many of the 
arguments presented over different chapters of this thesis. At its heart is the idea 
that capitalist development cannot be understood as a unilinear movement from 
‘the national’ to ‘the global’. Instead, the political geography of capitalist
1998 (see above, chapter 3, fh. 20). It also entails a historical and analytical inflation of 
the concept o f hegemony itself.
17 Hardt and Negri 2000, xiv.
18 An alternative, but in many respects equivalent approach to Hardt and Negri’s is
suggested by William Robinson, who argues that current transformations cannot be
grasped in terms o f the transition from one hegemonic structure to another. For 
Robinson, the hegemony o f one state is the mode o f political regulation o f  international 
world economies; the globalisation o f the world economy engenders a process o f global 
state formation based on the hegemony o f a transnational class; national states become 
part o f the structure o f a ‘global state’; Robinson 1999, 7. This formulation is 
incompatible with the thrust of the argument o f this thesis as it posits a strong contrast 
between international and global; it indicates, however, the need to go beyond 
hegemony as the core category o f critical IR/IPE.
19 This is not to say that such issues are ignored in hegemony-based approaches. The
notion o f an “internationalisation o f the state”, for instance, introduced by Christian 
Palloix 25 years ago, has since been taken up by many hegemony-theorists o f IPE in 
order to capture the transformations in the relationship between the nation state and the 
world market; Palloix 1977, 14; cf. Cox 1996, 107-109; Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 
194.
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modernity should be conceptualised as simultaneously involving local, regional 
and global scales; because of the territoriality of political authority, it is the ‘state 
scale’ which will be of particular importance in the construction of the 
sociospatial orders of capitalist modernity.^® States assume a crucial role in the 
creation of the spaces of capitalist accumulation, engaging in continual attempts 
to restructure space. In these attempts, states cannot simply be presumed to 
always act on behalf of particular classes, class fractions, social forces, socio­
economic groups, etc.; state autonomy is a crucial aspect of capitalist modernity.
Yet the autonomy of the capitalist state is highly ambivalent. It is real in that 
the abstract sphere of the political is not directly involved in the act of 
exploitation; the capitalist class can organise its class power privately, allowing 
capitalists to pursue their individual interests without the need for the direct 
control of the state. In fact, for most of the history of capitalist modernity, it was 
not a capitalist bourgeoisie that controlled the state, but ‘post-absolutist state 
classes’ which sponsored and promoted capitalist industrialisation in order to 
reproduce themselves internally and externally. Exactly who rules the capitalist 
state, and in whose interests concrete policies are made, cannot be determined on 
the basis of the definition of capitalism as a class society.
At the same time, this autonomy is no more than apparent in that the very 
abstraction of ‘the political’ from ‘the economic’ contributes to the reproduction 
of privatised relations of exploitation; it is also apparent in as much as the 
maintenance of the state presupposes not only the guaranteeing of private 
property and capitalist property relations, but also the successful accumulation of 
capital. It is for these reasons that states - far from merely guaranteeing private 
property, the sanctity of contracts and the rule of law - become increasingly 
drawn into the mediation of the tensions and contradictions of capitalist social 
relations, whether they manifest themselves economically or socially. This 
argument, then, leads us back to our starting point, namely the distinct 
spatialisation strategies that states pursue in order to resolve or alleviate the 
problems which arise from the fact that capitalist accumulation is always to some 
degree global, while its political reproduction is territorial.
20 Cf. Neil Brenner 1997,
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I cannot hope to achieve more than a preliminary outline of the historical 
geographies of capitalist modernity, which will necessarily reduce the complexity 
of the historical process. Its purpose is to provide the starting points for future 
research and the basis for a concluding discussion of the contemporary process of 
socio-spatial restructuring.^'
9.3, The British World Economy
A capitalist world economy did not emerge before the nineteenth century, 
when under “British auspices market exchange was effectively globalised as 
production for the market replaced the mere trading of goods”.^  ^Obviously, there 
had long been international trade, and this trading system increasingly 
transmitted the goods produced in Britain under capitalist conditions. Some 
economic historians maintain that the particular role of Britain in the eighteenth- 
century world economy was the effective cause of the Industrial Revolution in 
Britain (and the reason for its relatively early onset ) .Whi le  this argument is 
incompatible with the emphasis I have put on the transformation of social 
property relations within England since the demise of feudalism, capitalist 
development and the industrial revolution would indeed have been impossible 
without a world market for food, resources and manufactured goods. The role of 
international trade and overseas colonialism was thus far from negligible, but it 
did not itself constitute the dynamic factor of social and economic development 
in Britain. More important had been the development of a domestic market and
21 The following account tends, in particular, to focus too narrowly on the dominant 
spatialisation strategies of the dominant states. This must lead to severe distortions as 
every world economy reflects the different and often incompatible spatialisation 
strategies which any particular state pursues, and this in a context o f other states doing 
the same. It misses, for instance the complexity of a system in which some states will 
pursue certain strategies precisely because other states are not, thus trying to fill niches. 
In this respect the argument presented in the following sections tends to mirror the 
problems o f the hegemony-approach, which attributes to much coherence and 
homogeneity to particular world orders.
22 Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 27.
23 The list o f scholars adhering to this view is almost endless and includes liberals as well 
as Marxists. For a recent example, see O ’Brien 1999. This link has been challenged by a 
growing number of economic historians; see Thomas and McCloskey 1994. Also see the 
excellent surveys by Mokyr 1993 and Meyers 1987.
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rising mass incomes and demand. '^  ^In other words, the Industrial Revolution was 
the product of capitalism, and the capitalist element was not the operation of the 
world market, whose nature was still largely circumscribed by the non-capitalist 
property relations prevailing in the areas whose exchange it mediated.
By 1800, Britain had assumed a central role in the world economy. While the 
world-wide proportion of foreign trade to production was around 3 percent, the 
ratio was 27 percent for Britain, rising to 45-50 percent by 1860.^  ^ British 
manufactured goods swamped the European markets after the breakdown of the 
Continental System, which had difficulties paying for these commodities with 
agricultural exports into the protected British market. Some (France, Russia and 
Austria especially) reacted to the introduction of the Com Laws by raising their 
own tariffs. But this did not stop the movement of British capital and capital 
goods to Europe, nor did it prevent the exchange of commodities (although 
Britain increasingly exported to non-European markets). During this period, 
Britain was able to develop complementary patterns of trade not only with its 
formal and informal overseas empire, but also with Europe. These European 
exports to Britain consisted not only of food and raw materials, but increasingly 
of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, too, but many of these 
commodities were produced with British machines (and financed with British 
capital).^^
If we look at these patterns of economic transactions from the perspective of 
world economic integration, we can arrive at two very different conclusions. On 
the one hand, the degree of integration looks relatively low if we take our starting 
point to be the European market, given that the export and import ratios to GDP 
of most European countries were rather low. If, however, we begin from the 
assumption (following from earlier discussions on the process of capitalist 
development in Europe) that Britain, rather than Europe as a whole, formed the 
‘core’ of the first capitalist world economy, we arrive at a rather different picture. 
As Eric Hobsbawm notes:
24 Cf. Elsenhans 1983; Wood 1991, ch. 6.
25 Pollard 1974, 14.
26 Pollard 1974, 17-19.
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An entire world economy was ... built on, or rather around, Britain, and this country 
therefore temporarily rose to a position o f global influence and power unparalleled by any 
state of its relative size before or since ... There was a moment in the world’s history when 
Britain can be described, if we are not too pedantic, as its only workshop, its only massive 
importer and exporter, its only carrier, its only imperialist, almost its only investor; and for 
that reason its only naval power and the only one which had a genuine world policy. Much 
o f this monopoly was simply due to the loneliness o f the pioneer, monarch o f all he surveys 
because o f the absence o f any other surveyors.^^
This unique economic position allowed Britain to introduce its free trade 
policy during the 1840s, creating the conditions for a “single system of free flows 
in which the international transfers of capital and commodities passed largely 
through British hands and institutions”.^ * But while many European states 
subsequently embraced free trade, and the idea of free trade may be said to have 
become hegemonic, Britain itself did not become a hegemon. According to 
Holsti, “Great Britain’s role as a world power did not translate into continental 
hegemony. The governance system in nineteenth century Europe was a 
polyarchy, not a hegemony”.^  ^ In its relationship with Britain’s formal and 
informal empire, on the other hand, the internationalisation of the authority of the 
British state was much more direct. The element of coercion was far more 
decisive here than that of consent and ‘leadership’.
The ‘regime of free trade’ was therefore not premised on the 
internationalisation of British authority as far as Europe was concerned, while the 
‘imperialism of free trade’ to which areas in the Middle East, Latin America and 
Asia and later Africa were subjected was dependent on direct or indirect political 
control. This should not distract from the specificity of the British world 
economy. Most importantly, political control was not systematically employed to 
advance the interests of British capitalists, but guaranteed the penetration of the 
European periphery by all capitals. It thus acted as an ‘ideal collective capitalist’ 
on a global basis, however much the benefits did de facto accrue to British 
traders, industrialists and financiers (given the limited scope of overseas activity 
of continental European capitalists). The spatialisation strategy of the British 
state was thus oriented towards providing the preconditions for the world-wide 
expansion of capital, whatever its origins. Yet while this spatialisation strategy
27 Hobsbawm 1990, 13.
28 Hobsbawm 1990, 14.
29 Holsti 1992, 56.
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required the widespread and ongoing use of force in order to produce and 
maintain social property relations conducive to capitalist penetration, it also 
reflected the notion that political means should not be used for particularistic 
economic interests.
The presupposition of this system was the temporary absence of economic and 
political competitors who could have threatened the exceptional role of Britain -  
a presupposition that could not possibly be maintained forever without political 
control over the European countries undergoing capitalist transformations. In 
these countries, however, political power was used in order to shape comparative 
advantages in the international trading system, though this power was so far used 
mainly in a defensive capacity. The situation after the Vienna Congress put 
severe restraints on the European great powers; instead of resuming their 
traditional military competition, their main consideration was now the prevention 
of liberal revolutions and nationalist projects of secession or unification.
The primary international issue became the management of the external 
consequences of the passive revolutions to capitalism, while securing the internal 
consolidation of the post-absolutist state classes. Far from expressing the 
interests of capitalists or the capitalist class, foreign policy in this period 
reflected the concerns of ruling ‘groups’ which had formed a kind of class during 
the ancien regime (a ‘state class’ which maintained itself mainly through its 
control of property in the state), but had now become an ‘elite’ seeking to 
maintain control over the social and economic forces they created in order to 
maintain at least some of their privileges. It is this ambivalent role of these ‘post­
absolutist elites’ which also helps us to understand the very different role of the 
state in the ‘newly industrialising countries’ of continental Europe. Their 
spatialisation strategies were directed at achieving national economies which 
could sustain the pursuit of the ‘national interest’ of these states.
It was clear that this purpose could only be achieved if European countries did 
not become permanently integrated into the British world economy on the basis 
of existing comparative advantages in food and natural resources. Natural factor 
endowment could be no more than a starting point for nationally defined 
development projects that aimed at catching up with industrial Britain. The 
‘national political economy’ of List and Hamilton rather than the ‘cosmopolitical
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economy’ of Smith and Ricardo thus became the guiding ideological framework 
in many of these s t a t e s E v e n  when, after 1860, most of the newly 
industrialising countries committed themselves to free (or freer) trade, their 
governments typically maintained a strong role in economic development and in 
shaping the international competitiveness of specific sectors and industries.
But, as we have seen, for a long time the role of the state in economic 
development remained defensive. Ironically, it was during the heyday of free 
trade that the only relevant peak of international wars during the “hundred years’ 
peace” occurred (between 1858 and 1871). The failure of the 1848 revolutions, 
and the incorporation of the middle classes, allowed European states more 
latitude in their international relations, and enabled them to once more use the 
instrument of war to advance their interests. But these interests themselves were 
changing. The wars of this period were neither simple wars of aggrandisement, 
nor were they meant to achieve economic advantages in any immediate way. 
Hobsbawm notes correctly: “Nobody -  not even Marx, contrary to a common 
assumption, thought of European wars as primarily economic in origin in this 
period”.^ '
These wars were, instead, wars of nation-building. To reduce this process in 
Germany and Italy to the creation of larger economic territories in the interest of 
‘capital’ would be fundamentally misleading. There was clearly a link to the 
rupture in social life which the ongoing capitalist transformation brought with it. 
But in many ways, these wars were part of the defensive movement of the post­
absolutist state elites against the aspirations of the capitalist bourgeoisie. 
Bismarck’s project of unification, for instance, aimed first and foremost at the 
weakening of the middle classes in the Prussian parliament and the preservation 
of the privileges of the aristocracy and monarchy. The achievement of national 
unity by the monarchical institutions of Prussia was meant to undermine the 
ability of liberal groups in parliament to press for constitutional changes.
30 Cf. Ruggie 1983b, 6. “Political economy, as [List] used the term ‘teaches how a given 
nation in the present state o f the world and its own special national relations can 
maintain and improve its economic conditions,’ whereas cosmopolitical economy 
‘teaches how the entire human race may attain prosperity’ on the assumption ‘that all 
nations on earth form but one society living in a perpetual state o f peace’”; ibid., 6-7.
31 Hobsbawm 1989, 99.
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The result was the increasing cooptation of the middle classes on the basis of 
an aristocratic worldview, which had been the dominant trend since 1815 (and 
reinforced after 1848). Nowhere in continental Europe did industrial capitalist 
interests have immediate sway over governments. The interests of capitalists, and 
more importantly, of the capitalist economy, could not be ignored, but their 
‘requirements’ could only find their way into government policy refracted 
through the social, political and economic interests of the post-absolutist state 
e l i t es . In  no way can the switch to free trade itself be explained with reference 
to the interests of the ‘rising’ industrial bourgeoisie; in Germany the interests of 
the Junkers were probably decisive.
Even in Britain, the dominant social interest was not that of the industrial 
capitalists. For Hobsbawm, the repeal of the Com Laws is a clear sign of the 
ascendancy of industrial capital over agriculture. But, as Cain and Hopkins argue, 
industrialists remained subordinated to the ‘gentlemanly’ culture of service 
capital concentrated in the City of London. The dominance of ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism’ dated back to 1688, arising from an alliance between agricultural and 
finance capitalists, which henceforth shaped British trade and colonial policy.^^ 
After the turn to free trade, agriculture suffered a sharp decline, and industrial 
capitalists achieved more influence; moreover, the central form of capital 
internationalisation became, for a short while, the export of manufactured 
commodities, before it was once again surpassed by financial exports. 
Industrialists were integrated in a subordinate position into the genteel and, 
despite the decline of agriculture, landed culture of the city and the manor.
There was, however, a cmcial difference between the mling orders of Britain 
and continental Europe. Put simply, whereas in the latter the dominant 
aristocracy, until very recently at least, was a thoroughly non-capitalist class 
which imposed its purposes on the newly emerging capitalist bourgeoisie, in 
Britain the aristocracy had been a (or even the) capitalist class for many centuries 
and politically dominant since 1688. This implies an important modification of 
the Schumpeterian perspective which pervades the work of Mayer and Halperin: 
the same label may disguise very different contents; the British aristocracy
32 Pieterse 1989, 153-55; cf. Halperin 1997, 85-92; Mayer 1981, ch. 3.
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represented a very different social interest than the aristocracy in France, Austria, 
or Germany.
According to Cain and Hopkins, there “was no sharp, Schumpeterian antithesis 
between aristocracy and capitalism in Britain after 1850, but there was a 
distinction to be drawn between gentlemanly and industrial capital”. In their 
perspective, while Schumpeter’s “insight that the capitalist system’s 
development was significantly affected by the non-capitalist environment from 
which it sprang” must be maintained, it is misleading to posit too strong an 
opposition between the old and the new. Thus, instead of stressing “the gulf 
between traditional elites and the modem economy”, Cain and Hopkins 
emphasise “the extent to which capitalism and tradition came to terms with each 
other to create a unique domestic ‘substance’”.^"* The alliance of gentlemanly 
capitalists also expressed itself in a particular form of imperialism and 
expansion. “Put simply, overseas expansion and the imperialism which 
accompanied it played a vital role in maintaining property and privilege at home 
in an age of social upheaval and revolution”.^ ^
This argument applies, in principle, also to continental Europe which was in 
the middle of the transition to capitalism, even if the aristocratic element was 
clearly much more dominant here (and thus created different ‘domestic 
substances’). The point to emphasise here is not the dualism of contradictory 
social forms and motivations, but their interpenetration. When, after the 1870s, 
war and military competition made their return onto the European (and 
increasingly global) scene, this did not reflect the resurgence of the aristocracy’s 
‘atavistic impulses’, but the increasing contradictions of capitalism in its existing 
form. The conflicts between the aristocracy and the middle classes were 
overshadowed (though not replaced) by the aspirations of the workers; the 
contradictions between national regulation and global accumulation increasingly 
emerged as acute problems facing the newly industrialising countries.
While the development of capitalism in this period implies a totalisation of 
capital, it also entailed a certain fragmentation of the world economy that had
33 Cain and Hopkins 1993, ch. 1.
34 Cain and Hopkins 1993, 15.
35 Cain and Hopkins 1993, 45.
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been created under British tutelage. It is this state of affairs which those, who 
posit an ascending movement from the national to the global, take as their 
starting point. As we have seen, this must misrepresent the real development of 
capitalist modernity which started out more global (though less universal) than 
perhaps any capitalist world economy since. In order to understand this process, 
we must turn our attention to the emergence of the nation (as opposed to 
territorial or national) state.
9.4, Nation-Formation and the Imperialist World Economy
9.4.1. The State and the Nation 
Why did states become so crucial in defining not just the spatial, but also the 
social forms of organisation which have characterised capitalist modernity ever 
since the last third of the nineteenth century? For most liberal theorists of the 
nineteenth century, it was clear that military rivalry had become a thing of the 
past with the onset of the capitalist or industrial period. In this perspective, the 
rise of this new economic society generated a new economic rationality, which 
would leave individuals to prefer chasing wealth rather than power. In the long 
run, this new order was bound to assert itself politically, subordinating the state 
to the rule of rational interests of the bourgeois classes as the bearers of 
rationality rather than the violent passions of the aristocracy. As Hobsbawm puts 
it:
The bourgeois prophets of the mid-nineteenth century looked forward to a single, more or 
less standardized, world where all governments would acknowledge the truths o f political 
economy and liberalism carried throughout the globe by impersonal missionaries more 
powerful than those o f Christianity or Islam had ever had; a world reshaped in the image o f 
the bourgeoisie, perhaps even one from which, eventually, national differences would 
disappear.^^
Herbert Spencer even envisaged the demise of the state, whose functions 
would be taken up by a society growing increasingly complex and integrated. 
Indeed, the state itself originated in a society organised for war rather than 
commerce, and the increasing predominance of the latter made war, and thus the 
state, increasingly unnecessary for its reproduction. As a result, there would be a
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world in which individuals competed directly against each other in the world 
market, with no role for military competition organised by states/^ Marx and 
Engels did not follow liberal thinking quite so far, but there can be no doubt that 
they, too, expected a declining role for the state, given that “the national 
differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more 
vanishing"/^ While this would allow for the universal competition between 
individuals, it would, more importantly, also lead to a situation in which war 
between classes would replace war between states. As we have seen in chapter 5, 
they had an inkling that these two lines of conflict might intersect in ways as yet 
unforeseen, but the full historical consequences of this intersection escaped them.
Central to the historical process, whereby the territorial state became more and 
more critical to all aspects of social life, was the transformation of statehood 
from the dynastic to the nation-state. One aspect of this transformation was the 
tendency for the borders of the state and the boundaries of nations to become 
more congruent, whether through movements of national secession or 
unification. Perhaps even more important, however, was the increasing need for 
states to be able to represent themselves as embodying the nation - not just 
culturally, but also politically.
What were the sources of the historical constitution of the nation-state? The 
idea of the nation had existed for many centuries in Europe, without becoming 
the basis for state legitimacy. During the nineteenth century, it became a political 
rallying point especially (but not only) for the middle classes, which often 
associated the demand for national sovereignty with the call for national unity or 
secession. By the late nineteenth century, however, nationalwm had become a 
weapon in the hands of the post-absolutist state classes against the middle classes 
as well as a means of integrating the working classes. The latter task became 
increasingly pressing with the onset of the Great Depression after 1873, and the 
second industrial revolution which not only increased the number of workers but 
also created (with its large factories) the conditions for more effective 
organisation in parties and trade unions. These processes of social and territorial
36 Hobsbawm 1989, 83.
37 Koch 1984, 324.
38 Marx and Engels 1998, 36.
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integration also allow us to understand the ‘territorialisation’ of the social 
sciences, and their role in the construction of national spaces.
9.4.2. The Territorial Trap Revisited 
For Marx and Engels, the worker had no fatherland. In their 1848 perspective, 
the individual worker was quickly losing his or her ties to particular localities: 
“modem industrial labour, modem subjection to capital, the same in England as 
in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national 
character”.^  ^ From the perspective of 1914, however, this was clearly a cmel 
misunderstanding. Not just the workers, but the capitalist bourgeoisie as well, 
were evidently associated with particular national states. Thus, the period 
between 1873 and 1914 has thus laid the foundations for the state-centrism that 
has dominated the social sciences until recently. And yet, it would be completely 
misleading to follow the social sciences into their statist ontology. For both the 
‘nationalisation’ of the social sciences and the ‘containerisation’ of society after 
the 1870s were aspects of the mediation of capitalist class relations and of the 
social and economic contradictions to which they gave rise. And, as Martin 
Albrow points out, much of these efforts of the state were stimulated directly by 
Marx’s theory of global capitalism and transnational class relations:
M arx’s work revealed the deepest problem for the future o f nation-state society, namely that 
its trajectory would be influenced by forces which crossed its boundaries. For any analysis o f 
the economic system showed that it was intrinsically connected to the world as a whole. ... 
Marx’s ideas struck terror into the nation-state and simultaneously gave internationalism the 
reputation o f subversion."*®
The subsequent ‘caging’ or ‘containerisation’ of the market and of social 
relations must be understood in this context. It is not so much an expression of a 
transhistorical logic of centralisation inherent in the ‘political sphere’, but a 
reaction to the transnationalisation of social relations which had been a product 
of the very measures (i.e. the imposition of capitalist production relations) which 
continental European states had pursued since the early nineteenth century in 
order to effect an industrial revolution. As Albrow argues:
39 Marx and Engels 1998, 21.
40 Albrow 1996, 45.
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It is well known that the response o f the nation-state to the social transformation which 
industrial production brought in its wake was to domesticate the problem. That is, the forces 
which were worldwide, the new threats from uncontrolled society, were converted into 
problems within the nation-state. The ‘social problem’ was a code to refer to the problem of 
incorporating the newly formed industrial proletariat into nation-state society. It was a big 
enough problem setting to generate simultaneously socialism, the welfare state and sociology 
as an academic discipline."*'
Albrow’s arguments allow us to understand the nationalising of the social 
sciences after Marx as a reflection of the process of social containerisation, to 
which they themselves contributed by legitimising the state’s project. The first 
major sociological challenge to Marx’s understanding of modernity as based on 
capitalist class relations which embodied this trend was Max Weber’s historical 
sociology. In the self-representations of the social sciences, this challenge is 
usually regarded as the recovery of the dimension of political power which 
liberals and Marxists had chosen to discount, blinded by the rise of industrial 
capitalism. In this perspective, a vital reality of modem life since at least the 
sixteenth century is finally given the weight it deserves, whose consideration 
would enable Weber and his successors to make understandable why the socialist 
movement failed to make a world revolution and the state became more rather 
than less dominant in the further course of modem history. In this sense, we have 
become accustomed to resolving the Marx-Weber debate in the latter’s favour: 
Marx was wrong, Weber was right.
Altematively, however, Weber’s work may be regarded as a critical step into 
the state-centrism which has since taken hold of the social sciences, including 
Intemational Relations. Moreover, his contention that bureaucratised and 
territorial states rather than transnational classes determine socio-spatial 
organisation appears as not simply a value-free analytical statement reflecting the 
role which the state had assumed in orienting the actions of individuals; it is 
itself an intervention by this self-described “class-conscious bourgeois”"*^ into a 
social struggle which at that moment was far from decided. The purpose of this 
intervention was precisely to legitimise the caging and domestication of social 
relations whose revolutionary potentials were threatening capitalist society, and 
thus to make the ideal-type of the modem state more reflective of the actual
41 Albrow 1996, 45-46.
42 W eber’s self-description is quoted in Mommsen 1985,235.
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practices of the individuals of capitalist society by legitimising the state’s claim 
to the loyalty of its subjects. If, therefore, the Communist Manifesto proved “a 
pathetic prophecy”, as Weber suggested,"*  ^ it did so not least because Weber and 
other social scientists developed theories which sustained the state’s right to 
suppress alternative forms of social and spatial organisation, and to employ 
‘legitimately’ their monopoly of the means of coercion for this purpose.
Returning to Albrow’s argument, it is thus possible to see that Weber’s 
sociology, like “much of social theory was effectively designed to reflect back to 
the state its own efforts to control society”. But, as we have seen, not just to 
reflect these efforts:
Most o f the modem theory o f the state was devoted to demonstrating that its particular form
of social organization was indeed the true and permanent expression of the nature o f society.
But the fact is that a particular version of the state, the nation-state, sought to create society
44m Its own unage.
The origins of the ‘modem’ social sciences in the period of nation-state 
formation at the end of the nineteenth century were thus not coincidental; they 
were themselves deeply implicated in the constmction of nation-state as the 
primary form of political community. The importance accorded to the nation­
state in Weber’s work is not the result of his rediscovery of an ‘objective reality’ 
temporarily forgotten by liberals and socialists. For Weber, in other words, the 
analytical centrality of the state follows from his belief that “the furtherance of 
the nation-state must take primacy over all other objectives’’.'^ ^
Behind the move of the social sciences into what John Agnew has termed the 
“territorial trap”, which can be understood as the conceptualisation of the 
territorial state as a “sacred unit beyond historical time”, is thus the political 
project of the containerisation of social relations.'^^ This project sought to 
supplant and eventually replace the imagined community of a transnational class 
striving to overcome the territoriality of political authority, and ultimately even 
statehood as such, with the imagined community of the nation. The social 
substance of this project was not any natural tendency of the state towards self-
43 Quoted in Mommsen 1985, 235.
44 Albrow 1996, 43.
45 Giddens 1972, 26.
46 Agnew 1994, 65.
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aggrandisement, which Realists have abstracted from the historical context of 
this period, but the attempt to maintain capitalist class relations and the capitalist 
market, both potentially non-territorial, through the strengthening of the 
relationship between state, territory, and society.
9.4.3. Nationalisation, Internationalisation, and Inter-imperialist 
Rivalry
There is more that needs to be said about the constitution of the nation-state, 
the national economy, and national society. We may best understand certain 
aspects of nation-formation, however, if we also look at this process from the 
perspective of the intemational system, and particularly the growing inter­
imperialist rivalry between the leading states of this system. The blurring of the 
boundary between domestic and intemational spheres is not an innovation of the 
contemporary period.'^  ^Nation-formation and imperialist expansion were closely 
related processes. The theorisation of this relationship, moreover, was a central 
concem of the classical Marxist theorists of imperialism. As Ankie Hoogvelt 
notes, they developed their frameworks in a historical context dominated by two 
countervailing tendencies:
One the one hand there was the intensifying nationalist rivalry between the capitalist 
countries which boiled over into the First World War, and on the other was the phenomenal 
growth, not just o f a world market for commodities freely exchanged across borders, but o f 
the internationalisation o f production itself when giant firms from metropolitan countries 
began to vertically integrate mine-to-market production chains across the globe, when 
intemational trusts and cartels appeared to set world market prices and allocate spheres of 
investment and distribution outlets, and when shares began to be traded across frontiers and 
intemational loans became the order o f the day.^*
The theories which Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin produced to account for 
these contradictory tendencies gave historical materialism a slant which removed 
it far from the original perspective of Marx and Engels, who clearly privileged 
the tendency of globalisation. Yet they could claim that the seeds for the
47 It is cmcial, however, not to dismiss the historical efficacy of such socially constituted 
boundaries between inherently related ‘spheres’ o f social reality too easily, whether in 
the context o f the presence or the past. The task of the social sciences is to grasp the 
nature o f historical social orders through their ‘appearances’, and to account for these 
appearances, rather than to seek undifferentiated essences just beneath the surface of 
social life.
48 Hoogvelt 1997, 23.
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transformations of capitalism which they had to grapple with had already been 
recognised by Marx and Engels - and therefore that they were doing nothing but 
building on Marx’s original insights. It was in the tendency for monopoly to 
replace free competition, which Marx had posited as an inevitable process of 
capitalist development, that they located the sources of both nationalist 
integration and imperialist expansion.
The result of this inevitable process of monopolisation was, according to 
Hilferding, the rise of ‘finance capital’, which united the banking and industrial 
capital and thus imposed on the capitalist class a single class interest. Having rid 
themselves of their fractions, capitalists could now impress their collective 
interest on the state. This interest was seen to lie in maintaining the conditions 
for reaping monopoly profits at home (through the raising of tariff walls), and in 
promoting the search for new outlets for investments abroad. Capital export 
implies the control of the areas of investment. Finance capital thus entails a 
stronger economic role for the state which acquired three essential functions: the 
creation of an economic space as large as possible; which is shut off by the state 
against foreign competition through tariff walls; and which thus becomes an area 
for exploitation by national monopolies organised by the state (which in turn 
comes to lose all autonomy vis-à-vis finance capital). As a consequence of the 
rise of monopoly capitalism, the "bourgeoisie ceases to be pacific and 
humanitarian. ... Its ideal is now to secure for its own nation the domination of 
the world, a striving which is as unlimited as the capitalist drive for profits from 
which it derived”.'^ ^
The state thus came to assume a central role in securing the expanded 
reproduction of (monopoly) capital. We have already noted (in chapter 5) that the 
classical Marxist theorists of imperialism had little by way of a theory that 
explains why ‘national blocs of capital’ should have become the organisational 
form of intemational political and economic competition. But theirs was a 
specific concem. Taking the existence of capitalist states (and the complete 
dominance of the capitalist class over these states) as given, they wanted to know 
why these states increasingly engaged each other in military competition. The
49 Hilferding, quoted in Faber, Groh and Walther 1982, 219.
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thesis which they put forward has immediate spatial implications: the more 
competition within the industrialised states was restricted, the more competition 
was transferred to the intemational realm, where it was pursued with the support 
of the state apparatus. As Bukharin suggested, national economies were 
transformed "fnto one gigantic combined enterprise under the tutelage o f the 
financial kings and the capitalist state'\^^ These political-economic complexes 
now competed against each other for profits in the world market much like 
individual firms had competed against each other within the national economies 
-  with the vital difference that the new form of competition was pursued by 
political and military means. Each state, furthermore, sought to gain exclusive 
control of economic territories beyond its national boundaries. Lenin in particular 
saw the super-profits that could be reaped in these dependent areas as cmcial to 
the ability of capitalists to bribe the ‘aristocracy of labour’ into accepting the 
existing political and economic stmctures.
It should be noted here that the element of colonialism never assumed more 
than a subordinate role in these theories of imperialism. For Lenin, Bukharin and 
Hilferding, what was new about the ‘new imperialism’ was not the striving for 
colonies. All of them recognised that colonialism had existed throughout the 
nineteenth century and far beyond. Indeed, as Lenin argued, the new imperialism 
only began when all the world had been split up between the capitalist great 
powers — roughly around 1900. Their theory of monopoly capitalism was thus 
not meant to explain the scramble for Africa and the division of Asia into spheres 
of influence, as so many of their critics assumed when they sought to falsify the 
‘economic’ theory of colonial expansion.^' Indeed, they were perfectly willing to 
accept that colonialism was, like every concrete historical phenomenon, the 
result of ‘manifold determinations’, from the need for raw materials to strategic 
considerations, to the externalisation of social problems.^^ What their theory of 
monopoly capitalism was meant to explain was the increasing inter-imperialist 
rivalry between capitalist states and the failure of the working class to resist a 
war in which workers fought willingly for their fatherlands.
50 Bukharin 1972, 73-74 (emphasis in the original).
51 Stokes 1969; Etherington 1984.
52 Cf. Linklater 1990, 86-89; Etherington 1984, 134.
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Imperialism, in the sense used by the classical Marxist theorists of 
imperialism, was thus not identical with colonialism. Colonialism was only 
relevant to the theory and practice of imperialism in as much as colonies became 
part of the spatialisation strategies of the imperialist powers. Where colonies, 
under whatever flag, had so far been open to the capital of any country, they now 
(around the turn of the century) became the preserves of the colonising power. 
And where the colonialism of the pre-imperialist era, including the scramble for 
Africa, had been managed cooperatively and relatively peacefully (as far as the 
relationship between the colonisers is concerned!), the competition for the 
redivision of colonies for exclusive use now became much more aggressive.
While these issues and problems do indeed constitute the proper focus of a 
theory of imperialism, the preceding remarks are not meant to suggest that the 
answers given by Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin can be accepted without 
scrutiny. Far from it. Scores of critics have dealt severe - and probably deathly - 
blows to the idea that imperialism is nothing but monopoly capitalism. Bill 
Warren (whose alternative theory of capitalist development is, it must be said, at 
least as dubious as the one he attacks so effectively), has pointed out that the 
causal link between monopolisation, capital export, and imperialism posited by 
Lenin et al. cannot be maintained. The states with the most extensive empires 
and capital exports do not fit the monopoly theory either. Britain (and to a lesser 
extend France) was marked by a low degree of monopolisation and 
concentration.^"* On the other hand, some of the players on the imperialist chess 
board, including Russia, the USA, Italy, Germany and Japan, were rather 
insignificant as capital exporters. In fact, as Fritz Fischer notes, a crucial problem 
for Germany's imperialist aspirations was its lack of exportable capital, which 
undermined its ability to tie governments in the agrarian world to itself. This was 
the result of the enormous industrial development recently experienced by 
Germany:
German industrialisation had consumed vast investments, which were no longer available in
the race for spheres o f influence; this was directly contrary to France, which could employ
53 Cf. Kieman 1974, 6.
54 Warren 1980, 65.
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enough investment-seeking capital politically, because she was less developed
economically/^
The Russian case was rather different from these two (or that of Britain); it 
was the main recipient of French funds and only just beginning to undergo 
capitalist industrialisation. What, then, is the common element which drove these 
states to pursue imperialist strategies, if it is not monopolisation and the need for 
outlets for capital investments? Realist scholars of IR/IPE have often suggested 
that there is no such common element; states of all possible social constitutions 
have engaged in imperialism since the beginning of time.^  ^ Instead, they have 
pointed to the inexorable logic of anarchy which forces states to expand their 
power. In this way, the crucial question asked by the classical Marxist theorists 
of imperialism (and many other contemporary observers), why military violence 
assumed such renewed prominence at the end of the nineteenth century, 
disappears from sight.
If abstract theories of the anarchical intemational system remain unable to 
elucidate concrete historical processes, it should also be noted that the search for 
an element common to all late-nineteenth century imperialist state/society 
complexes may indeed be futile, as Realists suggest. But does a theory of 
imperialism have to be built upon either an intemational or a comparative 
methodology? I would suggest that such is not the case. It may be quite possible 
that imperialist strategies were first adopted by some states, in reaction to the 
social and economic contradictions of capitalism, whose strategies then induced 
other states to embrace similar policies even though the social and economic 
problems which they confronted were rather different ones. In this way, 
imperialism may become an attribute of the intemational system, even though the 
origins of imperialism can only be found in a limited number of imperialist 
states.
55 Fischer 1984, 133.
56 Cf. Waltz 1979, 25.
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9.4.4. Imperial World Economies
This is not the place to develop a new Marxist theory of imperialism beyond 
establishing some starting points. Such a theory would have to encompass, as we 
have seen, the intemational dynamic which relayed the consequences of the 
increasing imperialist orientation of states like Germany or France to other states 
at the end of the nineteenth century. The increasing rivalry between states also 
reinforced the militaristic tendencies within these states which led to the 
increasing subordination of bourgeois to military values. Any historical 
materialist theory that fails to admit the central role of inter-imperialist strategic 
rivalry (and the autonomisation of this geopolitical dynamic once it had been set 
in motion) in the age of imperialism remains one-sided and, in the end, 
irrelevant. Neither in the process of colonial expansion up to 1895-1900, nor in 
the subsequent imperialist struggles for the redivision of the world (and the 
political encagement of parts of the world economy under the leadership of rival 
imperialist powers), can economic motives account for all or even most foreign 
policy decisions.
And yet, imperialism was unequivocally part of the contradictory self­
expansion and the social, political and economic reproduction of capitalism. Its 
origins are to be found in the world economic crisis of 1873-1896, which also 
became a world social and political crisis. Given that the territorial states which 
global capitalism had inherited from the absolutist period were the only available 
political organisations that could assume the role of maintaining capitalist 
property relations and securing (and this meant: expanding) the conditions for 
capital accumulation, it was these territorial states which more and more canie to 
assume centre-place in the process of capitalist development. But in this process 
of crisis management, these states also sought to establish increasing control over 
the global presuppositions and dynamics of capitalism.
On the one hand, this took the form of the development of nation-states. Most 
importantly, this entailed redirecting the loyalty of the workers from a 
transnational class allegiance to the state itself (as well as the shifting of the 
loyalty of other parts of the population from the local to the national level). This 
could not be achieved through nationalistic propaganda alone; legal, political and 
social concessions, which often entailed significant economic costs, were
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necessary. This, in turn, required more control over the economy; nation 
formation also necessitated the creation of national economies. On the other 
hand, for many states the formation of national economies was only part of a 
strategy which aimed at the incorporation of parts of the world economy under 
the sovereign authority of rival nation-states. Especially those states undergoing 
the ‘second industrial revolution’ could not afford (or thought they could not 
afford) to remain dependent on the goodwill of other states for their access to raw 
materials. With respect to finance and credit, too, the political, diplomatic and 
military power proved of great value. The more exclusive the rights that could be 
wrought by governments from the ruling groups of non-European states, the 
more the potential benefits to their own ‘national’ capitals.
Imperialism was itself also directly involved, at least in some countries, in the 
constitution of the nation as the primary form of political community. ‘Social 
imperialism’ is thus central to any comprehensive theory of imperialism.^’ It 
allows us to see, in particular, that the descent into inter-imperialist rivalry was 
intimately bound up with the constitution of ‘hegemony’ within some of the 
crucial imperialist powers, especially through the national and social 
incorporation of the working class. The very attempt of the dominant classes to 
make their authority more stable in the face of social challenges by reconstituting 
this authority on a hegemonic basis had profound consequences for the relations 
between states. For the establishment of hegemony within gave the pursuit of 
‘national interests’ abroad much more importance and allowed for much less 
compromises, whether for ‘material’ or symbolic reasons. Domestic consensus 
formation and inter-imperialist rivalry were thus aspects of the same process. 
Together, they spelled the end of the transnationally integrated British world 
economy. For the workers could only be given a fatherland i f  capital could be 
made to carry the national flag.
The imperial political economies, which sought to internalise partial world 
economies into the boundaries of an imperial state, were at the same time 
symptoms and agents of the demise of the British world economy since the world
57 The role o f social imperialism has been emphasised by Wehler 1970 and 1985 (on 
Germany); Williams 1980 (on the USA); for the relevance o f the concept in the English
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economic crisis. After the first industrial revolution in continental Europe, 
Britain had increasingly shifted its division of labour to the non-European areas. 
With the second industrial revolution, the continental European states followed 
Britain on this path, seeking to recreate a core-periphery relationship with their 
own colonies. But while for the European states this was but one part of their 
economic development strategies, in Britain the ‘retreat into empire’ emerged as 
an ‘alternative’ to the state-sponsored organised capitalism that was a 
precondition for the second industrial revolution.^* Britain, however, did not 
react to the imperialist strategies of its continental rivals by imposing tariffs and 
other forms of exclusion around its colonies. In this respect, even though Britain 
had the largest colonial empire the world had ever seen, the notion of 
imperialism as defined by the classical Marxist theorists of imperialism may be 
much less applicable to Britain than to France and especially Germany. This was 
also suggested by Joseph Schumpeter, whose position is concisely summarised 
by Etherington:
as long as [the British] colonies were not cordoned off by tariff barriers as ‘objects of
exploitation in a sense different from that in which independent countries can be exploited’,
Britain could not be numbered among the aggressive imperialists.^’
This leads us back to the domestic processes which gave rise to imperialist 
strategies of expansion. Schumpeter, of course, pointed to the continuing 
dominance of absolutist ruling classes in explaining why the continental 
European states were so prone to militaristic forms of political and economic 
expansion. Put this way, Schumpeter’s argument is completely overstated. 
However, it is crucial to note that while imperialism was, at heart, a response to 
the global crisis of capitalism, the way in which states reacted to this social and 
economic crisis was indeed strongly shaped by the interests of the post-absolutist 
state elites of continental Europe. These social strata, while having become 
dependent on the growth and expansion of capitalism, nevertheless had interests 
which often conflicted with those of the capitalist bourgeoisie. It was on the
context, see Snyder 1991, ch. 5. For the problems of the concept o f social imperialism, 
see Eley 1976.
58 Hobsbawm 1989 and 1990.
59 Etherington 1984, 155.
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premise of their predominance, moreover, that hegemonic blocs were created in 
the period of nation-state formation and inter-imperialist rivalry.
The classical Marxist theorists of imperialism looked at the ‘new imperialism’ 
from the perspective of its implications for the transition from capitalism to 
socialism. They depicted a situation where capitalism, as a result of its 
‘maturation’, had become ‘overripe’. Its contradictions had become so severe 
that only military expansion could sustain its need for new outlets for goods and 
capital. The state, which had assumed a decisive role in this quest, had itself 
come completely under the sway of finance capital. Looking forward to the final 
breakdovm of capitalism, however, these theorists failed to notice that the new 
imperialism was, in many respects, still part of the transition from absolutism to 
capitalism, even though it already expressed and mediated the contradictions of 
global capitalism. In many respects, the increasing inter-imperialist rivalry was 
thus not the result of monopoly capitalism; imperialism was not a necessary and 
inevitable stage of capitalist development, but a political strategy of specific 
social strata seeking to maintain their privileges in the face of the rapid social, 
political, and economic transformations brought about by capitalism. In this 
sense, imperialism was also an aspect of the ‘European civil war’ which was to 
lead the world into two devastating wars.^°
9.4.5. Conclusions
The decisive development of the period between 1873 and 1914 was the 
replacement of the British world economy by a number of competing imperial 
world economies. This was the result of the role assumed by the territorial state 
in ‘resolving’ the contradictions of capitalism through specific social and spatial 
‘fixes’.^ ' It should be noted, however, that just as the caging of capitalism’s 
global civil society through the nation-state, the nationalisation of the economies 
was only relative. The imperialist states that strove to replace Britain at the apex 
of the intemational system and the world market, as Philip McMichael points 
out, “internalized the conditions of (world) capitalist competition in their
60 Cf. Mayer 1981; Halperin 1997.
61 Cf. Harvey 1982,431-45.
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commercial policy”. Most crucially, they secured the ability of the capitals on 
which they placed increasing “national limits” to reproduce themselves in the 
world market through the adherence to the gold standard. “Thus, in the center of 
world-capitalism in particular, the nation-sXdXQ emerged as the characteristic 
political structure of the world market”.^ ^
In this sense, it would be completely mistaken to understand the efforts of 
states to nationalise capitalist society as an absolute reality rather than as a 
tendency, or even to regard this as feasible within the framework of capitalism. 
Levels of trade and investment between capitalist states remained high and 
colonies never became fully exclusive. It was, in fact, only in the autarkist 
fantasies of the fascist regimes in Germany and Japan some decades later that the 
idea of a (partial) world economy subordinated completely under one state came 
to dominate. The notion of a political and economic ‘GroBraum’ came to express 
the most extreme variant of the perpetual attempts of capitalist states to resolve 
the contradictions between territorial authority and global capitalism.^^ In the 
end, however, it was a completely different model of bridging the national and 
the global that emerged as dominant (or, indeed, hegemonic), based on a system 
of intemational governance under American leadership.
9.5. Pax Americana and the Welfare State
9.5.1. A Re-embedded Economy?
The intemational order established after World War II seems to be that of a 
system of national states and national economies linked together through inter­
national relations. While there is a world market, it appears to be subordinated to 
the control of sovereign states who, by limiting the mobility of capital, gained a 
high level of national autonomy in deciding over their societal development. A 
major reference point in this mythology is the work of Karl Polanyi. '^^
62 McMichael 1987, 193-94.
63 Cf. Diner 1993, 50-54.
64 Polanyi 1957. I argue in Lâcher 1999a that Polanyi has been claimed wrongly for the
social-democratic project o f national welfare capitalism that came to dominate after
1945. Many parts o f the present section are based on this article.
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Towards the end of World War II, Karl Polanyi came to the conclusion that 
‘market society’ had finally run its course. The devastation it had wrought upon 
social life, he argued, had been just too catastrophic for the ‘market utopia’ to 
emerge as dominant once again, as it had after World War I. All the now 
dominant models of social organisation, namely communism, fascism and the 
New Deal, had one thing in common: they rejected the self-regulating market for 
societal self-determination. Polanyi, while not expecting the New Deal to 
represent the final form of an economy embedded in society, certainly took it to 
be a first step in a gradual reassertion of the primacy of cultural and political 
institutions over the market.
But is this what actually came to pass after the end of World War II? 
According to John Ruggie, the postwar period saw indeed a major reorganisation 
of the balance between economic and politics; this balance was institutionalised 
in an intemational system of economic “multilateralism ... predicated upon 
domestic intervention”, which may be termed “embedded liberalism”.^  ^ This 
intemational order sought to reconcile an open world economy with the active 
role of states within their domestic economies, thus reflecting a general reversion 
of the priority formerly accorded to economic concems both domestically and 
intemationally. However, as Ruggie himself points out, “Polanyi’s prediction of 
the end of capitalist intemationalism does not stand up well against the 
subsequent intemationalization of production and flnance”.^  ^ These processes 
took off during the late nineteen-fifties, suggesting a rather gradual contrast 
between the supposedly ‘subservient’ role of finance in the Pax Americana and 
its dominance in the neoliberal period thereafter. The expectation which Polanyi 
associated with the ‘great transformation’ envisaged for the postwar period was 
that
the market system will no longer be self-regulating, even in principle, since it will no longer 
comprise labor, land, and money. To take labor out o f the market means a transformation as 
radical as was the establishment o f the competitive market’
But can it really be maintained that, measured against these criteria (which 
require a complete decommodification of the so-called factors of production), the
65 Ruggie 1982,393.
66 Ruggie 1982, 388.
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economy of postwar western societies underwent a process of re-embedding in 
Polanyi’s sense? Gosta Esping-Andersen has indeed suggested that the essence 
of social policy is the extension of social rights, which have the capacity to 
decommodify labour power by allowing people to sustain their standard of living 
independently of the market. Yet Esping-Andersen himself is quick to note that 
what he calls decommodification “should not be confused with the complete 
eradication of labor as a commodity”, i.e. with “de-proletarianization”. This, 
however, was precisely what Polanyi regarded as central to an economic re- 
embedding.^^ Nowhere was decommodification in this more far-reaching sense 
approached or even attempted, not even in the social-democratic welfare states 
which rank highest on Esping-Andersen’s “de-commodification score”.^ ^
In the period of the dominance of the welfare state, the possibility for 
individuals to temporarily ‘opt out’ of the market, and the capacity of society to 
sustain this partial decommodification of the labour power of individuals, 
remained premised on the operation of the market mechanism, and thus on the 
ability of nationally defined societies to achieve their material reproduction 
through the market. Moreover, this societal reproduction was, as in all phases of 
capitalist modernity, dependent on the ability of individual capitals to compete in 
the world market. This was a capitalist world market - but what kind of capitalist 
world market?
9.5.2. Bretton Woods and the Expansion o f the Commodity Form 
The nature of the world market of the Pax Americana has been the subject of 
countless studies, many of which are built on the assumption that this was an 
inter-national world economy par excellence. There were, indeed, important 
mechanisms that had been designed with the express purpose of insulating, to 
some degree, the national economies of this system from the immediate pressures
67 Polanyi 1957,251 (emphasis added).
68 Polanyi made a strong distinction between societal protectionism, marked by communal
or state that put certain limits on the commodity status o f land, labour and money, and a
re-embedding of the economy, which can only be achieved by taking these ‘factors o f 
production’ out o f the market. This argument is developed in more detail in Lâcher 
1999b.
69 Esping-Andersen 1990, 37 and 47-54.
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of the world market.’® While the expansion of world trade had been a central 
objective of the Bretton Woods order, it was accepted that the stability of the 
world economy presupposed the political and social stability of the state/society 
complexes which ‘made up’ the postwar world political economy. This was seen 
to require the ability of national economies to adjust to changes in comparative 
advantages through (limited) adjustments of the exchange rate. In order to 
prevent speculative assaults on currencies, however, capital mobility was 
severely restricted. These mechanisms, it is argued, constituted a world economy 
integrated by ‘arms-length’ exchange of products manufactured within distinct 
national economies.
Instead of a Polanyian re-embedding of the economy, the world economic 
order constructed after World War II reflected the Keynesian concem of saving 
capitalism from itself. It sought to contain the economic and social contradictions 
of capitalism through a number of mechanisms which transformed the 
relationship between the political and the economic (without transcending their 
fundamental abstraction from each other)” . State interventionism was, more than 
ever before, recognised as a necessary and legitimate instrument in securing the 
social reproduction and profitable accumulation of capital. But whereas the rise 
of organised and welfare capitalism had been a cmcial aspect of the turn to 
imperialist strategies, it was now accompanied by the development of institutions 
of intemational govemance. Their task was the prevention of a retum to 
imperialist competition by allowing for the coordination between capitalist states 
in their attempts to secure the intemational competitiveness of their capitals. To 
some extent, moreover, the world economic institutions also enshrined the right 
of states to shield parts of their national economies from the world market.’^
The reconstitution of the relationship between politics and economics was thus 
part and parcel of a more encompassing transformation in the relationship 
between the territorial state and the world economy. The re-emergence of a 
universalistic world economy was made possible by the mitigation of its sway 
over national economies. The Gold Standard of the late nineteenth and early
70 See, for example, Ruggie 1982; Helieiner 1994a; Kapstein 1994; Cox 1987.
71 Cf. Rupert 1995, 86.
72 Cf. Cox 1987, 220.
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twentieth centuries had allowed for the direct impact of the law of value on each 
national/imperial economy, which could only be lessened by individual states 
through the use of political instruments that led to the particularisation of the 
world economy. The Bretton Woods order, by contrast, provided the political 
preconditions for the increasing force of the law of value over national 
economies by establishing the collective institutions which would allow national 
economies to adjust to its constantly changing commands and demands.
The geopolitical presupposition of this system was the internationalisation of 
the authority of the US. If ever the notion of hegemony had any pertinence in the 
intemational realm, it was in this historical context. Not only did the US accept 
some of the demands of its junior partners, it also played a cmcial role in the 
social, political and economic reconstmction of these state/society complexes. A 
central aspect of this process was the final obliteration of the influence of post­
absolutist mling elites in European societies. From now on, the class conflicts 
which shaped the development of these state/society complexes were indeed 
those between capital and labour. The sphere of the political was now, finally 
subsumed under capital, though the exclusive territoriality of political space 
continued to structure capitalist modernity.
The ability to constmct the relationship between national states and the world 
market on a relatively consensual basis, however, required more than the 
hegemony of one state, but also the transformation of class relations within each 
state. The ‘politics of productivity’, which the US actively promoted, aimed at 
transforming producers into consumers. The postwar reconstmction of ‘social 
order’ was achieved by de-ideologising “issues of political economy into 
questions of output and efficiency”; in this way, the postwar “politics of 
productivity” was thus to “ensure the primacy of economics over politics”.^  ^ It 
sought to shift class stmggles from conflicts over property and sovereignty to 
conflicts over distribution. After the ravages of the first half of the twentieth 
century, stabilisation “meant winning the adherence of a large enough segment of 
the working classes to preserve the scope for private economic power and
73 Maier 1987, 146; cf. Panitch 1987, 134.
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hierarchy that defined liberal c a p i t a l i s m " I n  that respect, postwar 
reconstruction can be seen as a completion of the inter-war stabilisation of 
capitalism through a social bargain, “the increasing satisfaction of material wants 
in retum for a restoration of industrial authority"/^
In this sense, the domestic and intemational limitations placed on the economy 
through the extension of citizenship rights and social policy were accompanied 
by an increasing subordination of all aspects of social life under the exigencies of 
‘the market’. Efficiency and productivity became, more perhaps than ever before, 
the guiding principles not just of action in the economic ‘sphere’, but of the 
organisation of society as a whole. It should be noted that the totalisation of 
capitalism in this particular form was not just a phenomenon of the domestic 
sphere. As Robert Gilpin argues: ‘While solving the problem of a closed 
economy, the welfare state has only transferred the fimdamental problem of the 
market economy and its survivability to the intemational level’. F o r  Gilpin, the 
tensions between the welfare state and capitalism could be limited, for a while, 
because of the US’s willingness to shoulder the burdens of the hegemonic power. 
But Ruggie also notes that a cmcial aspect of the welfare compromise was the 
extemalisation of its costs (in particular, inflation) to other welfare states, but 
also to the Third World.^^
But the postwar order was marked not simply by an extemalisation of the 
problems arising from welfare capitalism; more fundamentally, the partial 
decommodification of labour within these states was accompanied by the global 
expansion of commodity relations. This took the form of an ongoing process of 
‘primitive accumulation’ (i.e. the first level of commodification of labour). As 
Aristide Zolberg suggests, the postwar “expansion of the market system fostered 
the transformation of the outlying regions of Europe into a periphery whose 
growing population was propelled by the processes of the great transformation 
into the national and intemational industrial reserves’’.^ * The reliance on foreign 
labour, to be procured and discarded according to economic rationales, was
74 Maier 1987, 184.
75 Maier 1987, 168.
76 Gilpin 1987, 63.
77 Ruggie 1982, 229f.
78 Zolberg 1991,312.
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fundamental to the operation of welfare capitalism, in its ability to limit 
inflationary tendencies inherent in national economies based on relatively high 
wages/^ Thus he concludes: “The arrangements that arose throughout the OECD 
were predicated on an expansion of the world economy to encompass a vast 
periphery and the subjection of this periphery to the great transformation”.^ ® The 
availability of migrant labour allowed the welfare states of the West to keep in 
check the social rights and economic incomes of workers, by buttressing 
competition between them. It thereby underpinned the ‘social contracts’ which 
turned workers into consumers.
The territorial state, it may be concluded, did indeed play a crucial role in 
organising not just political space, but also the social and economic space of 
capitalist modernity. It did so especially during the century from 1870 to 1970, if 
in very diverse forms in different historical phases. But while the territorial state, 
as nation-state, came to structure economy and society in decisive ways, it never 
fully contained capitalist social relations within its particularistic boundaries. The 
state mediated the contradictions of capitalism in every phase of this 
development. And as capitalism always remained - in a fundamental way -  
global, states continued to face the problem of having to secure the reproduction 
of ‘their’ capitals in a world market in which their authority could not be 
projected without being limited by the sovereignty of other states. We have to 
take account of both these dimensions of capitalist modernity instead of falling 
for the nationalist conceit. Only then can we effectively disentangle ourselves 
from the territorial trap, for we can now see that the methodological territorialism 
of the ‘modem’ social sciences was indeed inadequate even to the period of the 
world-historical dominance of the nation-state.
79 Cf. Dreher 2000, ch. 2.
80 Zolberg 1991, 316; cf. Pellerin 1996.
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES: THE 
DEMISE OF THE TERRITORIAL STATE?
Summary
The starting point for this thesis has been the observation by many critics of 
state-centric IR that an autonomous science of ‘the intemationaT is no longer a 
plausible suggestion. Theorists of IPE, in particular, have suggested that 
‘globalisation’ has led to an increasing blurring of the boundaries between 
politics and economics on the one hand, and domestic and international spheres 
on the other. The new global age is hence seen to require a change from 
international to global studies.
I have argued that this challenge to state-centric IR (and IPE) is, in many 
respects, not far-reaching enough. By accepting that the state was the ‘container’ 
of society prior to the dawn of the global age somewhere around 1973, the critics 
of orthodox IR/IPE fail to recognise the global dimensions of capitalist 
modernity even before this supposed historical breaking point. They thus arrive 
at interpretations of current processes of transformation (and transformations 
there certainly are), which are too simplistic with respect to both the differences 
drawn between the periods of capitalist modernity before and after 1973, and to 
the sources identified as underlying this transformation. What they miss, in short, 
is the existence of a capitalist world society which in some (though changing) 
ways transcends the territorial boundaries of states.
However, there can be no doubt that states were much more than 
epiphenomenal superstructures in the development of capitalism. They were 
certainly not, as world-systems theory posits, subordinate moments of a totality 
determined by the world-economy and international division of labour. As a 
social system, world capitalism is clearly more than the sum of its national parts, 
yet the parts are not merely ‘organs’ of the whole. Conversely, while capitalist 
society has been (and continues to be) identifiably related to states, it was never 
simply encaged by the states of capitalist modernity. The state-centrism of
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mainstream IR and IPE, and Wallerstein’s world-systemic analysis mirror each 
other’s one-sidedness. As conceptualisations of modernity, which prioritise 
different aspects of the same social reality, they are equally problematic. The 
challenge is to develop an approach that avoids their respective limitations.
I have argued that this challenge can best be met within the framework of 
historical materialism, which is able to grasp the character of capital as a global 
social relation -  but only if historical materialism is able to overcome its 
economistic and evolutionistic tendencies. I have sought to show that the attempt 
by Marxists to overcome the base/superstructure model by positing the ‘relative 
autonomy’ of the state (and other social ‘levels’) has led into a cul de sac. In 
trying to overcome the deterministic implications of structural Marxism, the heirs 
to this tradition have increasingly severed the link between structure and 
conjuncture, between capitalism in the abstract and the concrete forms of 
capitalism.
The first generation of post-structural Marxists, especially Aglietta, managed 
to bridge this gap, but only at the price of overt functionalism. The more theorists 
moved away from the original regulationist formulation, the more they began to 
ground the relationship between capitalism and its conjunctures in the 
instrumentalist agency of dominant classes and hegemonic blocs. In the end, in 
the work of Robert W. Cox, the conjuncture has itself become the longue durée, 
the historical structure which serves as the basis for historicisation of social life. 
The transition between, for instance, the Pax Britannica and ‘imperialism’ is thus 
situated at the same historical level (and accorded the same ontological status) as 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The consequence is the inability of 
this approach to account for the fundamental social forms of capitalist modernity 
which span different ‘historical structures’. It directs our attention to the social 
forces which impose specific purposes and functions on given institutions, rather 
than to specify the social relations which constitute the social forms themselves. 
However, these cannot be alternative focal points of historical materialism; both 
dimensions have to be integrated in a viable theory of historical change.
I have suggested that the notion of capitalism as a ‘structured process’ 
provides an alternative starting point for a non-reductionist historical 
materialism. Such an approach would allow us to take account of the historical
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specificity of capitalism as a form of social organisation without assuming that 
capitalism is always essentially the same. The key to the specificity of capitalism 
lies in the way in which surplus is extracted in this form of society. This, in turn, 
enables us to see that the abstract state of capitalist modernity is both part and 
parcel of capitalism and autonomous from the directives of the capitalist class or 
the requirements of the economy. While both class interests and economic needs 
are important factors that influence policy formation, they cannot be accorded a 
priori ontological primacy.
The capitalist state is not, however, simply ‘abstractly political’; it is also an 
organisation that claims political sovereign authority over a territorially delimited 
space. Yet while capitalist sovereignty is distinguished by its abstract nature, the 
question remains why capitalist states are based on exclusive territoriality in the 
first place. If the relations of exploitation under capitalism are inherently 
global(ising), then why are the capitalist relations of domination not 
corresponding in their spatial extension to the capitalist world market and global 
social relations? I have argued that the reasons for this disjuncture are not to be 
found in the nature of capital itself; the territoriality of capitalist political space 
should instead be seen as a historical legacy of the feudal and absolutist 
dynamics of ‘political accumulation’ that preceded capitalism.
What do these arguments imply for the historicisation of the international 
system? Most importantly, the sovereignty or territoriality of the state can no 
longer be understood as the defining hallmark of the ‘modem’ international 
system. Modernity in international relations is, pace Ruggie, underdefined in 
terms of territoriality. We cannot, in other words, attribute a single historical 
dynamic to the international system in the period from 1500 to 2000 (or even just 
1973). In fact, the very notion of ‘modernity’ itself becomes highly problematic 
as social forms which are usually regarded as aspects of a single historical epoch, 
namely ‘modernity’, now appear to have their social roots in very different social 
(property) relations.
This argument clearly contrasts to the widespread notion in historically 
informed scholarship on ‘the international’ that there is an “analogy” between the 
emergence of absolute private property and absolute sovereignty in the absolutist
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period.’ The private property of absolutism was a pre-capitalist form of
politically constituted property, which continued to mediate political forms of
surplus appropriation. Thus, the late fifteenth-century differentiation of external
and internal realms was not accompanied by the separation of politics and 
economics. Only in the nineteenth century did the latter process take place in 
continental Europe. Capitalism thus came to exist in a preconstituted system of 
territorial states. While the capitalist revolution transformed the nature of 
statehood, it reproduced the basic fact of the exclusive territoriality of political 
space. Neither Ruggie’s privileging of territoriality nor the Marxist decoding of 
sovereignty as a specifically capitalist social form are therefore adequate as 
centres of a historical theory of ‘modem international relations’.
Having started from the argument that modernity is fundamentally 
misunderstood if conceptualised as a historical order dominated by and centred 
on territorial states, it appears, at this point in the argument, that the category of 
modernity itself is highly problematic, as it subsumes under one term forms of 
social organisation that are radically dissimilar. Most of what is today designated 
as typically ‘modem’ is in fact an outgrowth of a social order that has vanished 
long ago. R.B.J. Walker appropriately laments the tendency of IR theorists to 
built their understanding of intemational relations on the practices of the early 
modem period while ignoring the fundamental changes in the constitution of the 
intemational system which have taken place since then: “theories of intemational 
relations remain deeply informed by the ontological horizons of early 
modemity”. In particular, the “primacy of space in the cultural and intellectual 
experience of the early modem period” proved decisive in shaping later forms of 
political community, as well as the modes of thought with which we understand 
society as territorially bounded and organised as sovereign spaces.^
Walker adds that sovereignty discourses that take space to be fixed and outside 
of history, identical with itself through time, are becoming increasingly 
problematic:
1 Ruggie 1993; Burch 1994; Ashley 1987; Giddens 1985; and, as something o f a locus
classicus, Anderson 1974.
2 Walker 1993, 10 and 11.
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questions about political identity, and thus about the legitimation of various forms of 
inclusion and exclusions, are no longer adequately answered in the territorial terms we have 
inherited from  early-modern Europe and reproduced so readily in the name o f  state and 
nation?
Unlike most other critics of state-centric IR/IPE, Walker recognises and 
problematises the limitations of the territorial understanding of social life in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Avoiding the ‘nationalist conceit’, he does 
not take the (self-)representations of the nation-state as the sovereign master of 
space as an unproblematic and irreducible fact of the last 200 years. In that way, 
he also a avoids the linear historico-geographical scheme positing a progression 
from the national (and, by corollary, the intemational) to the global - or from 
spatiality to temporality - that underlies much of the globalisation debate.
I have suggested that the solution to the problems of the category of modemity 
may not be found in redefining modemity, but in replacing it with ‘capitalism’. 
This cannot be achieved, however, by simply redesignating all that is commonly 
held to be ‘modem’ as ‘capitalist’. The two categories are incommensurable. 
Neither should they be taken to refer to the same social reality (if from different 
vantage points); nor can capitalism be understood as a sub-set of modemity, 
whether as its ‘economic stmcture’, or as a particular historical variant of 
‘modem society’ alongside others (such as absolutism). But, while according 
place of prominence to ‘capitalism’ as the category best suited to provide the 
bases for the historicisation of contemporary society, I have also noted that this 
presupposes a limitation of the claims made for efficacy of capitalism as a 
constitutive and explanatory concept. In particular, capitalism did not develop 
out of itself the system of territorial states which fragments capitalist world 
society.
Nevertheless, intemational relations during the period of capitalist modemity 
did not simply represent an anachronistic or atavistic principle. On the one hand, 
territoriality was increasingly ‘intemalised’ as the content of territorialised 
authority was transformed and became capitalist territoriality. The intemational 
relations of capitalist modemity came to mediate the emergence and expansion, 
but also the crises and contradictions, of a historical form of society in which
Walker 1993, 21-22 (emphasis added).
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surplus is primarily appropriated privately by ‘economic’ means. But this 
‘internalisation’ of the system of territorial states also entailed, the ‘imbrication’ 
of the interstate form of capitalist political space into the ‘base’ of capitalism. 
The logic of process of capitalist modemity has been socially and spatially 
stmctured decisively through the super-imposition of interstate relations on the 
contradictions of capitalist class society. And while the foreign policies of states 
caught in the transition from absolutism to capitalism increasingly reflected the 
social challenges and economic problems which this process generated, the 
solutions to the problems of capitalist society at specific points of development 
also came to reflect the concerns of states. These concerns were also shaped in 
the process of strategic interaction with other states.
While the ‘anarchy’ of the capitalist intemational system has a character that is 
very different from the anarchical system of absolutism, and while the particular 
capitalist logic of anarchy is itself the product of the contradictory development 
of capitalist modemity, the fact that an anarchical system of states came to 
stmcture capitalism’s real existence in the first place was highly significant for 
the further development of capitalist modemity. In fact, every crisis in global 
capitalism has led to the strengthening of political territoriality; even more 
importantly, perhaps, it has also led to the territorialisation of capitalist world 
society and economy. The inherited territoriality (and thus, from the systemic 
point of view, anarchy) of the intemational system, even in its capitalist form, 
prevented the possibility of state-formation at the global level to ‘deal’ with the 
contradictions of global capitalism. Consequently, as political power became 
increasingly central to the reproduction of capitalist property relations and 
capitalist accumulation, it was national states that organised capitalism. They did 
so, on a particularistic basis, deploying various strategies to subsume the world 
economy (or parts of it) under their independent territorial authority.
The conflicts between these national states, and even the process of their 
consolidation, mediated the expansion and deepening of capitalist social 
relations.W e cannot understand imperialism and the world wars of the first half 
of the twentieth centuries if we abstract from the world-historical and “global
Cf. van der Pijl 1997, 30-36.
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character of this structuring process” whereby states sought to encage social 
relations that inherently transcended boundaries/ Global capital remained the 
presupposition of the nation-state. As a consequence, the dynamics of inter­
national relations between 1873 and 1945 continued to reflect not only the 
contradictions of global capitalism; they expressed, more specifically, the 
contradictions which arose from the attempts by national states to resolve the 
social and economic contradictions of capitalism by strengthening not just the 
power of the state, but also the link between individual and state through the 
construct of the nation, which became the primary source of political identity.^
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, it should be noted, have correctly identified, 
in the Communist Manifesto and elsewhere, the inherent tendency for capital to 
globalise and totalise itself. And yet, when they argued that capital was reshaping 
the world in its own image, they were at least as completely wrong about 
capitalist modemity and its developmental trajectory, as they were absolutely 
right. They failed, in particular, to anticipate how closely conjoined capital and 
the territorial state would become. While Marx and Engels clearly recognised 
that it was British capital that was doing most of the reshaping, they did not grasp 
the implications, which were to become so decisive for European and world 
history: that the image of capital could be painted in rather different (national) 
colours.
This failure may be easily understood in the context of the 1840s, when the 
expansion of capital took place under the auspices of a state that pursued an 
universalistic world market strategy, keeping its own borders, and the boundaries 
of the areas it controlled, open to non-British capital. But it nevertheless 
indicates a profound misunderstanding of the (potential) role of the state, and of 
interstate relations, in capitalist modemity. Marx and Engels simply did not 
understand the extent to which capital’s ‘logic of process’ could become 
transformed, in response to the social and economic crises of global capitalist
5 McMichael 1987, 194.
6 The expansion of citizenship, the construction o f domestic hegemony, and the national
fragmentation of global capital and world society were closely related processes. As
Grew laconically notes, the “states so reconstructed then plunged into World War I as
their citizens cheered, seeking in wartime the social integration the state at peace could 
not provide” ; Grew 1984, 112.
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development, through the utilisation of state power as a resource in world market 
competition. Historically, as we have seen, the nationalising of capital was not so 
much the result of capital using states as their tools. Rather, states, as they 
claimed to pursue the interests of the nation, imposed their colours on individual 
capitals in order to integrate national society and to challenge the British red on 
the map of the world.
Capital did indeed create a world in its own image. But superimposed on the 
canvas of capitalist world society were the frames constructed, in historically 
changing ways, by states and their borders. At least for the 100 years from 1870 
to 1970, the ‘units’ of the world market were not individual capitals, but national 
economies. States were able, to a significant degree, to containerise social 
relations and processes. They were able, in this way, to impose an inter-national 
form on transborder social and economic movements. Yet this intemational 
system was never more than part of the reality of capitalist modemity. Far from 
being a mere appearance that hides a global essence, the representation of the 
world as an agglomeration of national states with their attendant national 
societies and national economies is nevertheless a mystification. At every 
moment of the development of capitalist modemity (a development in which 
states clearly assumed a directing role), states continued to mediate the dynamics 
and contradictions of global capitalism. In any particular conjuncture, moreover, 
states were confronted with the impossibility for capital (as a social relation and 
as a process of accumulation) to be merely national or even intemational.
The dichotomy of ‘the national’ (and its corollary ‘the intemational) and ‘the 
global’ is therefore incapable of serving as the basis for the conceptualisation of 
current processes of social and spatial transformation. Rather than a teleological 
progress from the ideal-type of the national/intemational to the ideal-type of the 
global, the central focus of a historically informed analysis of globalisation 
should be the continuing dialectic of territorializing and globalising tendencies. 
This dialectic, I have argued, arises from the tensions and contradictions inherent 
in the ‘territorial non-coincidence’ of national statehood and global economy, 
which in tum feeds on the contradictions of capitalist class society.
The centre of a historical geography of the intemational system thus has to be 
the political production of space, and of different spatial scales. The national
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State has played, throughout capitalist modemity, a cmcial role in patterning the 
integration and fragmentation of global space. But neither was this state ever a 
container of social relations, nor could the strategies it pursued to produce social 
and spatial ‘fixes’ be understood in abstraction from the problems of the 
economic and social reproduction of capitalist social relations. State-centric 
IR/IPE, in short, was never a viable proposition.
Perspectives
One implication of the argument that I have put forward in this thesis is that 
we misunderstand the current transformation of social relations, and the 
reconstitution of the relation between the spaces of the political and the 
economic, if we conceptualise it in terms of a progression from ‘the national’ to 
‘the global’.
Does this mean that nothing has changed? Certainly not. The relationship 
between state and market has been reorganised, as the functions of states in the 
national and the global economy have been redefined. The boundary between the 
political and the economic has been redrawn, as many dimensions of social life 
have been taken out of the realm of public control and subjected to 
considerations of profitability. Finance has assumed, as a result of decreasing 
restrictions on its mobility, a central role in the capitalist economy, which it did 
not have in the immediate postwar period. There have also been profound 
changes in the organisation of capitalist production over the last quarter-century. 
In many ways, production has indeed become more integrated across borders 
than after 1945 - and perhaps more than at any time since the emergence of a 
capitalist world market.
All this adds up to an important modification in the way in which capitalism 
exists and operates; more specifically, it clearly signals a transformation of the 
socio-spatial organisation of capitalist modemity. But it does not amount to a 
transition from a national/intemational to a global mode of existence of 
capitalism. To be sure, the spatialisation strategies of firms (and not just of the 
huge global corporations among them) are increasingly geared to the formation 
of transnational production chains. World market competition has become the
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necessary point of reference to their economic activity. In some sectors of the 
world economy, the classical notion of a territorial division of labour posited by 
Ricardo seems indeed increasingly inadequate; rather than specialisation on the 
production of goods in which countries have comparative cost advantages, we 
find firms in different countries, producing the same goods and competing with 
each other on the basis of absolute advantages.
It may be argued that this development heralds the transcendence of the 
territorial division of labour by a global social one. It should be noted, however, 
that the intra-sectoral trade first became a hallmark of precisely that world 
economy which serves the globalisation debate as its international counter-point: 
the Pax Americana. John Ruggie argues that states in the postwar period 
promoted a division of labour that would reduce the costs involved in 
adjustments to changes in comparative advantages that could undermine the 
competitiveness of whole economic sectors. In order to shield the national 
economy, and in order to prevent social instability, they promoted competition 
within economic sectors, as this would not entail lower adjustment costs.
The result was that economic transactions were increasingly concentrated 
between the industrialised countries of North America, western Europe, and 
Japan; this triadisation remains a central feature of today’s world economy. It 
also led to decreasing specialisation between countries and rising intra-firm 
trade. As Ruggie concludes, the postwar division of labour entailed a “critical 
shift in functional differentiation from  the level of country and sector to the level 
of product and firm”.^  Robert W. Cox, moreover, notes that a transnational 
economy of global production was gradually supplanting the intemational 
economy of trade already since 1945.*
But is the implication of these arguments merely that a more gradual transition 
process from the national/intemational to the global should be assumed than 
most contributions to the globalisation debate are willing to accept? This would 
modify the notion of a progression to the global rather than to replace it with a 
focus on the dialectic of territorialisation and globalisation. The latter approach, 
by contrast, starts from the recognition that no phase of capitalist modemity has
Ruggie 1982, 399-401; Ruggie draws heavily on Cooper 1980.
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ever been purely ‘international’, but combined national, intemational and global 
(as well as local, urban, and regional) scales. We cannot, however, leave things at 
that and conclude that capitalism in the current phase is just the same as 
capitalism in any other phase, a mix of scales. The cmcial question is how these 
scales are related to each other in specific historical conjunctures.
The production of space, and of the nexus of spatial scales, I have sought to 
show in the preceding chapter, is a social process in which territorial states have 
historically played a crucial role. The intrinsic globalising tendency of capital has 
always formed the context in which states deployed their spatialisation strategies, 
and it has also tended to undermine any particular ‘spatial fix’. However, states 
never just codified the prevailing world market strategies of firms, nor did they 
simply execute the global interests of ‘their’ capitalist classes. States constitute 
social spaces, creating a specific nexus between territorially based political 
authority and the different scales of accumulation, from the local to the global. 
They thereby shape and limit the spatialisation strategies of firms and classes.
If one thing is clear from the history of capitalist modemity over the last two 
centuries, it is that the role and function of the territorial state cannot be ‘read 
o ff the dominant forms of capital and its prevalent form of world market 
movement. The cmcial difference between imperialism and the current phase of 
capitalism, for instance, is not to be found in the ‘fact’ that today foreign direct 
investment has replaced portfolio investment and trade as the basis for world 
economic integration. Much of liberal and Marxist globalisation theory relies, 
however, on the representation of economic development (linked to arguments 
about technological progress) as an ‘independent variable’ that is supposed to 
explain changes in the forms and functions of states, without itself requiring 
much explanation.
In historical materialist versions, the rise of the transnational corporation, 
which organises globally integrated production, accounts for the dissolution of 
the close link between nation-state and capital. The ‘intemationalised state’ is 
one that no longer represents its ‘national capital’, but all the capitals active 
within its boundaries. In this way, a global capitalist class, which is no longer
8 Cox 1987, 244.
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defined by the territorially fragmented character of political authority, emerges, 
and with it a global class interest/ This argument also underlies the neo- 
Gramscian perspective. As Cox notes, while classes have so far existed within 
“nationally defined social formations”, the result of the emerging global 
production structure is that “it becomes increasingly pertinent to think in terms of 
a global class structure alongside or superimposed upon national class 
structures”. What is more, the globally organised capitalist class is dominated by 
‘finance capital’, which now no longer rules through the nation-state, but instead 
generates a “network of control and private planning for the world economy of 
intemational production” that “performs the function of Lenin’s collective 
capitalist in the conditions of late-twentieth-century production relations”.’®
William Robinson takes this approach to its conclusion by arguing that 
“economic globalization has its counterpart in transnational class formation and 
in the emergence of a transnational state (...) which has been brought into 
existence to function as the collective authority for a global mling class”.” For 
Robinson, this argument expresses the essential difference between a Marxist 
and a Weberian understanding of globalisation. Whereas the latter can posit a 
disjuncture of political and economic stmctures, as each sphere follows its 
autonomous logic, Marxism, according to Robinson, suggests that when 
capitalist class relations become global, the state cannot but become global, too, 
as the capitalist state is nothing but the institutionalised political form of the 
capital relation.’^
It is precisely this logic that has been challenged in this thesis. The fact that the 
capitalist state has, so far at least, taken the form of a territorial state wielding 
exclusive political sovereignty does not derive from the independently given 
intemational form of world market integration. Capitalist statehood has been 
based on territorial sovereignty not because capital, in its early stages of self- 
realisation, required a national state, but because of the historical préfiguration of 
capitalist modemity by precapitalist forms of territoriality. That capital’s world 
market movement was, for most of its history, predominantly (though far from
9 Cf. Radice 1984, 116.
10 Cox 1996b, 110-111.
11 Robinson 1999, 2.
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exclusively) based on intemational forms of intercourse (i.e. trade rather than 
foreign direct investment) was itself also the result of the agency of states 
seeking to territorialise socio-economic processes in order to contain the 
contradictions of capitalism.
If such is indeed the case, then we have to start analysing contemporary 
processes of ‘globalisation’ in rather different terms. To begin with, the 
teleological notion of globalisation has to give way to a concept of socio-spatial 
restructuring that does not presuppose the necessary obliteration of territorial 
statehood and the creation of a seamless global space regulated by global forms 
of political authority. This allows us to appreciate the increasing integration of 
finance and transnational production (at least in some sectors), without losing 
sight of the cmcial role of territorial states in the new world economic order. 
Instead of taking ‘globalisation’ to be an irreducible economic process with 
certain political consequences, some scholars have pointed out that states were 
actively involved in the mobilisation of capital during the 1970s and 1980s. This 
role of states does not begin with the constmction of hegemonic blocs to secure 
the stability of an autonomously emerging global regime of accumulation. States 
constituted transnational spaces and thus promoted transnational strategies of 
economic actors.'^ This form of agency, rather than aiming at the creation of 
global consensus, was often part of a competitive strategy designed to enhance 
the competitive advantages of firms originating from within particular states.’'^  
Though some of these arguments are overstated, they nevertheless indicate the 
direction that future research needs to take: to analyse ‘globalisation’ as a 
political process.
Research on the current processes of socio-spatial restmcturing can thus not 
limit itself to asking about the consequences of ‘globalisation’; it has to begin by 
asking how and why transnational forms of economic intercourse were promoted 
by (specific) states. That does not make the question regarding the consequences 
of global economic integration redundant; the Realist argument that national 
states are the unchallenged masters of the ‘global economy’ as they created it, is
12 Robinson 1999, 5-6.
13 On the construction o f ‘global finance’, see Helleiner 1994b.
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equally misleading as the suggestion by some Marxists that ‘globalisation’ 
cannot lead to the demise of the sovereign state, as capitalism cannot exist 
without a state. As I have pointed out in chapter 5, this argument suffers from the 
equation of ‘the capitalist state’ with the territorial state that has characterised 
capitalism’s history so far. Indeed, I have argued that the form of statehood that 
corresponds to the concept of capital is the ‘global state’; the contradictions that 
arise out of the ‘territorial non-coincidence’ of state and world market have been 
the main concern of the final chapters of this thesis.
From this perspective, it is clear that the globalising tendency of production 
and finance, incomplete as it is, must lead to a sharpening of these 
contradictions, even if it was itself originally a state-sponsored development. The 
globalisation literature recognises the increasing gap between global 
accumulation and the regulation and governance of the world economy. But it 
takes for granted that, this time around, the historical process will lead to the 
strengthening of global governance rather than to the reversion to some form of 
inter-imperialist rivalry. Along with the exhaustion of Enlightenment thought, it 
might be argued, there is now a definite collapse of the efficacy of exclusive 
territoriality in structuring capitalism, which goes hand in hand with a process of 
global state-formation.
This process, according to Robinson, does not imply that national states 
disappear; far from it, as global capital requires the differences between national 
legislations to play off against each gther. But beyond the destruction of the 
autonomy of the national state, there is also a transfer of ultimate decision­
making authority to supranational institutions.'^ Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri similarly note: “Government and politics come to be completely integrated 
into the system of transnational command. Controls are articulated through a 
series of intemational bodies and functions”.'  ^ This development can best be 
grasped, they argue, in terms of the emergence of a new form of state, a ‘global 
empire’, which is as different from the nation-state as it is from the particularistic 
and rival empires of the late-nineteenth century. Moreover, it is only with the
14 On the role o f the USA in creating a ‘global’ economy as part o f its attempt to
undermine trade competition from Europe and Japan, see Gowan 1999, ch. 3.
15 Robinson 1996, 18-20.
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process of global state-formation corresponding to the globalisation of 
production that a Marxist theory of the state becomes possible; for only when 
nation-states decline and “the state and capital effectively coincide” do we find 
the “full realization of the relationship between the state and capital”. Capital and 
labour now confront each other without the mediation of national frontiers and 
national state apparatuses.'^
The possibility of global state-formation cannot be precluded, then, by 
reference to the need for states in capitalism; if anything the globalising tendency 
of capital would make a corresponding process of political integration necessary. 
Only such a global state could sustain global capital through crises and 
contradictions. Only a global state could secure the social and economic 
reproduction of global capital. But while a global state is an essential 
requirement for the successful continuation of capitalist globalisation, the point 
of this thesis was to show that it cannot be presumed that such a process will 
indeed take place.
While there are, indeed, discernible movements towards global state- 
formation, there are equally strong movements towards political fragmentation. 
True, the institutions of global governance have taken over increasing state 
functions, supported by the organisations of consensus formation. But, as E.A. 
Brett correctly notes, that “is not to say ... that this structure is capable of 
performing the functions required of it if the stable evolution of the system over 
the long term is to be guaranteed”. Brett argues that while increasing economic 
integration has indeed, as most globalisation theorists posit, undermined the 
efficacy of the national state in the social and economic reproduction of capital, 
there is no effective global political structure that could take over the role of the 
nation-state.'^
It may be, then, that territorial statehood, while not originating within 
capitalism, has become so entrenched that it is all but impossible to move
16 Hardt and Negri 2000, 307.
17 Hardt and Negri 2000, 236. More positively, it might be argued, there is the potential for
the emergence o f a more inclusive form o f political community, in which national states 
no longer define citizenship by excluding most o f the world’s population; cf. Linklater 
1998,216-218.
18 Brett 1985, 22-23.
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towards a form of state that corresponds to capital’s globalising dynamic. The 
very fact of intemational anarchy, despite its transformations not only with the 
emergence of capitalist relations of sovereignty, but also with the subsumption 
under capital of the relations of domination within nation-states after 1945, 
prevents the possibility for a state form adequate to capital’s global existence to 
emerge. This does not imply a return to Realism or even to the ‘anarchy 
problématique’ in the orthodox sense; what distinguished the approach presented 
here is precisely the recognition of the contradictions between national statehood 
and capital’s global dynamic, which is totally absent from the Realist framework. 
Having been reproduced in the transition to capitalism, territorial statehood may 
not be so easy to get rid off. As Ellen Meiksins Wood suggests: “The inevitable 
uneven development of separate, if inter-related, national entities has virtually 
guaranteed the persistence of national forms’’.*^
If this is the case, we would do well to analyse current processes of socio- 
spatial transformation from the perspective of the continuing dialectic of 
territorialisation and globalisation, rather than from the expectation that the 
globalising tendency is about to obliterate the territorializing one. We have to 
focus on the contradictions inherent in the further totalisation and 
universalisation of capital, and to ask in what way the dynamics and 
contradictions of global capitalism may be shaped by states, which still find 
themselves in a relationship of political and economic competition with each 
other. From this perspective, the question that has to be asked about our current 
period is not only in what way global economic integration is undermining the 
state, but also in what way the continuing territoriality of capitalist political space 
is undermining the possibility for globally integrated production and finance. 
Even today, as Istvan Mészâros notes, is the globalising urge of capital limited by 
the fact that the
vital configuration of ... ‘global capital’ is to the present day totally devoid o f its proper 
state formation. This is what sharply contradicts the intrinsic determination o f the system 
itself as inexorably global and unrestrainable. Thus the missing ‘state o f the capital system’ 
as such demonstrates capital’s inability to carry the objective logic of the system’s 
unrestrainability to its ultimate conclusion. It is this circumstance that must put the sanguine 
expectations o f ‘globalization’ under the shadow o f grievous failure, without removing,
19 Wood 1999b, 8.
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however, the problem itself -  namely the necessity of a truly global integration o f humanity’s
reproductive interchanges.^^
Thus, the notion of an irresistible and irreversible process of economic 
globalisation in an age in which capital has become all-powerful and reduces 
states to mere transmission belts is incomplete and one-sided. Capital, even in 
the form of the transnational corporation, retains its links to particular states and 
territories.^’ States, on the other hand, continue to provide political support in the 
world-economic competition between capitals. If states so far seem content to 
fulfil the requirements of the capitals they seek to localise within their 
boundaries, it is nevertheless the task of critical IR/IPE theory to point to the 
potentials for conflict and geo-political and geo-economic competition between 
these states. Such competition may not centre around the national economy; the 
strong regional structures of the ‘global’ world economy may provide an 
alternative focal point for the competition and spatialisation strategies of states if 
the contradictions of capitalism once again threaten the economic and social 
survival of capital, and thus of the state(s) built on this foundation.
It may be the end of the nation-state form of capitalist territoriality that we are 
witnessing today. The containerisation of social relations and economic 
processes that nation-states attempted (with incomplete success) does indeed 
seem to be a thing of the past, as the capacity of states to regulate their ‘national 
economies’ deteriorates. However, the inherited territoriality of capitalist 
political space, of which the nation-state was one particular expression, appears 
altogether more resilient and unlikely to be completely subsumed under the 
capital relation. In this sense, it may be to early yet to embrace, as so many 
liberals and Marxists enthusiastically if sometimes unconsciously do, the 
economic determinism and evolutionism of the Communist Manifesto. There is 
more that is wrong with this historical document than its being a little precipitous 
(by about 150 years).
20 Mészâros 1998, 35.
21 Cf. Pauly and Reich 1997.
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